# The Human Cost of Internet Shutdowns | Scott Carpenter

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k-GtNWR9Zn4

[00:06] Good afternoon, everyone.
[00:08] My name is Scott Carpenter.
[00:11] I am the director of policy and international engagement at Jigsaw, and me and my team are here to talk a little bit about the human cost of internet shutdowns.
[00:21] When Egypt became the first government in the world to shut off its internet during the Arab Spring, I remember the fear and panic I had for my friends who were in the streets of Cairo at the time joining the protest against the Mubarak regime.
[00:39] I had no idea what was happening to them, and they had no idea how to communicate with each other or the outside world.
[00:46] Importantly, however, the international backlash was sufficiently strong that it not only brought that internet shutdown to an end relatively quickly, but it also contributed to the hope that the international community's future response against like shutdowns would be also galvanized.
[01:07] The United Nations at the time, importantly, made the Egyptian government shutdown a violation of gross human rights.
[01:18] But, since that first state-imposed shutdown of the internet, things have changed and not for the better.
[01:26] In July of this year, the UN Special Rapporteur issued a very disturbing report, where he issued the grim warning that internet shutdowns are not only becoming worse in terms of duration, but also much more widespread.
[01:45] The fact is that internet disruptions are now the primary tool that governments use to silence dissent and to control their populations.
[01:56] Mostly because the voice of the international community has gone quiet.
[02:03] You see, unlike suppressing protest by violence,
[02:08] When governments sever an internet connection, it usually goes unnoticed apart from those who are affected.
[02:15] And even when people do learn about it, the international community's response is lukewarm.
[02:21] Because after all, shutting down an internet connection is not the same thing as committing violence against an individual or a population.
[02:32] Or is it?
[02:35] As everyone in this room knows, internet shutdowns, when they happen, are deeply problematic and disruptive.
[02:45] Not only do we lose access to our ability to communicate with one another, we lose access to information that can endanger our lives if we don't have access to it.
[03:02] Recently, in our latest uh edition of the current, which is Jigsaw's digital journal, we
[03:10] Captured a number of these personal stories.
[03:14] And when you hear them, when you read them, from people who live and work in areas that suffer internet shutdowns, you're struck by the fear and uncertainty that takes place when they come to the realization that their lifeline to their family, to their friends, to their workplace, and yes, even to the outside world, hangs by an internet connection.
[03:46] The phenomenon of internet shutdowns is becoming much more complex and complicated and worrisome.
[03:53] Part of the reason for that is that governments are now using sophisticated blocking techniques known as throttling, which makes our ability to detect those disruptions much more difficult.
[04:05] And you can't easily condemn what you can't see or measure.
[04:11] That's why monitoring and highlighting, documenting, even partial shutdowns is so critical important.
[04:22] Periodic shutdowns, too, need to be captured.
[04:29] When we monitor and document those types of shutdowns, we ensure that no government is able to disrupt its people's internet without us knowing about it in as close to real time as possible, which is why Jigsaw is investing in trying to make the sort of data we've been talking about publicly available so that we have a better understanding of what's happening when a government tries to make its internet inaccessible.
[04:59] We're working together with researchers and academics from groups such as Access Now, OONI, and Sensor Planet.
[05:08] We're also working with these partners and other partners to develop technical.
[05:12] Approaches to preventing or mitigating the impact of shutdowns when they happen.
[05:18] And we are encouraged that through combination of virtual private networks and shared proxy servers, uh that it is we are being able to keep people's access to the open web possible even when internet shutdowns take place.
[05:35] Moreover, some of the work we're doing on new internet standards, we are hopeful when fully implemented will do more to make domain throttling at the uh domain throttling more difficult to do as well.
[05:51] But as always, technology is only part of the solution.
[05:57] We believe a key point in making future internet shutdowns more problematic is to raise the cost now in the eyes of the international community for such actions today.
[06:11] Grassroots movements like the hashtag
[06:14] KeepItOn movement, which includes some 240-plus organizations across 105 countries, is a great start.
[06:25] The advocacy tools they've developed, the technical support, the legal interventions that they're piloting are all extremely helpful, but they can't do it alone.
[06:36] Democratic governments have to come together, too, step up and to act.
[06:46] As the world's most technologically advanced governments come together in new fora like the so-called T12 or D10, they should make internet shutdowns a key part of their agenda.
[07:03] As I say, no government should be able to shut down the internet without us knowing about it.
[07:11] And any democracy, by the way, who wants to join that august group.
[07:16] Should forswear interference on the internet at the infrastructure level.
[07:21] Governments could work through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, for instance, where like-minded governments like the United States could pick up on the work of the Freedom Online Coalition.
[07:31] That coalition is a coalition of 35 democracies that has already come together to support free uh free expression.
[07:45] Governments could also work together with the private sector to enhance funding for research to better understand the nature of the problem, where the threat is going, what's going to happen next.
[07:56] And when crises come, when shutdowns come, governments can also work with the private sector to best understand how to respond technically and how to develop future policy oriented approaches that would limit the impact of such shutdowns.
[08:13] But importantly, governments need to come together.
[08:17] With civil society, when internet shutdowns happen, to condemn them.
[08:24] Condemn them strongly.
[08:27] Governments could work with civil societies and think tanks to develop red lines that could ultimately trigger sanctions against countries that are deemed to have fallen short of their commitments under international human rights norms and international human rights laws.
[08:48] Democracies, it is true, have faced a number of problems as the internet has matured.
[08:55] Malware, ransomware, spyware, attacks on our information space, misinformation, disinformation, hate, harassment, toxicity, to name just a few.
[09:11] But without the open internet, Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya could not have joined us.
[09:19] Here at Oslo Freedom Forum.
[09:22] And just think of the powerful voices that you've heard from the stage over the course of the past 2 days who can use the internet to share that message more broadly and at home.
[09:35] Thank you very much for your attention.
[09:38] I really look forward to the discussion that's going to follow.
[09:42] Have a great afternoon.
[09:51] Please help me to welcome our panelists.
[09:55] Felicia Antonio, the campaigner and Keep It On lead at Access Now.
[10:06] Marianne Diaz Hernandez, the Keep It On fellow.
[10:13] Dr. Roya Ensafi, assistant professor at the University of Michigan and the founder and lead researcher at the Censored Planet Project.
[10:23] Vinicius Fortuna, engineering manager at Jigsaw.
[10:28] And Scott Carpenter, whom you just saw.
[10:34] So, to get started, maybe Marianne or Felicia, this might make sense for you.
[10:40] In the past year, there have been multiple internet shutdowns that have made the news.
[10:47] And very recently, there have been concerns around continued access to the internet in Afghanistan.
[10:54] For our audience here today, what is a shutdown?
[10:57] Why do they happen?
[11:00] And how do they affect the people who are on the ground?
[11:07] Yes.
[11:08] Hi.
[11:08] Thank you.
[11:11] So, I always like to emphasize the larger digital rights community has not come to a everyone agrees term or definition for.
[11:23] What an internet shutdown is.
[11:25] But for us, for Keep It On, an internet shutdown is an intentional disruption of the internet that renders it inaccessible or unusable that targets a specific location or a specific group of people.
[11:42] And this means that it can make the larger internet inaccessible in a region or a country, but also it also might mean that it can affect maybe a specific service or a specific app if they are mostly used to communicate or to interact with people that which is the case in countries where they block social media for instance in specific circumstances.
[12:11] And that is for many number of any number of reasons, but the most used are national security in order to restore peace and order.
[12:24] Which is a phrase that is said when there are protests or civic disruptions or of any kind to prevent spread of misinformation or to prevent hate speech that is also one of the reasons that's given when it is aimed at restricting speech at restricting dissent.
[12:46] And basically the the main points are that it is intentional.
[12:52] It can be issued by a government.
[12:57] The order can be issued by a government, but it also can be issued by any group that holds control of a territory or or the towers or the infrastructure or by any kind has power over a specific area.
[13:13] And which happens for instance in in conflict zones where certain groups can order shutdowns and and can and do order.
[13:24] Shutdowns.
[13:25] And that this intentionality betrays uh an intention to restrict uh basically the free flow of information and speech.
[13:39] It seems sometimes that people might believe that if a country doesn't have a very high internet penetration that maybe an internet shutdown might only be affecting the elite.
[13:50] Can you tell us maybe a little bit about the the human impacts of shutdowns even in even in countries that maybe don't have a lot of access?
[14:01] Yes, like if that that's I have heard that argument, but it doesn't make any sense to me because for countries that have lower internet penetration, that amount of internet penetration can be extremely important for them.
[14:17] Can be a way to get information out that they cannot by by any other means.
[14:23] So, these are countries that oftentimes have
[14:27] A restrictive environment for the free flow of information.
[14:29] Some countries that maybe don't have the most free environment for press to function.
[14:40] And so, in those cases, it's even more damaging because when you have higher internet penetration, that often means less concentration, more companies providing the service, and an environment where you can in fact like if if something is restricted, you can work around it and and and go somewhere else and hire a different company or or travel to another location.
[15:06] While in places where internet penetration is low, it's very often the the service is more concentrated.
[15:13] And concentration, as we have seen recently, is not good for for the internet to work.
[15:20] Internet needs to be as as distributed as possible to to work properly.
[15:29] Roya, your team documents internet shutdowns, and you've done a lot of really incredibly innovative work to do that in a way that is um it's ethical and it's expansive.
[15:41] Can you tell us about some emerging ways that governments are disrupting sites and social media?
[15:50] Um uh hi everyone.
[15:50] Absolutely.
[15:55] Um Okay, uh Citizen Lab Planet um has been collecting weekly data on website blocking for the past years.
[16:02] Uh looking at this data, we see a a gradual escalation of censorship all over the world, especially on encrypted traffic targeting SNI, the part of the communication that is still unencrypted.
[16:15] Um this can be explained because of commoditization of uh filtering technology that bring monitoring and blocking and many advanced capabilities to the hands of any internet provider.
[16:28] As a result, we have seen two emerging.
[16:30] Behavior.
[16:30] First, governments don't need to spend lots of money to build the Great Firewall of China.
[16:37] You know, they just need to set up a centralized management system and demand regional internet providers to block targeted contents for a specific region that rather than blocking for everyone within that country, and that's a scary.
[16:52] Second, this uh cheap filtering technologies bring advanced capabilities beyond outright blocking to the hands of these providers.
[17:00] In March, um Russian ISPs slowed down or throttled access to Twitter in order to pressure Twitter to comply with content removal request.
[17:13] Um Russia gave um Twitter till May 15 to either obey their demands or they would move to blocking.
[17:22] Unfortunately, Twitter panicked.
[17:24] They did bend to Russia's request and didn't provide any transparency about what the contents.
[17:31] They removed or what the negotiation between Russia and Twitter was about.
[17:37] At that time, I did extensive rapid response investigation to understand in and out of that how the throttling is implemented and you can find a report.
[17:46] Throttling is a new emerging censorship technique that is very easy for providers to implement and deploy, but really hard as it's got mentioned for users to attribute or circumvent.
[18:00] Worse, measuring is so tricky and the current censorship detection platforms are not yet equipped and so we are in a uphill battle here.
[18:07] And these are the two emerging behaviors I fear about.
[18:12] Thank you.
[18:13] Scott, one of the things that Roya said there struck me, which is the threats that occur against technology companies to either remove content or to face throttling or shutdowns.
[18:25] What role can tech companies play to protect your users in when faced with that dilemma?
[18:34] I think it's a great question and one that's apropos of the moment, of course, given the fact that that Google and Apple had to take down the application of Alexei Navalny right before the elections that took place there.
[18:50] And there were obviously some very difficult choices being made as a result of some of the threats that were coming against the company at the time.
[18:59] But on the broader question, I think that the tech companies that have access to quite a bit of infrastructure can begin to think through what technical steps they might take to prevent such actions from continuing to occur.
[19:17] But then at the policy level, I think it's important, again as I said in my opening remarks, to have democracies come together to condemn what's happening, to make clear that it's not okay for these types of actions to take place.
[19:31] That that that the legal aspects.
[19:36] Of various laws have to have the engagement of multi-stakeholders, for instance.
[19:44] That they move through a clear parliamentary system where one party is not controlling everything and making things happen.
[19:51] So, I think that there are technical things that the companies can do, but I think that there are also policy initiatives that only governments can do to hold other governments accountable, and that they should that the democracy should come together to do that.
[20:08] Vinnie, Venessa.
[20:10] Sorry.
[20:10] Uh one of the things that Scott mentioned was uh technical solutions.
[20:15] I know that your team has been working on a number of interesting tools to circumvent and to respond to shutdowns.
[20:21] What's exciting you right now?
[20:23] I am very excited about the success of our Outline VPN.
[20:30] Every one of you can become a fighter for internet freedom.
[20:35] With Outline, you can create your own.
[20:37] VPN service on the cloud,
[20:40] and then share access with your friends,
[20:43] your family, your community. You can
[20:47] enable people to participate in the
[20:49] global internet.
[20:51] How cool is that?
[20:53] You can
[20:57] go to social media and brag
[20:59] You can go to social media and brag
[20:59] about it that you're helping people and
[21:01] inspire others to do the same.
[21:03] Uh
[21:05] Outline has always been about community.
[21:08] We actually started with the Shadow
[21:10] Socks protocol, which is something built
[21:13] by people in China to bypass the Great
[21:15] Firewall.
[21:17] And nowadays, we have organizations such
[21:19] as the ASL 19 and nthLink that are
[21:23] running Outline servers and distributing
[21:26] access for free to people in places like
[21:30] China and Iran and other places that
[21:33] censor the internet.
[21:35] So,
[21:36] um
[21:38] And I was talking like, yeah, it's all
[21:40] about the community. We also work with
[21:41] the research community. Last year,
[21:44] we worked with the GFW report and the
[21:46] University of Colorado Boulder
[21:49] to learn how servers were being detected
[21:53] and blocked. And with this
[21:55] collaboration, we figured out how to
[21:57] prevent blocking. And now it's like
[21:58] working very well in the most repressive
[22:01] regimes. And it's been growing, um
[22:04] we There are tens of thousands of
[22:07] Outline servers out there based on
[22:09] updated statistics. And
[22:12] that's a few times more than the entire
[22:15] Tor network. It's It's huge. And
[22:20] I like to see that as
[22:22] fighting
[22:24] uh
[22:24] for internet freedom guerrilla style.
[22:29] Um
[22:30] And the future It looks kind of like a
[22:32] guerrilla, right?
[22:36] Um Yeah, so we were we were able to
[22:39] build or to continuously grow this uh
[22:43] community and diversity of service we
[22:45] provide service providers. Like a couple
[22:47] years ago, there were like only one or
[22:49] two VPNs that were resistant to
[22:52] censorship. Now, it's tens of thousands
[22:54] or yeah. And we want to expand the the
[22:58] platform so people can start
[23:00] implementing their own protocols. So, we
[23:03] not only have a diversity of services,
[23:05] but also diversity of technology. So,
[23:08] it's
[23:10] that will make the ecosystem a lot more
[23:11] resilient.
[23:13] So,
[23:14] occasionally there's there's an idea of,
[23:17] you know, beaming free internet into
[23:20] repressive environments, right? So, the
[23:21] first the balloons and and now Elon Musk
[23:24] and the satellites they're going to save
[23:25] us.
[23:26] Um is that
[23:28] a realistic possibility at the moment?
[23:30] And are there any other moonshot ideas?
[23:32] And anyone feel free to feel free to
[23:34] answer if you have anything.
[23:37] I can say something.
[23:39] Yeah, let me give the technical answer
[23:40] first. No.
[23:42] Okay, now. Go ahead.
[23:45] Yeah, um
[23:46] like if you want to use satellite, you
[23:48] need to have infrastructure on the
[23:49] ground that is easy to detect and
[23:52] interfere with.
[23:53] Uh if you have balloons, they can be
[23:54] shot down. So, we you don't really like
[23:56] have a lot of good solutions.
[23:59] Uh what I've seen happen is like people
[24:01] going to the borders to get internet
[24:03] from the neighbor
[24:04] uh like neighboring country or um
[24:08] people using international SIM cards cuz
[24:11] depending on how internet is blocked,
[24:12] you can get access using that. Uh in
[24:15] Iran, I know there's the Toosheh service
[24:17] that beams kind of uh what it's one
[24:19] direction. You can download content and
[24:23] apps, but you cannot send anything out.
[24:26] So, it's limited. There's SMS without
[24:28] borders that allows you to
[24:31] use email and social media using SMS,
[24:33] but
[24:34] like none of them are ideal. So, there's
[24:36] still kind of
[24:37] uh work to be done that and
[24:39] it's important to go through the other
[24:41] routes like litigation which those
[24:42] people know about.
[24:43] Yeah, so I think it'd be great then to
[24:44] hear maybe from you, Felicia. I mean, I
[24:46] know that there have been um
[24:49] a lot of cases of legal advocacy having
[24:52] an effect on internet shutdowns. Can you
[24:54] give us some some examples?
[24:58] Yes, um yes.
[25:00] course. The courts play an important
[25:03] role in
[25:04] the fight against internet shutdowns and
[25:07] is becoming one of the strategies that
[25:10] civil society is using to push back
[25:14] once we exhaust all avenues to get
[25:16] governments to stop stop shutting down
[25:18] the internet. So,
[25:20] the most recent successes I would like
[25:24] to cite is
[25:25] Last
[25:27] year the the court of
[25:30] the community court of the economic
[25:33] community of West African states
[25:36] ECOWAS
[25:37] ruled that the internet shutdowns that
[25:40] were imposed in Togo
[25:42] in 2017 during protests were illegal and
[25:46] they violate fundamental rights of
[25:48] citizens, which is a landmark ruling for
[25:51] the community and we did welcome it
[25:54] very much. Prior to that we had a number
[25:57] of interesting cases as well where for
[26:00] instance in Sudan in 2019 when the
[26:03] military shut down the internet, an
[26:05] individual actually took the service
[26:07] provider that is Zain
[26:09] to court
[26:11] and the court ruled in his favor, got
[26:13] his internet restored and
[26:17] as a result of that
[26:19] legal case internet access was restored
[26:22] in the whole of the country.
[26:24] In the same year there was a shutdown
[26:28] that was ordered by the
[26:30] one minister
[26:32] in Zimbabwe and then the the the case
[26:36] was taken to court by civil society and
[26:38] again
[26:39] the court ruled that the minister did
[26:41] not have the power to shut down the
[26:43] internet
[26:44] as a national security measure. So,
[26:46] these are
[26:48] becoming ways and means for civil
[26:51] society to push
[26:52] and challenge internet shutdowns in
[26:55] court.
[26:55] And the most recent example I would
[26:58] cite is
[27:00] Article 19 2.
[27:01] Um during the elections in
[27:04] Zambia,
[27:06] um the government
[27:08] blocked access to social media. Civil
[27:10] society took um the government to court
[27:12] and then the Zambia High Court
[27:15] ordered the authorities to restore um
[27:18] access to these platforms. That was
[27:19] after after um elections. And then um
[27:23] the last issue or the case we are
[27:25] currently monitoring is um the case
[27:28] before the ECOWAS Court again
[27:31] um with regards to Twitter being blocked
[27:34] in Nigeria. And so last week there was a
[27:36] hearing and um I think there'll be the
[27:39] judgment is scheduled to
[27:42] um um take place in
[27:44] January next year.
[27:46] Um all things being equal. And so we
[27:48] continue to keep an eye on that and that
[27:50] again was put forward by civil society
[27:52] groups and people that rely on the
[27:55] internet. So I think litigation is very
[27:58] important um now. Um but one thing that
[28:01] is also important to note is not all
[28:04] courts are welcoming and not all courts
[28:07] are accessible to the people. And so you
[28:09] have to also understand this um as a
[28:13] strategy that you use to um push back
[28:16] against internet shutdowns.
[28:18] So
[28:19] I I know one of the interesting features
[28:21] of the of the court system is you always
[28:24] need to have evidence that you can
[28:25] submit. Obviously testimony can be part
[28:27] of that evidence, but documentation also
[28:29] is extremely important uh in those
[28:31] cases. And Roya, your group has been
[28:34] working on documentation for for years.
[28:37] What is your approach and how has it
[28:38] evolved over time?
[28:41] Um yeah, a a decade ago when Arab Spring
[28:44] happened, I asked uh how we can collect
[28:47] censorship data without asking local
[28:49] volunteers in the region. Um, we could
[28:52] see so many infrastructure machine in
[28:55] all the networks that follow some
[28:57] internet protocols and are visible from
[29:00] here through internet wide scanning.
[29:03] And, uh, we asked how we can repurpose
[29:05] these protocols to collect censorship
[29:07] data. Uh, the results of this way of
[29:10] thinking becomes sensor planet. We built
[29:13] many tools that send traffic from, uh,
[29:15] send traffic from here to many
[29:17] infrastructure devices uh, often owned
[29:20] by organizations or government
[29:22] themselves and collect data about
[29:24] different form of website blocking such
[29:27] as IP, DNS, application application
[29:29] layer. And we run our tools weekly and
[29:33] collect data about, uh, 2,000 sensitive
[29:35] and popular domains and from 100,000
[29:38] vantage points in almost all countries.
[29:41] Um, this remote way of measuring is kind
[29:44] of safer, so it does, because it doesn't
[29:47] need volunteers' help. Uh,
[29:49] more it leads to a more continuous and
[29:53] robust data.
[29:54] Um, and, um, and, um, um,
[29:58] recently, in collaboration with Jigsaw
[30:00] team, um, with you guys basically, we
[30:02] built an interactive dashboard that
[30:05] facilitated working with our data for
[30:07] all practitioners and collaborators. I
[30:10] will tweet about our dashboard, um,
[30:13] after the panel and I encourage people
[30:15] reaching out if they see our data is
[30:17] useful to them.
[30:18] Uh, we also have developed a rapid
[30:20] response, uh, capabilities uh, within
[30:23] sensor planet team, uh, to quickly run
[30:26] censorship measurements in response to
[30:28] real-world events. Uh, we helped uncover
[30:30] many details about high-profile events
[30:33] such as Kazakhstan man-in-the-middle,
[30:35] uh, event and, uh, we work very closely
[30:38] with activists and journalists for a
[30:39] broader impact. And so, please feel free
[30:42] to reach out to us if you think our
[30:44] expertise and capabilities can help you
[30:47] with your advocacy efforts.
[30:50] All right. Well, we're out of time. Um
[30:52] but, I'd like to go around
[30:54] I'd like to go around and ask each of
[30:55] our panelists for
[30:57] uh for one thing that they think uh
[31:00] people here in our audience can do to
[31:02] make a change.
[31:04] Why don't we start with uh with you,
[31:06] Roya, since you I think hinted at one at
[31:08] the end of your your last answer.
[31:11] Yeah. Raise voices to the ones don't
[31:13] have a voice.
[31:18] Uh Felicia.
[31:23] Um shutting down the internet is
[31:26] diplomatically incorrect. And so, we
[31:29] should call out governments that shut
[31:32] down the internet undiplomatically.
[31:35] There's nothing about let's be
[31:36] diplomatic in how we handle that. And um
[31:40] let's keep it on at all times and push
[31:42] back against internet shutdowns.
[31:46] Mariam.
[31:48] Yeah, to continue with with in that in
[31:51] that vein, um there is no circumstance
[31:55] in which an internet shutdown is
[31:57] correct. So, there is no excuse for
[32:00] that. And in that aim, every one of of
[32:03] of us, like it doesn't matter the amount
[32:06] of knowledge that we have about
[32:07] shutdowns, can help spread information
[32:10] and shed light into the the countries
[32:13] where there are internet shutdowns
[32:14] happening right now and where there are
[32:16] severe human rights violations. And if
[32:18] we don't uh visualize what's happening
[32:21] there, they may not ever come back
[32:24] online. And and it's not as as Roya
[32:27] said, they cannot uh get that
[32:29] information out by themselves. They
[32:31] depend on others helping us helping them
[32:34] to do that. So,
[32:35] um that's that's what we need to do.
[32:37] Spread that information.
[32:40] This is working?
[32:42] This is working?
[32:44] Uh, I would say
[32:46] be a fighter for internet freedom. Uh,
[32:49] run servers and distribute access. Run
[32:52] uh, measurements uh, like OONI and and
[32:55] uh, talk talk to those folks there at
[32:57] Sensor Planet to tell them what to
[33:00] measure.
[33:01] Um,
[33:02] explore the data.
[33:05] Go to their dashboard. Uh, and go to
[33:07] OONI. Uh,
[33:08] share your insights. Uh, report on those
[33:11] things. And um,
[33:14] if you're a developer, build on top of
[33:16] the existing tools. Uh, improve the
[33:18] existing tools and just like share the
[33:20] word and inspire other people.
[33:23] Yeah, I would say something similar. I
[33:25] was really impressed by and and moved by
[33:28] the story you told. I think keeping
[33:31] close to those of us who are trying to
[33:34] work on technical solutions to keep us
[33:36] safer, it's really important that we are
[33:39] working toward the use cases that you
[33:41] are most concerned about. So, finding
[33:44] ways for us to collaborate uh,
[33:46] to hear your stories, that's part of the
[33:48] reason we're here at EFF because we get
[33:51] to meet so so many people who are on the
[33:52] front lines of these challenges. So, um,
[33:56] keep telling your stories. Uh, find ways
[33:58] for us to hear them and we will find
[34:00] ways to hear them.
[34:02] Thank you, everybody.