# WAR UPDATE: Military Insider Gives Terrifying Prediction & Reveals How Unprepared America Truly Is

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a8D31JnlW-Y
Translation: ru

[00:04] Mr. Jeremy, thank you very much for doing this.
  Мистер Джереми, большое спасибо за это.

[00:08] So, in the United States, I think most people to the extent they're paying attention are watching what's happening in Iran and have a sense that what's happening between Russia and NATO, Ukraine, United States, the festering war in Eastern Europe is kind of a stalemate and nothing really is happening there.
  Итак, в Соединенных Штатах, я думаю, большинство людей, насколько они обращают внимание, следят за тем, что происходит в Иране, и имеют ощущение, что происходящее между Россией и НАТО, Украиной, Соединенными Штатами, затяжная война в Восточной Европе — это своего рода тупик, и там на самом деле ничего не происходит.

[00:27] I don't know if that's true.
  Я не знаю, правда ли это.

[00:30] Assess what you think is happening between Russia and Ukraine and its proxies right now.
  Оцените, что, по вашему мнению, происходит сейчас между Россией и Украиной и их прокси.

[00:35] Yeah, I I think you're right.
  Да, я думаю, вы правы.

[00:36] I don't think it is true, Tucker.
  Я не думаю, что это правда, Такер.

[00:38] I think that the the general sense in the West is that you'll hear it from some people that uh Russia's losing on the battlefield and that the Russian economy is about to fall apart.
  Я думаю, что общее ощущение на Западе таково, что вы услышите от некоторых людей, что Россия проигрывает на поле боя и что российская экономика вот-вот развалится.

[00:49] I mean, I've heard it time and time again and there's no evidence to support either of those things.
  Я имею в виду, я слышал это снова и снова, и нет никаких доказательств, подтверждающих ни одно из этих утверждений.

[00:57] The um the the the battlefield issue is poorly understood and I think and the reason is that people don't understand Russia's motivations and they don't understand what the strategy is.
  Вопрос поля боя плохо понимается, и я думаю, причина в том, что люди не понимают мотивации России и не понимают, в чем заключается стратегия.

[01:05] Um, in an article I wrote recently on the coming war with Russia, I said that Claus, who was the great political philosopher of war, said that the most important decision that a military man and a and a politician can make is to understand the nature of the war.
  Хм, в статье, которую я недавно написал о предстоящей войне с Россией, я сказал, что Клаузевиц, который был великим политическим философом войны, сказал, что самое важное решение, которое может принять военный и политик, — это понять природу войны.

[01:21] And I don't think that the West has understood the nature of the war with Russia, nor for that matter with Iran.
  И я не думаю, что Запад понял природу войны с Россией, да и с Ираном тоже.

[01:27] What what they haven't understood with Russia is that um this is as far as Russia is concerned is an existential war.
  Чего они не поняли в отношении России, так это того, что, насколько это касается России, это экзистенциальная война.

[01:34] You know, they are fighting to to make sure that Russia is preserved.
  Знаете, они сражаются, чтобы обеспечить сохранение России.

[01:38] And when you get people like Kayakalis saying that Russia must be broken up, who who can blame them?
  И когда такие люди, как Каякалис, говорят, что Россия должна быть раздроблена, кто может их винить?

[01:45] I think had we understood that, I think that would be a start.
  Я думаю, если бы мы это поняли, это было бы началом.

[01:47] Unfortunately, we're we're approaching the war, it seems to me, is a negotiation, a negotiation with arms.
  К сожалению, мы подходим к войне, как мне кажется, как к переговорам, переговорам с оружием.

[01:53] You know, if we increase a bit of pressure on Russia, then they'll eventually come back to the um negotiating table.
  Знаете, если мы немного усилим давление на Россию, то они в конце концов вернутся за стол переговоров.

[02:01] What what they've missed though is that Russia I think has a clear strategy and I can't I can't be
  Чего они, однако, не заметили, так это того, что у России, я думаю, есть четкая стратегия, и я не могу, я не могу быть

[02:07] Sure about it.
  Уверен в этом.

[02:08] I'm not in the Russian general staff but I think it's got about five um key phases.
  Я не вхожу в российский генеральный штаб, но думаю, что у него есть около пяти ключевых этапов.

[02:14] I mean, we know that the run-up to the uh special military operation Tucker was um it was clear that there were so many warnings going back as far as 1996.
  То есть мы знаем, что подготовка к специальной военной операции, Такер, была — было ясно, что было так много предупреждений, начиная с 1996 года.

[02:24] And yet, unfortunately, we've we've uh ignored them all.
  И всё же, к сожалению, мы их все проигнорировали.

[02:28] Notwithstanding the warnings not only came from Russia, but from of our some of our very best strategic thinkers, from George Keenan back as far as 1996 and from John Mshimer uh in 2014.
  Несмотря на то, что предупреждения поступали не только из России, но и от некоторых из наших лучших стратегических мыслителей, от Джорджа Кинана еще в 1996 году и от Джона Миршаймера в 2014 году.

[02:39] But when you get to the start of the war um then it seemed to me as the war kicked off and I have to say I did not see the war coming.
  Но когда доходишь до начала войны, то мне показалось, когда война началась, и я должен сказать, я не предвидел войны.

[02:46] I was uh involved in the offshore energy sector.
  Я был вовлечен в офшорный энергетический сектор.

[02:48] But as I got to understand it then the first thing that became obvious to me that this was not a war to or a special military operation to invade Ukraine.
  Но когда я начал это понимать, первое, что стало мне очевидно, — это была не война или специальная военная операция для вторжения в Украину.

[02:58] And the answer the reason was simpler.
  И ответ, причина была проще.

[03:00] There weren't enough troops.
  Было недостаточно войск.

[03:01] You know Ukraine is about the size of half of Europe and you're not going to do that with 190,000 troops.
  Знаете, Украина примерно размером с половину Европы, и вы не сделаете это с 190 000 солдат.

[03:05] I cannot for a
  Я не могу для

[03:07] Moment think that the Russian general staff advised Putin that they had enough troops to invade Ukraine.
  Момент, когда думают, что российский генеральный штаб посоветовал Путину, что у них достаточно войск для вторжения в Украину.

[03:13] This was always about the Donbas and I think the first phase of the strategy was really the use of military force to support a diplomatic engagement and indeed that diplomatic engagement actually went quite well.
  Это всегда было связано с Донбассом, и я думаю, что первая фаза стратегии на самом деле заключалась в использовании военной силы для поддержки дипломатического взаимодействия, и действительно, это дипломатическое взаимодействие прошло довольно хорошо.

[03:27] The Russians had open negotiations with the um Ukrainians after day one.
  Русские вели открытые переговоры с украинцами после первого дня.

[03:31] Uh and you know as as we arrived in March then there was ready to they were ready to sign as both sides were um an agreement which would have have stopped the war it was no NATO um neutrality for Ukraine um self-determination for the Donbass but that was ready to sign and it would have been signed I'm almost certain if it hadn't been for Boris Johnson uh no doubt with Biden's support actually going across and persuading Zalinski to to um fight Russia and that he would have all the support he needed.
  И, знаете, когда мы прибыли в марте, тогда они были готовы подписать, обе стороны были готовы подписать соглашение, которое остановило бы войну: это был отказ от НАТО, нейтралитет для Украины, самоопределение для Донбасса, но оно было готово к подписанию, и оно было бы подписано, я почти уверен, если бы не Борис Джонсон, без сомнения, при поддержке Байдена, который фактически поехал и убедил Зеленского бороться с Россией и что у него будет вся необходимая поддержка.

[04:06] So that's phase one.
  Так что это первая фаза.

[04:06] I think at phase two
  Я думаю, на второй фазе

[04:09] When it becomes clear to Russia that they are in a going to have to fight um and are likely to have to fight NATO because of what they're hearing, what you then see is uh what I would call militarily a a withdrawing contact.
  Когда России становится ясно, что им придётся воевать и, вероятно, воевать с НАТО из-за того, что они слышат, то вы видите то, что я бы назвал военным отходом.

[04:24] So essentially what the Russians were doing were recognizing that actually the Kiev um attack and and the actions in the Donbass uh were although diplomatic they would now need to withdraw to a line and what they did was they withdrew back to what's known as Sarcan line which was a defensive line um instructed by the general who was the expert in Russia in defensive lines and uh that from about September onwards they then moved into three phase three after the withdrawal which is what I call attritional defense and what that essentially means was meeting their two objectives their objectives were denazification and demilitarization both of which were were operational objectives and the strategic objective.
  По сути, русские осознавали, что на самом деле атака на Киев и действия в Донбассе, хотя и были дипломатическими, теперь потребуют отхода на линию, и они отошли к так называемой линии Саркана, оборонительной линии, построенной генералом, который был экспертом в России по оборонительным линиям, и примерно с сентября они перешли к третьей фазе после отхода, которую я называю изнурительной обороной, и это по сути означало достижение двух целей: денацификации и демилитаризации, обе из которых были оперативными целями, и стратегической цели.

[05:11] though tuck it was clear it was to preserve Russia's security
  хотя, черт возьми, было ясно, что это для сохранения безопасности России

[05:16] and what offensive what defensive attrition means is is wearing down the men and material of the Ukrainian army
  и что означает наступательное, что оборонительное истощение — это изматывание личного состава и техники украинской армии

[05:23] and goodness me.
  и боже мой.

[05:25] We helped them a lot in that cuz we persuaded them to to expend not one army but two armies against that defensive line for not a single penetration.
  Мы им в этом очень помогли, потому что убедили их потратить не одну армию, а две армии на ту оборонительную линию без единого прорыва.

[05:33] So you get to uh leaked 2023 and at that stage I think what Russia does is they've [snorts] uh started to they uh as the war got going they started to mobilize uh and increase the forces they need the industrial capacity and so by late 2023 they're ready to move into phase three.
  Итак, мы доходим до э-э утекшего 2023 года, и на этом этапе, я думаю, Россия делает следующее: они [фыркает] э-э начали, они э-э, по мере развития войны, начали мобилизацию э-э и наращивание сил, им нужны промышленные мощности, и так к концу 2023 года они готовы перейти к третьей фазе.

[05:53] Phase three was what I call offensive attrition.
  Третья фаза — это то, что я называю наступательным истощением.

[05:57] Not necessarily securing territory, but really going on and starting to continue um wearing down the men and material of the Ukrainian army.
  Не обязательно захват территории, а действительно продолжение и начало, гм, изматывания личного состава и техники украинской армии.

[06:07] Don't forget the Ukrainian army had no uh air superiority, none of the things that you want fighting a an offensive or indeed a
  Не забывайте, у украинской армии не было э-э превосходства в воздухе, ничего из того, что нужно для ведения наступления или, в самом деле,

[06:13] Defensive war.
  Оборонительная война.

[06:16] And moving slowly forward.
  И медленное продвижение вперёд.

[06:19] Um, I think as well they were probably starting to clarify what it would be their ultimate objectives.
  Хм, я также думаю, что они, вероятно, начинали прояснять, каковы будут их конечные цели.

[06:24] And I remember saying I think to Danny Davis about a year and a half ago I [clears throat] thought their minimalist objectives would be to secure the Donbass and the four eastern oblasts Crimea and their maximum objectives might be to go further might be to go to secure the whole of Novaria which is the Adessa and the next four of the west um.
  И я помню, как говорил, кажется, Дэнни Дэвису около полутора лет назад, я [прочищает горло] думал, что их минимальные цели заключались бы в том, чтобы закрепиться в Донбассе и четырёх восточных областях, Крыму, а их максимальные цели могли бы заключаться в том, чтобы пойти дальше, возможно, закрепиться во всей Новороссии, то есть Одессе и следующих четырёх на западе, хм.

[06:43] I wasn't sure which way they would go but I've heard Putin say quite recently that actually he's talking about not Russia and the logic behind that is about security.
  Я не был уверен, в каком направлении они пойдут, но я слышал, как Путин совсем недавно говорил, что на самом деле он говорит не о России, и логика этого связана с безопасностью.

[06:54] It's about establishing [clears throat] what they believe to be a secure buffer protecting the Russian people within it and the question really is how long it takes them to get there if indeed they keep going in that way.
  Речь идёт о создании [прочищает горло] того, что они считают безопасным буфером, защищающим русских людей внутри него, и вопрос на самом деле в том, сколько времени им потребуется, чтобы добраться туда, если они действительно продолжат двигаться в этом направлении.

[07:05] So I think when you start to understand that then all of the stuff that we've heard well the Russians are going slowly it misses the objective it misses what they're trying to achieve and when you understand what they're doing what I
  Поэтому я думаю, когда вы начинаете это понимать, тогда всё, что мы слышали, — ну, русские продвигаются медленно, — упускает цель, упускает то, чего они пытаются достичь, и когда вы понимаете, что они делают, что я...

[07:14] Think is a clear strategy then I think what that does is to actually help you work out what they're doing why they're doing why they're doing it and how the west should be thinking because at the moment we sort of see on the one hand Russian army is not doing very well it's not securing much much territory that's not true it's actually increasing it's been securing territory for at least the last 30 or so months.
  Думаю, это четкая стратегия, и тогда я считаю, что это на самом деле помогает вам понять, что они делают, почему они это делают и как Запад должен мыслить, потому что сейчас мы вроде как видим, с одной стороны, российская армия действует не очень хорошо, она не захватывает много территории — это неправда, на самом деле она увеличивает, она захватывает территорию уже как минимум последние 30 с лишним месяцев.

[07:37] But they're not securing they weren't securing territory initially to simply to secure the territory.
  Но они не захватывали, они не захватывали территорию изначально просто для того, чтобы захватить территорию.

[07:43] They were doing it to actually to wear down and attract the um the Ukrainian army with a high degree of success as we know from the casualties.
  Они делали это, чтобы на самом деле измотать и привлечь украинскую армию с высокой степенью успеха, как мы знаем из потерь.

[07:52] So I think when you when you get that topic, I think it's much easier to understand what they're doing and where they're heading.
  Так что я думаю, когда вы поднимаете эту тему, становится гораздо легче понять, что они делают и куда направляются.

[07:56] Well, having life insurance is one of those things that helps you sleep better at night.
  Ну, наличие страховки жизни — это одна из тех вещей, которые помогают вам лучше спать по ночам.

[08:01] If something were to happen to you, what exactly would happen to your loved ones, your children?
  Если бы с вами что-то случилось, что именно произошло бы с вашими близкими, вашими детьми?

[08:05] We've heard so many stories of families losing a parent and having their life insurance policy save their financial lives.
  Мы слышали так много историй о семьях, которые теряли родителя, и их полис страхования жизни спасал их финансовое положение.

[08:10] That's the whole point of it.
  В этом и заключается весь смысл.

[08:12] It makes all the difference in the world.
  Это имеет огромное значение.

[08:14] The next question becomes, well, how do I
  Следующий вопрос становится: ну, как мне

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  Получить страховку жизни?

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  Вот где появляется Ethos, компания, с которой мы гордимся сотрудничать.

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  Ethos делает получение плана страхования жизни быстрым, легким и на 100% онлайн.

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  Люди не оформляют его, потому что это хлопотно и дорого.

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  Это решает эту проблему.

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  Вы получаете предложение за секунды.

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  Подайте заявку за минуты и получите покрытие в тот же день.

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  Медицинского осмотра нет.

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  Вы просто отвечаете на несколько простых вопросов о здоровье.

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  Затем вы можете получить покрытие до 3 миллионов долларов.

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  Некоторые полисы от 30 долларов в месяц.

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  Чтобы получить покрытие, требуется около 10 минут.

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  Ставки и, очевидно, время подачи заявок могут варьироваться, но это отлично.

[08:55] That has always made sense to me.
  Это всегда имело для меня смысл.

[08:58] If foreign leaders gave speeches calling for the break up of the United States, I would of course do everything I could to support the defense of the United States.
  Если бы иностранные лидеры произносили речи, призывающие к распаду Соединенных Штатов, я бы, конечно, сделал все возможное, чтобы поддержать защиту Соединенных Штатов.

[09:08] Um, I would see that as existential.
  Я бы воспринял это как экзистенциальную угрозу.

[09:09] If someone said, "We're going to break up the UK," you'd probably take up arms in its defense.
  Если бы кто-то сказал: «Мы собираемся разделить Великобританию», вы, вероятно, взялись бы за оружие для ее защиты.

[09:13] Of course.
  Конечно.

[09:13] So, um, I've understood that since the
  Итак, я понял это с тех пор, как

[09:16] First day.
  Первый день.

[09:19] What I have never understood is the West's motive.
  Что я никогда не понимал, так это мотив Запада.

[09:22] Why would the United States and its whatever you call them but its partners in NATO uh give this kind why would they want a war with Russia and a war that has hurt them like what is the motive there?
  Почему Соединённые Штаты и их, как бы их ни называли, но их партнёры по НАТО, э-э, дают такое — почему они хотят войны с Россией, войны, которая навредила им, — в чём тут мотив?

[09:37] Um it's a really really good question and um I have said for quite a long time now that the Russian uh operations are being guided by a military strategy and the western operations are being guided by a political narrative and with um objectives that that change quite a lot.
  Эм, это действительно очень хороший вопрос, и эм, я уже довольно давно говорю, что российские э-э операции руководствуются военной стратегией, а западные операции руководствуются политическим нарративом и эм целями, которые довольно сильно меняются.

[09:55] I think the initial objective and it depends uh which um particular party on the NATO side you're talking to but the initial objectives were uh possibly to break up Russia.
  Я думаю, первоначальная цель — и это зависит от того, э-э, с какой именно стороной в НАТО вы говорите — но первоначальные цели были, э-э, возможно, развалить Россию.

[10:07] There's a very interesting rand study written in 2018 I think it is which is called extending Russia.
  Есть очень интересное исследование RAND, написанное, кажется, в 2018 году, которое называется «Расширение России».

[10:15] Um the um Russian intelligence chief budov actually um in a on YouTube
  Эм, эм, начальник российской разведки Будов, эм, на YouTube.

[10:19] Um video which is on YouTube talked about the need to actually have a war with Russia to actually help them get into NATO.
  Эм, видео на YouTube говорило о необходимости фактически начать войну с Россией, чтобы помочь им вступить в НАТО.

[10:27] I think there's also what I would call um lag in thinking because a lot of the um the uh um people who were proposing the extension the expansion of NATO without um thinking through the consequences did not anticipate this.
  Я думаю, есть также то, что я бы назвал эм отставанием в мышлении, потому что многие из эм тех, кто предлагал расширение НАТО без эм обдумывания последствий, не предвидели этого.

[10:43] I'm certain they didn't anticipate it because they weren't ready.
  Я уверен, они не предвидели этого, потому что не были готовы.

[10:48] Um you know another great failure of NATO I'm afraid to say they were not ready for the war.
  Эм, знаете, еще один большой провал НАТО, боюсь сказать, они не были готовы к войне.

[10:52] I mean if they had had thought it through and said that if we keep doing this then Russia will um respond then actually they would either have made uh defensive preparations or they wouldn't have done it.
  Я имею в виду, если бы они обдумали это и сказали, что если мы продолжим так делать, то Россия эм ответит, тогда на самом деле они либо сделали бы оборонительные приготовления, либо не стали бы этого делать.

[11:04] So I think we can say with a high degree of certainty that they they did not think it through.
  Так что я думаю, мы можем с высокой степенью уверенности сказать, что они не продумали это.

[11:09] So I think there's some lag in there.
  Так что я думаю, здесь есть некоторое отставание.

[11:11] And I think there's also I'm afraid to say and I think this is probably more European than um than than United States although you will know better than the United States.
  И я думаю, есть также, боюсь сказать, и я думаю, это, вероятно, более европейское, чем эм, чем Соединенные Штаты, хотя вы знаете лучше, чем Соединенные Штаты.

[11:19] There's a high degree of rustophobia
  Существует высокая степень русофобии

[11:20] which I find it very very difficult to understand.
  что мне это очень и очень трудно понять.

[11:25] I think it's in part our press.
  Я думаю, это отчасти наша пресса.

[11:27] It's in part the narrative that we've built.
  Это отчасти нарратив, который мы построили.

[11:30] Uh it's in part the nature of spin in modern western politics where um you know an event kicks off and uh people spin to to help those um parties that are in power stay in power.
  Э-э, это отчасти природа спина в современной западной политике, где, ну знаете, событие начинается, и э-э люди спинают, чтобы помочь тем э-э партиям, которые у власти, остаться у власти.

[11:43] And what that means is that um the population generally start speaking start to get deceived.
  И это означает, что э-м население в целом начинает говорить, начинает обманываться.

[11:49] I don't think they're lied to but [clears throat] they're deceived because they're presented with one side of the story.
  Я не думаю, что им лгут, но [прочищает горло] их обманывают, потому что им представляют одну сторону истории.

[11:54] Now that really matters in war because in war you need to be able to look at all sides of the story which is why I penned the article the coming war with Russia because nobody seemed to thought what that war might like.
  Теперь это действительно важно на войне, потому что на войне нужно уметь смотреть на все стороны истории, поэтому я написал статью «Грядущая война с Россией», потому что никто, казалось, не думал, на что эта война может быть похожа.

[12:06] It's very difficult to be understand fully though the motivations but I think within those factors Tucker you've probably got the answer.
  Очень трудно полностью понять мотивы, но я думаю, что в рамках этих факторов, Такер, вы, вероятно, получили ответ.

[12:15] I I I understand why the European populations are russophobic because the
  Я-я-я понимаю, почему европейские населения русофобны, потому что

[12:21] Propaganda has played upon their best qualities.
  Пропаганда сыграла на их лучших качествах.

[12:25] Russia is seen as the aggressor.
  Россия рассматривается как агрессор.

[12:25] Ukraine is the underdog.
  Украина — аутсайдер.

[12:28] I think Europeans in general root for the underdog.
  Я думаю, европейцы в целом болеют за аутсайдера.

[12:31] That's a sign of their decency.
  Это признак их порядочности.

[12:34] It's also allowed, you're allowed to hate Russians because they're white, so you don't have to feel guilty about painting them as animals.
  Это также разрешено, вам разрешено ненавидеть русских, потому что они белые, так что вам не нужно чувствовать вину за то, что вы изображаете их животными.

[12:40] You're not racist when you do that.
  Вы не расист, когда делаете это.

[12:42] I understand all of that.
  Я всё это понимаю.

[12:44] And they just don't know any better because Europe is a biosphere in its media.
  И они просто не знают ничего лучшего, потому что Европа — это биосфера в своих СМИ.

[12:49] Like there's no outside information comes in, right?
  Типа никакая внешняя информация не поступает, верно?

[12:51] Of course.
  Конечно.

[12:53] Same in the United States.
  То же самое в Соединённых Штатах.

[12:56] What I don't understand is the motive of the liars.
  Чего я не понимаю, так это мотива лжецов.

[12:59] Like why do European leaders seek a war with Russia?
  Типа почему европейские лидеры ищут войны с Россией?

[13:01] Why do American leaders seek a war with Russia?
  Почему американские лидеры ищут войны с Россией?

[13:03] I mean, these are not stupid people and yet they are hellbent on destroying their own countries in the service of this war against a country that doesn't need to be our enemy.
  Я имею в виду, это не глупые люди, и тем не менее они полны решимости разрушить свои собственные страны на службе этой войны против страны, которая не должна быть нашим врагом.

[13:13] I mean, it doesn't make any sense.
  Я имею в виду, это не имеет никакого смысла.

[13:15] Um, if I had to answer the question in one phrase, it's the lack of the
  Хм, если бы мне пришлось ответить на вопрос одной фразой, это отсутствие

[13:22] Ability to think strategically.
  Способность мыслить стратегически.

[13:24] [clears throat] Um there was a wonderful American general uh who I studied when I was writing on strategy called Andre Buffer and he said that in war the loser deserve to lose cuz his defeat will be a consequences of poor of inadequate strategic thinking either before or during the conflict.
  [прочищает горло] Хм, был один замечательный американский генерал, которого я изучал, когда писал о стратегии, по имени Андре Буффер, и он сказал, что на войне проигравший заслуживает проигрыша, потому что его поражение станет следствием плохого или неадекватного стратегического мышления либо до, либо во время конфликта.

[13:43] I think um that the institutional lag in entities such as NATO um which had done badly in Afghanistan.
  Я думаю, хм, что институциональное отставание в таких организациях, как НАТО, хм, которые плохо проявили себя в Афганистане.

[13:51] I was in Afghanistan and let's face it, NATO lost.
  Я был в Афганистане, и давайте посмотрим правде в глаза: НАТО проиграло.

[13:55] Um, so the idea that NATO could prevail over Russia, having lost against the Taliban, it's just extraordinary thinking, but it's in NATO.
  Хм, так что идея, что НАТО может одержать победу над Россией, проиграв Талибану, — это просто необыкновенное мышление, но оно есть в НАТО.

[14:04] I think as well that the advice um within the establishment, I used to call them the elites, but I've now realized that they're not elite because elites are about high performance, whereas we're not seeing that within the establishment.
  Я также думаю, что советы хм внутри истеблишмента — я раньше называл их элитой, но теперь понял, что они не элита, потому что элита — это о высокой производительности, тогда как мы этого не видим внутри истеблишмента.

[14:21] So I think the establishments have what I can best
  Так что я думаю, у истеблишмента есть то, что я могу лучше всего

[14:23] Describe as a sort of institutional lag.
  Опишите как своего рода институциональное отставание.

[14:26] And um uh sort of blinkered thinking.
  И своего рода ограниченное мышление.

[14:30] And we see that in many ways um and when you look at across the broad nature of the strategic context in which we're operating and if you can be bothered to listen to what the Russians have been saying then um you know the logic uh that they present is um I find is sort of unequivocal.
  И мы видим это во многих отношениях, и когда вы смотрите на широкий характер стратегического контекста, в котором мы действуем, и если вы удосужитесь послушать, что говорят русские, то логика, которую они представляют, на мой взгляд, является однозначной.

[14:50] I mean, I've listened, of course, to your interview with um uh Vladimir Putin and of course Levoff and there was almost nothing that I could think of that I disagreed with.
  Я имею в виду, я, конечно, слушал ваше интервью с Владимиром Путиным и, конечно, с Левоффом, и не было почти ничего, с чем я мог бы не согласиться.

[14:58] The problem though, the West is not interested in listening, it seems to me.
  Проблема, однако, в том, что Запад не заинтересован слушать, как мне кажется.

[15:02] And so I think this is more about incompetence and it must be incompetence on the Europeans.
  И поэтому я думаю, что это скорее о некомпетентности, и это должна быть некомпетентность европейцев.

[15:10] Uh that you know there might be within the neocons and certain elements of um the sort of neoconlike establishments in the west in the E3 in Britain, Germany and France that is um determined to break up Russia.
  Что, знаете ли, возможно, среди неоконов и определенных элементов своего рода неоконсервативных кругов на Западе, в E3, в Британии, Германии и Франции, есть те, кто полон решимости развалить Россию.

[15:21] Um but
  Но

[15:24] It's obviously impossible, it seems to me.
  Это, очевидно, невозможно, как мне кажется.

[15:27] Um, you know the one you hear Kaakalis saying that.
  Хм, знаете, того, кого вы слышите, как говорит Какалис.

[15:31] Well, can I ask you? I was at a dinner with her not long ago in a foreign country with a lot of foreign diplomats who are not mediocre at all.
  Ну, могу я спросить вас? Я был на ужине с ней не так давно в чужой стране с множеством иностранных дипломатов, которые вовсе не посредственны.

[15:42] And she got up to speak, and the feeling of contempt for her and bewilderment that someone this stupid could have a leadership position in Europe.
  И она встала, чтобы говорить, и чувство презрения к ней и недоумения от того, что кто-то настолько глупый может занимать руководящую должность в Европе.

[15:52] People were shocked by just how unimpressive, how uninformed she was, how childish, how girlish she was.
  Люди были потрясены тем, насколько она была невпечатляющей, неосведомлённой, ребяческой, девчачьей.

[16:00] Everything was a kind of grotesque and dumb moral generalization.
  Всё было своего рода гротескным и глупым моральным обобщением.

[16:03] Hitler versus Churchill kind of level stuff.
  Материал уровня «Гитлер против Черчилля».

[16:09] How does someone like that, how does a structure like the EU, a continent with the smartest people in the world, in my opinion, promote someone like Callus to a position of leadership?
  Как кто-то вроде неё, как структура вроде ЕС, континент с умнейшими людьми в мире, по моему мнению, продвигает кого-то вроде Каллас на руководящую должность?

[16:17] Like how does that happen?
  То есть как это происходит?

[16:20] Um, it's a very good question because you could ask exactly the same question about Vonair.
  Хм, это очень хороший вопрос, потому что можно задать точно такой же вопрос о Фонайр.

[16:24] Yes, yes, you know, Vondair when I was...
  Да, да, знаете, Фондер, когда я был...

[16:26] Um serving was notorious for being the worst minister of defense that Germany had ever had.
  Эм, Сервинг был печально известен как худший министр обороны, который когда-либо был у Германии.

[16:33] And suddenly we find that she is um is in charge or the you know has a leadership role in the EU.
  И вдруг мы обнаруживаем, что она, эм, руководит или, знаете, занимает руководящую роль в ЕС.

[16:38] You could also say it about about Rut as well and I thought the last um NATO secretary general was bad but my goodness me um he's got very good competition now.
  Вы могли бы сказать то же самое и о Рютте, и я думал, что последний, эм, генеральный секретарь НАТО был плох, но, боже мой, эм, у него теперь очень хорошая конкуренция.

[16:49] I think it also goes across the western leadership as well generally uh in my experience you know I'm sort of um I'm I'm uh you know started in my naval career back in 76 uh this is the worst set of leaders that I think we've got collectively for um for as long as I've been alive I think so.
  Я думаю, это также относится и к западному руководству в целом, э, по моему опыту, знаете, я вроде как, эм, я, я, э, знаете, начал свою военно-морскую карьеру в 76-м, э, это худший набор лидеров, который, я думаю, у нас есть коллективно, эм, за всю мою жизнь, я так думаю.

[17:09] I I I can't answer your question other than to say that it's it's an ex it's a very difficult position to be but also it's an incredible weakness that we have in the west and explains So much of what's going wrong in the west is the lack of highquality leadership and I used to teach leadership and I look at some of the ways that these leaders are
  Я, я, я не могу ответить на ваш вопрос, кроме как сказать, что это, это бывшая, это очень трудная позиция, но также это невероятная слабость, которая у нас есть на Западе, и объясняет так много того, что идет не так на Западе, это отсутствие высококачественного руководства, и я раньше преподавал лидерство, и я смотрю на некоторые из способов, которыми эти лидеры

[17:27] Operating and it's, it's um extraordinarily um well the issue is competence and I'm sure some of these are decent people.
  Работает и это, это эм чрезвычайно эм ну проблема в компетентности, и я уверен, что некоторые из них порядочные люди.

[17:37] They're doing what they think, but they're obviously not competent.
  Они делают то, что думают, но они явно некомпетентны.

[17:39] And I say that strategically that that for a for a strategic operation, the measure of success is was the operation effective?
  И я говорю это стратегически, что что для для стратегической операции мерой успеха является была ли операция эффективной?

[17:48] Was it enduring?
  Была ли она долговременной?

[17:51] Were the results enduring?
  Были ли результаты долговременными?

[17:51] And was it was it efficient?
  И была ли она была ли она эффективной?

[17:53] Now, on all of the the um the interventions of this century, starting Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and now Iran, we failed at every one of those.
  Теперь, что касается всех эм эм вмешательств этого века, начиная с Афганистана, Ирака, Ливии, Сирии, Украины и теперь Ирана, мы провалились в каждом из них.

[18:05] I would say some people will argue about Syria, although if you think recreating a caliphate within Syria is a good idea, that's open question.
  Я бы сказал, некоторые люди будут спорить о Сирии, хотя если вы думаете, что воссоздание халифата в Сирии — хорошая идея, это открытый вопрос.

[18:12] It looks to me like Iran is being lost.
  Мне кажется, что Иран теряется.

[18:14] It looks to me like Russia is being lost.
  Мне кажется, что Россия теряется.

[18:18] So, we've got a consistency in terms of um capacity to think and act strategically.
  Итак, у нас есть последовательность в плане эм способности мыслить и действовать стратегически.

[18:23] I think this isn't just though about the politicians.
  Я думаю, это, однако, не только о политиках.

[18:25] I think it's also about senior military officers, about senior
  Я думаю, это также о старших военных офицерах, о старших

[18:29] Diplomats, about senior intelligence officers.
  Дипломаты, о старших офицерах разведки.

[18:33] So, you know, this is I I wouldn't want to blame the politicians entirely.
  Так что, знаете, я бы не хотел полностью винить политиков.

[18:37] I've operated right at the top of British government as the um executive assistant to our chief of defense staff.
  Я работал на самом верху британского правительства в качестве исполнительного помощника начальника штаба обороны.

[18:43] So, I've watched people operating being part of that.
  Так что я наблюдал за людьми, работающими в этой системе.

[18:47] Um but strategic thinking is is the key shortfall and it's uh caused us a lot of harm and I think it explains as well why uh we're going backwards whereas many other countries in the world are going forward.
  Но стратегическое мышление — это ключевой недостаток, и оно причинило нам много вреда, и я думаю, это также объясняет, почему мы движемся назад, тогда как многие другие страны мира движутся вперед.

[19:00] Sadly, that is absolutely consistent with what I've seen.
  К сожалению, это полностью соответствует тому, что я видел.

[19:02] Lots of reasons to be strongly in favor of Mars men.
  Много причин быть решительно в пользу Mars men.

[19:05] Low testosterone is bad.
  Низкий уровень тестостерона — это плохо.

[19:08] Obviously, it affects your performance more than anything else in almost every part of your life.
  Очевидно, это влияет на вашу производительность больше, чем что-либо другое, почти во всех сферах вашей жизни.

[19:12] And that's why Mars men exist to fix that.
  И именно поэтому существуют Mars men, чтобы это исправить.

[19:16] The body makes testosterone, but a lot of it gets stored away and remains impossible to use.
  Организм вырабатывает тестостерон, но большая его часть откладывается и остается недоступной для использования.

[19:22] And that explains why a lot of men at a certain age feel low energy all the time, indecisive, sad.
  И это объясняет, почему многие мужчины в определенном возрасте постоянно чувствуют упадок энергии, нерешительность, грусть.

[19:28] Mars men could be the answer to
  Mars men могут быть ответом на

[19:30] Unlocking that testosterone so you can actually use it.
  Разблокируя этот тестостерон, чтобы вы могли его реально использовать.

[19:34] So to be clear, no needles here, nothing synthetic.
  Итак, чтобы было ясно: никаких игл, ничего синтетического.

[19:37] Real ingredients that optimize energy, focus, and strength.
  Настоящие ингредиенты, которые оптимизируют энергию, концентрацию и силу.

[19:41] Made in the United States, third party tested, built with just eight natural ingredients.
  Сделано в Соединенных Штатах, протестировано третьей стороной, создано всего из восьми натуральных ингредиентов.

[19:46] Mars Men supports healthy testosterone levels, energy, stamina, basically a sense of drive throughout the day.
  Mars Men поддерживает здоровый уровень тестостерона, энергию, выносливость, в общем, чувство драйва в течение дня.

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  Если вам не подходит, 90 дней на возврат денег.

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  В течение ограниченного времени наши слушатели получают скидку 50% навсегда, плюс бесплатную доставку и три бесплатных подарка.

[20:03] All available now at men go to Mars.com.
  Все доступно сейчас на men go to Mars.com.

[20:06] Men go to Mars.com for 50% off and three free gifts.
  Переходите на Mars.com для получения скидки 50% и трех бесплатных подарков.

[20:09] After you buy it, show your support for the show.
  После покупки покажите свою поддержку шоу.

[20:13] Tell them that we sent you to Marsmen.
  Скажите им, что мы отправили вас к Marsmen.

[20:18] Um, so at the point we're at right now, it seems more dangerous in the West War against Russia than it has been ever.
  Хм, так что на данный момент кажется, что Западная война против России опаснее, чем когда-либо.

[20:29] Um, can you describe where you think we are and where this is?
  Хм, можете ли вы описать, где, по вашему мнению, мы находимся и куда это ведет?

[20:30] going?

[20:32] Yeah, let me let me do it through the um

[20:35] the the um tool Tucker of the article I

[20:39] wrote on the coming war with Russia. And

[20:41] the reason I wrote it was I hearing a

[20:43] lot of people here saying we're we're

[20:45] getting ready for war with Russia. We'll

[20:46] be ready to fight in uh 2030. I don't

[20:49] think that's true [snorts] because we

[20:51] can't afford to can't afford to be. But

[20:53] anyway, that's the um that's the

[20:56] narrative that's being sold to the

[20:58] European publics. Um and the problem is

[21:01] that of course the Russians will be

[21:03] listening to this. Of course they'll be

[21:04] listening to it. So, um, uh, I thought

[21:07] it would be a good idea to say, well,

[21:08] okay, well, if we're going to be ready

[21:09] to fight a war with Russia, what's it

[21:11] going to be like? And the first, um, um,

[21:14] thing about the article was I said that,

[21:16] um, let's not assume that Russia is

[21:19] going to wait, um, doing nothing until

[21:21] 2030 until we're ready. So let's assume

[21:24] that because of the way that we're

[21:26] starting to promote attacks deep into

[21:29] Russia by the E3, that's um Germany,

[21:32] Britain, and France providing weapons

[21:34] and weapons with significant warheads as

[21:37] well, 250 kg and significant range deep

[21:39] into Russia. Let's not assume that the

[21:41] Russians are just going to sit back and

[21:43] let this happen. though my um uh

[21:47] starting [clears throat] point was to

[21:48] say okay well let's assume that Russia

[21:51] attacks uh Europe or attacks certain

[21:54] elements of Europe and what the Russians

[21:55] have said is that they have not taken

[21:57] these attacks off the off the off the um

[22:00] the agenda which is a warning and it's a

[22:03] warning which we seem to be ignoring so

[22:05] let's assume that the first attacks

[22:07] happen in September of this year and and

[22:10] my um scenario and and I should

[22:12] emphasize it's a scenario not a

[22:14] forecast. So, it's trying to make people

[22:16] think about what could happen. So, let's

[22:18] assume these attacks happen in September

[22:20] of this year and the Russians destroy uh

[22:23] with hypersonic missiles the factories

[22:26] that are uh making drones and missiles

[22:29] in Britain, in France, and in Germany.

[22:33] And uh the question then is what does

[22:35] Europe Europe do? And of course, the

[22:37] first thing Europe does is it says okay,

[22:39] well, we're now going to invoke article

[22:41] 5. as all of a sudden people realize

[22:44] what article 5 really means. I mean

[22:46] you've got NATO which you know when I

[22:48] was serving in NATO understanding NATO

[22:50] force Mediterranean we used to say that

[22:53] NATO stood for no ability to organize.

[22:55] It's slightly unfair. Um but actually

[22:57] NATO isn't this great omnipotent um

[23:00] coalition. People say it's the strongest

[23:02] coalition since the since since in

[23:06] history. I mean that obviously isn't

[23:07] true. The strongest coalition in history

[23:09] as far as I can see was the Allied

[23:11] coalition. the second war with the

[23:12] United States, uh, Britain, the

[23:14] Commonwealth, Russia, and China. It's

[23:17] the strongest coalition by far. So NATO

[23:20] invokes article 5. Um, and the three

[23:23] countries that have been attacked invoke

[23:24] article 5. And they realize that

[23:26] suddenly that actually what Article 5

[23:28] means is that an attack on one is an

[23:30] attack on all, but it doesn't doesn't

[23:31] mean that actually those the whole of

[23:34] the NATO forces have to respond and

[23:36] people decide to respond as they think

[23:38] best. And in the article I propose that

[23:41] um Hungary says nope we're not getting

[23:43] engaged. Spain says nope we're not

[23:45] getting engaged. We don't think this is

[23:46] in our interests. I think other

[23:48] countries might equivocate. Um you know

[23:52] it's difficult to say but you know

[23:53] countries like Hungary for example

[23:55] obviously won't. So at that stage we

[23:57] suddenly see um that this isn't all it

[23:59] means. But the the the big issue Tucker

[24:02] is what does the United States do? Now,

[24:05] of course, we know that Rubio has been

[24:07] um looking as if the United States is

[24:10] shifting back into support uh these

[24:12] operations, but at that moment, I think

[24:15] there's an open question about what

[24:16] United States do if it does if it says

[24:18] seize attacks into Russia, especially if

[24:21] those have been warned uh that the

[24:23] attacks are warned and we've made no um

[24:25] response to them. And my guess is that

[24:27] the American will not want to commit

[24:30] troops into uh mainland Europe to fight

[24:34] a line a war against Russia on European

[24:36] soil and for the for US troops to fight

[24:38] and die on the European soils. I

[24:40] wouldn't if I were in the United States.

[24:42] So you're then in the situation well now

[24:44] to what the Europeans do and again just

[24:47] to develop the scenario I assume that

[24:48] the Europeans do the only thing they can

[24:50] do cuz their land forces are not ready

[24:54] is that they use air forces to respond

[24:57] to Russia and that that doesn't go very

[24:59] well that actually they find that

[25:01] they're up against Russia which got a

[25:03] lot of experience in air defense and one

[25:06] of my jobs in the Navy was to be the

[25:08] captain air defense destroyer And um I

[25:12] was what was known as the anti-air

[25:13] warfare commander and I can tell you

[25:15] that we are in poor shape uh in uh

[25:18] Europe in terms of being able to defend

[25:19] our skies. Uh we would struggle to

[25:22] respond to saturation drone attacks.

[25:24] We've got extremely limited uh responses

[25:28] to to ballist conventional ballistic

[25:30] missiles. I'm a great fan of Ted Ted

[25:32] Postal who is an MIT professor on this.

[25:35] He thinks that the um uh the Patriot

[25:37] [clears throat]

[25:38] Pack 3 systems are possibly looking

[25:40] about 3% effectiveness.

[25:43] And when it comes to hypersonic

[25:44] missiles, we've got no response

[25:45] whatsoever. So suddenly we're making

[25:48] attacks that aren't very successful. But

[25:50] in res in return, I say that because the

[25:53] E3 have decided to respond to Russia's

[25:56] attacks that they then take the gloves

[25:58] off and use um hypersonic missiles

[26:01] probably with conventional missiles to

[26:03] to do more damage. And the thing that I

[26:06] would go after, especially as a energy

[26:08] expert, would be to do the same thing

[26:10] that they've done in in Kiev and in

[26:12] Ukraine, which to the surgically um

[26:15] start to undermine our our um energy

[26:17] infrastructure. And I can tell you that

[26:19] a a Resnik missile landing in a liquid

[26:23] natural gas terminal or an oil terminal

[26:25] in Milford Haven or um Rotterdam would

[26:29] do extensive damage. Uh that would be

[26:32] bad enough, but unfortunately of course

[26:33] because of the sanctions we placed on

[26:35] Russia in the first place about 40 year

[26:38] four years ago, we've uh switched

[26:41] ourselves off from Russian oil, switched

[26:43] ourselves off from Russian gas. So

[26:45] that's 40% of our gas. Uh we've also of

[26:49] the of the particular um products we've

[26:53] switched ourselves off to Russian diesel

[26:55] who used to provide us with 40% of

[26:57] Europe's diesel. Now as an energy expert

[27:00] if you can explain to me how you can run

[27:02] a modern industrial society without

[27:05] diesel then I'm all ears but I don't

[27:07] know how to do it. It's respon diesel is

[27:09] critical for farming, for fishing, for

[27:12] food logistics, for construction, for

[27:15] running the other two primary energy

[27:17] sources. That's renewable energy and

[27:19] nuclear energy. Uh I could go on and on.

[27:21] It is really is the critical fuel and

[27:23] we've switched ourselves off to it. And

[27:25] of course having switched ourselves off

[27:27] and increased our prices in in Europe

[27:30] which of course is having an effect on

[27:31] our economies especially German's

[27:33] economy we're now the situation when the

[27:36] straightforers closed and so we've got a

[27:39] a second WAM on top of the first WH. So

[27:42] talk about being in a very very fragile

[27:44] position. It's an extremely weak

[27:46] position not least of all because we

[27:49] import um about 12 million barrels a day

[27:52] into oil into into the European region.

[27:55] Um, Norway is reasonably

[27:57] self-sufficient. In fact, Norway is

[27:58] completely self-sufficient and we get

[28:00] about 45% or so of our um, hydrocarbons

[28:05] from the North Sea, although that's

[28:06] reducing, but uh, Europe generally is

[28:10] extremely um, extremely vulnerable. So,

[28:13] what you got is a situation which is

[28:14] that our energy infrastructure is being

[28:16] written down at a time when we have no

[28:18] no chance of defending our skies against

[28:21] it. And again, this is why I was trying

[28:22] to actually uh make the the point to

[28:25] people who are prepared to think about

[28:27] this what this war might look like

[28:29] because the economic consequences of

[28:31] this would be profound. Mathematically,

[28:34] there's a really close relationship

[28:35] between the use of energy and GDP. It's

[28:38] [clears throat] extremely close. It's

[28:40] it's close to one. It's about sort of.99

[28:42] or something. Yes.

[28:44] So what that means is when you take

[28:45] energy out of the system then you are

[28:48] going to have a con consequent uh effect

[28:50] which is similar in rough order of

[28:52] magnitude on your economy. So if we take

[28:55] 10% of the world's energy away then

[28:58] surprise surprise don't be surprised if

[28:59] we get a global reduction in GDP of 10%.

[29:04] Now that's getting close to a

[29:05] depression. Indeed it's on the

[29:06] borderline of a depression. But going

[29:08] back to Europe, um it wouldn't surprise

[29:10] me at all if we're in a situation where

[29:13] were such an attack to happen then we

[29:15] would be in deep economic trouble. Um

[29:18] and I think that would lead to deep

[29:19] political trouble as well. Um [snorts]

[29:22] but again um you know [clears throat] it

[29:24] is a scenario and the point of the

[29:25] scenario was to help people really think

[29:28] about what such a war might uh might

[29:30] mean uh and and really make sure that

[29:34] we've done the risk assessment. Now, I I

[29:36] developed it as a scenario because what

[29:38] I wanted people to think about was doing

[29:40] the risk assessment. At the moment, um

[29:43] the Europeans's risk assessment of what

[29:45] they're doing, as far as I can see, is

[29:46] based on a guess. And the guess is, uh

[29:49] we're going to keep firing longrange

[29:51] weapons into Russia, and we're going to

[29:53] guess that the Russians aren't going to

[29:55] respond. And I think that's a very

[29:57] dangerous guess. I mean, people say the

[29:59] Russians don't have red lines and and I

[30:01] keep saying to them, well, just a

[30:03] second. The Russian told us that if we

[30:05] tried to expand NATO into Georgia or to

[30:08] Ukraine, then it would result in a war.

[30:10] And indeed, all our clever thinkers told

[30:12] us the same thing. And surprise,

[30:14] surprise, when we did do that, a war

[30:16] happened. So, Russia do have red lines.

[30:19] So, I think it's wrong to have that

[30:21] guess. And the way that risk management

[30:23] works, I'm not a great fan of risk

[30:24] management. It's used by the financial

[30:26] sector to do risk analysis. And as far

[30:28] as I can see, it doesn't work for them.

[30:30] But what they do do is they say if

[30:32] you're thinking about a risk have a

[30:34] think about uh the um impact and the

[30:37] probability. Now even if the probability

[30:39] is low of Russia doing what I've said

[30:42] the impact is profound. So to me that's

[30:45] a risk which you really need to work

[30:47] very very hard to think through and to

[30:49] make sure that the population who you're

[30:53] exposing to that risk have been taken on

[30:55] board rather than just um crack on

[30:59] without really thinking about it. So I

[31:01] think there needs to be in Europe a

[31:03] political debate about this and whether

[31:05] we're prepared to let our politicians

[31:08] lead us uh into into a situation where

[31:12] we're exposed to this risk and we we've

[31:15] been here before in Europe. 2014 and

[31:18] 1914 I should say you know the run um

[31:22] the f Barbara Tuckman's famous book you

[31:24] know the guns of August where we fell

[31:26] into the first world war people thought

[31:28] it would be over in 4 months and four

[31:30] years later Europe was devastated so

[31:33] let's at least try to do the thinking

[31:35] this time round and decide that if we

[31:37] are going to do these things and to poke

[31:40] the bear uh for ready for a war which we

[31:43] would lose anyway uh let's at least have

[31:46] a have a public debate about that and

[31:48] see how the country feel about it and

[31:49] other countries feel about it cuz I'm

[31:51] strongly of the view that actually if

[31:54] the country were exposed to what I'm

[31:55] talking about the difference in terms of

[31:59] political support for it would be

[32:01] profound. I think the political support

[32:03] for it would fall away. It doesn't

[32:06] matter what the moral issue is. I happen

[32:08] to think the moral that the moral high

[32:10] ground lies with Russia. what happens is

[32:12] the issue of power and Russia has the

[32:14] balance of power here and overwhelmingly

[32:17] so um my suspicion is if we were able to

[32:20] have that debate and I think we should

[32:22] have that debate then I don't think

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[33:39] I I think one disadvantage that the

[33:41] Europeans have is they don't understand

[33:43] how hated they are by the people

[33:44] planning these wars. I think it's true

[33:46] of all the wars of the last hundred

[33:48] years. I think at least in my country,

[33:50] the the foreign policy strategists, the

[33:54] neocons, uh who are driving all of this

[33:57] truly hate Europe and would like to see

[33:59] it destroyed. The Israelis hate Europe

[34:01] and Europeans can't seem to admit that

[34:03] to themselves. Um it's very obvious by

[34:05] the effects. So, let's say that the

[34:08] Russians did lob a hypersonic missile

[34:10] into Roderdam or into the UK.

[34:13] Everyone knows, it's very obvious that

[34:15] that Europe can't mount a conventional

[34:18] war against Russia. They would lose

[34:19] instantly. The one thing they do have,

[34:21] however, is nuclear weapons. So, how

[34:23] much incentive would there be to use a

[34:26] nuclear weapon in response?

[34:28] Um, it's a $64,000 question, and I I

[34:32] actually cover that in the article. Um,

[34:34] I think the what what what we're talking

[34:36] about is that if either um Britain or

[34:40] France, the two nations with nuclear

[34:42] weapons, chose to respond with nuclear

[34:44] weapons, that essentially is committing

[34:46] national suicide.

[34:48] Yes,

[34:48] I would expect the Russians to to

[34:50] respond. Don't let's let's forget that

[34:52] they got nearly 5,500

[34:55] nuclear weapons just short of that. And

[34:57] you know, I think Britain's got sort of

[34:59] I think there might be 200 is those

[35:01] sorts of figures. Um, I think that the

[35:04] um that that a prime minister or

[35:06] president of France who is prepared to

[35:08] use nuclear weapons to support a

[35:11] conventional war which we were likely to

[35:13] lose in the first place, I think that

[35:15] would be a very um it's a suicidal call

[35:19] to make. So I cannot see it um I cannot

[35:22] see it happening

[35:23] really because they cheered the

[35:25] destruction of their own energy

[35:26] pipeline. they emedded the invasion of

[35:29] their country by, you know, north and

[35:31] and subsaharan Africa, like they're

[35:34] suicidal. That's what it seems as an

[35:36] observer. So,

[35:37] yeah, I I think it's um it's that that

[35:42] it's suicidal by incompetence, but I

[35:44] would like to think um that within the

[35:48] um establishment, there are enough

[35:50] people who would by this stage,

[35:52] especially if we were starting to go to

[35:54] war, had really start to to to think

[35:56] this through. I [snorts] would also like

[35:57] to think that and I'd be interested in

[36:00] your view on this that there were

[36:01] Americans who were saying this isn't

[36:03] very [clears throat] good. You this

[36:04] isn't what we you know we we were

[36:06] thinking that we could help with a break

[36:08] up of Russia. It's not happening. This

[36:10] war is starting to kick off. Uh we need

[36:13] to get this to a close. And I don't know

[36:14] if that would happen, but I would like

[36:16] to think that actually there would be

[36:18] some voices um in America. You know, the

[36:21] sorts of people who would spring to mind

[36:22] for me would be people like JD Vance

[36:25] [snorts] and um Tulsi Gab's no longer

[36:28] there, but the the voices of reason

[36:30] within the White House. Um be curious to

[36:32] see what Donald Trump's view as well,

[36:34] but I'm sure the Americans would not

[36:36] want to be doing anything which open

[36:38] them to the possibility of a nuclear

[36:40] exchange with Russia. So, you know,

[36:43] my sense is that Trump's views are

[36:45] irrelevant. I don't think he was for

[36:47] this war with Iran. He did it anyway.

[36:49] He's utterly controlled. So, so there's

[36:52] that. JD Vance is the only person I'm

[36:55] aware of in American national politics

[36:57] with any power at all to extend he has

[36:59] power who would oppose this. Um, but I

[37:02] don't see anyone other than JD Vance.

[37:05] I hope I'm wrong.

[37:08] Yeah. Yeah. Um, I hope you are too. I

[37:11] mean, there's no doubt that the voices

[37:12] of the independent media is starting to

[37:14] be heard. We've got a long, long way to

[37:16] go, but we're starting to be heard. But

[37:18] again, this is why I think this debate

[37:20] needs to happen now rather than later. I

[37:22] mean, Europeans haven't thought about

[37:24] this a lot. I mean, when when the um the

[37:27] attacks were conducted on the the um

[37:30] Russian strategic bombing force, I

[37:32] thought that was an act of incredible

[37:34] strategic recklessness because those

[37:37] bombers were out on the um the airfields

[37:39] on the pan so they could be seen by

[37:41] satellites as part of the start treaty.

[37:44] So it was part of the treaty and uh

[37:46] Russian nuclear doctrine is such that if

[37:49] there were if their nuclear triad an

[37:51] element of the nuclear triad is attacked

[37:53] then their response is to respond with

[37:55] nuclear weapons. They chose not to do it

[37:57] thank goodness but we're playing with

[37:59] fire here and and I think that um uh the

[38:03] the issue I think is is not the nuclear

[38:06] response and I I think it's a very open

[38:09] question. It's an open question not only

[38:10] for us but for the Russians as well. you

[38:12] I could imagine the Russians saying,

[38:14] "Yeah, actually that we've got um people

[38:16] who are so incompetent in uh Western

[38:19] capitals that um we perhaps don't want

[38:22] to respond this way or they might do it

[38:24] in a more measured way." I mean, here's

[38:26] a very good question. What if the

[38:28] responses were not against Germany,

[38:30] France, and uh Britain, but against

[38:33] Germany? And what if the responses were

[38:36] such that they took out Germany's drone

[38:38] factories and Poland's drone factories?

[38:41] Would then Britain and Russia and France

[38:43] be prepared to sacrifice their nations

[38:46] and tens of millions of deaths

[38:50] uh to support um Germany in that

[38:52] situation? Very very good question and I

[38:55] don't know what the answer is. Um but I

[38:58] mean to me the answer is let's at least

[39:01] um think carefully about what we're

[39:02] trying to do with these long range

[39:04] weapons in fight attacks into Russia and

[39:07] let's also think about diplomacy. I mean

[39:10] the fact that we can have um have um

[39:14] you know have have um meetings u where

[39:18] we're where the west is talking about

[39:20] solutions to the to the Russia Ukraine

[39:23] war and triumphantly exclude one of the

[39:26] belligerent and it's diplomatic

[39:28] incompetence of the highest order I can

[39:30] see. Yeah. We we in the very difficult

[39:33] uh uh British and Irish uh relationships

[39:36] during the the troubles in Ireland

[39:39] maintain diplomatic very very subtle

[39:41] diplomatic uh engagement throughout the

[39:43] almost the whole of that war. And thank

[39:45] goodness we did. You what we need I

[39:48] think is to at least think about this

[39:50] alternative pathway to peace. I'm sure

[39:52] it's there. I often thought that one of

[39:55] the biggest problems is NATO. You know,

[39:58] NATO at the moment is is bit bit of a

[40:00] self-licking lollipop. But what what I

[40:02] what I once said, n exists to um

[40:06] confront um a threat which is created by

[40:10] its own existence that doesn't have the

[40:13] power to confront the threat that his

[40:15] existence has created. So I think NATO

[40:19] to my mind is a key part of the problem

[40:20] here. And

[40:22] what a beautiful formulation that is.

[40:25] NATO ex exists to confront the

[40:29] opposition it's created but doesn't have

[40:31] the power to successfully resist that I

[40:33] mean that's that's the truest thing I've

[40:35] heard today.

[40:36] Yeah as it was in a real it was in a um

[40:40] um a one of the Quincy Institutes a

[40:42] responsible statecraft article about 18

[40:44] months ago. I mean it's so obvious you

[40:47] know um and yet people think that NATO

[40:49] is omnipotent. Um so I think that um

[40:53] understanding that actually the NATO

[40:55] guarantee is is I wouldn't say it's as

[40:58] little as paper but it is much less um

[41:01] comprehensive than people think because

[41:03] it relies on military forces which are

[41:06] to my mind nowhere near as battleh

[41:07] hardened as Russians are. You know the

[41:09] the second best army in the world I

[41:11] would say at the moment in terms of

[41:12] battle hardened is the Ukrainian army.

[41:14] Yes.

[41:14] Uh you know the first is the Russian

[41:16] army. um the Chinese will be watching

[41:18] extremely closely. So the idea that NATO

[41:22] um you know can with a disperate group

[41:25] of um countries with different levels of

[41:28] force forces with different levels of um

[41:32] [clears throat] equipment capabilities

[41:33] can actually be brought together into a

[41:35] coalition to defeat the most battle

[41:37] hardened army in the world. You know it

[41:39] just doesn't stack up, does it? You

[41:41] don't need to be a military man to

[41:42] understand that. It doesn't stack up.

[41:45] Unfortunately, a lot of the military

[41:46] people don't understand this. Um they

[41:48] they're not really um interested, as far

[41:51] as I can see, in um understanding

[41:54] Russia. I just find it um profound. Um

[41:59] um I've been listening to a couple I was

[42:00] listening recently to one of our former

[42:02] chief of defense staff and I said in a

[42:05] um meeting in which we were at I said,

[42:07] "What do you think about talking to

[42:08] Russia?" And his response was, "Yes, I

[42:10] think we probably should do that." But

[42:12] he said, "But not Putin." I thought,

[42:15] well, that's just astonishing that

[42:17] anybody could say that. And it shows you

[42:19] the degree of Russophobia. I mean, I

[42:22] was, you know, I in my service career, I

[42:24] spent a lot of the time of my service

[42:25] career preparing to fight the Russians.

[42:27] But when the Cold War came

[42:29] [clears throat] and partnership for

[42:31] Peace was kicked off and we started to

[42:33] engage with the Russians, nobody, we

[42:35] were, most of us in my experience were

[42:37] delighted that we could be in that

[42:39] position. So quite how we've got back to

[42:42] this situation of um seeing Russia as

[42:45] the enemy is a good question. A lot of

[42:47] it is to do with not listening to Russia

[42:49] and not hearing Russia cuz when you

[42:51] listen to them and hear them, it's

[42:53] fairly obvious what they want, but

[42:54] people just don't seem to be able to to

[42:56] do it. It's a bit like um I mean I'm not

[42:59] a soccer player, but it's it's a bit

[43:01] like um getting your team ready for a um

[43:05] a match and um not bothering to study

[43:08] the opposition. Yes. I mean, how many

[43:10] football coaches would do that? How many

[43:12] American football coaches would do it?

[43:13] How many, you know, everybody would be

[43:14] studying the opposition? And if we were

[43:16] studying the opposition, then that would

[43:18] be a good start. Could then realize the

[43:19] challenge we've got, but we would also

[43:21] be in a much position to understanding

[43:22] the opposition.

[43:24] Well, they're much more serious than we

[43:25] are and much more. It's not close. And

[43:28] so, that right there gives you pause.

[43:30] Why would you ever get into a conflict

[43:33] with people who are at least as smart as

[43:34] you and much more committed? Um, you

[43:37] wouldn't. So where you after your

[43:40] military service spent 15 years in the

[43:42] energy sector

[43:44] where you're qualified to answer this

[43:45] question

[43:47] where is the west the US Europe

[43:51] Australia New Zealand Canada uh with

[43:53] energy right now

[43:56] I think um it's a very good question and

[44:00] I I my strong sense um this is intuitive

[44:04] with some analysis to to support it but

[44:07] My strong sense is that we're um on the

[44:10] edge of a crisis. And the reason I say

[44:13] that is if you take um it's not 20

[44:15] million barrels per day and let's just

[44:16] stay with oil for the moment, not not

[44:18] natural gas, but just taking oil, which

[44:21] is the critical resource for almost all

[44:23] of the others. um if you take 20 million

[44:25] barrels of oil out of the sit out of the

[44:27] um straight horses in fact it's 13 then

[44:31] um sooner or later that has to show up.

[44:33] Now what what um I was surprised with is

[44:36] how long it's taken. And of course and

[44:39] when you start to see what's going on,

[44:41] you start to see what's happening. It

[44:43] takes um from the closure of the

[44:46] straightfor it takes about 2 months for

[44:48] the ships u which are traveling at 12

[44:50] knots which is about the same speed as a

[44:52] bicycle you know to get to the United

[44:54] States and to um to places like Cushing.

[44:58] It takes about uh a month or so to get

[45:01] to Europe. So firstly you've got all the

[45:03] ships which had left were still moving.

[45:06] Uh the inventories of course were

[45:09] significant. There was a bit of an old

[45:10] glut at the time. So those have been

[45:12] largely drawn down as far as I can see.

[45:15] Uh the strategic petroleum

[45:16] [clears throat] reserves as well uh have

[45:18] largely been drawn down. I think Cushing

[45:21] is now the American strate reserve I

[45:23] think is pretty low. Figure I have in my

[45:25] mind you you may know this better than

[45:27] me is about 20%.

[45:28] That's right. Again, when you get start

[45:29] to get to the drags, um you've got to

[45:32] think carefully about it. Um even when

[45:33] the oil moves through pipelines, so from

[45:37] Cushing up to this up to um to New

[45:40] England, it's traveling at between three

[45:42] and five three and 8 miles an hour. So

[45:44] that of course takes time. And of

[45:45] course, the oil in the pipeline needs to

[45:47] you need to have oil in the pipeline for

[45:49] the pipeline to work,

[45:50] right?

[45:50] So the oil in the pipeline isn't

[45:52] working. Uh it's not working inventory.

[45:54] And last, but by no means least, is

[45:56] China. And what I don't think any of us

[45:58] understood was how China would respond

[46:00] to this. And I don't think we completely

[46:03] understand. But China uh reduced its um

[46:07] its demand by about 5 million barrels

[46:09] per day, which is significant reduction.

[46:12] It's also home to the largest strategic

[46:14] petroleum reserve in the world. I think

[46:16] the figure I've got is 1.3 billion

[46:17] barrels per day. So it's a very

[46:19] significant uh reserve. Um I also

[46:23] suspect I don't know. I suspect one of

[46:24] the ways that China was thinking about

[46:26] this was not just about self-interest,

[46:29] but I suspect the Chinese were thinking

[46:30] that as an exporting nation, they were

[46:33] thinking long and hard about the impact

[46:35] that the straight of most closure would

[46:37] have on the rest of the Far East because

[46:39] there are other nations in the Far East

[46:40] which are much more vulnerable. Japan

[46:42] had a very big um reserve, but places

[46:46] like Taiwan, you the the 90% of the

[46:50] semiconductors are made in Taiwan. a

[46:52] place like Taiwan were much more much

[46:53] more vulnerable. So I suspect one of the

[46:55] reasons China may have done that is not

[46:57] just um uh uh not not just for tactical

[47:01] reason but also for thinking about their

[47:02] export markets cuz um reduction in oil

[47:06] in these other places could have a

[47:07] significant significant impact. Um I

[47:10] don't think anybody really knows. Um but

[47:13] one of the the other things to think

[47:15] about is that sorry I'll just finish. I

[47:18] think I would would be surprised if we

[47:19] were not seeing consequences of this in

[47:22] August. Uh and I've certainly heard some

[47:26] very um good analyst who I I follow um

[47:30] talking about September as well. I'm a

[47:33] great fan of an American ge u geo

[47:36] physicist called Art B who's an

[47:38] exceptional um exceptional analyst. The

[47:41] other thing though of course is that

[47:42] even when the straits form open then

[47:45] there is a lag. there's a lag on

[47:48] actually those um um the whole system

[47:50] getting going again. It's a bit like

[47:52] sort of closing off your plumbing in

[47:54] your pipe in your pipes at home and then

[47:56] expect it to function perfectly. Now,

[47:59] one of the interesting things is that

[48:00] when the um I can't remember what the

[48:04] ship's name was, a ship container ship

[48:06] um um blocked the Suez Canal. And for

[48:10] every one day that that container ship

[48:12] block the sewers canal um of there's a

[48:15] there's like a very good merchant navy

[48:17] analyst called Sam Mogiano who said it

[48:19] was about 6 days for the whole logistics

[48:21] system to recover. So even if it's 3

[48:24] days you could be talking for um you

[48:26] know as a minimum it would be the amount

[48:28] of time that the straits been closed it

[48:30] will take to recover but it could be

[48:32] twice that or it could be three times

[48:33] that. So I'm expecting and forecasting

[48:36] that we'll be looking at a significant

[48:39] recession starting in the autumn and

[48:42] that could tip into recession in the new

[48:45] year. Quite where that recession will

[48:47] play in the globe is an open question. I

[48:49] mean the country that's most insulated

[48:50] from it surprise surprise is Russia. You

[48:53] know Russia's anarchic nation. uh it's

[48:56] well understood the consequences of um

[49:00] uh you know of um of of what's going on.

[49:04] I think although Putin's first degree is

[49:07] in law, his postgraduate work was in

[49:10] resource economics. So I'm would be

[49:13] astonished if they don't understand

[49:15] this. I know that the Chinese have been

[49:18] looking at their own energy situation

[49:21] for decades. Um there's good evidence to

[49:24] say that in 2003 when the the Americans

[49:27] with allies went into to Iraq that the

[49:30] Chinese thought that that was about oil

[49:32] and they began um uh increasing their um

[49:36] their um their own reserves. So but but

[49:40] as for places like Europe, you know,

[49:42] we're incredibly vulnerable. So is a lot

[49:44] of the Far East. Um, so I'm afraid to

[49:46] say on places like Africa and there's an

[49:48] open question about the United States as

[49:50] well that the the Trump line that that

[49:53] the United States is a um is an exporter

[49:56] of oil is true in as much as an exporter

[49:59] refined product. But when it comes to to

[50:03] um crude, it's an importer of crude the

[50:06] tune of about 6.5 million barrels per

[50:09] day. And even if you've got access, you

[50:11] know, through, for example, Venezuela or

[50:13] Canada, oil is a funible commodity. So

[50:17] you may have access, but the prices of

[50:19] the oil are going to go up. So I don't

[50:20] know what it's like over there in the

[50:22] States at the moment um in terms of, you

[50:25] know, cost per per barrel, it's up here.

[50:28] Um but if those costs were to increase

[50:30] significantly

[50:32] um in the next 2 to 3 months, um I would

[50:34] imagine that would not be the sort of

[50:37] run you'd want into the midterms. And I

[50:39] would be surprised if they don't

[50:41] increase significantly. And even if you

[50:43] open the straight for I would be

[50:45] surprised if the lag in the system is

[50:47] such that you're still not suffering

[50:49] from the consequences of those well into

[50:51] the midterms and probably into the new

[50:53] year.

[50:56] So oil Brent crude was like priced in

[50:59] dollars I think 71 last week. M

[51:03] um if you'd told me almost 4 months

[51:05] after the closure of the straight that

[51:06] it would be 71, I I would never have

[51:08] believed that. What how did that happen?

[51:11] Were you surprised by it that it's so

[51:13] low?

[51:13] Yes, very very I I was just as surprised

[51:16] as you and I think most of the analysts

[51:17] were, but I think a lot of it is to do

[51:19] with the the the lag. It's also um

[51:22] there's this distinction between the

[51:24] futures markets and the actual delivery.

[51:27] I was talking to a Singaporean colleague

[51:29] last month and he said that and I don't

[51:31] know whether this is still the case that

[51:32] notwithstanding what Brent was at or

[51:34] what WTI was at that in Singapore they

[51:37] were buying crew for $200 a barrel. So

[51:41] you know the difference is the

[51:42] difference is is the interesting one.

[51:45] It's what what people are actually

[51:46] paying for it. I mean there may be a

[51:48] short-term lag. Who knows? But that's

[51:50] that's the open question. the so-called

[51:52] crack spread between um you know what

[51:54] you're paying what or what you're

[51:57] forecasting to pay in the futures

[51:58] markets and what you're actually paying

[52:00] on the day.

[52:01] How does a country exist at $200 a

[52:04] barrel?

[52:05] Yeah. Well, fortunately um Singapore is

[52:08] an extremely efficient country.

[52:10] Yes. [clears throat]

[52:11] So, you know, but that must be having

[52:13] political effects. I guess as well it's

[52:15] quite a small country. I didn't uh I was

[52:17] so surprised when I had $200 a barrel. I

[52:19] didn't ask ask much more. Um but again

[52:22] if if we um get up to those sorts of

[52:25] figures you I think back to to 2007 and

[52:29] 2008 the great global financial crisis

[52:32] you I was happened to be in Houston at

[52:34] part of that and I remember vividly

[52:36] seeing the stock market red all over.

[52:38] I'll never forget it. I remember talking

[52:41] to an American who was working in the

[52:43] British consulate in Houston. He'd lost

[52:46] half his half his retirement savings in

[52:48] that that crash. Um and again it seems

[52:51] to me that that if you were to get up to

[52:54] those sorts of figures 150 and if you've

[52:57] got a global economy which is already um

[53:01] not in trouble but already very

[53:03] precarious then it wouldn't surprise me

[53:05] if we have another great financial

[53:06] crash. I mean who knows you know we

[53:08] might say it's it I'm

[53:10] $150 an oil barrel oil a function of

[53:14] that to me it seems impossible that it

[53:17] wasn't a function of that. People will

[53:19] talk about um people talk about um

[53:23] synthetic uh collateralized debt

[53:25] obligations in the housing market. I

[53:27] think a lot of it's to do with the Euro

[53:28] dollar areas actually and how how

[53:31] funding in the Euro dollar areas were

[53:33] actually tightening. But it seems

[53:34] impossible to me that actually that that

[53:36] that oil which is the primary resource

[53:39] wasn't playing into that. I mean, it's

[53:41] playing into things like Lufans I think

[53:44] canceled 20,000

[53:46] flights um about a couple of months ago.

[53:49] Um I don't know what bunker fuels are

[53:52] like. That's the fuel used for ships,

[53:55] but um when I was talking to somebody

[53:57] recently about those, those were

[53:58] doubled. So again, it's what people are

[54:01] actually paying rather than the futures

[54:02] market. And it's when those two come

[54:04] back into alignment, then we'll know

[54:07] probably more what's happening. the the

[54:09] the the problem I've said this before as

[54:11] well Tucker is that when somebody Danny

[54:14] Davis who I think you know Daniel Davis

[54:16] yes said to me he said if you were the

[54:17] Zar of the world uh what would you do

[54:19] about solving the energy crisis I said

[54:21] the problem is that the energy crisis

[54:23] nobody's in charge the whole of the

[54:26] energy markets are run by the market so

[54:29] there is no single entity can say well

[54:31] we need to do x y and zed to sort this

[54:32] out you know you can't just say well we

[54:34] need to actually um run more tankers few

[54:38] the straits almost cuz if the shipping

[54:39] companies say we don't like the look of

[54:41] that thanks we'll wait until it's ready.

[54:44] Um so there are a whole load of issues

[54:45] here which are really run by the market

[54:48] and there I think there's nobody who

[54:50] really understands the thing itself and

[54:53] even if they did understand there's

[54:54] nobody who can actually press a button

[54:56] and press five or six buttons to make

[54:58] the whole thing work again properly.

[55:00] That's right. Again, I'm I'm hearing the

[55:01] same thing from other analysts and you

[55:03] know, I listen to this like a book and I

[55:05] don't say that I've got the answers, but

[55:07] what I do say is that you take this

[55:08] amount of energy out of the system, it's

[55:11] bound to have economic consequences.

[55:13] It's a mathematical impossibility that

[55:15] it won't. [snorts]

[55:16] And in a globalized economy, no nation

[55:19] can have real sovereignty. Of course,

[55:21] you can't act independently on behalf of

[55:24] your country because you're not in

[55:25] control of your country because you

[55:26] don't control its economy. So yeah, I no

[55:29] one kind of thought about that obviously

[55:31] in the post-war era. So let me just ask

[55:35] you a final question which is how

[55:38] long are these two conflicts likely to

[55:40] continue? Do you see hope of resolution

[55:42] in Eastern Europe or in the Middle East?

[55:46] Um I think if I take um the Middle East

[55:49] first, I've got a strong suspicion. I

[55:51] can't say for sure that as the continued

[55:55] closure of the straits comes home to the

[55:59] United States and that as the midterms

[56:02] go as I think it's almost impossible to

[56:04] avoid now badly and I suspect that that

[56:07] will create a very different political

[56:08] atmosphere in the United States if

[56:10] you've got very significant price

[56:12] increases and you're seeing lots of

[56:14] damage being done to the global economy.

[56:17] So my suspicion is that that's the thing

[56:19] which might bring the um uh the the Iran

[56:24] war to a closure. I can't say for sure.

[56:27] Um but the um interesting thing as well

[56:30] will be to see the extent to which um in

[56:33] a if were the situation to be improved

[56:36] between the United States on the one

[56:37] hand and China and Russia on the other

[56:39] hand uh both both China and Russia could

[56:42] actually have a hand in helping to bring

[56:43] that um that war to a close. What's for

[56:46] sure is that unless the United States is

[56:49] able willing to uh deploy significant

[56:53] land troops when I say significant we're

[56:55] talking tens hundreds of thousands cuz

[56:58] nothing else is going to make a

[56:59] difference then the then then the war

[57:02] cannot be mitarily. Yeah. And we know I

[57:05] don't think I'm I'm overg guessing to

[57:08] say that there's no political appetite

[57:09] in the United States to deploy land

[57:11] forces into the Iranian war. Um I think

[57:14] as regards the um Russia Ukraine war

[57:17] that's a more difficult one to call. Um

[57:19] my guess uh is that what you what Putin

[57:24] will be thinking about will be about the

[57:26] coming economic crisis in Europe

[57:28] [clears throat] cuz one of the things

[57:29] that he could be saying to himself is

[57:31] okay I could respond um by as the

[57:35] Europeans start to ratch up pressure on

[57:37] me but actually I can see what's coming.

[57:40] So by the time this economic crisis hits

[57:43] Europe, then at that stage the Europeans

[57:45] will be recognized finally that they

[57:47] simply can't afford the weapons and

[57:49] they're actually because they're

[57:51] actually tipping into recession. I mean

[57:52] arguably Germany is already in

[57:54] recession. I think both Britain and

[57:55] France probably probably are on the on

[57:57] the edge of it that suddenly um they're

[58:00] in [clears throat] deep economic trouble

[58:02] and the last thing they want to do is to

[58:03] actually invite their their um countries

[58:06] to um to invest 5% of their GDP in

[58:11] fighting a war which by this stage

[58:13] they'll hopefully rise cannot be won. Um

[58:16] if that happens then I would like to

[58:18] think that it could be could be um

[58:20] brought to a close by the end of the

[58:22] year if the if the recession hits. Um

[58:25] it's slightly sort of weird way to think

[58:26] about it per perhaps um if it were to be

[58:29] diplomacy a lot will depend I think on

[58:32] again it might depend on the midterms it

[58:34] might depend on how the neocons see it.

[58:36] It might depend on the E3 uh and their

[58:39] policies. Um but sooner or later people

[58:42] I'm sure going to recognize that the war

[58:44] cannot be cannot be won. Um the the one

[58:47] other thing that could bring it to a

[58:49] close would be a change in policy by

[58:51] Russia because the alternative to

[58:53] striking uh Europe and I still don't do

[58:56] not think that's off the table even

[58:58] though it's the scenario. The

[58:59] alternative could be a move on Kiev, an

[59:01] arbor move on Kiev. And I think that

[59:03] would be done not for military reasons

[59:05] but for political reasons. And if uh

[59:08] Kiev, the Kiev government were to

[59:10] collapse, then I think at that stage I

[59:12] think it would be game over. So I

[59:15] wouldn't Russia have never mentioned it,

[59:16] but I wouldn't be surprised if it's been

[59:19] something they thought through as a a

[59:21] possible course of action.

[59:23] I do I mean Putin has got to be under

[59:27] domestic pressure. He doesn't rule as an

[59:29] absolute dictator. I mean, he's got

[59:31] constituencies in the GRU, the military.

[59:34] Lots of people would like his job. I

[59:36] mean, how much pressure is he under to

[59:38] respond with force, greater force, do

[59:40] you think?

[59:41] I think he's under significant pressure.

[59:43] Um, but um I I actually took the time

[59:48] when the the war kicked off to listen to

[59:52] Oliver Stone's interviews with Putin to

[59:55] get to know the man. And I also took the

[59:57] time to actually read Philip Short's

[59:59] biography of him. And then you at the I

[01:00:02] came out of that thinking this is a man

[01:00:05] who's extremely strategic and whatever

[01:00:08] you think about him um due to what

[01:00:11] you've heard in the press, this is a

[01:00:13] person who deserves significant respect.

[01:00:16] Yes.

[01:00:16] So if I had been thinking about this, I

[01:00:18] would say we need to think very

[01:00:20] carefully because this is a strategic

[01:00:22] leader who deserves significant respect.

[01:00:24] I think he is under pressure, but

[01:00:27] equally I think he's the sort of man who

[01:00:29] will um be able to resist this pressure

[01:00:32] and do what he thinks best, which is

[01:00:33] what I think he's been doing until now.

[01:00:36] So um although I often hear people say,

[01:00:39] "Oh, why hasn't Putin um I hear

[01:00:42] podcasters and people in the alternative

[01:00:45] media saying that Putin not being

[01:00:46] affected? He should have responded by

[01:00:48] now." Um, I have a strong in intuition

[01:00:52] that supported by the general staff and

[01:00:54] and when I went to Afghanistan before I

[01:00:55] went there, I read the Russ the general

[01:00:58] Russian general staff's analysis of

[01:01:00] their um Afghan campaign. Uh, they did a

[01:01:04] 10-year campaign and got out in good

[01:01:05] order after 10 years. And the um the the

[01:01:10] the structure they left there took took

[01:01:12] 2 years before actually things started

[01:01:15] to become again. We got out after 20

[01:01:17] years. uh much more money expended and

[01:01:19] and where things were collapsing around

[01:01:20] got out. I was really impressed by what

[01:01:22] the the Russian general staff. So I

[01:01:24] would think that actually he's going to

[01:01:25] be very well advised as well by the

[01:01:27] Russian general staff. So I would think

[01:01:29] he's the sort of the man who will be

[01:01:31] able to hold his nerve and I think he's

[01:01:33] the sort of man who will do what he

[01:01:35] thinks right strategically. So again,

[01:01:37] although I've pushed that scenario as

[01:01:39] one to think about and I would think

[01:01:41] that he will have that on the table and

[01:01:43] it wouldn't surprise me if that one way

[01:01:44] in which that if I were to forecast how

[01:01:46] that scenario would play play out rather

[01:01:48] than to to put a sort of worst case, I'd

[01:01:51] say it's he if he were going to use

[01:01:53] weapons, he would the first thing he

[01:01:56] would do is he would ring up the White

[01:01:57] House and say we are going to use

[01:01:59] weapons against uh the E3.

[01:02:01] [snorts and clears throat] Then having

[01:02:02] done that he would then say ring up um

[01:02:05] Mertz Mackerron and um uh Bernham as it

[01:02:09] will be and say we are going to use

[01:02:11] weapons against production facilities

[01:02:13] unless we have a clear um a clear

[01:02:16] response from you saying that you will

[01:02:18] stop providing Ukraine with these sorts

[01:02:20] of weapons. So that's what I would guess

[01:02:22] he would do cuz he would escalate. So

[01:02:25] sorry it's a different type of

[01:02:26] escalation but in terms of holding his

[01:02:28] nerve I would think he will hold his

[01:02:29] nerve for a bit but I think a lot will

[01:02:31] depend on on firstly how the war

[01:02:33] continues to play out secondly the

[01:02:35] economic conditions and thirdly the

[01:02:37] extent to which they the Russians become

[01:02:39] nervous that they are going to find

[01:02:41] large weapons fired into the middle of

[01:02:43] Russia which have been built in France,

[01:02:46] Germany or Britain and if they do start

[01:02:48] to think that is um that is going to

[01:02:51] happen then I would expect uh Putin to

[01:02:53] respond. but in a very measured way.

[01:02:56] That sounds exactly right to me. What

[01:02:59] what a wise analysis. Thank you for

[01:03:00] taking the time to do this.

[01:03:03] It's pleasure, Tucker. And I think keep

[01:03:05] keep up the good work. I think we in the

[01:03:06] in the independent media, uh it's

[01:03:09] important. I get so often I get to the

[01:03:12] podcasts I've done with Danny and Glenn

[01:03:13] Dies and others people saying thank

[01:03:15] goodness at last some common sense and

[01:03:18] we really need this common sense because

[01:03:19] the danger otherwise is that we'll we'll

[01:03:22] do a 1914 which is the last thing we

[01:03:24] need to do.

[01:03:25] Yeah. I spent 35 years in traditional

[01:03:28] media and the second I went to

[01:03:29] independent media I thought this is

[01:03:30] where all the smart people are. I

[01:03:32] wondered where they were [laughter]

[01:03:34] like they're they're not in traditional

[01:03:36] media. So thank you and you're a perfect

[01:03:38] example. So, thank you for doing this.

[01:03:40] Yeah, pleasure. Pleasure.

[01:03:41] Thanks.