# ⭐서울대 필독서⭐노벨상 수상자⭐주식만 하면 뇌가 고장 나는 당신에게: '생각에 관한 생각' (남궁민 북칼럼니스트) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cqGbnWfuMlI Translation: ko [00:00] The book discussed today is Daniel Kahneman's Thinking About Thinking. 오늘 논의된 책은 대니얼 카너먼의 '생각에 대한 생각'입니다. [00:04] Humans have actually made it this far by surviving and surviving on the African savanna. 인간은 실제로 아프리카 사바나에서 생존하고 또 생존함으로써 여기까지 왔습니다. [00:08] I think I see a hyena in the distance. 멀리서 하이에나가 보이는 것 같아요. [00:10] Then I won't go out. 그러면 나가지 않을 거예요. [00:12] For example, there is a banana over there that I need to eat, but no matter how I look at it, there is something that looks like a bear. 예를 들어, 저기 먹어야 할 바나나가 있는데, 아무리 봐도 곰처럼 생긴 것이 있습니다. [00:20] Then, it is highly likely that it is not a bear. 그러면, 그것은 곰이 아닐 가능성이 매우 높습니다. [00:22] It can clump together. 그것은 뭉칠 수 있습니다. [00:24] That is definitely a banana. 그것은 분명히 바나나입니다. [00:26] The friends who went to eat bananas here probably survived nine times, but if it was a bear once, they would have died. 여기서 바나나를 먹으러 간 친구들은 아홉 번은 살아남았을 테지만, 한 번 곰이었다면 죽었을 것입니다. [00:30] Yes. 네. [00:32] But oh my, that looks dangerous. 그런데 아이고, 저것 위험해 보이네요. [00:35] If you don't think it's right, don't do it. 옳지 않다고 생각되면 하지 마세요. [00:37] Some friends kept surviving even after going hungry for a while. 어떤 친구들은 한동안 굶주린 후에도 계속 살아남았습니다. [00:40] In the wild, those who sought safety eventually survived, and we are the descendants of those very safety seekers. 야생에서는 안전을 추구한 자들이 결국 살아남았고, 우리는 바로 그 안전 추구자들의 후손입니다. [00:44] You know, there are times like that in work life. 있잖아요, 직장 생활에도 그런 때가 있습니다. [00:52] Since the laws of the wild were the same, it is natural that the instinct to avoid dangerous sunlight is much stronger than the instinct to approach bananas. 야생의 법칙이 동일했기 때문에 위험한 햇빛을 피하려는 본능이 바나나에 접근하려는 본능보다 훨씬 강한 것은 당연합니다. [00:57] The problem is that it has become a very difficult principle since it came to breakfast investment. 문제는 그것이 아침 투자에 적용되면서 매우 어려운 원칙이 되었다는 것입니다. [01:00] Economic Instinct begins. 경제 본능이 시작됩니다. [01:03] The book discussed today is Daniel Kahneman's Thinking About Thinking. 오늘 논의할 책은 대니얼 카너먼의 '생각에 관한 생각'입니다. [01:07] We have book columnist Nam Guk-min here to introduce us. 책 칼럼니스트 남국민 님이 소개해 주시기 위해 자리했습니다. [01:09] Welcome. 환영합니다. [01:11] Hello. 안녕하세요. [01:11] This is the most famous book when it comes to behavioral economics, isn't it? 행동경제학 하면 가장 유명한 책이죠, 그렇지 않나요? [01:13] That is correct. 맞습니다. [01:13] It is a book whose name you have probably all heard at least once, and it was published in 2011. 여러분 모두 한 번쯤은 들어봤을 이름의 책이며, 2011년에 출판되었습니다. [01:20] The Korean edition came out the following year. 한국어판은 그 다음 해에 나왔습니다. [01:23] However, it became a truly top-tier bestseller in Korea, and not just in Korea, but globally, it has sold millions of copies. 하지만 한국에서 정말 최고 수준의 베스트셀러가 되었고, 한국뿐만 아니라 전 세계적으로 수백만 부가 판매되었습니다. [01:30] But the book's true stature isn't measured solely by sales figures; it is the fact that many of the well-known books in behavioral economics that followed it all cite it. 하지만 이 책의 진정한 위상은 판매 수치만으로 측정되지 않습니다. 그 뒤를 이은 행동경제학의 잘 알려진 책들이 모두 이 책을 인용한다는 사실입니다. [01:42] Hmm. 음. [01:42] It can be said that classics are books that other books cite. 고전은 다른 책들이 인용하는 책이라고 할 수 있습니다. [01:46] Yes. 네. [01:46] But this book is also really thick. 그런데 이 책은 정말 두껍기도 합니다. [01:48] It's super thick, right? 엄청 두껍죠? [01:51] You can do this [laughs]. 이렇게 할 수 있어요 [웃음]. [01:52] Actually, to use an analogy from the field of economics... 사실, 경제학 분야의 비유를 사용하자면... [01:54] It is a book like Adam Smith's theory of national treasures. 애덤 스미스의 국부론 같은 책입니다. [01:57] So, it is a book that holds the status of a national treasure in the field of behavioral economics. 그래서 행동경제학 분야에서 국보와 같은 지위를 가진 책입니다. [01:57] However, since 하지만, [02:01] Books of such high standing are usually very thick and difficult to read, you could say this is a book that gives the impression of being far out of reach despite its high status. 그렇게 높은 지위에 있는 책들은 보통 매우 두껍고 읽기 어려워서, 높은 지위에도 불구하고 손이 닿지 않는 책이라는 인상을 준다고 할 수 있습니다. [02:09] So I asked for your help. 그래서 당신의 도움을 요청했습니다. [02:10] It is too difficult for us to read, so please read it for us. 우리가 읽기에는 너무 어려우니, 우리 대신 읽어 주세요. [02:12] Instead, I have been reading it carefully and thoroughly, so I will try my best to solve it within the allotted time. 대신, 나는 그것을 주의 깊고 철저하게 읽어 왔으므로, 주어진 시간 안에 해결하기 위해 최선을 다하겠습니다. [02:16] Yes. 네. [02:16] Now, this is a book considered the original text of behavioral economics, but I heard the author isn't an economist? 자, 이것은 행동경제학의 원전으로 여겨지는 책인데, 저자가 경제학자가 아니라고 들었습니다. [02:23] You're right. 맞습니다. [02:25] He wrote a book that could be called the bible of the economics field, but he is not an economist. 그는 경제학 분야의 성경이라고 할 수 있는 책을 썼지만, 경제학자는 아닙니다. [02:29] The author of this book is Daniel Kahneman, a psychologist. 이 책의 저자는 심리학자 대니얼 카너먼입니다. [02:34] Uh, last time—no, last time when we were reading *Guns, Germs, and Blood*—that person was actually an ornithologist too, but suddenly, yes. 어, 지난번에—아니, 지난번에 *총, 균, 피*를 읽을 때—그 사람도 사실 조류학자였는데, 갑자기, 네. [02:41] You wrote that sociology report, so when you look at this, it seems a bit like cheating. 당신이 그 사회학 보고서를 썼으니, 이것을 보면 약간 반칙처럼 보입니다. [02:44] You probably did it with sincerity rather than as a side job, but I wonder if people from other fields can write such a good book. 당신은 아마 부업이 아니라 진심으로 했겠지만, 다른 분야의 사람들이 그렇게 좋은 책을 쓸 수 있을지 궁금합니다. [02:56] Yes, Daniel Kahneman is a cognitive psychologist from Israel. 네, 대니얼 카너먼은 이스라엘 출신의 인지 심리학자입니다. [03:00] He is someone who already received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002. 그는 이미 2002년에 노벨 경제학상을 받은 사람입니다. [03:01] Ah, other economists must have been 아, 다른 경제학자들은 분명히 [03:02] Incredibly jealous. 엄청나게 질투심이 많다. [03:03] That's right. 맞아요. [03:05] No, psychologists have this kind of mutual livelihood, right? 아니요, 심리학자들은 이런 상호 생계를 가지고 있죠, 그렇죠? [03:10] But he is a psychologist who could be called a recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002, yet he has never once taken an economics class in his entire life. 하지만 그는 2002년 노벨 경제학상 수상자라고 불릴 수 있는 심리학자이지만, 평생 단 한 번도 경제학 수업을 들은 적이 없습니다. [03:18] But how does economics... I mean, what this means is... 그런데 경제학은 어떻게... 제 말은, 이것이 의미하는 바는... [03:20] I also majored in economics, and there is something they say right from the very first lecture of Principles of Economics when you enter the department. 저도 경제학을 전공했는데, 학과에 들어갈 때 경제학 원론 첫 강의에서 바로 말하는 것이 있습니다. [03:27] It usually starts by talking about what kind of being a human is. 보통 인간이 어떤 존재인지에 대해 이야기하는 것으로 시작합니다. [03:31] That person is a rational being. 그 사람은 합리적인 존재입니다. [03:34] Those who have studied economics have heard this phrase so much they are sick and tired of hearing it: Homo conocus. 경제학을 공부한 사람들은 이 말을 너무 많이 들어서 듣기만 해도 지긋지긋합니다: 호모 코노쿠스. [03:39] In other words, all disciplines of economics are developed under the premise of rational human beings, but this person is someone who hasn't taken that course. 다시 말해, 모든 경제학 분야는 합리적인 인간이라는 전제 하에 발전했지만, 이 사람은 그 수업을 듣지 않은 사람입니다. [03:46] So, in other words, behavioral economics is precisely about ignoring and breaking that premise itself, and proving that it is not the case. 그래서 다시 말해, 행동경제학은 바로 그 전제 자체를 무시하고 깨뜨리며, 그것이 사실이 아님을 증명하는 것입니다. [03:58] Hey, no, I don't really know. 야, 아니, 나는 정말 모르겠어. [04:00] So when I hear things like this, I snort. 그래서 이런 말을 들으면, 나는 코웃음을 칩니다. [04:01] I also think that the things you learn first aren't really that important. 또한 처음 배우는 것들이 그렇게 중요하지 않다고 생각합니다. [04:04] I feel like it reinforces. 그것이 강화되는 것 같아요. [04:03] Too many preconceptions, that's why. 너무 많은 선입견이 있어서 그래. [04:05] In a way, this person has shown that even sentences in textbooks can be wrong, and what they said in their Nobel Prize acceptance speech was very impressive. 어떤 면에서, 이 사람은 교과서의 문장조차 틀릴 수 있다는 것을 보여주었고, 노벨상 수상 연설에서 한 말이 매우 인상적이었습니다. [04:17] So, I want to deny the concept of rationality. 그래서 저는 합리성이라는 개념을 부정하고 싶습니다. [04:19] One word is a summary of the entire book. 한 단어가 전체 책의 요약입니다. [04:21] So, actually, it can be said that this person's short keyword penetrates the entire thick book. 그래서 실제로 이 사람의 짧은 키워드가 두꺼운 책 전체를 꿰뚫는다고 할 수 있습니다. [04:28] Yes. 네. [04:31] This book is very thick, but last time when we were reading *Total Germ Count*, I said let's just focus on luck and real estate, and today, humans are not rational beings. 이 책은 매우 두껍지만, 지난번에 *총균쇠*를 읽을 때 운과 부동산에만 집중하자고 말했고, 오늘은 인간은 합리적 존재가 아니라고 합니다. [04:39] That's right. 맞습니다. [04:39] Let's grab this and go. 이걸 잡고 가자. [04:40] That is correct. 정확합니다. [04:43] And to prove that, I have brought an example that many of you listening will likely relate to— specifically, stock investment. 그리고 그것을 증명하기 위해, 듣고 계신 많은 분들이 공감할 만한 예를 가져왔습니다. 바로 주식 투자입니다. [04:48] No, there is stock investment inside this. 아니요, 이 안에 주식 투자가 있습니다. [04:50] So, humans keep talking about things that aren't rational in a book that is over 600 pages long. 그래서 인간은 600페이지가 넘는 책에서 합리적이지 않은 것들에 대해 계속 이야기합니다. [04:56] But when I hear that, is that really the case? 하지만 그 말을 들으면, 정말 그런가요? [04:58] Because even when choosing a lunch menu, we always choose the tastier one. 왜냐하면 점심 메뉴를 고를 때조차 우리는 항상 더 맛있는 것을 선택하기 때문입니다. [05:01] Also, whenever there is a discount, I try to think hard and 또한, 할인이 있을 때마다 나는 열심히 생각하려고 노력하고 [05:05] choose everything right away, but I come to think that it isn't rational. 모든 것을 바로 선택하지만, 그것이 합리적이지 않다고 생각하게 됩니다. [05:09] yes. 네. [05:10] However, today I would like to apply the argument that this book is not rational to the topic of stock investment and explain it. 하지만 오늘 저는 이 책이 합리적이지 않다는 주장을 주식 투자 주제에 적용하여 설명하고자 합니다. [05:18] yes. 네. [05:19] Let's get started right away. 바로 시작하겠습니다. [05:19] yes. 네. [05:21] So, before we start, let me ask Mr. An Nam-woo-seo a question. 그래서 시작하기 전에 안남우서 씨에게 질문을 드리겠습니다. [05:23] Anna Hoon-seo, you currently have two stocks in your stock account. 안훈서 씨, 현재 주식 계좌에 두 개의 주식을 보유하고 있습니다. [05:27] yes. 네. [05:29] I bought 1 million won worth of both Stock A and Stock B. 주식 A와 주식 B를 각각 100만 원어치 샀습니다. [05:30] A long time ago. 오래전에요. [05:32] But now Stock A has risen a lot and reached 1.5 million won. 그런데 지금 주식 A는 많이 올라서 150만 원이 되었습니다. [05:35] yes. 네. [05:36] But as for Stock B. 하지만 주식 B는요. [05:39] It has dropped a lot now, falling to 600,000 won. 지금 많이 떨어져서 60만 원이 되었습니다. [05:41] hmm. 음. [05:41] You suffered a loss of 400,000 won, right? 40만 원의 손실을 입었죠? [05:43] But now I suddenly need some urgent money. 그런데 지금 갑자기 급전이 필요합니다. [05:46] The all-level suddenly became a bit short. 전체적으로 갑자기 좀 부족해졌습니다. [05:48] I have to pay my credit card bill. 신용카드 대금을 내야 합니다. [05:49] uh. 어. [05:50] Then, which of these two stocks do you think you would sell? 그렇다면 이 두 주식 중 어느 것을 팔겠습니까? [05:56] If you ask me right now, I have to sell what made a profit anyway. 지금 저에게 묻는다면, 어차피 수익이 난 것을 팔아야 합니다. [05:58] It feels a bit like I got some free money. 마치 공짜 돈을 얻은 것 같은 느낌이 듭니다. [06:00] Actually, since I sold something that was in the red, this is an action that locks in my loss, right? 사실, 손실 중인 것을 팔았기 때문에 이것은 손실을 확정짓는 행동이죠? [06:06] That really gives you that kind of pain, like your finger has been cut. 그것은 정말로 손가락이 잘린 것 같은 고통을 줍니다. [06:10] Yes. 네. [06:12] Because it amounts to me admitting my failure. 왜냐하면 그것은 제가 실패를 인정하는 것과 같기 때문입니다. [06:12] But when you sell a stock that has gone up, it feels like you got money for free, and since you earned 500,000 won, well, you get it. 하지만 오른 주식을 팔면 공짜로 돈을 얻은 것처럼 느껴지고, 50만 원을 벌었으니, 음, 이해가 됩니다. [06:22] When I actually conduct research and survey people, most of them say they sell stock A. 제가 실제로 연구하고 사람들을 조사해 보면, 대부분은 주식 A를 판다고 말합니다. [06:24] Yes. 네. [06:24] So, people sell profitable stocks first and think, "Oh, if I wait, things will work out," regarding the losing stocks. 그래서 사람들은 수익이 난 주식을 먼저 팔고, 손실이 난 주식에 대해서는 "아, 기다리면 어떻게든 되겠지"라고 생각합니다. [06:31] But is this really a rational decision? 하지만 이것이 정말 합리적인 결정일까요? [06:32] Oh, no. 아, 아닙니다. [06:34] If you think about it based on reasonable standards. 합리적인 기준에 따라 생각해 보면 말이죠. [06:36] Regarding the future outlook, it is not important how much it has dropped or risen. 미래 전망에 관해서는, 얼마나 떨어졌거나 올랐는지는 중요하지 않습니다. [06:41] Actually, how much it fell or rose in the past isn't really important. 사실, 과거에 얼마나 떨어졌거나 올랐는지는 정말 중요하지 않습니다. [06:45] Actually, if you are truly rational, the question you should be considering is: Will Stock A go up in the future? 사실, 당신이 진정으로 합리적이라면 고려해야 할 질문은: 주식 A가 미래에 오를 것인가?입니다. [06:50] The point is that you need to consider whether Stock B will rise in the future. 요점은 주식 B가 미래에 오를지 여부를 고려해야 한다는 것입니다. [06:52] Uh, for example, A is Hynix and B is the pharmaceutical company I am currently suffering from. 어, 예를 들어, A는 하이닉스이고 B는 제가 현재 고통받고 있는 제약 회사입니다. [06:58] Yes. 네. [06:59] Ah, [sigh] you're right. 아, [한숨] 맞아요. [07:01] It's such a waste to sell Hynix. 하이닉스를 파는 것은 정말 아깝습니다. [07:02] That's right. 맞습니다. [07:05] But actually, you have to make the decision at the very moment you sell. 하지만 실제로는, 파는 바로 그 순간에 결정을 내려야 합니다. [07:05] Hmm. 음. [07:07] B is more promising when viewed at the moment of sale. B는 판매 시점에서 볼 때 더 유망합니다. [07:08] So, I absolutely have to hold onto that one, and selling the one that went up is correct, right? 그래서 저는 그 주식을 꼭 보유해야 하고, 오른 주식을 파는 것이 맞는 거죠? [07:14] But if, at the moment of selling, the stock that has risen a lot so far is almost certain to rise even more tomorrow. 하지만 판매 시점에서 지금까지 많이 오른 주식이 내일 더 오를 것이 거의 확실하다면요. [07:18] Hmm. 음. [07:18] If I hold the right stocks, they should rise further tomorrow, and since the stocks that have fallen will remain sluggish, I should sell them so that when viewed as X in my account tomorrow, the total amount will be higher. 올바른 주식을 보유하면 내일 더 오를 것이고, 떨어진 주식은 계속 부진할 것이므로, 내일 내 계좌에서 X로 볼 때 총액이 더 높아지도록 그 주식을 팔아야 합니다. [07:29] The total amount would be higher. 총액이 더 높을 것입니다. [07:31] Being truly rational means choosing which one will result in a larger total amount, and based on that criterion, it is actually more rational to keep A and sell B. 진정으로 합리적이라는 것은 어떤 것이 더 큰 총액을 가져올지 선택하는 것을 의미하며, 그 기준에 따라 A를 유지하고 B를 파는 것이 실제로 더 합리적입니다. [07:40] Hey, but it is kind of too cruel. 야, 하지만 그건 좀 너무 잔인한데. [07:42] That's right. 맞아. [07:44] But this... uh, everyone will probably feel a pang of guilt. 하지만 이건... 어, 아마 모두가 죄책감을 느낄 거야. [07:46] I'm the same way. 나도 마찬가지야. [07:48] If you do this in a hurry. 서둘러서 이렇게 하면. [07:48] But this is precisely an example that reveals the core error of human judgment. 하지만 이것은 바로 인간 판단의 핵심 오류를 드러내는 예입니다. [07:52] So, let me explain it to you again. 그러니 다시 설명해 드리겠습니다. [07:55] Come to think of it, the account tomorrow, right? 생각해 보면, 내일 계좌 말이죠, 그렇죠? [07:58] So, we have all received education and understand this to some extent, so why do we make such mistakes? 그래서 우리 모두 교육을 받았고 어느 정도 이해하고 있는데, 왜 이런 실수를 할까요? [08:05] That is because although our brain appears to be a single unit, it actually 그것은 우리의 뇌가 하나의 단일체처럼 보이지만 실제로는 [08:08] Operates as two separate systems: System 1 and System 2. 시스템 1과 시스템 2라는 두 개의 분리된 시스템으로 작동합니다. [08:12] You mean two systems? The brain. 두 시스템을 말하는 건가요? 뇌 말이죠. [08:14] That is correct. 맞습니다. [08:16] This is the frame that runs through the entire book. 이것이 책 전체를 관통하는 틀입니다. [08:19] The original English title of this book is Think King Fast Anslow. 이 책의 원래 영어 제목은 Think King Fast Anslow입니다. [08:23] Hmm. 음. [08:23] I think quickly and slowly. 나는 빠르게 그리고 느리게 생각합니다. [08:25] That is correct. 맞습니다. [08:27] So, we think quickly and slowly, and this is the difference between System 1 and System 2. 그래서 우리는 빠르게 그리고 느리게 생각하며, 이것이 시스템 1과 시스템 2의 차이입니다. [08:34] Although our brain appears to be a single system, it actually operates using two separate systems. 우리의 뇌는 하나의 시스템처럼 보이지만, 실제로는 두 개의 분리된 시스템을 사용하여 작동합니다. [08:37] System 1 is very fast. 시스템 1은 매우 빠릅니다. [08:40] It's intuitive. 직관적입니다. [08:40] I make a decision in an instant. 나는 순간적으로 결정을 내립니다. [08:43] Hmm. 음. [08:43] So it's fast. 그래서 빠릅니다. [08:43] As for Slow. 느린 것에 관해서는. [08:46] For example, regarding the system, what is 2 + 2? 예를 들어, 시스템에 관해, 2 더하기 2는 무엇인가요? [08:48] 4 comes out right away. 4가 바로 나옵니다. [08:49] You just used the system. 방금 시스템을 사용하셨습니다. [08:51] Yes. 네. [08:53] But if I were to ask Anausa, um, I don't know 35 * 27. 하지만 제가 아나우사에게 묻는다면, 음, 35 곱하기 27을 모릅니다. [08:59] The calculation for this needs to come down again, right? 이 계산은 다시 내려와야 하죠, 그렇죠? [08:59] It makes judgments very slow. 판단을 매우 느리게 만듭니다. [09:04] You know how you think, "From here, it goes like this, so I'll just upload it for a moment and..." 여기서부터 이렇게 가니까 잠시 업로드하고... 이렇게 생각하는 방식 아시죠? [09:05] Then, that is actually System 2. 그러면, 그것은 사실 시스템 2입니다. [09:07] Hmm. 음. [09:07] I'm going to 나는 할 것입니다 [09:09] show you a picture. 사진 하나 보여드리겠습니다. [09:11] Yes. 네. [09:12] Just by looking at this woman's expression, 이 여성의 표정만 봐도, [09:13] yes. 네. [09:14] He is frowning a lot and 그는 인상을 많이 찌푸리고 있고 [09:16] looks menacing. 위협적으로 보입니다. [09:16] yes. 네. [09:17] The moment everyone sees this, they think, "Oh, that woman is angry." 모든 사람이 이것을 보는 순간, "아, 저 여자는 화가 났구나"라고 생각합니다. [09:19] hmm. 음. [09:21] Which area is this using? 이것은 어떤 영역을 사용하는 것일까요? [09:23] hmm. 음. [09:24] That's number 1. 그것은 1번입니다. [09:25] That's right. 맞습니다. [09:27] You know what we call first impressions. 우리가 첫인상이라고 부르는 것을 아시죠. [09:29] The point is that the judgment, which appears to have been decided in just one second, actually returns to the system. 요점은 단 1초 만에 결정된 것처럼 보이는 그 판단이 실제로는 시스템으로 돌아간다는 것입니다. [09:31] hmm. 음. [09:32] Falling in love at first sight. 첫눈에 반하는 것. [09:34] Something like this. 이런 것 말이죠. [09:34] That's right. 맞습니다. [09:34] okay. 좋아요. [09:36] My first impression was really good, but after a while, I realized it's not that great. 첫인상은 정말 좋았는데, 시간이 지나니 그렇게 대단하지 않다는 것을 깨달았습니다. [09:41] People often ask, "Where does 'this is bad' fall?" 사람들은 자주 묻습니다, "'이것은 나쁘다'는 어디에 속하나요?" [09:43] It is System 2. 그것은 시스템 2입니다. [09:45] Actually, if you think about it, judging a person in just one second can be rash and 사실 생각해보면, 단 1초 만에 사람을 판단하는 것은 성급하고 [09:50] highly likely to be wrong. 틀릴 가능성이 매우 높습니다. [09:52] Of course, physiognomy isn't wrong. 물론, 관상이 틀린 것은 아닙니다. [09:54] There are people like this, but ultimately, System 2 needs to operate, and the 이런 사람들도 있지만, 궁극적으로는 시스템 2가 작동해야 하고, [09:56] System and 2 are 시스템과 2는 [09:58] separated, and the System is intuitive and 분리되어 있으며, 시스템은 직관적이고 [10:01] fast. 빠릅니다. [10:02] System 2 is rational and level-headed, so what is the problem? 시스템 2는 합리적이고 침착하니, 문제가 무엇일까요? [10:08] It would be nice to always think this way, but what if we took every moment this seriously and thoughtfully? 항상 이렇게 생각하면 좋겠지만, 매 순간을 이렇게 진지하고 신중하게 대한다면 어떨까요? [10:08] Uh, 어, [10:10] I think that would be a really hard life. 그것은 정말 힘든 삶일 것 같아요. [10:12] Right? 그렇죠? [10:15] Actually, calculating such complex calculations requires a lot of energy and is a difficult task. 사실, 그렇게 복잡한 계산을 하는 것은 많은 에너지를 필요로 하고 어려운 작업입니다. [10:17] So, this system is not trying to work properly. 그래서 이 시스템은 제대로 작동하려고 하지 않습니다. [10:20] It's very lazy. 매우 게으릅니다. [10:22] yes. 네. [10:22] hmm. 음. [10:25] Then, how does this manifest in the stock market? 그렇다면 이것이 주식 시장에서 어떻게 나타날까요? [10:27] Here is how this manifests in the stock market. 이것이 주식 시장에서 나타나는 방식입니다. [10:29] Let me give you an example. 예를 하나 들어보겠습니다. [10:30] Just as I opened it, the stocks I bought yesterday were all blue. 방금 열었을 때, 어제 산 주식이 모두 파란색이었습니다. [10:33] It has plummeted by 10%. 10% 폭락했습니다. [10:35] When you open your eyes, what thoughts would all of you have the moment you see that? 눈을 떴을 때, 여러분 모두 그 순간 어떤 생각이 들까요? [10:40] Actually, I'm just hot. 사실, 그냥 화가 났어요. [10:41] Ah, right. 아, 맞아요. [10:42] [Laughs] [웃음] [10:45] That is a kind of emotion of fear, sadness, and depression. 그것은 두려움, 슬픔, 우울의 일종의 감정입니다. [10:46] You cover it right away, don't you? 당신은 그것을 바로 덮어버리죠, 그렇죠? [10:47] yes. 네. [10:47] That is when the system circle moves. 그때 시스템 서클이 움직입니다. [10:50] So, System One is already in despair and thinks, "Oh, this is a big problem." 그래서 시스템 원은 이미 절망에 빠져 "아, 이거 큰일이야"라고 생각합니다. [10:55] If it is actually rational, why did it drop? 만약 실제로 합리적이라면, 왜 떨어졌을까요? [10:57] Were there any negative factors? 부정적인 요인이 있었나요? [11:00] Wouldn't this company's fundamentals be different? 이 회사의 펀더멘털이 다르지 않을까요? [11:01] You need to think, but most people don't go as far as System 2 and only move System 1. 생각해야 하지만, 대부분의 사람들은 시스템 2까지 가지 않고 시스템 1만 움직입니다. [11:05] You either dump it like I did there, or just panic sell, right? 당신은 내가 거기서 한 것처럼 던져버리거나, 그냥 공포에 매도하죠, 그렇죠? [11:09] Let's just sell it. 그냥 팔아버리자. [11:10] Something big happened. 큰 일이 일어났어. [11:10] You just 당신은 그냥 [11:11] Sell it off thinking there must be something there. 거기에 뭔가 있을 거라고 생각하며 팔아치운다. [11:13] That is precisely what can be called a victory for System One. 그것이 바로 시스템 1의 승리라고 할 수 있는 것이다. [11:16] Hmm. 음. [11:16] There is also the opposite situation. 반대 상황도 있다. [11:19] When people hear about a stock, for example, that a friend or cousin bought some biotech stock and doubled their investment, the moment they hear this, most people generally think, "Oh, should I buy some too?" yes. 예를 들어, 사람들이 친구나 사촌이 바이오 주식을 샀다가 투자금을 두 배로 불렸다는 주식 이야기를 들으면, 그 순간 대부분의 사람들은 일반적으로 "아, 나도 좀 살까?"라고 생각한다. 맞다. [11:31] This is exactly what a system is. 이것이 바로 시스템이다. [11:34] But actually, if something is reasonable, System 2 needs to operate. 하지만 실제로는 어떤 것이 합리적이라면 시스템 2가 작동해야 한다. [11:38] Right? 그렇지? [11:39] Why? 왜? [11:39] Did it really go up? 정말 올랐나? [11:40] Is that right? 그게 맞나? [11:43] Or, you should be thinking, "What are the financial statements like for that specific stock?" but for most people, it is too late. 또는 "그 특정 주식의 재무제표는 어떤가?"라고 생각해야 하지만, 대부분의 사람들에게는 너무 늦었다. [11:49] The reason I don't think about this is because I am late and lazy. 내가 이것에 대해 생각하지 않는 이유는 내가 늦고 게으르기 때문이다. [11:51] Hmm. 음. [11:52] In the end, whether you panic sell or buy whatever, it means that System 1 ultimately beat System 2. 결국, 공황 상태로 팔든 무엇이든 사든, 그것은 시스템 1이 궁극적으로 시스템 2를 이겼다는 뜻이다. [12:00] That is correct. 맞다. [12:00] Actually, if I had my way, people usually sell things when they drop 10%—it's really strange, isn't it? 사실, 내 마음대로라면, 사람들은 보통 10% 떨어지면 물건을 판다—정말 이상하지 않은가? [12:04] So, I've noticed that it usually goes up when I come back after lunch. 그래서 나는 점심 먹고 돌아오면 보통 오른다는 것을 알아차렸다. [12:08] [Laughs] [웃음] [12:09] I tell everyone to buy it because I sold it. 내가 팔았으니 모두에게 사라고 말한다. [12:11] So, let's talk about things like that. 그럼, 그런 것들에 대해 이야기해 봅시다. [12:12] There are many cases where the price goes up wondering who knew I sold it, but then later on, you realize it wasn't a big deal and was just a baseless rumor. 내가 팔았다는 걸 누가 알았는지 궁금해하며 가격이 오르는 경우가 많지만, 나중에 알고 보니 별일 아니었고 근거 없는 소문에 불과했다는 것을 깨닫게 됩니다. [12:19] But if you ask why System 2 didn't do the work, System 2 consumes a lot of energy. 하지만 시스템 2가 왜 그 일을 하지 않았는지 묻는다면, 시스템 2는 많은 에너지를 소모하기 때문입니다. [12:25] Usually, when we get home from work, it’s so hard to get back, isn’t it? 보통 퇴근하고 집에 돌아오면 다시 움직이기가 너무 힘들죠, 그렇지 않나요? [12:27] That is when people say they don't want to use their brains. 그때 사람들은 머리를 쓰고 싶지 않다고 말합니다. [12:29] At times like that, you really just want to watch a variety show where you can laugh out loud, you know? 그럴 때는 정말 크게 웃을 수 있는 예능 프로그램을 보고 싶잖아요, 그렇죠? [12:33] It is the same. 똑같습니다. [12:35] Because System 2 is also difficult, people don't operate it often. 시스템 2도 어렵기 때문에 사람들은 자주 작동시키지 않습니다. [12:39] So, it means that if we just do exactly as System One tells us to, we end up making investments that we regret later. 그래서 시스템 1이 시키는 대로만 하면 나중에 후회할 투자를 하게 된다는 뜻입니다. [12:44] Hmm. 음. [12:44] Yes. 네. [12:44] So, shall we take a look at some of the specific pitfalls that our System 1 creates? 그럼, 우리 시스템 1이 만들어내는 몇 가지 구체적인 함정들을 한번 살펴볼까요? [12:50] Yes. 네. [12:50] For example, the first thing I would like to ask is, you mentioned earlier that when looking at the account, there are profits and losses, right? 예를 들어, 제가 가장 먼저 묻고 싶은 것은, 앞에서 계좌를 볼 때 수익과 손실이 있다고 말씀하셨죠? [12:58] What was that reference point? 그 기준점은 무엇이었나요? [13:00] That's the price I paid. 그건 제가 지불한 가격입니다. [13:00] That's right. 맞습니다. [13:00] 1 million won. 100만 원입니다. [13:00] I always think about this here. 저는 항상 여기서 이것에 대해 생각합니다. [13:02] But this number becomes the standard for all our pots. 하지만 이 숫자가 우리 모든 포트의 기준이 됩니다. [13:06] But Kahneman calls this the anchoring effect. 그러나 카너먼은 이것을 닻 효과라고 부릅니다. [13:10] Hmm. 음. [13:10] All of them are coming down. 그들 모두 내려오고 있습니다. [13:10] The 그 [13:11] Anchor gets off the ship just as he's about to get hurt. 앵커가 다칠 뻔한 순간에 배에서 내린다. [13:13] Then, if you get off the ship, you'll just circle around that area and won't be able to go anywhere else. 그러면 배에서 내리면 그 지역 주변만 맴돌고 다른 곳으로 갈 수 없게 된다. [13:19] Hmm. 음. [13:19] In other words, the number 1 million won gets ingrained in our minds. 즉, 100만 원이라는 숫자가 우리 마음에 각인된다. [13:25] For example, there is a famous experiment conducted by Kahneman. 예를 들어, 카너먼이 수행한 유명한 실험이 있다. [13:26] We had the experiment participants spin the roulette wheel. 우리는 실험 참가자들에게 룰렛을 돌리게 했다. [13:29] Yes. 네. [13:29] However, this roulette wheel is heavily rigged so that a specific number is set to come out, and it is configured to show either 10 or 65. 하지만 이 룰렛은 특정 숫자가 나오도록 심하게 조작되어 있으며, 10 또는 65가 표시되도록 설정되어 있다. [13:39] Both are meaningless numbers. 둘 다 의미 없는 숫자이다. [13:40] So, I have some people run it and see the results, and then I ask them this. 그래서 나는 몇몇 사람들에게 그것을 돌리고 결과를 보게 한 후, 그들에게 이것을 묻는다. [13:47] Among the UN member countries, is the proportion of African countries higher or lower than this number? 유엔 회원국 중에서 아프리카 국가의 비율이 이 숫자보다 높은가요, 낮은가요? [13:52] Uh, I'm asking. 어, 내가 묻고 있다. [13:52] And then I ask, "What is the exact percentage?" 그리고 나서 "정확한 비율이 얼마인가요?"라고 묻는다. [13:56] Yes. 네. [13:56] But actually, the numbers that come up on the roulette wheel have nothing to do with the trend subscription rates of European, or rather African, countries. 하지만 실제로 룰렛에서 나오는 숫자는 유럽, 아니 아프리카 국가들의 트렌드 가입률과 아무 관련이 없다. [14:03] It doesn't matter. 상관없다. [14:04] Yes. 네. [14:04] However, the groups that saw 10 said the average was 25%. 하지만 10을 본 그룹은 평균이 25%라고 말했다. [14:09] He said that the group with 65 was 45%. 그는 65를 본 그룹은 45%라고 말했다. [14:12] But come to think of it, everyone knows that it has nothing to do with the numbers that come out of the spinning wheel. 하지만 생각해 보면, 모두가 그것이 돌아가는 바퀴에서 나오는 숫자와는 아무 상관이 없다는 것을 알고 있습니다. [14:18] The point is that after 65 just came up on the spinning wheel, when asked a question, the person called out a higher number, while the person who saw a lower number called out a lower number. 요점은 65가 방금 돌아가는 바퀴에 나온 후, 질문을 받았을 때 한 사람은 더 높은 숫자를 외쳤고, 더 낮은 숫자를 본 사람은 더 낮은 숫자를 외쳤다는 것입니다. [14:25] Yes. 네. [14:28] So, this means that the numbers on that spinning wheel have become a sort of mechanism that makes one give an irrational answer. 그래서 이것은 그 돌아가는 바퀴의 숫자들이 비합리적인 답변을 하게 만드는 일종의 메커니즘이 되었다는 것을 의미합니다. [14:32] But where do we usually see this? 하지만 우리는 보통 이것을 어디서 볼까요? [14:37] Well, those stock companies and securities firms release things like target stock prices. 음, 그 주식 회사들과 증권 회사들이 목표 주가 같은 것들을 발표합니다. [14:40] So, we are going to anchor that as well. 그래서 우리는 그것도 기준으로 삼을 것입니다. [14:42] That's right. 맞습니다. [14:44] Yes. 네. [14:44] Of course, it could be the result of their research, but there is no reason to judge it based on that. 물론 그것은 그들의 연구 결과일 수도 있지만, 그것에 기반하여 판단할 이유는 없습니다. [14:49] There is a price right now, and we need to make a judgment based on reasonable standards. 지금 가격이 있고, 우리는 합리적인 기준에 기반하여 판단을 내려야 합니다. [14:55] For example, regarding the price I paid, it’s like this. 예를 들어, 내가 지불한 가격에 관해서는 이렇습니다. [14:57] Well, considering how high Samsung Electronics has risen, it's going to 100,000. 음, 삼성전자가 얼마나 올랐는지 고려하면, 10만 원으로 갈 것입니다. [15:01] I'm selling it because 100,000 electronics are going. 10만 전자가 가고 있기 때문에 나는 그것을 팔고 있습니다. [15:02] It's like this. 이렇습니다. [15:04] For example, my friend went up to 100,000 won, so I think it has gone up as much as it can. 예를 들어, 내 친구가 10만 원까지 올랐으므로, 나는 그것이 더 이상 오를 수 없을 만큼 올랐다고 생각합니다. [15:08] Actually, whether it is 101,000 won or 9,900 won, it has nothing to do with the value of the company itself. 사실, 그것이 101,000원이든 9,900원이든, 회사 자체의 가치와는 아무 상관이 없습니다. [15:13] People say my goal is 100,000 won. 사람들은 내 목표가 10만 원이라고 말한다. [15:15] He said he would sell it for 100,000 won. 그는 그것을 10만 원에 팔겠다고 말했다. [15:17] That creates a strange kind of anchoring, and the important thing is how much further it goes from 100,000 won; since it reached 100,000 won, I am selling. 그것은 이상한 종류의 앵커링을 만들어내고, 중요한 것은 10만 원에서 얼마나 더 나아가느냐이며, 10만 원에 도달했으므로 나는 판매하는 것이다. [15:26] It is common to provide a step-down anchoring effect in this way. 이런 방식으로 단계적 하향 앵커링 효과를 제공하는 것은 흔하다. [15:28] Those who had been stuck for a long time said that. 오랫동안 갇혀 있던 사람들이 그렇게 말했다. [15:29] It’s a very sad story, but [laughs] there are a lot of people with Samsung Electronics salaries of 70,000 or 80,000 won. 매우 슬픈 이야기지만, [웃음] 삼성전자 급여가 7만 원이나 8만 원인 사람들이 많다. [15:34] This was the peak price several years ago, you know. 이것은 몇 년 전의 최고 가격이었다, 알다시피. [15:37] So, that is a kind of injury. 그래서, 그것은 일종의 상처이다. [15:40] Ah, I feel so uneasy if I only put that amount in there. 아, 그 금액만 거기에 넣으면 너무 불안하다. [15:42] That's right. 맞아. [15:42] yes. 네. [15:42] yes. 네. [15:45] The problem is that, strictly speaking, the prices from 7 or 8 years ago—or rather, a few years ago—have absolutely no relevance to the company's current internal conditions, but they have simply become the standard. 문제는 엄밀히 말해 7~8년 전, 아니 몇 년 전의 가격이 회사의 현재 내부 상황과 전혀 관련이 없지만, 단순히 기준이 되었다는 것이다. [15:52] I know, right. 그렇지, 맞아. [15:54] But it is really scary. 하지만 정말 무섭다. [15:56] So, it means that all the numbers become anchored. 그래서, 모든 숫자가 앵커링된다는 뜻이다. [15:56] That's right. 맞아. [15:56] you're right. 네 말이 맞아. [15:59] The point is that there are really too many anchoring numbers around, and since each and every one of them becomes anchored to us, it leads to irrational numbers. 요점은 주변에 앵커링 숫자가 정말 너무 많고, 그 각각이 우리에게 앵커링되기 때문에 비합리적인 숫자로 이어진다는 것이다. [16:05] I actually fell for this myself, but one of my juniors invested in Tesla early on and made several times his initial investment. 나도 실제로 이에 속았지만, 후배 중 한 명이 일찍 테슬라에 투자해서 초기 투자금의 몇 배를 벌었다. [16:12] yes. 네. [16:12] Oh, right. 아, 맞아. [16:12] Ah, now I'm even getting free meals, and my fortune has 아, 이제 공짜 밥까지 얻어먹고, 내 운이 [16:14] changed several times over. 여러 번 바뀌었다. [16:16] [Laughs] [웃음] [16:17] But this junior told me about it later at dinner, and I remember it so vividly. 그런데 이 후배가 나중에 저녁 식사 때 그 이야기를 해줬고, 나는 그것을 아주 생생하게 기억한다. [16:23] Ah, when I heard that, I thought, "Oh, I could do that too," so I jumped in belatedly as well. 아, 그 말을 들었을 때 나는 '아, 나도 그렇게 할 수 있겠다'고 생각해서 늦게나마 뛰어들었다. [16:29] But then, the story of how many times that amount was stuck in my head. 그런데 그 금액이 몇 배가 되었다는 이야기가 내 머릿속에 박혀 있었다. [16:34] But actually, from my perspective, the fact that my friend made several times his money has nothing to do with my choice to invest here today. 하지만 사실 내 관점에서 보면, 내 친구가 몇 배의 수익을 냈다는 사실은 오늘 내가 여기에 투자하기로 한 선택과 아무 관련이 없다. [16:39] It has nothing to do with it. 그것과는 아무 관련이 없다. [16:41] Because it's a story from the past. 왜냐하면 그것은 과거의 이야기이기 때문이다. [16:43] But furthermore, this information is meaningless because people who are usually cut in half or even a quarter don't tell their friends. 게다가 이 정보는 무의미하다. 왜냐하면 보통 반토막 나거나 4분의 1로 줄어든 사람들은 친구들에게 말하지 않기 때문이다. [16:48] Ah, that's right. 아, 맞다. [16:49] I only talk about the successful friends. 나는 성공한 친구들에 대해서만 이야기한다. [16:51] They only talk about how much it has gone up. 그들은 얼마나 올랐는지만 이야기한다. [16:54] So, that wrong anchor got stuck in my head [snorted], and actually, the results right after that weren't very good. 그래서 그 잘못된 기준이 내 머릿속에 박혔고 [코웃음], 실제로 그 직후의 결과는 그리 좋지 않았다. [17:01] Because the fact that the profits have reached a level to cheer for implies that there is some risk of a drop. 왜냐하면 수익이 환호할 만한 수준에 도달했다는 사실은 하락 위험이 어느 정도 있다는 것을 암시하기 때문이다. [17:05] Therefore, Kanema calls this the availability heuristic. 따라서 카네마는 이것을 가용성 휴리스틱이라고 부른다. [17:09] He explains that 그는 설명한다 [17:15] Information heard recently—specifically, among that anchoring—becomes deeply ingrained in our minds, leading us to make choices biased toward it. 최근에 들은 정보, 특히 그 닻 내림 효과 속에서 들은 정보는 우리 마음에 깊이 각인되어, 우리가 그 쪽으로 편향된 선택을 하게 만듭니다. [17:23] He argues that while there is no real reason why what we heard yesterday should be more important, humans have a tendency to be swayed by such things, describing this as an irrationality known as the availability heuristic. 그는 어제 들은 것이 왜 더 중요해야 하는지에 대한 진짜 이유는 없지만, 인간은 그러한 것들에 영향을 받는 경향이 있으며, 이것을 가용성 휴리스틱이라고 알려진 비합리성이라고 설명합니다. [17:32] Can you give me another example? 다른 예를 들어 주실 수 있나요? [17:34] People are anchoring more to that recent news. 사람들은 그 최근 뉴스에 더 고정되고 있습니다. [17:37] There is another example, for instance, a similar case where someone didn't take the plane after a plane accident. 또 다른 예가 있습니다. 예를 들어, 비행기 사고 후에 비행기를 타지 않은 비슷한 경우입니다. [17:45] There are cases where people don't go to a country just because there was a major terrorist attack there. 사람들이 그곳에서 큰 테러 공격이 있었다는 이유만으로 그 나라에 가지 않는 경우가 있습니다. [17:49] For example, the fact that there was a plane accident yesterday actually has nothing to do with the fact that my next flight has become more dangerous. 예를 들어, 어제 비행기 사고가 있었다는 사실은 실제로 제 다음 비행이 더 위험해졌다는 사실과 아무 관련이 없습니다. [17:55] That is true, though. 하지만 그것은 사실입니다. [17:57] Of course, there might be some airlines with wrongful practices, but generally speaking, even though the plane I am about to take isn't dangerous just because there was an accident yesterday, people feel uneasy about it and end up giving it up. 물론 잘못된 관행을 가진 항공사가 있을 수 있지만, 일반적으로 말해서, 제가 타려는 비행기가 어제 사고가 있었다고 해서 위험한 것은 아니지만, 사람들은 그것에 대해 불안감을 느끼고 결국 포기하게 됩니다. [18:07] This is also referred to as a typical availability heuristic. 이것은 또한 전형적인 가용성 휴리스틱이라고 불립니다. [18:09] There is also an environment these days that encourages this kind of thing. 요즘에는 이런 종류의 것을 조장하는 환경도 있습니다. [18:11] Ah, well, for me, that is something like investment YouTube. 아, 글쎄요, 저에게는 그것이 투자 유튜브 같은 것입니다. [18:14] For those of you watching YouTube, it must be 유튜브를 시청하는 여러분에게는, 그것이 분명히 [18:16] Really hard not to invest these days. 요즘 투자하지 않기가 정말 어렵다. [18:18] That's right. 맞아. [18:19] If you look at things like thumbnails, there are stories like "the story of [something] three times," or "a review of entering Gangnam with [something]; if you don't buy it, you're a fool; it's going to double tomorrow." 썸네일 같은 걸 보면 "[무언가]의 세 번 이야기"나 "[무언가]로 강남 입성 후기; 사지 않으면 바보; 내일 두 배 간다" 같은 이야기들이 있어. [18:27] You know how things like this get uploaded. 이런 것들이 어떻게 올라오는지 알지. [18:28] Yes. 응. [18:30] If you look at things like a 200% return this month or making 100 million won, there is a common thread. 이번 달 200% 수익이나 1억 원 벌기 같은 걸 보면 공통점이 있어. [18:36] I solve half of it. 나는 그 절반을 해결해. [18:37] You probably haven't seen a story like this. 아마 이런 이야기는 본 적 없을 거야. [18:37] Oh, I know, right. 아, 맞아, 그렇지. [18:37] It happens sometimes. 가끔 그런 일이 있어. [18:40] It happens sometimes, but people don't really watch things like that. 가끔 그런 일이 있지만, 사람들은 그런 걸 잘 보지 않아. [18:41] That's right. 맞아. [18:41] I don't even want to watch it, and it won't get many views, so it will be much worse than saying it doubled. 나도 보고 싶지 않고, 조회수도 많이 안 나와서, 두 배 됐다고 말하는 것보다 훨씬 나빠. [18:47] Yes. 응. [18:47] As a result, those who didn't make it don't say anything. 결국, 성공하지 못한 사람들은 아무 말도 하지 않아. [18:50] But only those who have earned several times as much talk about it. 하지만 몇 배를 번 사람들만 그 이야기를 해. [18:52] As this becomes biased toward survivors, it gives people the perception known as the availability heuristic—that if you invest, you must make money. 이게 생존자 편향이 되면서, 사람들에게 가용성 휴리스틱이라는 인식을 줘—투자하면 반드시 돈을 번다는. [19:01] Yes. 응. [19:03] But I think this is the most dangerous part. 하지만 나는 이게 가장 위험한 부분이라고 생각해. [19:03] That optimism. 그 낙관주의. [19:05] That is correct. 맞아. [19:05] Actually, I am not going to make that investment again. 사실, 나는 그 투자를 다시 하지 않을 거야. [19:08] You know there are people who have made up their minds. 결심한 사람들이 있다는 거 알지. [19:10] These people whose family motto is that only investments fail. 가훈이 투자만 실패한다는 사람들. [19:11] It was a bathrobe at my house. 우리 집에서는 목욕 가운이었어. [19:12] The reason that usually happens is that when it starts rising sharply, people generally just think, "Oh, that ca 그런 일이 보통 일어나는 이유는, 급등하기 시작하면 사람들이 대개 그냥 "아, 그게"라고 생각하기 때문이야. [19:16] n't be right. 맞지 않을 거야. [19:18] But as it keeps rising, when my friend's in-law's 8-ton stock starts making money, I wonder if I'm right. 하지만 계속 오르다가 내 친구의 처가의 8톤 주식이 돈을 벌기 시작하면, 내가 맞는지 의문이 든다. [19:23] Then, when my mother-in-law and even my friend's friend's mother start buying, if I get in too, it's usually the peak. 그러다가 장모님과 심지어 내 친구의 친구의 어머니까지 사기 시작하면, 나도 들어가면 보통 정점이다. [19:27] The reason for this is that if you ignore it at first and then enter when the availability heuristic has truly reached its peak, you end up falling at the very tail end. 그 이유는 처음에 무시하다가 가용성 휴리스틱이 진정으로 정점에 도달했을 때 진입하면, 맨 꼬리에서 떨어지게 되기 때문이다. [19:36] Therefore, this kind of recent information bias, or specific information bias, is something that really needs to be guarded against. 따라서 이런 종류의 최근 정보 편향, 또는 특정 정보 편향은 정말로 경계해야 할 것이다. [19:42] yes. 네. [19:42] So, what Kahneman said was the most dangerous thing was overconfidence, right? 그래서 카너먼이 말한 가장 위험한 것은 과신이었죠, 맞죠? [19:47] you're right. 맞아요. [19:47] Unfounded confidence in one's judgment ability. 자신의 판단 능력에 대한 근거 없는 자신감. [19:52] People are calling this overconfidence. 사람들은 이것을 과신이라고 부릅니다. [19:54] The reason this is really dangerous is... 이것이 정말 위험한 이유는... [19:54] Regarding non-anchoring—thinking, "I bought something for 1 million won, so I should earn 1 million won"—or the availability heuristic for recently heard information, since I just mentioned these things, I do think, "Ah, yes, we shouldn't fall for that." 앵커링이 아닌 것에 관해서—"100만 원에 샀으니 100만 원을 벌어야지"라고 생각하는 것—또는 최근에 들은 정보에 대한 가용성 휴리스틱에 관해서, 방금 이런 것들을 언급했기 때문에, 나는 "아, 그래, 우리는 그거에 속으면 안 돼"라고 생각합니다. [20:09] yes. 네. [20:09] You should be cautious, but if you start to become overconfident, you stop being cautious, and because you are not being cautious, you end up becoming overconfident. 조심해야 하지만, 과신하기 시작하면 조심하지 않게 되고, 조심하지 않기 때문에 결국 과신하게 됩니다. [20:17] That Karum is telling his own anecdote [20:19] . [20:20] You said this person is Israeli. yes [20:22] . [20:22] When I was young, I worked as an officer selection interviewer in the Israeli army [20:25] . hmm. hmm. [20:27] But he assigns outdoor training tasks to the candidates and [20:33] evaluates them while observing them. He says things like, "This one is [20:35] promising," or "This one lacks the necessary qualities." He [20:37] said this and did all the evaluation himself [20:39] . [20:40] But you had this experience, and later you were [20:42] hired and worked, right? [20:44] So, since they actually [20:46] serve as officers, results show whether they are excellent or lacking. [20:49] Yes. [20:53] When I looked at the evaluations he had conducted and the actual performance evaluations, I realized he had almost no power [20:55] . uh [20:56] . He should have been a bit shocked after seeing that [20:58] . That's right [20:58] . Actually, I looked at it thinking, "Oh, my eyes are right," but if I was completely wrong, I should have thought, " [21:03] Ah, I shouldn't be doing things like this [21:05] ." yes [21:05] . [21:06] In reality, the truly chilling [21:07] part is that Kahneman honestly confesses [21:09] . That statistical report gave me the [21:14] confidence that I would be able to judge people in the next interview as well [21:15] [laughs]. [21:17] My eyes can't be wrong. [21:20] Uh, I can just improve on this and do better next time [21:21] . That's right [21:22] . It means having that kind of thought [21:24] . But even the [21:26] psychologist who wrote the book "Thinking About Thinking" and [21:29] verified it with data said yes [21:31] . The point is that he was [21:34] unable to deny the judgments he had made so far [21:36] . hmm. [21:37] So, this overconfidence of oneself [21:40] leads to a really scary and strange conclusion [21:42] . Because even [21:43] if you present such clear evidence, it [21:45] won't be fixed at all. That's right [21:47] . Uh, actually, regarding stories about friends or things like that, it’s [21:49] familiar that there are certain sports that, ah, don’t [21:52] work. Objectively speaking, if there [21:54] is a stock that has already been cut in half—for instance—and we [21:56] tell a friend to cut their [21:58] losses and move on because it doesn't seem promising, that is what [21:59] we tell [22:02] investors these days [22:04] . They talk about becoming an involuntary long-term investor [22:07] . [22:08] Oh, my heart hurts. [Laughs] It feels [22:10] like I'm talking. You [22:12] become a major shareholder by averaging down on the drop. We talk about things like this. The reason for that is that [22:14] I have studied that stock sufficiently, [22:18] analyzed its financials for investment, and I [22:21] know something better than the market. The point is that [22:23] once you fall into such overconfidence, it is [22:25] difficult to get out of it. [22:28] Because, in reality, even [22:31] hedge fund and [22:33] professional fund investors who [22:35] spend their entire lives researching investments [22:38] say that fewer than 10% actually outperform the market benchmark in the long run. hmm. [22:40] That is why beating index investing is a [22:43] very difficult area even for experts, so [22:46] we—including all of us, [22:48] including myself—find that perhaps I could do something better [22:51] . [22:53] Everyone acknowledges that this is an unavoidable weakness, yet they jump into [22:55] investing with such overconfidence. Consequently, they suffer [22:58] further losses by averaging down, [23:01] fail to cut their losses, and keep buying and selling because they believe they made the decision at [23:04] that moment [23:06] . [23:07] Oh, this is wrong. If you keep judging, selling, wondering if [23:09] that is going up or what, you end up [23:13] experiencing your stock account just melting away. [23:14] Day traders [23:15] become day traders. But the reason for this is that [23:17] what does this overconfidence [23:20] activate? [23:24] I am giving the final approval stamp to System One. hmm. The [23:25] moment you think, "Hmm, my judgment is right," your [23:28] fingers start moving according to whatever comes to mind, and [23:30] as this repeats, System 2 ends up taking [23:33] a nap while [23:34] System 1 just keeps moving wildly—it [23:37] leads to a bad situation [23:38] . Just by [23:39] listening to the story so far, it seems to have clearly shown just [23:41] how flawed our brains' judgments are and [23:43] how foolish we were [23:46] . That's right [23:46] . That is correct. But it does [23:49] n't end here. [23:50] Of course. It’s [23:50] not just this judgment; they are saying there are more serious problems with the person. [23:53] Then, remember how [23:55] we said earlier that if System 2 is activated, we [23:57] need to make a judgment about what will happen in the future? [24:00] But they say that even that judgment has [24:02] too many irrational aspects. hmm. [24:05] Daniel Kaname explains this using something called prospect [24:07] theory. [24:09] Why do we sell profitable stocks and hold onto losing [24:12] stocks? He explains that this is precisely [24:16] because of prospect theory, which operates irrationally. yes [24:17] . It is prospect theory. So, you know [24:20] how there is the expected utility theory in economics [24:22] . [24:22] That is correct. To [24:23] put it simply, humans make [24:25] rational choices in a way that maximizes their profits [24:27] . Given this premise, is this being [24:29] overturned? Right [24:30] ? The [24:32] reasonable outlook regarding human cultivation is, as you said, that I am [24:35] giving 1 million won, and in the future, it will [24:37] become 2 million won. Then, they say there will be the [24:39] joy of 1 million won. [24:41] But I think that if I lose the entire 1 million won, there will be [24:43] 1 million won of sadness [24:45] . [24:46] Then, in terms of quantity, the two [24:48] are actually the same amount. This can be seen as the [24:50] traditional perspective known as Expected Utility Theory, but [24:52] Prospect Theory is [24:56] introduced by explaining an experiment that challenges this. Please do it [24:58] . [24:59] It's a coin toss game. I am going to make a [25:01] proposal to Announcer Ahn now. I [25:03] will give you a coin now. If you [25:05] flip this coin and it lands heads up, [25:06] I will give you 1.5 million won [25:08] . yes [25:09] . If [25:09] tails come up, you have to give me 1 million won [25:11] . [25:12] Uh. Are you going to play this [25:13] game? [25:15] I don't think I would do it. Our PD [25:17] says he will do it. [25:17] This grinds people down, doesn't it? yes. They said that since they went out into the streets and conducted [25:20] experiments on people, [25:21] most people refused to do it when they made the proposal [25:25] . [25:26] So, because if it's the tails, you have to pay [25:27] 1 million won. [25:29] But actually, if it lands heads up, you win 1 million to [25:30] 1.5 million won, right? [25:32] Uh, right. But if [25:32] you combine the two, you make a profit of 500,000 won. [25:35] But the back side can come out. That's right [25:37] . Actually, if the probability of winning is [25:39] 50% and the probability of losing is 50%, the [25:41] expected profit of this game [25:43] is 250,000 won. He [25:46] gains a utility of 250,000 won just by flipping the coin once [25:49] . in fact. So, [25:51] from a traditional perspective. [25:52] But as I mentioned, the problem is that most people [25:54] refuse to participate. [25:56] That statement makes it impossible not to say that there must be something wrong with the traditional premise [26:01] . The reason is exactly as you mentioned [26:03] . Because I'm afraid of losing 1 million won [26:05] . yes [26:06] . This is Kakanorman's key [26:08] discovery. The point is that even with the same amount of money, humans [26:14] weave the pain and joy of profit and loss asymmetrically. [26:16] The joy of 1 million won and the sorrow of 1 million won are [26:20] not the same when you put Zhou on top. hmm. For [26:21] example, I [26:28] tried to negotiate with people by asking, "Then, how much more are you willing to spend to play this game?" yes. So, they said they would do it if the [26:31] money I give them is generally around 2 to [26:33] 2.5 million won [26:35] . This [26:37] means that although people thought they were the same in traditional theory, [26:42] when looking at how the brain actually works, it has been revealed that the pain of suffering is about [26:44] two to two to 2.5 times [26:47] greater than the pleasure of gain [26:51] . [26:51] That is the reason for saving and depositing money. That's true [26:53] . yes. For example, [26:55] losing 100,000 won is the same joy as [26:58] gaining about 200,000 or 250,000 won through savings [27:00] . yes. [27:02] So, they explain that it is [27:03] human psychology that people cannot help but feel extremely pain when they suffer a loss [27:06] . yes [27:07] . So, the reason you [27:09] sold the profitable stocks first and [27:11] didn't sell the losing stocks, as mentioned in the stock account question earlier, is now [27:13] coming out here. [27:14] Right? Why do we fail to cut our losses and end up [27:16] becoming involuntary long-term investors? Why did [27:19] I suddenly become a semiconductor expert investor in Samsung Electronics over the past five years [27:21] ? It will be [27:23] boneless. That's right [27:24] . Actually, I also thought about the common good regarding that pain, but the fact that I [27:29] lost 20,000 won is something I really don't want to endure unless [27:32] someone gives me about 40,000 to 50,000 won [27:34] . Earlier, I mentioned that [27:37] Stock A became 1.5 million won and [27:40] Stock B dropped to 600,000 won. You might have [27:46] said that with a 500,000 won gain and a 400,000 won loss, the one with the bigger gain is actually the one with the 500,000 won gain. However, the [27:47] truth is that you need to make a profit of about 1 million won for the [27:53] amount of pain and joy to be equal when you sell both stocks. hmm. [27:59] It is the case that I take profits razor-sharply, but cannot cut losses. That is why people keep saying that cutting losses is [28:01] difficult, but [28:03] then where does this system of difficulty [28:05] come from? [28:07] It means it comes from System One. [28:08] Uh, 2 tells you to do it, but [28:10] 2 is the one doing the thinking. System 2 keeps saying, "Hey, if it's a [28:12] 400,000 won loss and a 500,000 won [28:14] profit, of course you should do it." [28:18] But regarding [28:20] the system, I'm like, 'Oh, I don't know, I'm in so much pain,' and [28:23] my emotions are too important to handle it. That's right [28:24] . They are saying they can't move their fingers, as if they hurt too much [28:28] . The reason for this is... This [28:31] doesn't add up. in fact. Because, while there are [28:33] gains and losses, the reason is that [28:36] humans are innately risk-averse [28:39] . [28:41] Because they want to choose something certain [28:43] . It went up 10%, so let's [28:45] sell here. Then it doesn't matter if it goes up even more. It's [28:47] very comfortable in times like this. I'm [28:49] fine with just stopping here. Once [28:51] you enter a loss zone, people [28:55] don't want to accept the losses from that point on, and they just get stuck [28:58] there because the losses didn't actually happen [29:00] . At the same time, they keep trying to dilute the issue, saying that it ca [29:01] n't be helped and let's try [29:04] one more time [29:06] . yes. [Laughs] [29:07] Actually, stock experts often get [29:09] worked up about this kind of talk. Well, [29:10] once a market starts rising, there is momentum, [29:12] so invest more in stocks that are actually performing well to [29:15] increase your profits. Oh, I mean, I don't like that either [29:17] . [29:18] But it seems like the profits are decreasing somehow [29:19] . [29:20] you're right. Anyway, even around me, if [29:24] the asking price for lunch goes up from 120,000 won to, for example, 121,000 won, they say, " [29:26] Ah, that extra 1,000 won is a [29:28] waste." Yeah, yeah. I [29:28] placed a bet at 119,000 won, but I [29:31] can't buy it. But when I look back, it always ends up being [29:32] 130,000 won or [29:34] 140,000 won. [29:36] But when selling, [29:37] if the price drops, I just sell at market price right away [29:39] . [29:40] Ah, that's right. You're supposed to buy it in installments, but you should just [29:41] put the whole amount in. [29:43] When averaging down. [29:44] That is correct. Actually, this doesn't mean that humans are [29:46] irrational or stupid [29:48] . We humans have actually made it [29:52] this far by surviving and surviving on the African savanna. It seems like this [29:54] friend saw a hyena in the distance in the past [29:56] . yes [29:57] . Then it is right not to go out [29:59] . For example, there is a banana over there that I need to [30:01] eat, but no matter how I [30:03] look at it, there is something that [30:05] looks like a bear. [30:07] Then, it is highly likely that it is not a bear [30:09] . It can clump together. That is [30:11] definitely a banana. [30:13] Hmm, [30:15] the friends who went to eat bananas here probably survived nine times, but if that [30:18] one time was a bear, they would have died. yes [30:20] . [30:20] But oh my, that looks dangerous. don't do it [30:22] . Some friends kept surviving even after going hungry for a while [30:25] . In the wild, [30:28] those who sought safety eventually [30:30] survived, and [30:31] well, the point is that [30:32] we are the descendants of those safety seekers [30:34] . hmm. [30:35] Well, this is something we really experience in real life [30:37] . You know, there are times like that in work life [30:40] . If you don't think it's right, don't do it. [30:42] We talk about that a lot. Do [30:43] n't do it when you're unsure whether to do it or not. That's right [30:44] . Because the laws of the wild were exactly the [30:47] same, we were that kind of beings, and it is natural that the [30:49] danger of avoiding bears is [30:52] much stronger than the instinct to approach bananas [30:55] . The problem is that it has become a [30:58] very difficult principle since it came to stock investing [31:00] . yes [31:01] . So, there is [31:05] another important axis in that prospect theory, isn't there? [31:06] you're right. It is called the [31:10] framing effect, which describes the way one views an accident. yes [31:12] . There is also an experiment for this. I'm going to show you how [31:16] our perspective changes when looking at the same situation, so what kind of [31:20] question am I asking? [31:22] A disease has spread through the city here, and [31:25] 600 people are at risk of dying. [31:27] However, there are two countermeasures. [31:30] Plan A is. It definitely saves 200 people [31:33] . [31:35] There is a policy that guarantees the survival of 200 people, and B has a [31:38] 1-minute probability that all [31:40] 600 people will survive. uh [31:42] . [31:43] However, there is a 2-minute chance that everyone will [31:46] die. yes [31:47] . oh. If [31:49] I ask you this, what would you choose? I'll take [31:50] number 1. That's right [31:51] . In fact, most people [31:54] say they choose Option A. [31:55] Something for sure. [31:56] However, in fact, when looking at Plan A and Plan B through expected [31:59] utility theory, they are actually [32:00] the same in terms of expected survivors. hmm. hmm. [32:03] Because there is a 1 in 200 chance that everyone [32:05] survives, or a 2 in 2 chance that everyone [32:08] dies. However, [32:11] when everyone was asked this question, no one would have been confused or given it much thought [32:13] . Of course you have to [32:14] choose the sure one. [32:14] Ah, I have to save at least 200 people. [32:16] But there is also a draft. Uh, [32:18] 400 people definitely die. [32:20] If you choose this. yes [32:21] . And Diablo has a 1% chance of everyone [32:26] surviving together. There is a 2% chance that everyone will [32:29] die. [32:31] So, there is a 1 in 10 chance that everyone will survive [32:32] . [32:33] yes. [32:34] But 400 people definitely die. [32:37] Isn't that the same thing as earlier? With Bian. [32:39] But if you ask people to choose, most of them [32:41] choose the latter. [32:43] Oh, really? why? Because they say [32:44] 400 people will definitely die. [32:46] Ah, in terms of the tone. The nuance is that people are leaning toward the idea of ​​choosing to save everyone just in case, rather than [32:49] making the choice where I definitely kill 400 people [32:54] . [32:56] That's strange. You just changed the words, but you only [32:58] changed the words. If you live [33:00] by what Kanoman calls this, it is called the framing [33:03] effect. So, mathematically, it [33:05] is a perfectly identical situation. yes. [33:07] However, when using the expression "saving a life," [33:11] I choose the option of definitely saving a life. It [33:18] means that when asked to choose to kill someone, they select the option that seems to have at least a slight possibility. [33:20] So, are we using System One right [33:23] now? That's right. [33:24] The moment you hear this, you might ask, " [33:27] Who says that, mathematically speaking, is exactly the same?" [33:29] That's what System 2 is saying. But from System One's [33:31] perspective, for example, if I were [33:34] suddenly called in one day to make a critical decision and said that doing [33:36] this would [33:38] kill 400 people. But if you do this, you can [33:40] buy everything with a 1% chance. If we do that, should [33:43] n't we at least try to save someone? [33:44] It means you can do yoga. [33:46] So, this is the really scary effect of framing, [33:48] yes. For [33:49] example, people talk about that a lot these days [33:51] . Actually, [33:54] Bitcoin dropped significantly at the beginning of the year, around 2026, but this [33:57] price was the peak price if we look back at the 2020s [34:00] . [34:01] Ah, that's right. [34:01] However, looking at the 2020 prices, [34:05] well, it was an enviable price, but when you [34:08] consider early 2026, it has become a [34:10] price that makes you waile in despair. What is the difference? [34:12] It's a difference in frames. [34:17] The price resulting from an upward rise and the [34:18] price resulting from a downward fall are the same [34:20] price, aren't they? However, [34:22] looking at it from a different perspective, it [34:23] could be a very attractive price, whereas others [34:25] might see it as too low [34:27] . That is what creates the difference. hmm. [34:29] That's true. Then, it seems we would need to make an [34:31] effort to view the same situation through the opposite frame [34:33] . [34:34] Experts use this particularly well [34:35] . Brokerage reports [34:38] are the very masters of this framing. There is a term like this [34:41] . Well, the downside is limited. [34:43] Yeah, yeah. What I mean is [34:43] exactly that it could drop even further [34:47] . [34:48] But for example, according to a brokerage report, [34:51] stocks have fallen a lot lately. I [34:53] looked up a report asking why it dropped like this, and if it says "downside is limited," I just scoff and think, " [34:56] Okay, then maybe it'll [34:57] go up?" You might think this. yes. [34:59] But if it drops a little more there, it [35:01] looks like it will. uh [35:02] . uh. uh. Then they probably [35:03] won't buy it. yes [35:04] . [35:04] But actually, it means the same thing. The fact that the [35:06] downside is [snorting] limited means it is [35:07] falling under limited influence, doesn't it? [35:09] But simply changing the wording makes it sound [35:11] very positive, and it [35:12] really is exactly about saving or killing. That's right [35:14] . There is also a story like this. There is a saying that " [35:17] buying opportunity during a correction." It is currently a correction, but it is a buying [35:19] opportunity. hmm. hmm. [35:21] That means the price has dropped now [35:23] . [35:24] If I said that prices are continuously falling, [35:26] people wouldn't even [35:28] look at it, right? You might [35:29] consider buying during a correction. It is an [35:33] opportunity to buy. That's right [35:34] . Actually, it is just a difference in how the same phenomenon is [35:36] described. [35:38] Well, [35:38] this isn't just true for investments; they [35:41] say the same applies to things like surgery. Even when doctors [35:43] limit truly critical surgeries, the [35:46] survival rate is 90%. If you do that, [35:49] most people say, "Let's do it." [35:51] But if a doctor says the [35:54] mortality rate after surgery is 10%, [35:56] isn't that too high? Let's say, for example, that is the case with [35:57] my family. They say that [35:59] most people mention surgery and ask if there is anything [36:01] else. yes [36:03] . yes. So, this is exactly how the [36:05] System and 2 operate differently; [36:08] the friend called System is too hasty, and the [36:11] person is really kind. hmm. [36:13] So, that means they are making such a wrong choice [36:14] . yes [36:15] . Are there any other dangerous situations that this might lead to [36:17] ? That's right [36:18] . This is the next stage that really puts people in danger, [36:20] and saying "I told you so" is what they call a [36:22] post-hoc judgment in Pyongyang [36:25] . Actually, looking back, you will be able to make [36:27] all the investments well [36:29] . hmm. [36:31] Who didn't know Samsung Electronics would do this well [36:32] ? I told you Bitcoin would drop like this [36:35] . Looking back, you [36:40] know how friends are often accused of rubbing salt in the wound. I told you back then. It's [36:42] falling. I told you it would go up back then [36:43] . When I talk about this, looking back, [36:45] my friends are practically all stock investment [36:47] experts, but [36:48] they say that when they say this, they are [36:50] n't really trying to brag, but that [36:52] they themselves think that way [36:53] . hmm. hmm. Even back in the [36:54] 2008 financial crisis, people were [36:57] all saying the same thing after it exploded. [36:59] I thought it would be a crisis at that time. The housing [37:02] bubble was really severe back then. When talking about this, if you [37:07] look at the movie *The Big Short*, which actually depicted that situation at the time... Michael Burry [37:10] bet that the market would collapse, [37:12] but people laughed at him, [37:14] mocked him, and insulted him, and he really [37:16] suffered so much that he felt like his hair was falling out [37:19] . yes. So, looking back, [37:21] everyone says it's obvious and that they [37:23] knew it too, but the truth is, there were very [37:26] few people like that. hmm. [37:27] So, once you know the result, the process [37:29] looks very inevitable, doesn't it? [37:30] you're right. The reason for this is that our [37:32] brains are actually excellent storytellers. They say that once time [37:36] has passed, you have a natural talent for turning those past experiences [37:37] into stories [37:39] . yes [37:39] . [37:40] So, we find patterns even in random events [37:42] . For example, something completely [37:45] unrelated. For example, the department head [37:46] [snorted] that if he shows up at work on time twice, he [37:49] leaves late about once. huh [37:51] . [37:51] Then, on the second day of work, if I arrived on time, they would say, " [37:54] Oh, you'll probably be a bit late this time," and when I got there [37:56] late, the department head would definitely be sitting there [37:57] . hmm. It means that even though [37:58] this isn't really a pattern, they [38:01] look for it there. that's [38:02] right. [38:02] This is a point emphasized by Nassim Taleb, the [38:04] author of the book *The Black Swan*: [38:07] when looking at the past, [38:09] our judgments were greatly [38:13] overestimated. [38:14] ah. Ah, I was smart after all. I keep thinking, "That's how it was back then," but it means I've [38:19] forgotten all the mistakes I made. hmm. On the [38:20] other hand, I think I have a cute speed as well [38:22] . [38:23] No, that’s better than me constantly living under stress [38:25] . [38:26] yes. [38:27] In investing, what I see most clearly is that there are [38:32] many people who draw charts and analyze them. There are [38:33] many around me. That's right [38:34] . As you keep going, you see [38:36] camel charts, cat charts, and Giyoung [38:39] charts popping [38:40] up. Look at that. People talk about how the shape of the deformity is like this, but looking [38:42] back, [38:44] drawing a picture on a chart is really [38:46] no big deal. [38:47] Then, if you ask why you didn't know that before drawing it, you do [38:51] n't say anything about that. When I [38:52] see a chart reversal like this, it really [38:58] looks like I know all the buying and selling opportunities. However, he explains that this leads to [39:00] excessive hindsight judgment, results in [39:03] overconfidence, and ultimately [39:06] leads to wrong investments [39:08] . yes [39:08] . Then, we also read a lot of books by successful investors, you know [39:11] . [39:13] But I should be a bit careful. [39:14] you're right. These days, if you go to a bookstore, it is [39:16] practically filled with stock investment books [39:18] . So I [39:20] earned 10 billion won with something. There are so many methods for stock investment that are [39:22] guaranteed to work [39:24] . And if you look at their stories, they [39:26] all sound plausible. For example, when [39:29] I went to the supermarket, I [39:32] saw some snacks that housewives buy a lot. [39:34] There are people who say, "I bought that," or for example, " [39:36] I went to a certain apartment complex, and as [39:39] investment flowed in from afar, I [39:41] bought that apartment." So I [39:42] became rich. If you [39:43] read it, everything is true, but the reason [39:46] we are unlikely to become rich after reading it is because it explains the following [39:49] . That is also a [39:50] post-mortem product, but um, there are probably [39:55] many people who failed by investing in items that sell well at supermarkets in that way. They [39:58] don't write books. There were [40:01] only those who happened to fit in there and wrote books, and there [40:04] were also countless real estate investors. [40:06] already. However, looking back now, for example, [40:07] those who invested in Gangnam [40:09] enjoyed the greatest profits. yes [40:10] . [40:11] Those who invested elsewhere don't [40:12] write books. hmm. [40:13] That is why reading books by famous investors is also a form of [40:16] posthumous bias. I am [40:27] explaining that when you look back and see the stories of successful people who were truly lucky, and think, "Oh, I should do it like that from now on," it generally doesn't work out. hmm. [40:28] So, does that mean luck [40:31] played a huge role in their case as well? [40:32] you're right. Ultimately, tremendous luck [40:35] played a role in that as well; he [40:37] rose steadily because he was incredibly lucky at the time, but looking back, we [40:44] think it was due to his skill and the insight written in that book. This is just like what [40:46] humans overestimate, [40:50] um, ah, [40:50] underestimate, and then overestimate that person's [40:53] judgment [40:55] . [40:56] Here is how it connects. Ultimately, it is said that there is a phenomenon of mean regression where values ​​that [40:58] rose or fell due to luck [41:00] eventually return to that average [41:04] . [41:05] However, we do [41:07] not think about repenting on average, and due to the bias that it will continue forever, we end up [41:12] making wrong investments. This is how you can view it [41:14] . yes [41:15] . So, you know how Kahneman talks about [41:19] whether praising children makes them perform better or not, calling it one of the most important realizations of his career? [41:23] you're right. I [41:25] really like what Kahneman says when he is an officer. They say that when they [41:27] praised them, the pilots really did learn quickly [41:29] . When I [41:32] mentioned this, another instructor said the opposite [41:34] . Based on my experience, I am [41:40] claiming that officers must really scold and be strict enough to bring tears to your eyes for you to become an ace [41:42] . yes [41:43] . But the thing is, even though both are quite experienced [41:45] instructors, they are saying completely opposite things [41:47] . [41:48] But [41:50] I think there are a lot of people who have had that kind of experience. That's right [41:50] . Uh, actually, those who have had a [41:53] lot of experiences like this, whether in the workplace or elsewhere, will likely have the [41:54] opposite opinion. [41:57] So, when people in their 50s or 60s who have established themselves [41:59] in a particular field gather, there is [42:01] no compromise. They both say that they are [42:03] right. The [42:04] reason for that is that while the observation [42:07] itself is correct, [42:10] there are many cases where things go wrong even after doing well. You're going to get scolded. So, there are [42:11] many cases where they perform poorly after being praised, and [42:16] many cases where they improve after being scolded for doing poorly. [42:17] So, it converges to some extent, but [42:19] actually, in a way, [42:22] when it is within the range passing the average, it is just a [42:24] passing phase, and [42:27] everything is bound to proceed in a somewhat predetermined order. [42:29] So, statistically, it converges to the average, but the point is that [42:31] we tend to overestimate factors like luck or other areas—such as whether they were praised for doing well or scolded for doing poorly— [42:34] rather than the specific average skill level of that group [42:46] . hmm. [42:47] Then, how can these things be [42:50] invested in and applied? [42:52] This is how Kanoman talks. [42:54] Humans [42:57] have the ability to float in relation to random fluctuations. hmm. For [42:58] example, well, I noticed that the [43:01] manager was angry every time he saw a crow in the morning [43:04] . uh [43:04] . Oh, I have something like that. There are [43:06] many things like that. Like, if you [43:06] see white lead while walking down the street, it means you have [43:09] good luck today. That's right [43:10] . We do that a lot. yes. For [43:11] example, if you see something you dislike in the morning, you start with the [43:13] baby's aches and pains and things [43:15] like that, but actually, whether it's a crow or me [43:18] encountering the manager, or the fact that the manager is in a bad mood, [43:20] really does [43:22] n't matter no matter how much you call it 'honey.' But the reason we [43:24] think that way is that while such things are highly [43:26] developed, when it comes to [43:28] investment, here is how it works. For [43:30] example, let's say I [43:31] received a performance bonus of exactly 10 million won. [43:33] They say stock investing is good these days. If I were [43:35] someone who didn't know much about stocks, let's go back a bit and [43:40] say I was Sidal who used to invest in stocks and funds. What would I look at first? Which [43:42] fund should we look for first? [43:44] Oh, right [43:45] . [43:46] That's the fund with the highest return rate. [43:48] In the top-performing fund market, you would [43:51] look for the most popular fund manager these days. [43:53] Then, it is highly likely that you will invest in that fund [43:54] . When we buy things, we [43:56] often look at popularity and rankings [43:58] . However, if you look at the actual statistics, it is said that [44:07] the probability of a fund with the highest return in one year even ranking in the top tier the following year, let alone taking first place, is extremely low. [44:09] Uh, I heard that. It is said that [44:10] this actually appears statistically [44:12] . Actually, for first place this year, skill is [44:15] important, but luck is also extremely important. For [44:18] example, honestly, there are [44:20] many people who became rich through things like investing in Nvidia. [44:22] But I wonder how many people really knew the future of AI when they invested [44:24] ? hmm. hmm. [44:27] But in a way, that can be [44:29] seen as luck in many respects; however, the point is that we have a [44:35] tendency to flock to places that deviate from the average, thinking, "Oh, there must be something there." [44:38] From that perspective, there are very many cases where we suffer setbacks by investing while assuming a causal relationship between this year's [44:40] performance and next year's performance that is almost unrelated [44:48] . Uh, [44:49] actually, it's similar with ETF investing. [44:52] Since ETFs have advanced so much these days, for [44:54] example, if small modular reactors are [44:56] promising, a small modular reactor ETF comes out in a few days, and if [45:00] robots are trending, a robot ETF [45:03] comes out. Of course, there [45:05] are still some that continue to perform well, but looking back, [45:14] there are many cases where ETFs that were doing incredibly well for a while perform poorly after just a few months or years have passed since their launch. This, too, ultimately [45:16] returns to the mean regression, and [45:19] many people are bound to be swayed by it [45:21] . They make this point. yes [45:22] . Now that I've heard all this, it seems like our brains are just [45:25] not suited for stock investing [45:27] . That's right [45:27] . Actually, if the smart System 2 [45:30] moves it. You will all be able to make money [45:32] . Because all the responsibilities regarding what mistakes we are making were [45:35] written in 2011 [45:36] . yes [45:36] . However, investment books have already written about this very difficult task and [45:40] system investing [45:42] . However, in the end, it is [45:44] System One that controls every moment of our lives [45:46] . This could be called the ultimate [45:49] tragedy, [45:50] yes. There are cases where people obsess over the purchase price due to anchoring patterns, thinking, " [45:53] I bought it for 100,000 won, so I [45:57] won't sell it until it reaches 100,000 won." There are also instances where people are swayed by the availability heuristic of seeing others succeed, and overconfidence where they [46:05] believe they can beat the market. As these [46:07] factors intertwine, they ultimately lead to [46:09] investment failure, but the point is that this is absolutely [46:13] not because we are lacking. It [46:19] means that the human brain is designed to work that way. So, tens of thousands of years [46:20] ago, our brains were the best for surviving on grasslands [46:23] . The [46:29] reason we ran away the moment we saw it and developed the ability to judge based on first impressions is that we have to determine whether it is a wild beast or what within one second [46:32] . You have to [46:37] decide within one second whether that is a gazelle or a hyena. Otherwise, everyone would have [46:38] died. If you look at that and [46:40] think of Gooldori, it means he is already dead. [46:45] They are people who used System One very well. That's right [46:45] . So, the problem is that [46:47] we are living in a 21st-century stock [46:50] market. hmm. [46:51] As a result, even though this stock market has [46:53] plenty of information and opportunities to make sufficient judgments, [46:55] we [46:58] invest using the judgment of the grasslands, so the performance is [47:01] poor. [Snorting] That can be said to be the [47:06] result of the choices our ancestors made to survive [47:07] . hmm. [47:08] Then, is there absolutely no hope for us [47:10] ? But actually, well, of [47:13] course, there is one brain that can handle this problem, but [47:15] there is also a way to overcome it. Because [47:19] I said that System 2 needs to move. The tasks that System 2 needs to perform are [47:22] well described in *Thoughts on Thought*, and [47:25] many investment books we can refer to have [47:30] written down the logic of System 2 on how to operate [47:31] . So, since investment books are [47:34] well-written guidelines for us to follow, they teach us that the [47:39] moment the system tries to move, we should activate System 2 to its fullest—just like how we intentionally [47:50] move our bodies by going out for a walk or a run even though we just want to lie down and sleep after dinner—by activating System 2 to [47:53] establish principles and [47:54] following them, thereby enabling us to make a [47:56] profit in the market [47:58] . [47:59] Easier said than done. That's right [48:01] . I guess it’s a principle because they can’t do that [48:02] . [48:02] Ah, if it suddenly goes up or down a lot, your [48:04] hands just get all worked up, [48:06] right? So, they [48:08] say investors do things like this. In fact, institutional [48:10] investors [48:11] unconditionally sell half when a stock drops by about 15% [48:14] . If [48:16] it drops by 20%, I will definitely [48:19] sell it mechanically. There are all sorts of rules like this. [48:21] That is the principle. It is a principle [48:23] . And for example, if [48:24] there are two stocks in a portfolio and [48:26] one of them accounts for [48:28] more than 70% of the portfolio, the excess [48:30] portion is sold unconditionally. hmm. [48:32] But you absolutely cannot [48:34] do this if you just try. However, massive institutions like original institutional investors [48:39] establish such principles as rules and [48:41] prepare manuals, [48:42] right? It [48:43] makes you move no matter what. Even for individuals, the only [48:46] way to overcome this is to [48:50] establish principles regarding things we struggle with, such as stop-losses, and consider what mindset you will have when selecting stocks to sell. It [49:00] teaches you to set aside the stocks you have already bought and establish a principle regarding which of these stocks will perform better tomorrow. yes. [49:02] That is why there is so much stock [49:04] investment information like this these days. Some information is [49:07] rising. [49:08] Rather than running System One, I think [49:10] seeing a lot of people teaching principles and scoffing at them is [49:18] one of the few ways we can survive with this grassland brain. yes [49:19] . So, it means that after System 2 is in a clear [49:20] mind and has fully standardized the principles into a manual, and after I have [49:25] memorized the multiplication table, I can then go out to the [49:29] marketplace to demonstrate my System 1 [49:31] . [49:32] That's right. For example, people who drink excessively or [49:33] are on a diet might set rules like only going for the first round, [49:37] but the book [49:41] doesn't ultimately stop at saying that humans are irrational. I'm not saying you should give up just because it's [49:43] irrational; rather, we need to [49:49] understand what kind of irrational behavior we are engaging in so that we [49:51] think about it at least once the moment we sell. Uh, this is something [49:53] System One does. Instead, the point is to try [49:56] rolling out your slow thoughts as much as possible [49:58] . You [49:58] think rationally, and—uh, [50:00] Professor Daniel Kahneman said this isn't what this book is about—but you [50:03] establish some principles and make a [50:06] comeback after making a few wrong choices [50:08] . Think to yourself, "Ah, I should have acted according to these principles back then," and [50:13] move forward in a slightly more mature direction. I [50:15] think this is how it teaches a lesson. yes [50:16] . Yeah, seriously. [Sigh] Now that I’m [50:18] reading about thoughts today, I realize that even [50:21] in the old classics, things like [50:23] Socrates saying "Know thyself"—ah [50:25] , so it all [50:27] started from there. You need to [50:29] know what you don't know. You need to know what you know [50:31] . That's right [50:31] . That's right. For example, [50:33] when I mentioned the two items earlier as A and B, [50:34] why is it irrational for me to choose B? You know, you [50:37] think like this. I really don't want to sell it. [50:40] But actually, should I [50:42] think about it one more time and realize, "Ah, this is the result of System One" [50:44] ? Since that is where it all begins, this [50:47] book serves as a [50:49] starting point for a great deal of research, and I think it is a book that we should definitely read at least once [50:53] . yes [50:53] . If you are having trouble with stock investing, I [50:56] recommend this book. yes. I enjoyed [51:00] hearing your thoughts on thinking today. It feels [51:01] more relatable and like [51:04] my own story, especially since you explained it by applying it to investment. [51:05] What is my System 2 doing? [51:07] Ah, I also prepared this with a very painful [laughs] [51:08] heart. I [51:11] think there are probably a lot of people who became completely numb while listening to this. [51:11] Ah, I've prepared it as well once it becomes boneless. [51:13] [Laughs] [51:13] Yes. Namgukmin Bukhalist, thank you for your hard work today [51:15] . Thank you. [51:16] thank you [51:20] [music]