# Historian Richard Sakwa: The West Chooses Self-Destructive War Over Peace | GEH With Radhika Desai https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yqNz1CbCEcs Translation: fr [00:00] These European elites are irrational. Ces élites européennes sont irrationnelles. [00:02] I mean, it just doesn't make sense. Je veux dire, cela n'a tout simplement pas de sens. [00:04] It doesn't I mean, you're in danger of destruing your own continent. Cela n'a pas de sens, je veux dire, vous êtes en danger de détruire votre propre continent. [00:07] You're in danger of provoking a nuclear war. Vous êtes en danger de provoquer une guerre nucléaire. [00:09] You're in danger of impoverishing your people where inequality is widened and so on. Vous êtes en danger d'appauvrir votre peuple là où les inégalités se creusent et ainsi de suite. [00:12] It's the end point of neoliberal gutting off the idea of national interest in the state activism on the one side, but in other words, it's hyperorm. C'est le point final du démantèlement néolibéral de l'idée d'intérêt national dans l'activisme étatique d'un côté, mais en d'autres termes, c'est l'hypernormalité. [00:21] Oh, so in other words, this normality undermines our I mean simple my simple common sense understanding of normality, common sense understanding of rationality. Oh, donc en d'autres termes, cette normalité sape notre, je veux dire simple, ma simple compréhension du bon sens de la normalité, la compréhension du bon sens de la rationalité. [00:34] We we just can't your question is an excellent one in that sense. Nous, nous ne pouvons tout simplement pas, votre question est excellente en ce sens. [00:36] It doesn't make sense. Cela n'a pas de sens. [00:39] Capitalism is declining. Le capitalisme est en déclin. [00:41] Growth rates are are declining. Les taux de croissance sont en déclin. [00:43] Inequality is increasing. Les inégalités augmentent. [00:45] Financialization is gone rampant. La financiarisation est devenue incontrôlable. [00:48] Productive uh capacities are at a low. Les capacités productives sont à un niveau bas. [00:51] And you know that you can't fight a war in modern times without industry. Et vous savez qu'on ne peut pas mener une guerre à l'époque moderne sans industrie. [00:54] And industry is what Europe and the United States increasingly are losing. Et l'industrie est ce que l'Europe et les États-Unis perdent de plus en plus. [00:59] Meanwhile, Trump is saying that these Pendant ce temps, Trump dit que ces [01:01] Guys should spend more on the military because actually, contrary to what is constantly asserted, the United States does not have an exorbitant privilege to keep printing dollars because the more it does so, the more the dollar is undermined. Les gars devraient dépenser plus pour l'armée parce qu'en réalité, contrairement à ce qui est constamment affirmé, les États-Unis n'ont pas un privilège exorbitant de continuer à imprimer des dollars, car plus ils le font, plus le dollar est affaibli. [01:16] Hello viewers and listeners. Bonjour à nos téléspectateurs et auditeurs. [01:19] Welcome to the 81st geopolitical economy hour. Bienvenue à la 81e heure d'économie géopolitique. [01:22] The socialist and anti-imperialist conversation that illuminates the fast-changing political economy and geopolitical economy of our times. La conversation socialiste et anti-impérialiste qui éclaire l'économie politique et l'économie géopolitique en évolution rapide de notre époque. [01:32] I'm Radika Desai and you're watching Radika Desai geopolitical economist. Je suis Radika Desai et vous regardez Radika Desai, économiste géopolitique. [01:36] But before we continue with this episode, let me take a minute to remind you to please like and share this video, subscribe to our YouTube channel, and if you can, please donate. Mais avant de continuer avec cet épisode, laissez-moi prendre une minute pour vous rappeler de s'il vous plaît aimer et partager cette vidéo, de vous abonner à notre chaîne YouTube, et si vous le pouvez, de faire un don. [01:47] You can do this through our Patreon or by becoming a paid subscriber on Substack or becoming a member here on YouTube. Vous pouvez le faire via notre Patreon ou en devenant un abonné payant sur Substack ou en devenant membre ici sur YouTube. [01:54] It helps us to produce high-quality content and keep it free. Cela nous aide à produire un contenu de haute qualité et à le garder gratuit. [01:59] And now back to the main topic of the day. Et maintenant, retour au sujet principal du jour. [01:59] Today I'm joined Aujourd'hui, je suis rejoint [02:01] Once again by Professor Richard Saka of the University of Canterbury, historian of Russia and its relations with the West, author of many, many books on the subject, the late latest of which is the Russo Ukrainian war, Follys of Empire. Encore une fois par le professeur Richard Saka de l'Université de Canterbury, historien de la Russie et de ses relations avec l'Occident, auteur de très nombreux livres sur le sujet, dont le plus récent est la guerre russo-ukrainienne, Folies de l'Empire. [02:17] Welcome back, Richard. Bon retour, Richard. [02:19] It's a great pleasure to be with you. C'est un grand plaisir d'être avec vous. [02:20] Thank you. Merci. [02:21] Uh it's always great to have you Richard. Euh, c'est toujours formidable de vous avoir, Richard. [02:23] And today we want to discuss where the conflict in Ukraine is at and what are some of the bigger dots that we have to join. Et aujourd'hui, nous voulons discuter de l'état du conflit en Ukraine et de certains des points plus importants que nous devons relier. [02:33] So just before uh uh beginning this recording I happen to be on the Financial Times website and I see that this morning Kiev was rocked by popular protests against Zilinski in particular against his firing of the popular defense minister Mihilo Furov. Donc, juste avant de commencer cet enregistrement, je me trouvais sur le site du Financial Times et je vois que ce matin, Kiev a été secouée par des manifestations populaires contre Zilinski, en particulier contre son limogeage du populaire ministre de la Défense Mihilo Furov. [02:49] The normally pro-Zalinski western press underlined that Zalinski fired Fodorov for being too honest for opposing those who profited from the war. La presse occidentale habituellement pro-Zalinski a souligné que Zalinski a limogé Fodorov pour avoir été trop honnête, pour s'être opposé à ceux qui profitaient de la guerre. [03:00] And if one Et si l'on [03:03] Puts it in the larger context of how important this war is to the West, to the Europeans in particular, you can see what an explosive piece of news this is. Cela le replace dans le contexte plus large de l'importance de cette guerre pour l'Occident, et pour les Européens en particulier, on voit à quel point cette nouvelle est explosive. [03:13] [snorts] [renifle] [03:13] Meanwhile, it was reported earlier this month that according to a Gallup poll, twothirds of Ukrainians support negotiations to end the war with Russia. Par ailleurs, il a été rapporté plus tôt ce mois-ci que, selon un sondage Gallup, deux tiers des Ukrainiens soutiennent des négociations pour mettre fin à la guerre avec la Russie. [03:24] Meanwhile, at NATO's Anchora summit, European size of relief could be heard across Europe when the President Trump left without opting out for the war in Ukraine or opting out of the war in Ukraine. Par ailleurs, au sommet de l'OTAN à Anchora, un soupir de soulagement européen a été entendu à travers l'Europe lorsque le président Trump est parti sans se retirer de la guerre en Ukraine. [03:38] Indeed, um the man who promised to end the war the day he was elected even offered Ukraine a license to produce Patriot missiles. En effet, euh, l'homme qui avait promis de mettre fin à la guerre le jour de son élection a même offert à l'Ukraine une licence pour produire des missiles Patriot. [03:48] However, any production of Patriot missiles, even if it gets started, would act would actually produce missiles only years down the road. Cependant, toute production de missiles Patriot, même si elle démarre, ne produirait en réalité des missiles que dans plusieurs années. [03:58] Meanwhile, Trump's propensity to go back on his word is now a fixture of international politics. Par ailleurs, la propension de Trump à revenir sur sa parole est désormais une constante de la politique internationale. [04:04] Trump's break with NATO was apparently avoided primarily by exaggerating the extent to which Ukraine's drone attacks on major Russian cities, energy facilities, and infrastructure inflicted damage on Russia and on Putin's political base. La rupture de Trump avec l'OTAN a apparemment été évitée principalement en exagérant la mesure dans laquelle les attaques de drones ukrainiens sur les grandes villes russes, les installations énergétiques et les infrastructures ont infligé des dégâts à la Russie et à la base politique de Poutine. [04:23] All this exaggeration was engineered because it was understood at the highest levels of European governments that Trump doesn't like losers that he likes winners. Toute cette exagération a été orchestrée parce qu'il était compris aux plus hauts niveaux des gouvernements européens que Trump n'aime pas les perdants, qu'il aime les gagnants. [04:35] Europeans meanwhile have been reiterating their commitment to Ukraine at every available opportunity and soon to be ex British Prime Minister Keir Starmer is in Kiev as we speak pledging Britain's cast iron support for Ukraine tying his successor's hands although we don't know whether his successor wouldn't have tied his own hands on this matter. Les Européens, quant à eux, n'ont cessé de réitérer leur engagement envers l'Ukraine à chaque occasion disponible, et le bientôt ex-Premier ministre britannique Keir Starmer est à Kiev au moment où nous parlons, promettant le soutien indéfectible de la Grande-Bretagne à l'Ukraine, liant les mains de son successeur, bien que nous ne sachions pas si son successeur n'aurait pas lui-même lié les siennes sur cette question. [04:58] Um at the same time there are increasingly unfavorable reports. Euh, en même temps, il y a des rapports de plus en plus défavorables. [05:01] So the latest report about the firing of of of this Donc le dernier rapport concernant le licenciement de de de ce [05:04] Guy and the protests against it, they're only the latest in a kind of mounting crescendo of negative reports about the about President Zilinski. Guy et les protestations contre cela ne sont que les derniers d'une sorte de crescendo croissant de rapports négatifs concernant le président Zilinski. [05:15] Um the the Western media is normally very eager to lionize Zalinski. Euh, les médias occidentaux sont normalement très désireux de magnifier Zalinski. [05:21] So the implication of this clear statement that Fodorov seems to have been fired because he was too honest. Donc, l'implication de cette déclaration claire selon laquelle Fodorov semble avoir été licencié parce qu'il était trop honnête. [05:28] Could it be part of a constructive dismissal of Zalinski by the West? Cela pourrait-il faire partie d'un licenciement constructif de Zalinski par l'Occident ? [05:31] Who would replace him? Qui le remplacerait ? [05:33] What would be the consequences for the war? Quelles seraient les conséquences pour la guerre ? [05:35] These are all open questions. Ce sont toutes des questions ouvertes. [05:38] And the same press uh portrays Fodorov's initiative as defense minister in glowing terms. Et la même presse euh dépeint l'initiative de Fodorov en tant que ministre de la Défense en termes élogieux. [05:42] And particularly it focuses on his innovative human relations management of the problem of recruitment. Et particulièrement, elle se concentre sur sa gestion innovante des relations humaines face au problème du recrutement. [05:50] They apparently are finding it very hard to recruit new soldiers and even more importantly the western press uh uh trumpets the relationship of Fodorov with the al artificial intelligence elite including Alex Karp. Ils semblent avoir beaucoup de mal à recruter de nouveaux soldats et, plus important encore, la presse occidentale euh euh vante la relation de Fodorov avec l'élite de l'intelligence artificielle, y compris Alex Karp. [06:06] Of Palanteer, Eric Schmidt of Google and of course Elon Musk. De Palanteer, Eric Schmidt de Google et bien sûr Elon Musk. [06:12] All these companies have benefited from lucrative contracts uh in from the Ukrainian government. Toutes ces entreprises ont bénéficié de contrats lucratifs, euh, de la part du gouvernement ukrainien. [06:16] Now with politics basically put on pause in Ukraine, although western press doesn't talk about that. Maintenant, avec la politique essentiellement mise en pause en Ukraine, bien que la presse occidentale n'en parle pas. [06:25] Um Zerinski assembling a cabinet out of the country's elites without any democratic accountability. Euh, Zerinski assemble un cabinet composé des élites du pays sans aucune responsabilité démocratique. [06:30] Clearly Ukraine has in one sense become a political paradise or the political paradise that people like Karp or Schmidt or what have you, Elon Musk dream about and they have certainly loudly mused about it which is a a a a a political system which is not democratic. Clairement, l'Ukraine est devenue en un sens un paradis politique, ou le paradis politique dont des gens comme Karp ou Schmidt ou quoi que ce soit, Elon Musk rêvent, et ils en ont certainement parlé à voix haute, ce qui est un, un, un, un, un système politique qui n'est pas démocratique. [06:49] They they have all said openly they don't like democracy. Ils ont tous dit ouvertement qu'ils n'aiment pas la démocratie. [06:52] So essentially then a political system would exist to tax the people and then spend the tax revenues on their companies on contract giving lucrative contracts to their companies. Donc, essentiellement, un système politique existerait pour taxer le peuple, puis dépenser les recettes fiscales dans leurs entreprises, en attribuant des contrats lucratifs à leurs entreprises. [07:03] Finally final point Richard before I throw a question to you. Enfin, dernier point Richard, avant que je ne vous pose une question. [07:05] The war has uh the La guerre a, euh, le [07:07] Increased military spending the war uh etc has across Europe uh required the constantly whipped up rousophobia. L'augmentation des dépenses militaires, la guerre, etc., a nécessité à travers l'Europe la constamment attisée rousophobie. [07:17] But at the same time, despite all these uh uh attempts on the part of governments and the media to whip up this rousophobia and the danger of that Russia represents, actually this war is becoming more unpopular than ever. Mais en même temps, malgré toutes ces tentatives de la part des gouvernements et des médias pour attiser cette rousophobie et le danger que représente cette Russie, en réalité cette guerre devient plus impopulaire que jamais. [07:31] So where do you think all of these things are pulling the Ukraine conflict? Alors, où pensez-vous que toutes ces choses tirent le conflit ukrainien ? [07:37] Thank you for that. Merci pour cela. [07:38] I think it's that's a marvelous introduction. Je pense que c'est une merveilleuse introduction. [07:40] You've covered a lot of important issues on Fodov. Vous avez couvert beaucoup de questions importantes sur Fodov. [07:43] You're absolutely right. Vous avez tout à fait raison. [07:45] He was accused of being too honest, which of course in certain circles is not considered a a good characteristic. Il a été accusé d'être trop honnête, ce qui dans certains cercles n'est bien sûr pas considéré comme une bonne caractéristique. [07:52] But he was also perhaps uh equally important, he was also considered too independent and uh even in danger of becoming too popular. Mais il était aussi peut-être tout aussi important, il était également considéré comme trop indépendant et même en danger de devenir trop populaire. [08:01] Uh and as uh a Ukrainian MP uh mentioned this morning on the radio that uh he was also uh in the line of those who are too Et comme un député ukrainien l'a mentionné ce matin à la radio, il était aussi dans la lignée de ceux qui sont trop [08:10] Popular like Zusni the present Ukrainian Populaire comme Zusni l'actuel Ukrainien [08:13] Uh with a former defense minister who's an ambassador in London at the moment uh Euh avec un ancien ministre de la défense qui est ambassadeur à Londres en ce moment euh [08:18] Becoming too popular too independent and therefore any tall poppy is immediately cut back uh Devenir trop populaire, trop indépendant et donc tout pavot élevé est immédiatement coupé euh [08:25] And that is the way that Zillinsky works. Et c'est ainsi que Zillinsky fonctionne. [08:28] What this shows is an interesting element insight into the Zillinski system itself and a man himself. Ce que cela montre est un élément intéressant d'aperçu du système Zillinski lui-même et de l'homme lui-même. [08:36] Though of course he's lionized in the west. Bien sûr, il est adulé en Occident. [08:38] Uh of course he spends most of his time in the west it seems to me rather than dealing with the enormous challenges facing his own people and that is symptomatic of his rule in general. Euh bien sûr, il passe la plupart de son temps en Occident me semble-t-il plutôt que de faire face aux énormes défis auxquels son propre peuple est confronté, et cela est symptomatique de son règne en général. [08:49] Uh, of course he was elected with his support of those tech people right from the start. Euh, bien sûr, il a été élu avec le soutien de ces gens de la tech dès le début. [08:53] He was always sort of the uh the the face of the modernizing westernizing elites. Il était toujours en quelque sorte le euh le visage des élites modernisatrices et occidentalisatrices. [08:59] Uh even though of course he comes from a Russophone background but uh very quickly he emerged and always even those who worked with him uh when he was a quite a successful comedian let's call Euh même si bien sûr il vient d'un milieu russophone mais euh très vite il a émergé et toujours même ceux qui ont travaillé avec lui euh quand il était un comédien assez prospère disons [09:12] Him that in earlier years before he became president uh that he he was what the Russians call that means very authoritative or dominating or authoritarian in his personal style with his own staff uh and of of course always uh with an eye out for his own personal financial profit. Lui qui, dans les années précédant sa présidence, était ce que les Russes appellent, c'est-à-dire très autoritaire ou dominateur ou autoritaire dans son style personnel avec son propre personnel, et bien sûr toujours avec un œil sur son propre profit financier personnel. [09:33] Uh and these characteristics uh though we you know clearly have been accentuated now in his seventh year of power uh with to I mean formally his term ended a couple of years back. Euh, et ces caractéristiques, bien que nous, vous savez, aient clairement été accentuées maintenant dans sa septième année de pouvoir, euh, avec, je veux dire, formellement son mandat a pris fin il y a quelques années. [09:47] So uh the fjordovin is is case is an interesting one and of course the way that he's dismissed the prime minister as well just a few days ago. Donc euh, le cas du fjordovin est intéressant, et bien sûr la façon dont il a également renvoyé le premier ministre il y a quelques jours à peine. [09:53] Issues. Problèmes. [09:55] But it's also interesting as you say about popular opinion, the the protests which are in Kiev and in some other places, the protests which were uh in over the last week in Lev or Leiv uh against the busification that is the seizure of people in the street to be sent off uh for slaughter basically at Mais c'est aussi intéressant, comme vous le dites, à propos de l'opinion populaire, les manifestations qui ont lieu à Kiev et dans d'autres endroits, les manifestations qui ont eu lieu euh la semaine dernière à Lev ou Leiv euh contre la busification, c'est-à-dire la saisie de personnes dans la rue pour être envoyées euh à l'abattoir essentiellement. [10:14] The front line. La ligne de front. [10:17] Uh and uh uh and the fact that these were protests in Lava of all places which is of course the heartlands of Galatian ethnoism and phobia of a deep deep form which then of course became the dominant ideology of the state of the Ukrainian state after the events of the Maidan in early 2014. Euh et euh euh et le fait qu'il s'agissait de manifestations à Lava de tous les lieux, qui est bien sûr le cœur du nationalisme galate et d'une phobie d'une forme très profonde qui est ensuite devenue l'idéologie dominante de l'État ukrainien après les événements du Maïdan au début de 2014. [10:36] Of course with the full support of the west which is uh again an interesting thing is that the west uh as so often is quite willing to abandon its own normative values when geopolitical concerns are at stake um we can call it double standards if one likes but it's clearly that this is the case go back just to the man himself I think that I mean for me I've always been astonished how he is lionized how you know star has welcomed him to number 10 how many times in all hugging and kissing and so on. Bien sûr avec le plein soutien de l'Occident, ce qui est euh encore une fois une chose intéressante, c'est que l'Occident euh, comme si souvent, est tout à fait prêt à abandonner ses propres valeurs normatives lorsque des préoccupations géopolitiques sont en jeu, euh, on peut appeler cela deux poids deux mesures si l'on veut, mais il est clair que c'est le cas, revenons juste à l'homme lui-même, je pense que je veux dire, pour moi, j'ai toujours été étonné de voir comment il est adulé, comment vous savez, Star l'a accueilli au 10 Downing Street combien de fois, avec des embrassades et des baisers et ainsi de suite. [11:07] And for me as a Catholic, it was perhaps the most appalling sign is that when they visited the Vatican, the two sitting in an empty vast empty chamber. Et pour moi en tant que catholique, c'était peut-être le signe le plus consternant : lorsqu'ils ont visité le Vatican, les deux assis dans une chambre vide et vaste. [11:16] With Trump and Zilinski as if in any way. Avec Trump et Zilinski comme si de rien n'était. [11:19] I mean his two one of the most catastrophic leaders of our times, you know, sullying, if I may put it, the Vatican and of course the magnificent uh encyclical just out by Leo the 14th, Magnifica Humanites, but that's another issue. Je veux dire, ses deux, l'un des leaders les plus catastrophiques de notre époque, vous savez, souillant, si je puis dire, le Vatican et bien sûr la magnifique encyclique tout juste publiée par Léon XIV, Magnifica Humanites, mais c'est un autre sujet. [11:32] But just to say the contrast between genuine leadership as evinced by as demonstrated by Leo the 14th today uh and these clowns effectively if I may put it who now rule us but just to say that I think history of course we talked a lot about Trump and so history can deal with that but just to say that history will deal I think very harshly with Zillinski because the responsibility of a leader is to look after your people to end up to make sure that they're secure that they end up more prosperous and in general happier more uh you know more beneficient uh uh context life as a result and in fact he's done the exact opposite and of course his. Mais simplement pour dire le contraste entre le véritable leadership, comme le démontre Léon XIV aujourd'hui, et ces clowns, si je puis dire, qui nous gouvernent maintenant, mais simplement pour dire que je pense que l'histoire, bien sûr nous avons beaucoup parlé de Trump, et donc l'histoire peut s'en occuper, mais simplement pour dire que l'histoire traitera, je pense, très sévèrement Zillinski, car la responsabilité d'un leader est de prendre soin de son peuple, de veiller à ce qu'il soit en sécurité, qu'il devienne plus prospère et en général plus heureux, dans un contexte de vie plus bienfaisant, et en fait il a fait exactement le contraire, et bien sûr son. [12:17] Responsibility for not averting the war and going along with western geopolitical concerns right from the start, abandoning the Istanbul peace which was on the table. Responsabilité de ne pas avoir évité la guerre et d'avoir suivi les préoccupations géopolitiques occidentales dès le début, abandonnant la paix d'Istanbul qui était sur la table. [12:27] It's not just Boris Johnson who visited on the 9th of April to say, you know, and the fact they're willing to sacrifice Ukrainians to impose — I mean, what's the goal of the west in this war? Ce n'est pas seulement Boris Johnson qui a visité le 9 avril pour dire, vous savez, et le fait qu'ils sont prêts à sacrifier des Ukrainiens pour imposer — je veux dire, quel est le but de l'Occident dans cette guerre ? [12:37] To impose a strategic defeat on Russia ultimately, otherwise they'd be talking and forcing some sort of peace process. Pour imposer une défaite stratégique à la Russie finalement, sinon ils parleraient et forceraient une sorte de processus de paix. [12:47] Uh, so that's the Fodv element. Euh, donc c'est l'élément Fodv. [12:51] Um, uh, you mentioned the attacks on Russia; they've been very damaging. Hum, euh, vous avez mentionné les attaques contre la Russie ; elles ont été très dommageables. [12:55] So Fodiov and his team, and of course started before they — I mean, they have been successful. Donc Fodiov et son équipe, et bien sûr ont commencé avant qu'ils — je veux dire, ils ont eu du succès. [12:59] Of course, a lot of these attacks is not just missiles as well, uh, certainly uh, in Briansk, in Kursk, and um, other uh regions, and in fact deeper and deeper. Bien sûr, beaucoup de ces attaques ne sont pas seulement des missiles aussi, euh, certainement euh, à Briansk, à Koursk, et hum, d'autres euh régions, et en fait de plus en plus profond. [13:11] So we're talking about the war being horizontally extended. Donc nous parlons de la guerre étant étendue horizontalement. [13:16] So far it's horizontally extended to the east to Jusqu'à présent, elle est étendue horizontalement vers l'est vers [13:18] Russia itself is very damaging. La Russie elle-même est très nuisible. [13:20] Most Russians so far have been shrugging it off. La plupart des Russes jusqu'à présent l'ont ignoré. [13:23] This is a country after all which has had so many traumas over the recent years. C'est un pays après tout qui a connu tant de traumatismes au cours des dernières années. [13:27] Uh the Chetchin wars, planes being knocked out, the Dublinic um theater siege, the uh bestan and so many awful things which have happened. Euh les guerres tchétchènes, des avions abattus, le siège du théâtre de Doublinique euh, le euh bestan et tant de choses horribles qui se sont produites. [13:38] But clearly it's it's beginning to affect public opinion. Mais clairement ça commence à affecter l'opinion publique. [13:41] I mean when I say that it's to hardening it rather than softening it is that in the sense that up to now the uh the argument has been is that this war has been uh how can I put it? Je veux dire quand je dis que c'est pour le durcir plutôt que l'adoucir, c'est dans le sens que jusqu'à présent le euh l'argument a été que cette guerre a été euh comment dire ? [13:53] Segregated. Ségréguée. [13:56] It's been uh sectioned off to some distant uh rumbling thunder over the horizon. Elle a été euh isolée vers un euh tonnerre lointain grondant à l'horizon. [14:02] Now it's the war is indeed coming home. Maintenant la guerre rentre effectivement à la maison. [14:04] It genuinely is when Moscow is attacked. C'est vraiment le cas quand Moscou est attaquée. [14:07] I I even I who was in Moscow obst Moi moi même moi qui étais à Moscou obst [14:18] My own house shook violently. Ma propre maison a tremblé violemment. [14:21] Two explosions at 7:12 and then an even more massive one at 7:14 that comes as a shock. Deux explosions à 7h12, puis une encore plus massive à 7h14 qui arrive comme un choc. [14:28] The foundations shake, the lights shake and so on, booming. Les fondations tremblent, les lumières tremblent et ainsi de suite, grondant. [14:30] And this was clearly what they call PVO, anti-aircraft attack, knocking down a drone, and that's 60 mi from Moscow. Et c'était clairement ce qu'ils appellent PVO, une attaque antiaérienne, abattant un drone, et c'est à 60 miles de Moscou. [14:41] So this war is intensifying horizontally. Donc cette guerre s'intensifie horizontalement. [14:43] The danger of course is that this empowers the hardliners, the hawks, call them what you will, within Russia who say to Putin, you know, enough of your temporizing, enough of your attempt to keep this war as a special military operation to keep it something distant and not to allow it to become a fullscale Russo NATO or Russo European war. Le danger, bien sûr, est que cela renforce les durs, les faucons, appelez-les comme vous voulez, en Russie, qui disent à Poutine : vous savez, assez de vos atermoiements, assez de votre tentative de maintenir cette guerre comme une opération militaire spéciale, de la garder comme quelque chose de distant et de ne pas lui permettre de devenir une guerre à grande échelle russo-OTAN ou russo-européenne. [15:08] Let's take the gloves off. Enlevons les gants. [15:08] That certainly and that would of course uh danger vertical escalation that is the possible use of uh vertical and horizontal maybe you know one uh Cela certainement et cela serait bien sûr euh danger d'escalade verticale, c'est-à-dire l'utilisation possible de euh verticale et horizontale peut-être vous savez un euh [15:18] Commentator is calling for a hypersonic missile attack on NATO headquarters in Brussels, for example, give them warning to keep the loss of life to an absolute minimum, but a warning shot in other words to restore the sense of deterrence, the fear of nuclear weapons to the western elites who keep saying Russia's bluffing. Le commentateur appelle à une attaque de missile hypersonique contre le siège de l'OTAN à Bruxelles, par exemple, pour leur donner un avertissement afin de limiter au maximum les pertes humaines, mais un coup de semonce en d'autres termes pour restaurer le sentiment de dissuasion, la peur des armes nucléaires chez les élites occidentales qui ne cessent de dire que la Russie bluffe. [15:41] Well, they're bluffing until one day they're not bluffing. Eh bien, ils bluffent jusqu'au jour où ils ne bluffent plus. [15:43] And when they stop bluffing, 'cause we don't know what happens to the nuclear escalation cycle. Et quand ils arrêtent de bluffer, parce qu'on ne sait pas ce qui arrive au cycle d'escalade nucléaire. [15:47] We do know one thing: that those dozens if not hundreds of, uh, what's called playing U war games, terrible term, but you know these sort of war games. Nous savons une chose : que ces dizaines, voire centaines de, euh, ce qu'on appelle des jeux de guerre U, terme terrible, mais vous savez, ce genre de jeux de guerre. [16:00] We know that once nuclear escalation is used, that almost well all of them actually show it's almost unstoppable, that you go very quickly up the nuclear escalation cycle. Nous savons qu'une fois que l'escalade nucléaire est utilisée, presque tous, en fait, montrent que c'est presque inarrêtable, que l'on monte très rapidement dans le cycle d'escalade nucléaire. [16:11] So those like some of those, uh, our colleagues in Moscow who are calling for a warning shot across the bows, okay, a shot across the bows in 18th century. Donc ceux, comme certains de ces, euh, nos collègues à Moscou qui appellent à un coup de semonce, d'accord, un coup de semonce au XVIIIe siècle. [16:21] Doesn't have, you know, a warning shot across the boughs now threatens the very existence of humanity. Il n'y a pas, vous savez, un coup de semonce en travers des branches qui menace désormais l'existence même de l'humanité. [16:28] So that's where we are. Voilà donc où nous en sommes. [16:31] But of course, just a final point on you mentioned the NATO anchor summit, which is a fascinating subject in and of itself. Mais bien sûr, un dernier point sur le sommet de l'OTAN que vous avez mentionné, qui est un sujet fascinant en soi. [16:38] Whole books will be written about it. Des livres entiers seront écrits à ce sujet. [16:41] The final declaration of course had only six little points in it. La déclaration finale, bien sûr, ne contenait que six petits points. [16:44] So absolute minimum. Donc le strict minimum. [16:47] Russia was, as usual, point two, warned or condemned or described as a long-term threat. La Russie était, comme d'habitude, au point deux, avertie ou condamnée ou décrite comme une menace à long terme. [16:57] Now, that could be described in two ways. Maintenant, cela pourrait être décrit de deux manières. [17:01] Long-term could be seen as, well, it's not an immediate threat, so what we're panicking about, or it could be seen that it is a long-term existential enduring threat. À long terme pourrait être vu comme, eh bien, ce n'est pas une menace immédiate, alors de quoi paniquons-nous, ou cela pourrait être vu comme une menace existentielle durable à long terme. [17:10] And really, guys, we really need to bump up military defense expenditure and so on. Et vraiment, les gars, nous devons vraiment augmenter les dépenses de défense militaire et ainsi de suite. [17:15] But as far as you know, this endless lordy talk that at least they managed to mollify Trump. Mais pour autant que vous sachiez, ce discours interminable et pompeux qu'au moins ils ont réussi à apaiser Trump. [17:21] So one of the things coming out. Donc l'une des choses qui en ressort. [17:23] Of this uh this anchor summit was is that NATO is in fact deeply divided uh. De ce sommet d'ancrage, il ressort que l'OTAN est en fait profondément divisée. [17:29] It emerged it was basically 31 versus one, one being the United States and that has a deeper view. Il est apparu qu'il s'agissait essentiellement de 31 contre un, un étant les États-Unis, et cela a une vision plus profonde. [17:37] And my final point, the deeper effect is that you know as you know I've talked a lot in recent years about the establishment of a political west after 1945 that this is a the political west I'm arguing is effectively a new civilization with huge consequences has huge changes. Et mon dernier point, l'effet plus profond est que, vous savez, comme vous le savez, j'ai beaucoup parlé ces dernières années de l'établissement d'un Occident politique après 1945, que cet Occident politique, je soutiens, est effectivement une nouvelle civilisation avec d'énormes conséquences, apporte d'énormes changements. [17:53] It changes the character of the state uh within its membership. Cela change le caractère de l'État au sein de ses membres. [17:55] It changes the character of citizenship itself. Cela change le caractère de la citoyenneté elle-même. [18:00] Of course, it undermines sovereignty. Bien sûr, cela sape la souveraineté. [18:01] It does a lot of things. Cela fait beaucoup de choses. [18:04] All except in one state, the United States, which has always kept its sovereignty. Tout sauf dans un État, les États-Unis, qui a toujours conservé sa souveraineté. [18:08] It's always done its own thing. Il a toujours fait ce qu'il voulait. [18:10] It's it was a separable part. C'était une partie séparable. [18:12] Meanwhile, we have melddered ourselves into this NATO stan uh as as seen in Anchora of course with with divergences for example Turkey emerges as a as a major power and the. Pendant ce temps, nous nous sommes fondus dans cette OTAN, comme on le voit à Anchora bien sûr, avec des divergences, par exemple la Turquie émerge comme une puissance majeure et. [18:24] Fact it was held in Anria was important. Le fait qu'il se soit tenu à Anria était important. [18:26] And of course Erdan is the host uh was a fascinating to see his own personal sense with a huge army. Et bien sûr, Erdan est l'hôte, euh, c'était fascinant de voir son propre sens personnel avec une immense armée. [18:34] And of course it's held in Turkey which uh clearly has questions to ask uh to answer about its human rights in the cons and democratic concerns over the last few years which of course were not mentioned. Et bien sûr, cela se tient en Turquie, qui, euh, a clairement des questions à poser, euh, à répondre concernant ses droits de l'homme dans les inconvénients et les préoccupations démocratiques de ces dernières années, qui, bien sûr, n'ont pas été mentionnées. [18:48] And of course what events in the Middle East were barely discussed. Et bien sûr, les événements au Moyen-Orient ont été à peine discutés. [18:50] Meanwhile, you know, we have mass murder and war going on there. Pendant ce temps, vous savez, nous avons des meurtres de masse et une guerre qui se déroulent là-bas. [18:54] And yet the obsession with with Russia and this is a sign clearly of the degeneration of thinking and the lack of well first of all the undermining of normative standards within Nestan on the one side and the lack of strategic vision on the other quite apart from the ethical nihilism on display. Et pourtant, l'obsession avec, avec la Russie, et c'est un signe clair de la dégénérescence de la pensée et du manque de, eh bien, tout d'abord, le sape des normes normatives au sein de Nestan d'un côté, et le manque de vision stratégique de l'autre, sans parler du nihilisme éthique exposé. [19:12] So sorry about the long answer but that's no no an absolutely fascinating list of points. Désolé pour la longue réponse, mais ce n'est, non, non, une liste de points absolument fascinante. [19:17] I think it's going to take us uh this you know until the end of the hour uh for us to discuss or begin to scratch the surface of this. Je pense que cela va nous prendre, euh, vous savez, jusqu'à la fin de l'heure, euh, pour discuter ou commencer à effleurer la surface de cela. [19:23] But let me just begin. Mais laissez-moi simplement commencer. [19:23] I mean because Je veux dire parce que [19:25] You know you you you've raised a number of points. Vous savez, vous avez soulevé un certain nombre de points. [19:28] I want to talk about the leadership question, um, the effect of the horizontal extension of the war on Putin and on Russia and where that, what that implies, uh, the use of nuclear rhetoric on both sides. Je veux parler de la question du leadership, euh, de l'effet de l'extension horizontale de la guerre sur Poutine et sur la Russie, et de ce que cela implique, euh, de l'utilisation de la rhétorique nucléaire des deux côtés. [19:44] I want to discuss that and how it it it it it they how there is some this kind of interaction between them. Je veux discuter de cela et de comment il y a une sorte d'interaction entre eux. [19:54] Uh, and and and then I want to come back to this idea of this very big idea you're raising of of a political west as a new civilization and how I mean I can I can understand that that's what some people want to achieve, but the question is can it be achieved, this is a separate question, but anyway so I want to discuss all these, but let's begin with the leadership question because if you look at it so people in Russia want the war to end right away, but and and and in fact or let's not begin with Russia because that's kind of almost the exception because the war continues to have a Euh, et puis je veux revenir sur cette idée très grande que vous soulevez d'un Occident politique comme nouvelle civilisation, et comment, je veux dire, je peux comprendre que c'est ce que certaines personnes veulent atteindre, mais la question est de savoir si cela peut être atteint, c'est une question distincte, mais de toute façon, je veux discuter de tout cela, mais commençons par la question du leadership, car si vous regardez les choses, les gens en Russie veulent que la guerre se termine tout de suite, mais en fait, ou ne commençons pas par la Russie, car c'est en quelque sorte presque l'exception, car la guerre continue d'avoir un [20:26] considerable degree of legitimacy in [20:28] Russia. But outside Russia, the [20:30] Ukrainians don't want the war to [20:32] continue. 66% of them are saying they [20:34] want negotiations to end the war. [20:36] Practically none, nobody in Europe among [20:40] the ordinary people of Europe want this [20:42] war to continue except certain elites [20:44] that are particularly attuned to the uh [20:47] rhetoric and and and and and discursive [20:50] discourses emanating from their [20:52] capitals. Most people are opposed to the [20:53] war and indeed we may be looking forward [20:56] to a point in time in the coming [20:58] elections in various countries in France [21:00] and elsewhere uh where these governments [21:03] will may lose because of this war. Uh so [21:07] so so the and and in across the pond in [21:10] the United States Trump actually [21:12] campaigned on ending the war, ending US [21:15] support for the war, all of these things [21:18] he remains in. So it really shows you [21:21] that essentially we have and we have [21:24] we're living in an era when the [21:26] leadership no longer uh uh uh I mean [21:29] it's completely detached from what [21:31] ordinary people want and so how you know [21:33] this creates an extremely unstable [21:35] situation. We've seen for example in [21:37] Britain for we've had like how how many [21:40] six prime ministers in seven years [21:42] the seventh coming up now it's seventh [21:43] in 10 years. Yeah. [21:45] Yeah. Exactly. So I mean this is like [21:47] astonishing you know the level of [21:49] instability. [21:50] uh uh uh Britain always used to contrast [21:53] its stab stability with Italy but in [21:56] Italy Bologna has been securely ensconed [21:58] for a while whereas the British have [22:00] been through quite a few prime ministers [22:02] since she was elected but anyway the the [22:05] the question I'm trying to ask is that [22:08] the leadership wishes to create or you [22:12] know who does who what what does the [22:14] European leadership actually want what [22:16] does the western leadership actually [22:18] want you said they'd like to eliminate [22:20] Russia, but that is not it's not [22:21] possible for them to do so. One I mean [22:24] are they just delusional or is it that [22:27] so long as the Russian threat Russian [22:29] bogey is there they can get away with a [22:32] lot of other things? I mean what's [22:34] really going on do you think? Yeah, [22:37] the one that I mean to slightly I mean [22:39] to pick up on your question but slightly [22:41] you phrase it. Can public opinion [22:43] actually change the course of events at [22:45] a present time? Uh and of course you're [22:47] absolutely right. Public opinion is as [22:49] you say uh there's no war fever. There's [22:52] war fever amongst elites but no war [22:54] fever amongst the mass of people in the [22:57] UK or any other European country. [22:59] Certainly not in Russia. That's the war [23:00] fever as you say. Absolutely rightly. uh [23:03] there's a sort of a grim determination [23:04] that it's a terrible task but which has [23:07] to be resolved and of course a deep [23:09] sadness because it's quite clear I mean [23:12] as the way I see it this Russo Ukrainian [23:14] war is a is a civil war it's a fraternal [23:17] war between two you know they're not the [23:19] same but two closely related peoples and [23:23] that perhaps explains some of the [23:25] bitterness and of course that precise [23:27] closeness of these peoples is precisely [23:30] what the western Ukrainians and the [23:32] Galatians are so concerned about and [23:34] that's why they wanted to forge and to [23:36] push the two countries so far apart. And [23:38] of course, this is what people like [23:40] Bigfinsky and so on have been trying to [23:42] do or tried to do for the last 30 years. [23:44] Make absolutely certain that these two [23:46] fraternal nations and of course they're [23:48] two maybe very similar peoples. That [23:50] doesn't mean to say they have to be one [23:51] state and that's certainly not the goal [23:53] of this war. Uh in other words, it's not [23:55] an an attempt to reestablish the Soviet [23:58] Union or anything like that. So, but can [24:01] public opinion again with within [24:03] Ukraine? Yes, they do want negotiations. [24:06] But then there follow-up questions. [24:08] Would you give up land for peace? No. [24:10] So, the conditions [24:11] I I I believe uh that's interesting you [24:14] say that because I believe I've read [24:15] somewhere that they were also willing to [24:17] make concessions on land. [24:19] They wanted that that the that that they [24:22] wanted peace badly enough. uh and and [24:25] you know the recruitment problems [24:26] they've been having. They find it [24:28] difficult to get people to go and fight [24:31] uh etc. This is you know uh yeah so so [24:35] anyway I just wanted to say no you're [24:36] right that that has shifted you're [24:39] absolutely right on the land for peace [24:41] that the opinion has shifted and more [24:44] people are now willing to trade land for [24:46] peace. So you're absolutely right it's [24:48] it's moving in that direction. Uh I [24:50] still think there's uh some way to go [24:52] before they'll do it. But the question [24:54] ultimately is you know your big question [24:57] how does it end? Uh and of course there [24:59] is of course this apocalyptic scenario [25:02] which is if the western elites western [25:04] Europeans not Trump interestingly enough [25:06] give him his due initially of course as [25:09] you say he emerged as the peace maker [25:11] the idea we have to understand Russia at [25:13] anchor of course he went completely the [25:16] other way but of but as you said in your [25:18] introduction uh the thing about Trump [25:21] now in his 80th year is that his sort of [25:24] uh he's always veered violently from one [25:27] side to the further. But his his [25:29] oscillations have gathered speed uh you [25:32] know overnight even and that is a sign [25:35] of uh clearly what now in his second um [25:38] coming up to soon third year of in the [25:41] second term uh and his own how can I put [25:44] it his own consistency which was never [25:47] high has become even higher. So but that [25:50] but that in part is because of the huge [25:53] pressure of Western European leaders who [25:56] all you know who've ganged up to to make [25:58] sure that he continues this resolute [26:00] line but public can public opinion [26:03] change their policies. This is where a [26:05] bigger theoretical question comes in. Uh [26:08] uh living aside the United States but [26:10] certainly in Western Europe as I've been [26:12] recently arguing that basically Western [26:15] Europe is trapped between two unpleasant [26:18] phenomena. Uh on the one side you have [26:20] illiberalism uh which of course they're [26:23] now very pleased that they have chased [26:24] some of it out in Hungary and elsewhere [26:26] but it's still quite prevalent in a [26:28] number of countries including our own. [26:30] On the other side we have democratism [26:34] and that is the view that uh democracy [26:37] or the NATO alliance NATO and [26:39] geopolitics is more important than mere [26:43] public opinion or even the ballot box [26:45] which of course we've seen that in the [26:47] attempted lawfare against Marin Le Pen [26:51] leaving aside the justice of the actual [26:53] specific case but clearly against Trump [26:56] of course earlier and the Democrats [26:57] before he was elected. Uh but [27:00] democratism is the belief that there are [27:02] some things more important than [27:04] democracy which in this case is NATO [27:06] enlargement and all of that. [27:08] Uh so so I I yeah I'm trying to puzzle [27:11] you by using the term democratism. [27:14] You are opposing it to democracy more a [27:18] performative the performance of [27:20] democracy rather than actually any [27:23] commitment to democracy. a sort of [27:24] meritricious [27:26] uh a sort of performance of democracy [27:28] perhaps is what you're calling [27:29] democratism. [27:31] Yeah. Very well. Absolutely. That's that [27:33] formulation indeed that uh and we see it [27:36] of course in the Romanian elections last [27:39] December. We saw it uh in the Muldoven [27:41] elections where I don't know how many up [27:43] to a million or perhaps there's too many [27:45] but the a quarter of a million Romania [27:49] or Muldovens uh in Russia weren't [27:51] allowed to vote and all of this you know [27:53] the list is quite large now uh and even [27:55] their attacks on Georgia because Georgia [27:58] is attempting to plow its own [28:00] geopolitical path an independent [28:02] sovereign uh independent path it's [28:05] really being hammered for this and [28:07] accused of being undemocratic when [28:09] perhaps it's the most democratic uh in [28:11] the region of course where you have a [28:13] totally um um how can I put it misshaped [28:16] and misbegotten election in Armenia but [28:18] it got the right result just recently uh [28:21] with uh uh Pashanyan then uh then that's [28:25] of course a model of democracy so [28:27] democracy becomes a victim of this [28:28] geopolitical contestation [28:30] yeah and and just one one final point [28:32] maybe I'll push on this leadership [28:34] question so it seems that um the the uh [28:38] uh uh the European leadership. I mean, [28:41] just before Trump was reelected, we were [28:44] able to say that somehow Biden has [28:46] invagled the European leadership into [28:49] abandoning policies that would be good [28:51] for Europe and adopting policies that [28:53] would be good for the United States. But [28:55] now uh with Trump in office and with [28:58] Trump sort of saying, you know, we [29:00] should end this war, etc., It's left [29:03] Europe more committed to the war and [29:05] Europe is trying to drag the United [29:07] States into the war rather than the [29:08] United States trying to drop drag Europe [29:10] into the war. I mean what changed and [29:13] and I'm still puzzling over this and [29:15] that's why I always think that there's [29:17] something else that the European elites [29:20] are pursuing which is not in fact the [29:24] dismembering of Russia but the goal of [29:27] you know countering the Russian threat [29:30] or the stated goal. serves a certain [29:32] other purpose and I I but what I can't [29:35] figure out is what that other purpose [29:37] might be. I mean I've thought of many [29:39] things. Number one, obviously it [29:41] increases defense expenditure and [29:43] defense increasing defense expenditure [29:45] is very interesting and important [29:46] because we're living in a time when the [29:49] actual ruling classes the capitalist [29:51] ruling classes of Europe or anywhere [29:53] else for that matter do not wish to make [29:56] any concession to ordinary people uh in [29:59] any form which would even for the [30:01] purposes of expanding demand which is [30:04] what they would need you know to [30:05] continue to function. So in the in in [30:08] lie of expanding popular demand for [30:10] ordinary goods, you can expand demand [30:12] for for for defense production by simply [30:15] raising the bogey of war. Secondly, uh [30:18] if you if you're constantly under [30:19] threat, you can repress political [30:22] disscent by linking it to possibility of [30:24] connections with uh uh uh [laughter] uh [30:26] uh others and so on. And perhaps a third [30:29] is somehow connected with the [30:32] disappearing security umbrella of the [30:35] United States over Europe. [30:38] Yeah. So I'd answer this in two ways. I [30:42] mean I think what you you've just given [30:43] some very good reasons which I think all [30:45] valid but uh what you you've basically [30:47] described is if you like the curtain has [30:50] been drawn and that Europe until [30:52] recently could always hide behind the [30:54] US. Oh that's the real imperial power. [30:57] that's the one irresponsible rogue power [30:59] even and so on. And it's shown that [31:01] these guys our leadership uh ain't much [31:04] better that uh that that you know okay [31:07] over the Iraq war in 2003 there were um [31:11] people did as we know France and Germany [31:14] and Russia opposed the invasion which [31:16] was totally illegal in 2003 but of [31:19] course they all came to heal afterwards. [31:21] So what we see since then is the fact [31:23] that what uh that the residual let's [31:27] call it the O politic line not just [31:29] simply in relationship the Soviet Union [31:31] or or Russia but o politique as a sense [31:34] of uh we can take sovereign decisions [31:37] ourselves that we can decide on these [31:39] issues of war and peace separately from [31:42] being members of this NATO alliance. [31:44] Well that's gone. that the NATO block [31:47] discipline that block uh uh unity is [31:52] more important than anything else. In [31:54] visav Russia first instance and over the [31:57] the war but even more than that in and [32:00] off itself it is a goal to maintain this [32:03] block discipline and block unity which [32:06] of course was much lorded at anchor just [32:08] recently. Look how brilliant we are and [32:11] attempts to divide us have failed. So [32:13] that becomes self- sustaining. But the [32:15] the second thing which uh I I would say [32:18] going back to my idea which I'm trying [32:20] to develop more of the political west as [32:22] a civilization at the core if you like [32:25] one of the foundations which perhaps [32:27] will help answer your the question is [32:30] that we're what we've seen now is the [32:33] emergence you know I've used various [32:35] words in the past the culture of the [32:37] second cold war I call I talked about [32:39] hermeticism but I'll now go a tiny bit [32:41] further hermeticism in other words it's [32:43] closed it's an enclosed system. It [32:45] cannot take into account the concerns [32:47] legitimate or otherwise security [32:49] concerns of the other, for example, [32:51] Russia. They just, you know, I would [32:53] endlessly ask people in the Ministry of [32:55] Defense when I was invited to give meet [32:57] people there and the FCDO, well, what [33:00] are what do you think are the minimal [33:02] Russian legitimate Russian security [33:04] concerns? Never answered. They just [33:06] simply evaded. They sort of looked, [33:09] shuffled around and so on. Okay. I mean, [33:11] it could be very minimalist, but at [33:13] least give us an answer. Yeah, [33:14] but they couldn't because the mere [33:16] evasion that in itself showed that this [33:18] ostitic tradition, this sovereignty has [33:21] given way to what uh could the other [33:24] German term west bind tying into the [33:28] west. This tying in and what this has [33:30] done has transformed the nature of [33:32] leadership to transformed the nature of [33:34] statehood transformed the nature of [33:36] sovereignty. It happens within the [33:37] European Union in an analogist process, [33:40] but we're talking about NATO or NATO [33:42] stan or political west. So that's what's [33:45] happened. Westbind dominates ospitique [33:48] even if you mention it nowadays [33:51] you you're condemned. Oh not just [33:53] because of the Moscow angle but the [33:55] implication of Soviet decision-making. [33:57] So leg these legacy states France, [33:59] Germany, UK have lost their ability. [34:03] West, but they're so bound to the west [34:05] to a west that the United States is [34:07] defecting from interestingly enough [34:09] because it was always a separable part [34:11] which makes them even more angry and [34:13] more intent on maintaining unity even as [34:15] that unity founders and disintegrates. [34:18] But the key bottom line here which I'm [34:21] trying to get to in a securitous manner [34:23] but I keep forgetting where I'm going on [34:25] this and that is the word and the [34:28] concept of hyperorm. Yeah, [34:31] hyperormality. What this means is is [34:33] that they can hence, you know, there's [34:36] so much discussion of saying these [34:38] European elites are irrational. I mean, [34:40] it just doesn't make sense. It doesn't. [34:42] I mean, you're in danger of destruing [34:44] your own continent. You're in danger of [34:45] provoking a nuclear war. You're in [34:47] danger of impoverishing your people [34:49] where inequality is widened and so on. [34:51] It's the end point of neoliberal gutting [34:53] off the idea of national interest in the [34:55] state activism on the one side, but in [34:58] other words, it's hypern. So, so in [35:00] other words, this normality undermines [35:03] our I mean simple my simple common sense [35:06] understanding of normality common sense [35:08] understanding of rationality we we just [35:11] can't your question is an excellent one [35:13] in that sense it doesn't make sense so [35:16] how can we explain all of this I'm [35:18] explaining it in terms of with the [35:20] development of this hypernormality which [35:22] is detached from any oakshortian [35:25] rationalism in politics as marvelous [35:27] book a few decades ago you marvelous [35:30] book to explain and that was the west at [35:32] its best when you had people like [35:34] Oakshot and so many others but [35:36] particular Oakshot because of you know [35:38] just great thinker in all sorts of ways [35:41] but that tradition instead of which they [35:43] they've already there under Isaiah [35:46] Berlin and Carl Pa and all of that sort [35:48] of attempts to say open society and its [35:51] enemies which was itself an [35:52] anti-pluralistic monist approach which [35:55] was incorporating cold war thinking into [35:57] the political west [35:58] uh which uh people like Oak who who [36:03] draws on classical visions of European [36:06] modernity and and conservatism and [36:08] civilization [36:10] where these guys were generating this [36:12] new civilization of the political west [36:14] which was anti-polurialist which was [36:16] monist totalistic let's not call it [36:18] totalitarian totalistic where indeed [36:21] everything else is either uh suffocated [36:25] by the sort of commodious consu [36:27] consumerism and everything else and [36:29] descent is incorporated uh and going all [36:32] the way back to the congress for [36:33] cultural freedom funded by the CIA in [36:36] the first cold war and then it was then [36:38] funded by NOS's [36:41] George Fish Foundation Ford Foundation [36:43] and so on and now to the point at which [36:45] even they don't need to do it it's [36:46] become so normalized but this is a [36:49] hyperormality because it's not the [36:51] normality which we can see in New Delhi [36:55] which we can see in Beijing or Shanghai [36:58] and indeed in Moscow which is always [37:00] accused of being completely crazy [37:02] irrational when in actual fact their [37:04] their vision and their joint statements [37:06] with China and so on are the model of [37:08] rationality going back to where we all [37:10] were at the starting point in 1945 in [37:13] creating the charter international [37:15] system with with the United Nations at [37:18] its foundation which is just simply well [37:20] it's certainly we can criticize it in [37:22] all sorts of respects but that is as it [37:25] were the the bottom line or the [37:26] foundation moment against which we can [37:29] test the irrationality which has [37:31] developed since then. Uh however [37:33] [snorts] you know flawed that system may [37:35] be. It's about a good baseline against [37:38] which we can say that's normal and [37:40] everything which diverges from it is not [37:42] and I'm afraid we've gone a long way [37:44] from that and yeah I mean [37:46] blocks anything else of course as well. [37:48] Again, I I I think what you're what [37:51] you're calling hyperormality is a sense [37:54] of normality which is actually detached [37:56] from normal life. [37:57] Indeed. [37:58] Uh and and and and but you know uh so [38:00] you know the way in which I've tried to [38:02] think about these things is to set it in [38:05] the context of the decline of capitalism [38:08] which is which underlines underlies [38:12] rather the uh uh uh the the situation [38:14] today and and constantly intrudes on it. [38:17] Uh so capitalism is declining, growth [38:20] rates are are declining, inequality is [38:22] increasing, financialization is gone [38:24] rampant, productive uh capacities are at [38:28] a low and you know that you can't fight [38:31] a war in modern times without industry [38:34] and industry is what Europe and the [38:36] United States increasingly are losing uh [38:40] elsewhere. I mean again just uh today [38:43] the FD is headlining that in order to [38:45] manufacture its drones Ukraine is going [38:47] to be buying components from China. [38:50] Great. Well, you know [38:51] that that is an interesting point by the [38:53] way which we need to come back to. [38:55] We come back to I think we we probably [38:57] going to have to return to this [38:59] conversation because we're uh anyway but [39:01] but let me finish the thought. So, so [39:03] the background is of western decline and [39:05] in the context of this western decline [39:08] the the visions of what the west ought [39:10] to achieve are getting more grandiose [39:13] but the capacity to achieve it is lower [39:16] than ever and uh so you have a lot of [39:19] very paradoxical things happening so for [39:21] example Trump says you spend more on uh [39:23] defense the Europeans finally after [39:26] decade a decade or more of wrangling are [39:28] coming around to saying all right we'll [39:30] spend more but the moment each [39:32] individual European country spends more [39:35] the more it will want to say the people [39:38] will not just follow the American line [39:40] the more they will have to individually [39:42] uh uh want to say okay what are we going [39:44] to spend this money on etc etc uh [39:48] secondly of course the fact that Germany [39:50] is spending a lot of money is raising [39:52] age-old suspicions around Europe what is [39:54] Germany going to do with all this extra [39:56] military spending uh etc uh uh uh so so [40:00] in these ways is the attempt to produce [40:03] unity may paradoxically produce [40:05] disunityity. Meanwhile, Trump is saying [40:07] that these guys should spend more on on [40:09] on the military because actually [40:12] contrary to what is constantly asserted, [40:14] the United States does not have an [40:17] exorbitant privilege to keep printing [40:19] dollars because the more it does so the [40:21] more the dollar is undermined. That is [40:23] why otherwise why wouldn't the Americans [40:26] simply say oh well we'll spend all the [40:27] money you don't worry about it and since [40:29] we are spending all the money you have [40:31] to listen to us the United States is not [40:34] doing that it cannot do that plus of [40:36] course uh uh uh uh wars are deeply [40:39] unpopular in the United States etc so [40:42] all of this is creating you know big [40:45] chasm between what the European elites [40:49] may want what the European ruling [40:51] classes may want and what they're going [40:53] to end up getting. [40:55] Yeah. Uh no, that that's actually [40:57] absolutely right. Uh if I can slightly [41:00] um reformulate what you just said, not [41:02] not not um not to disagree with it [41:04] actually. I think absolutely grand. But [41:05] to reformulate it, one way we can look [41:07] at it is that the first 40 years after [41:09] 1945 were if you like that social [41:12] democratic moment under the pressure of [41:14] the existence of the Soviet Union, the [41:16] existence of the communist alternative [41:18] and so on. So not only did they have to [41:21] defend well indeed against the Soviet [41:23] Union and its allies, but it also had to [41:25] defend against communist subversion [41:27] internally. Hence you had a new social [41:29] contract with the workers at a time of [41:31] course when you still had labor unions [41:32] and uh genuinely socialistminded [41:36] political parties and indeed MPs who'd [41:38] actually gone down the mines and worked [41:40] in the factories and could speak for the [41:42] people and their constituencies. Then we [41:44] spent the next 40 years disembedding [41:47] capitalism from social control the way [41:49] you've just said uh which uh they've [41:52] done brilliantly financialization [41:53] commodification of every almost every [41:55] human activity uh as well. Now the [41:59] including defense production with [42:01] serious consequences [42:03] indeed indeed. Then I mean if we say [42:07] we're now 80 years after 1945 [42:10] so I mean these are just obviously [42:12] clearly with lots of overlap and you [42:14] know not hard borders between these 40 [42:17] years but we're now entering a new [42:19] period. It may last 40 years. It may [42:21] last four four minutes if if we're [42:23] unlucky. But uh it's nevertheless it's [42:27] quite clear from what you've just said [42:29] that we're entering or capitalism and [42:31] the western political economy is [42:34] certainly entering in my view a new [42:36] phase. You've listed some of the factors [42:37] but we could add more. Clearly uh the uh [42:41] the AI or technological evolution and [42:43] the enormous power of of Silicon Valley [42:46] and the tech bios is just enormous which [42:49] has eroded further. It's no longer [42:51] neoliberalism if you like or [42:53] neoonservatism in the foreign policy. [42:56] There it's the what some people call it [42:58] I know that you don't like the term of [43:01] you know feudal whatever this varopakist [43:05] technofudalism technofudalism [43:06] or or or neofudalism. Yeah. [43:08] Yes. But uh but nevertheless uh it's you [43:11] know suggesting whatever this is one of [43:13] the ways of looking at what's happening [43:15] now the new the way that capital is [43:17] reconfiguring itself is the key issue. [43:20] One of the other factors again which you [43:22] you've sort of mentioned is that uh you [43:25] know exorbitant privilege but the pro [43:27] dollar which is under which has [43:28] underpinned the US economy for 40 years [43:31] and allowed it that so-called exorbitant [43:33] privilege as you guys disc called it is [43:37] that you know there more and more trades [43:39] and yuan swaps and national currencies [43:42] so dd dollararization is going to one [43:44] way or another the the people are no [43:46] longer holding dollars in so many [43:48] reserves. I think that global total you [43:51] probably know far better than I do but [43:52] only 65% now of global reserves are in [43:55] dollars down from 70 80% not long ago [43:59] and so in other words the global economy [44:01] is changing and a mere existence of [44:03] course of China as a major powerhouse [44:06] economy and the Soviet and Russia itself [44:08] of course maybe not of course bogged [44:10] down mired in this war but still it's [44:14] still huge economic dynamism and things [44:17] happening which people are not uh you [44:20] know it's well working towards you know [44:23] f sixthg and all sorts with China and so [44:26] I mean so many other things India of [44:28] course coming up in other words the [44:29] whole global context of capitalism is [44:32] changing because you've got alternative [44:33] models you've got the state socialist [44:35] model call it what you like whatever in [44:37] China you've got uh well you've got a [44:40] sort of statist capitalism less in chi [44:43] India recent years but nevertheless it's [44:45] still got a statist inflection in [44:47] certain respects and and so on and so [44:49] forth. And of course, you've got this [44:51] huge emergence not just of the Asian [44:53] economy, the Asian tigers as we used to [44:55] call it, but the sheer enormity of [44:59] what's happening, the transformation of [45:01] Africa, it's not just demographic, but [45:03] clearly uh there's also other things [45:06] going on there. Nigeria, Egypt, South [45:08] Africa, other countries uh demanding uh [45:13] well in other words we're entering a new [45:16] phase which everybody's trying to pin a [45:18] label on it. Technofudalism may be one [45:20] inadequate one but all trying to see how [45:24] this new elephant looks like and [45:25] everybody looks at one bit of it but [45:27] there is a new beast emerging. [45:30] Yeah. I mean I just just uh uh very [45:32] quickly on this I would say that uh as [45:35] you you're right I don't like the term [45:36] neo feudalism because people forget that [45:39] rontier income is very specifically [45:42] capitalist [45:43] yes [45:43] feudal feudal uh uh uh ruling classes [45:46] did not live on rontier income yes they [45:48] lived on extract exploitation extraction [45:50] of surplus from uh you know the actual [45:53] people who worked the land and and and [45:55] so on but that's but they owed m [45:57] obligations in return and So that was [46:01] not Rontier income actually comes into [46:03] being only with capitalism. It's a so so [46:06] to me this folks is what capitalism [46:08] looks like. It's not going to you know [46:10] reverting to feudalism at all. Secondly, [46:14] uh I think that the most important thing [46:16] that we can say about the power of AI [46:19] and you know in my introduction I was [46:21] referring to how these people have you [46:23] know people like Alex Karp and and and [46:25] Peter Teal and so on they openly [46:28] proclaim their disdain for democracy. [46:30] They uh they believe themselves that [46:32] they are superhuman. uh they are endowed [46:35] with superhuman intelligence and they [46:37] are going to create out of their [46:38] superhuman intelligence and extrahuman [46:41] intelligence which is AI and uh uh uh [46:45] this is complete nonsense. They have [46:47] inflated expectations [46:50] uh uh and and so there whatever [46:52] influence they have it relies on this [46:55] inflation of expectations. I don't doubt [46:57] that you know uh some of the [46:59] technologies they are producing may have [47:01] been used here or there but in reality [47:04] what they are doing is they are creating [47:07] a a a base of an infrastructure through [47:11] which they can constantly extract um the [47:15] value of a value that is produced by [47:17] others. So in in in in uh in the U in [47:20] the UK right now we have this [47:22] controversy over Palunteer getting [47:24] access to NHS uh health records and so [47:27] on. So all and this will allow them to [47:30] to you know create [47:32] certain types of databases and so on and [47:34] so forth. The the point is that in the [47:36] end what they want to do is control all [47:38] this information in the hope that [47:41] somehow by controlling and processing [47:44] this information something superior to [47:46] human intelligence will be produced. Of [47:48] course it will not be produced but [47:50] that's that's the bubble. This bubble [47:54] could burst quite [47:56] early on. That's the other thing. That's [47:58] another element of volatility in the [48:00] situation. But I just want to maybe [48:02] circle back because we should probably [48:03] end our conversation soon and we have [48:05] you know I think you're just going to [48:06] have to come back and maybe we should [48:08] have an entire program on on uh uh uh [48:11] your idea of the of NATO style and the [48:14] political west and and so on. But maybe [48:16] can we conclude this discussion by [48:18] talking about what's happening in [48:20] Russia? How you know where is what is [48:23] what is Putin's strategy? How is it [48:26] different from what the hardliners want? [48:28] What do you think is going to happen [48:29] given that now the the the war has as [48:33] you say come home to ordinary Russians [48:35] in a way that it did not have before? To [48:37] me the most important manifestation of [48:39] this is that middle class Russians are [48:41] quite irate that they cannot use the [48:43] internet as reliably as they once did. [48:46] So uh but yeah just take take that away [48:49] please. Yeah, can just before very [48:51] briefly before that indeed the whole [48:53] ideology of data is data is the new oil [48:56] and is all of that stuff and the other [48:58] point about Germany. Yes, the German [49:00] question is back. uh and of course a lot [49:03] of that hinges on whether Germany really [49:05] has managed to transform its social [49:07] consciousness after the second world war [49:09] and Japan of course uh or whether [49:12] there's ultimately a certain how can I [49:15] put it militarism I don't you know and [49:17] the debate is and I think this is a [49:19] discussion well worth having that should [49:22] we fear like Mrs. Ed at the time of [49:24] German unification and France Mitriant [49:27] that long tradition of fear of German [49:30] militarism in the heart of Europe and of [49:32] course that question is a valid one now [49:34] but just to just to throw that in as for [49:37] Russia two things two observations here [49:40] uh the first is that uh I I was [49:43] attending a number of conferences [49:46] in in Moscow just recently and not just [49:49] in Moscow by the way in in Pascov forum [49:52] and I I must say the thing which emerges [49:54] most importantly and counterintuitively [49:57] according to western uh views is the [50:01] that there there's still a huge [50:03] diversity of views and pluralism and [50:05] people are not afraid of stating it even [50:08] for example with the newspaper Nissimar [50:11] Gazetta independent newspaper it really [50:13] is some of the articles in there were [50:16] quite you know in a fifth year of war [50:19] just how bold some of the arguments and [50:21] some of the issues were dealing with [50:23] many sensitive issues for example [50:25] Russia's relationship with China uh the [50:27] the not so much in the conduct of the [50:29] war clearly fifth year of the war one [50:32] has to be careful and there are [50:33] limitations undoubtedly uh but [50:35] nevertheless amongst the academic and [50:37] political community who with whom I met [50:40] there is this huge diversity of views uh [50:42] clearly hawks and doves is a way of [50:45] describing it those who say look we [50:47] really need to unleash our genuine power [50:49] and if we don't do so now then it'll be [50:52] worse later because it'll be even we'll [50:54] have to demonstrate it even more [50:56] intensely at the moment. In other words, [50:58] a a small war now to avoid a big war [51:01] later is is on the one side and we know [51:04] some of our colleagues making that [51:06] argument. Uh and on the other side and [51:09] that seems to be prepundonderant that uh [51:12] we mustn't give into provocations that [51:14] this is exactly what the Zalinskyites [51:16] and those his the Starites exactly what [51:19] well Starmmer doesn't have a clue what [51:21] he's doing. I mean, so he just [51:22] completely support for Ukraine, the best [51:26] support for Ukraine is to save the [51:27] Ukrainian nation, save the Ukrainian [51:30] people from this dreadful war. Uh, and [51:32] one way or another, let I won't go into [51:35] detail here, but that would be genuine [51:37] support as opposed to there is no [51:39] military solution against a nuclear [51:41] power and Russia and Moscow understands [51:44] that that they ultimately cannot lose. [51:48] uh maybe we don't know what how to [51:51] define winning but certainly they cannot [51:52] lose ultimately uh one of the statements [51:56] I heard at one conference was that Yosha [51:59] may ultimately if they don't do [52:01] something now will have to sacrifice [52:04] itself to save humanity in other words [52:07] uh you know it would would actually have [52:09] to escalate to the Armageddon scenario [52:11] to save well to which of course is the [52:14] end of everything [52:15] for for the second time because of [52:17] course the Russians faced an enormous [52:19] demographic [52:21] uh hit when they fought the second world [52:23] war. [52:24] Absolutely. Yes. So the so that's that's [52:27] um but you're absolutely right but [52:28] there's also the a deeper under well an [52:31] undercurrent is that indeed and I think [52:34] you had put your finger on it in terms [52:35] of this the uh pressure on telegram the [52:38] the independent uh the the the what they [52:42] call them internet and social media [52:44] channels and indeed more and more [52:45] blockages on western sites and indeed [52:48] more and more um agencies called [52:51] undesirable and all of that and many of [52:53] those who are pro regime Put [52:55] Putin even are warning that uh that they [52:59] are allowing who knows who to and it's [53:03] not just simply the secure bureaucrats [53:04] the FSB and uh others [53:08] maybe within the administration itself [53:10] who are you know for example well [53:13] pushing these restrictive measures so [53:16] some described as another age of [53:18] prohibition as in the late Soviet years [53:20] I'm not full scale repression but just a [53:23] constant pushing and we know how the [53:26] late Soviet years ended up and of course [53:28] it undermines intellectual [53:30] in innovation and uh vitality to the [53:33] system. So there are concerns and people [53:36] are saying this openly and just one [53:38] final point it's interesting in all of [53:40] this is that Russia in my view is moving [53:43] into a genuinely postwestern phase. It [53:47] knows that it cannot have any [53:49] relationship with NATO, the political [53:51] west, the collective west, whatever you [53:52] want to call it, the Atlantic system. [53:55] But on the other hand, so many are quite [53:58] clearly [54:00] still [54:01] in and consider themselves Europeans. So [54:04] Russia becomes post-western but not post [54:07] European. And that they will not allow [54:09] the Zilinski and the Galatians and the [54:11] West Ukrainians to, you know, to to play [54:14] that role. Of course, the Zilinskiites [54:17] present Russia as you know barbarian [54:20] hordes, Mongols and so on. Appalling [54:22] sort of Edward say orientalization [54:25] of it and that that Ukraine is a bastion [54:29] holding the barbarians at the gate. All [54:31] of which is the way the Staragites [54:34] present this war. Clearly the shock of [54:37] the invasion clearly is that but you [54:39] know five minutes thinking is why did [54:41] they do it? And then then you start [54:44] unpacking, you know, and you go back and [54:46] you say, well, were there legitimate [54:48] concerns? Did we address them [54:49] adequately? And so on to avoid what we [54:52] all agree is a monstrous, awful war. I [54:54] mean, no one is in favor of it. We're [54:56] simply trying to identify the causes and [54:58] therefore hopefully find a way to stop [55:01] this awful intern war, not just between [55:04] fraternal peoples in Ukraine and Russia, [55:07] but this is a European civil war. This [55:09] is a genuinely and it's again just like [55:12] the first world war, the second world [55:14] war which debilitated our continent and [55:17] now we've got this third European war [55:20] which is yet again going to have that [55:22] same debilitating effect across the [55:24] continent [55:25] and and as you say some of the with the [55:28] reemergence of the German question for [55:30] example some of the same themes are [55:32] reemerging there's no doubt [55:34] um you know this thing you said about um [55:37] Russia entering a new phase is in its [55:39] life that which is on the one hand you [55:41] know not European but somehow [55:43] not western [55:44] not western but uh spiritually or [55:47] somehow culturally they remain European [55:49] but you know and professor Karaganov in [55:51] particular is always saying this you [55:53] know that I think the three of us at [55:55] Valdai we had a very interesting [55:56] conversation about you know he you know [55:59] he said you well the thrust of it was [56:03] that Russia was now increasingly [56:05] Eurasian politically but that somehow [56:07] culturally he felt that he was European [56:10] and then you and I had an interesting [56:11] discussion about whether we are you know [56:13] I am European etc. So interesting but [56:16] here here's the thing I think that I [56:19] mean to say you know [56:22] what or let me just they may be [56:24] spiritually European but the particular [56:27] strands of European culture to which [56:29] they attach themselves are precisely [56:31] those which are not liberal. They are [56:34] not accepting the whole of the European [56:36] legacy. They what they it seems to me [56:38] they're doing is they are rejecting [56:41] liberalism. [56:42] And I mean liberalism in the sense that [56:46] uh not in the sense of some benign a [56:49] commitment to freedom but in the sense [56:51] of the ideology that it was the uh that [56:54] accompanied capitalism uh whose core is [56:58] the protection of private property whose [57:01] core is the commercialization of [57:03] everything etc etc. So I think they're [57:05] moving away from liberalism. So in that [57:08] and for the rest European traditions are [57:11] not significantly different from any [57:14] other tradition. If you actually you [57:16] know started you know re researching [57:18] Chinese thought or Indian thought or for [57:21] that matter African thought you will not [57:23] or Islamic thought you will not find [57:26] anything that really separates Europe [57:29] from these traditions except liberalism. [57:32] And the Russians are not act they're [57:35] also moving away from liberalism. [57:38] Yes. Yes. But given my now view, it's [57:42] what sort of liberalism are they moving [57:44] away from? Uh and uh clearly there's one [57:48] of the terrible things about our own [57:50] liberalism is this cold war liberalism [57:52] which uh went beyond what uh you know it [57:56] isn't just a capitalist form. It was [57:59] even undermining that constitutionalism [58:01] and the rule of law which was associated [58:04] which I think goes back deeper and of [58:07] course all to Roman times before [58:08] capitalism and hopefully we'll have the [58:10] rule of law afterwards better better [58:14] rule of law when it's no longer [58:15] intermixed with so many other uh [58:17] negative phenomenon. So uh and of course [58:20] we have and there is and you know I will [58:23] actually stick to this that there is an [58:26] emancipatory type of liberalism uh which [58:29] means you know human dignity. It means [58:31] rule of law. It means you know I I want [58:34] defensible property rights. I don't want [58:35] somebody coming into my house some but [58:37] obviously we're talking I know [58:40] private property rights. That's personal [58:41] property right. I know absolutely I know [58:43] I know but I was just going to jump in [58:46] before you jumped in there to say I [58:48] quite understand that distinction but [58:50] nevertheless but you know even but the [58:53] two are connected when you start eroding [58:56] those liberal visions or if you like the [58:58] emancipatory liberal vision and I'd go [59:01] even a little bit further to say that [59:03] maybe this is heretical I'm more and [59:05] more thinking that even you know modest [59:09] entrepreneurialism is very important [59:11] dynamic that some people can fulfill [59:14] their destiny through establishing a [59:16] small business through establishing you [59:18] know a workshop making something doing [59:21] something thinking something even we as [59:23] academics that's what we do we we have [59:25] our little workshops in our studies and [59:27] we're working away intellectually yes [59:30] yeah no uh I mean this is again I mean [59:32] we've just opened such a cornucopia of [59:34] issues I'm sure that I'm going to have [59:36] you back very soon uh but for now I [59:39] think we should draw this to a close. I [59:41] think that was a very good set of points [59:42] [music] on which to end. So I just want [59:45] to say thank you to you Richard. Thank [59:47] you to our audience. Uh to our audience, [59:50] let me also say if you like this, [59:52] [music] please like, click the like [59:54] button, please share, subscribe, become [59:57] members and donate if you can. But uh [59:59] we'll end this for now. [music] Uh until [01:00:02] next time, goodbye. [01:00:18] [music]