# Hegel's Dialectic | The Complete System

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xt8GMqpRXn4
Translation: es

[00:05] Philosophy has a habit of domesticating its most difficult thinkers.
  La filosofía tiene la costumbre de domesticar a sus pensadores más difíciles.

[00:10] Hegel is the most domesticated of all, reduced to a turnary formula that he never used, assigned positions he explicitly rejected and treated as a historical curiosity rather than a living problem.
  Hegel es el más domesticado de todos, reducido a una fórmula ternaria que nunca utilizó, asignado a posiciones que explícitamente rechazó y tratado como una curiosidad histórica en lugar de un problema vivo.

[00:25] The reduction is convenient because the real Hegel poses a genuine threat to how most of us think about thinking.
  La reducción es conveniente porque el verdadero Hegel representa una amenaza genuina para la forma en que la mayoría de nosotros pensamos sobre el pensamiento.

[00:34] He is not arguing that thought is messy or that contradictions are useful metaphors or that history has a rhythm.
  Él no argumenta que el pensamiento es desordenado o que las contradicciones son metáforas útiles o que la historia tiene un ritmo.

[00:42] He is arguing that the very structure of rationality is self undermining in a way that produces necessarily and not accidentally the categories through which reality becomes intelligible.
  Él argumenta que la propia estructura de la racionalidad se socava de una manera que produce necesaria y no accidentalmente las categorías a través de las cuales la realidad se vuelve inteligible.

[00:56] That is a claim with teeth and it is not going away.
  Esa es una afirmación con dientes y no va a desaparecer.

[01:02] This series reconstructs the Hegelian
  Esta serie reconstruye el hegeliano

[01:05] This series reconstructs the Hegelian system from its foundations not from its reputation.
  Esta serie reconstruye el sistema hegeliano desde sus cimientos, no desde su reputación.

[01:10] The architecture matters here because Hegel's individual claims cannot be evaluated in isolation.
  La arquitectura importa aquí porque las afirmaciones individuales de Hegel no pueden ser evaluadas de forma aislada.

[01:18] A claim about contradiction in the logic cannot be properly assessed without understanding what Hegel means by logic and why it begins where it does.
  Una afirmación sobre la contradicción en la lógica no puede ser evaluada adecuadamente sin comprender lo que Hegel entiende por lógica y por qué comienza donde lo hace.

[01:30] The lordship and bondage dialectic cannot be understood without the account of recognition that precedes it.
  La dialéctica de la señoría y la servidumbre no puede ser comprendida sin el relato del reconocimiento que la precede.

[01:38] The political philosophy cannot be evaluated without the onlogical commitments of the doctrine of concept that underpin it.
  La filosofía política no puede ser evaluada sin los compromisos ontológicos de la doctrina del concepto que la sustentan.

[01:48] Each part of this series completes something that the previous part left deliberately open.
  Cada parte de esta serie completa algo que la parte anterior dejó deliberadamente abierto.

[01:55] The focus throughout is the current state of the debate.
  El enfoque a lo largo de todo es el estado actual del debate.

[02:00] Several developments since the early 1990s have genuinely changed the landscape.
  Varios desarrollos desde principios de la década de 1990 han cambiado genuinamente el panorama.

[02:05] Genuinely changed the landscape.
  Genuinamente cambió el panorama.

[02:08] Pippen's non-metaphysical reading, Robert Brandham's inferentialist reconstruction, Dieter Henrik's reflection theoretic critique, and the ongoing dispute about whether Hegel's logical contradictions constitute a form of dialtheism.
  La lectura no metafísica de Pippen, la reconstrucción inferencialista de Robert Brandham, la crítica teórica de la reflexión de Dieter Henrik y la disputa en curso sobre si las contradicciones lógicas de Hegel constituyen una forma de dialteísmo.

[02:23] Of dialtheism.
  De dialteísmo.

[02:26] Where the debate is unsettled, that will be said clearly.
  Donde el debate no está resuelto, eso se dirá claramente.

[02:29] Where a standard interpretation has been decisively challenged, the challenge gets its full hearing.
  Donde una interpretación estándar ha sido decisivamente desafiada, el desafío recibe toda su atención.

[02:36] Where Hegel may simply be wrong, that possibility will be faced rather than managed.
  Donde Hegel puede estar simplemente equivocado, esa posibilidad se enfrentará en lugar de gestionarse.

[02:45] Part one, the Kant inheritance.
  Primera parte, la herencia kantiana.

[02:49] Part one, the Kant inheritance.
  Primera parte, la herencia kantiana.

[02:53] Why Hegel cannot start anywhere else.
  Por qué Hegel no puede empezar en ningún otro lugar.

[02:55] Kant's first critique establishes something precise and disturbing.
  La primera crítica de Kant establece algo preciso e inquietante.

[02:58] The categories through which we structure experience, categories like causality, substance and unity are contributions of
  Las categorías a través de las cuales estructuramos la experiencia, categorías como causalidad, sustancia y unidad son contribuciones de

[03:06] substance and unity are contributions of the subject, not features read off from the world.
  la sustancia y la unidad son contribuciones del sujeto, no características extraídas del mundo.

[03:11] They are the conditions under which experience is possible for a mind like ours.
  Son las condiciones bajo las cuales la experiencia es posible para una mente como la nuestra.

[03:16] This means that what we can know is confined to phenomena.
  Esto significa que lo que podemos saber se limita a los fenómenos.

[03:23] The world as it appears under these conditions while things as they are in themselves the new manor or things in themselves remain permanently inaccessible.
  El mundo tal como aparece bajo estas condiciones mientras que las cosas en sí mismas, la nueva mansión o las cosas en sí mismas, permanecen permanentemente inaccesibles.

[03:35] We can describe the structure of our experience with precision but we cannot get behind it.
  Podemos describir la estructura de nuestra experiencia con precisión, pero no podemos ir más allá de ella.

[03:43] The thing in itself is real for can't but it is epistemically walled off.
  La cosa en sí misma es real para no poder, pero está epistémicamente aislada.

[03:49] This looks like a sober, modest result.
  Esto parece un resultado sobrio y modesto.

[03:53] It tells us where knowledge ends and speculation begins.
  Nos dice dónde termina el conocimiento y comienza la especulación.

[03:58] For a generation of philosophers after Kant, however, this modesty concealed a structural instability that Kant had not
  Para una generación de filósofos después de Kant, sin embargo, esta modestia ocultaba una inestabilidad estructural que Kant no había

[04:07] structural instability that Kant had not addressed.
  inestabilidad estructural que Kant no había abordado.

[04:08] The problem begins with the concept of the thing in itself.
  El problema comienza con el concepto de la cosa en sí.

[04:13] To say there is a thing in itself that affects us that causes our sensory manifold is already to apply the category of causality to something that lies outside the domain where causality is supposed to apply.
  Decir que hay una cosa en sí que nos afecta y que causa nuestro múltiple sensorial ya es aplicar la categoría de causalidad a algo que yace fuera del dominio donde se supone que la causalidad se aplica.

[04:30] Kant uses the concept of affection of the numinal world acting on us precisely where his own system forbids its use.
  Kant utiliza el concepto de afección del mundo numinal actuando sobre nosotros precisamente donde su propio sistema prohíbe su uso.

[04:41] Hegel's entry point into this problem is not to deny that Kant notice something real about the subject's contribution to experience.
  El punto de partida de Hegel para este problema no es negar que Kant notó algo real sobre la contribución del sujeto a la experiencia.

[04:51] The critical move is to show that the thing in itself as a concept is incoherent from within Kant's own framework.
  El movimiento crítico es mostrar que la cosa en sí como concepto es incoherente dentro del propio marco de Kant.

[05:01] If the thing in itself is unknowable, then we cannot say it exists, that it
  Si la cosa en sí es incognoscible, entonces no podemos decir que existe, que

[05:07] then we cannot say it exists, that it affects us, or that it is the ground of appearances.
  entonces no podemos decir que existe, que nos afecta, o que es el fundamento de las apariencias.

[05:12] These are all determinate claims about something Kant declared indeterminate.
  Todas estas son afirmaciones determinadas sobre algo que Kant declaró indeterminado.

[05:19] As Hegel puts it in the opening of the Encyclopedia logic, what is called the thing in itself is precisely the abstraction from all the determinations of actuality, which is itself a perfectly determinate result.
  Como dice Hegel en la apertura de la Lógica de la Enciclopedia, lo que se llama la cosa en sí es precisamente la abstracción de todas las determinaciones de la actualidad, que es en sí misma un resultado perfectamente determinado.

[05:35] The unknowable has been given a great deal of content by the act of calling it unknowable.
  A lo incognoscible se le ha dado mucho contenido por el acto de llamarlo incognoscible.

[05:44] But Hegel's deeper critique concerns the methodology of critique itself.
  Pero la crítica más profunda de Hegel se refiere a la metodología de la crítica misma.

[05:50] Kant proposed that before philosophy investigates the world, it should investigate the cognitive instrument it will use, the faculty of reason and understanding.
  Kant propuso que antes de que la filosofía investigue el mundo, debe investigar el instrumento cognitivo que utilizará, la facultad de la razón y el entendimiento.

[06:02] The idea is that you should examine your tools before you start building.
  La idea es que debes examinar tus herramientas antes de empezar a construir.

[06:08] tools before you start building.
  herramientas antes de empezar a construir.

[06:11] Hegel's objection sharpened most clearly in the preface to the phenomenology of spirit.
  La objeción de Hegel se agudizó más claramente en el prefacio de la Fenomenología del Espíritu.

[06:14] is that this approach is self-defeating.
  es que este enfoque se autoanula.

[06:18] To examine the faculty of cognition, you must use cognition.
  Para examinar la facultad de cognición, debes usar la cognición.

[06:20] To assess the limits of reason, you must use reason.
  Para evaluar los límites de la razón, debes usar la razón.

[06:24] The examination cannot stand outside of what it examines.
  El examen no puede estar fuera de lo que examina.

[06:27] Trying to know knowledge before you know anything is, as Hegel's analogy has it, like refusing to enter the water until you have learned to swim.
  Intentar conocer el conocimiento antes de saber nada es, como dice la analogía de Hegel, como negarse a entrar en el agua hasta haber aprendido a nadar.

[06:30] This is not a rhetorical point.
  Este no es un punto retórico.

[06:32] It has precise structural implications.
  Tiene implicaciones estructurales precisas.

[06:34] Kant's critical philosophy assumes that the distinction between how things appear to us and how they are in themselves is a stable starting point that critique can use without investigating.
  La filosofía crítica de Kant asume que la distinción entre cómo las cosas nos aparecen y cómo son en sí mismas es un punto de partida estable que la crítica puede usar sin investigar.

[06:38] Hegel denies that this distinction can
  Hegel niega que esta distinción pueda

[07:09] Hegel denies that this distinction can be taken as foundational.
  Hegel niega que esta distinción pueda tomarse como fundamental.

[07:11] The subject object split the very form of the opposition between knowing subject and known world is itself a product of a particular shape of thought not a transcendental given.
  La división sujeto-objeto, la forma misma de la oposición entre el sujeto que conoce y el mundo conocido, es en sí misma un producto de una forma particular de pensamiento, no una dada trascendental.

[07:26] It has a history and it will be overcome.
  Tiene una historia y será superada.

[07:31] The precise premise where Hegel and Kunt diverge is this.
  La premisa precisa donde Hegel y Kunt divergen es esta.

[07:34] Kant holds that the form of cognition and the content to which it applies come from different sources.
  Kant sostiene que la forma de la cognición y el contenido al que se aplica provienen de diferentes fuentes.

[07:47] The subject supplies the forms.
  El sujeto suministra las formas.

[07:49] The thing in itself supplies the material.
  La cosa en sí misma suministra el material.

[07:51] Hegel holds that this dualism is unstable because the act of distinguishing subject from object is already a conceptual act that neither side of the distinction can explain on its own.
  Hegel sostiene que este dualismo es inestable porque el acto de distinguir el sujeto del objeto es ya un acto conceptual que ninguno de los lados de la distinción puede explicar por sí solo.

[08:03] The concept of the thing in itself is a concept which means it is
  El concepto de la cosa en sí misma es un concepto, lo que significa que es

[08:10] itself is a concept which means it is already on the side of thought, not outside it.
  en sí es un concepto que significa que ya está del lado del pensamiento, no fuera de él.

[08:14] outside it.
  fuera de él.

[08:14] The boundary K draws is drawn by the very faculty whose scope is supposed to be limited by the boundary.
  El límite que K traza lo traza la facultad misma cuyo alcance se supone que está limitado por el límite.

[08:23] What Hegel takes from Kant and does not abandon is the idea that philosophy must be critical.
  Lo que Hegel toma de Kant y no abandona es la idea de que la filosofía debe ser crítica.

[08:33] The precantian rationalists, Linets and Wolf, most prominently simply assumed that reason could directly cognize the structure of reality without first asking what entitles reason to do this.
  Los racionalistas precantianos, Linets y Wolf, más prominentemente simplemente asumieron que la razón podía cognocer directamente la estructura de la realidad sin preguntar primero qué autoriza a la razón a hacer esto.

[08:46] Kant was right that this assumption needs examination.
  Kant tenía razón en que esta suposición necesita examen.

[08:49] But Kant's examination stopped at a fixed dualism of subject and world.
  Pero el examen de Kant se detuvo en un dualismo fijo de sujeto y mundo.

[08:55] A dualism that is itself in need of examination.
  Un dualismo que necesita ser examinado.

[09:02] Hegel's project is to push the critique further past the point where Kant stopped.
  El proyecto de Hegel es llevar la crítica más allá del punto donde Kant se detuvo.

[09:07] The result will not be a return
  El resultado no será un retorno

[09:10] stopped.
  detuvo.

[09:13] The result will not be a return to precritical dogmatism, but it will require abandoning the thing in itself and the permanent subject object split that comes with it.
  El resultado no será un regreso al dogmatismo precrítico, sino que requerirá abandonar la cosa en sí y la división permanente sujeto-objeto que conlleva.

[09:22] This leaves Hegel with a precise and urgent problem.
  Esto deja a Hegel con un problema preciso y urgente.

[09:25] If philosophy cannot begin from a given subject examining a given world, and if there is no preosophical vantage point from which to examine our cognitive tools, where does philosophy begin?
  Si la filosofía no puede comenzar desde un sujeto dado que examina un mundo dado, y si no hay un punto de vista prefilosófico desde el cual examinar nuestras herramientas cognitivas, ¿dónde comienza la filosofía?

[09:43] And how does it begin without simply presupposing what it needs to demonstrate?
  ¿Y cómo comienza sin presuponer simplemente lo que necesita demostrar?

[09:50] Part two, the thesis antithesis synthesis myth and what the dialectic actually is.
  Segunda parte, el mito de tesis antítesis síntesis y lo que realmente es la dialéctica.

[09:59] Most educated people believe Hegel's method operates through a triadic sequence.
  La mayoría de las personas educadas creen que el método de Hegel opera a través de una secuencia triádica.

[10:05] A thesis is posed, its antithesis is generated, and the two are reconciled in a synthesis.
  Se plantea una tesis, se genera su antítesis y las dos se reconcilian en una síntesis.

[10:11] are reconciled in a synthesis.
  se reconcilian en una síntesis.

[10:13] This formula is almost entirely wrong as a description of Hegel's procedure.
  Esta fórmula es casi completamente errónea como descripción del procedimiento de Hegel.

[10:17] a description of Hegel's procedure.
  una descripción del procedimiento de Hegel.

[10:19] Hegel never used the words thesis, antithesis, and synthesis as a systematic schema in any of his major texts.
  Hegel nunca usó las palabras tesis, antítesis y síntesis como un esquema sistemático en ninguno de sus textos principales.

[10:25] The formula derives primarily from Johan Gotly Fishta who did employ something like it and from popularizers who found the turnary structure a convenient shortorthhand.
  La fórmula deriva principalmente de Johan Gotly Fishta, quien empleó algo parecido y de divulgadores que encontraron la estructura ternaria un atajo conveniente.

[10:39] The historian Gustav Müller documented this in a careful 1958 study and it has been confirmed repeatedly in scholarship since the mislabeling matters because it fundamentally misrepresents what drives Hegelian transitions.
  El historiador Gustav Müller documentó esto en un cuidadoso estudio de 1958 y ha sido confirmado repetidamente en la erudición desde que el etiquetado erróneo importa porque tergiversa fundamentalmente lo que impulsa las transiciones hegelianas.

[11:00] The thesis antithesis synthesis picture implies that a position is stated, its external opposite is assembled against it and a mediating third term bridges them.
  La imagen de tesis antítesis síntesis implica que se afirma una posición, se ensambla su opuesto externo contra ella y un tercer término mediador las une.

[11:11] The movement looks like debate
  El movimiento parece un debate

[11:14] The movement looks like debate claim and counterclaim followed by claim and counterclaim followed by resolution.
  El movimiento parece un debate de afirmación y contradicción seguido de afirmación y contradicción seguido de resolución.

[11:19] Resolution.
  Resolución.

[11:19] This is not Hegel's account.
  Este no es el relato de Hegel.

[11:23] For Hegel, the transitions are driven not by an external opposite being introduced from outside, but by the internal instability of the concept itself.
  Para Hegel, las transiciones no son impulsadas por un opuesto externo introducido desde fuera, sino por la inestabilidad interna del propio concepto.

[11:31] A concept breaks down because of what it is, not because something from the outside challenges it.
  Un concepto se descompone por lo que es, no porque algo del exterior lo desafíe.

[11:39] The negation is intrinsic, not imported.
  La negación es intrínseca, no importada.

[11:46] What Hegel actually describes in the encyclopedia logic sections 79-82 is three moments or sides of every logical determination.
  Lo que Hegel describe en las secciones 79-82 de la lógica de la enciclopedia son tres momentos o lados de cada determinación lógica.

[11:57] The first moment is the moment of the understanding for stand in German where a concept is grasped as having a fixed stable definition with clear boundaries.
  El primer momento es el momento del entendimiento en alemán, donde un concepto se capta como una definición fija y estable con límites claros.

[12:12] A thing is what it is and not what it is
  Una cosa es lo que es y no lo que es

[12:15] A thing is what it is and not what it is not.
  Una cosa es lo que es y no lo que no es.

[12:19] The understanding is the faculty of not.
  El entendimiento es la facultad de no.

[12:22] The understanding is the faculty of determination of holding concepts apart and specifying their content precisely.
  El entendimiento es la facultad de determinación de mantener los conceptos separados y especificar su contenido con precisión.

[12:28] It is the mode of thought that makes science, mathematics and ordinary practical reasoning possible.
  Es el modo de pensamiento que hace posible la ciencia, las matemáticas y el razonamiento práctico ordinario.

[12:34] Hegel does not dismiss it.
  Hegel no lo descarta.

[12:37] The second moment is the dialectical moment also called the negatively rational.
  El segundo momento es el momento dialéctico también llamado lo racional negativo.

[12:45] Here the one-sidedness or restrictedness in the concepts fixed definition comes to the surface.
  Aquí la unilateralidad o restricción en la definición fija de los conceptos sale a la superficie.

[12:53] The concept's own determination carries within it a tension that destabilizes it.
  La propia determinación del concepto lleva en sí una tensión que lo desestabiliza.

[12:58] The crucial feature is that this is self sublation as Hegel calls it the concept's own nature driving it to pass into its opposite.
  La característica crucial es que esta es la autonegación, como la llama Hegel, la propia naturaleza del concepto que lo impulsa a pasar a su opuesto.

[13:10] No external force is required.
  No se requiere ninguna fuerza externa.

[13:13] The concept undermines itself.
  El concepto se socava a sí mismo.

[13:18] concept undermines itself.
  el concepto se socava a sí mismo.

[13:21] The third moment is the speculative or positively rational.
  El tercer momento es el especulativo o positivamente racional.

[13:23] positively rational.
  positivamente racional.

[13:26] This is where Hegel parts decisively from the standard logical tradition.
  Aquí es donde Hegel se aparta decisivamente de la tradición lógica estándar.

[13:29] from the standard logical tradition.
  de la tradición lógica estándar.

[13:32] In classical logic, if a set of premises generates a contradiction, the correct response is to reject the premises and conclude nothing positive.
  En la lógica clásica, si un conjunto de premisas genera una contradicción, la respuesta correcta es rechazar las premisas y no concluir nada positivo.

[13:38] response is to reject the premises and conclude nothing positive.
  respuesta es rechazar las premisas y no concluir nada positivo.

[13:41] The contradiction is a reductio ad absurdum, a dead end that refutes the starting point.
  La contradicción es una reductio ad absurdum, un callejón sin salida que refuta el punto de partida.

[13:47] a dead end that refutes the starting point.
  un callejón sin salida que refuta el punto de partida.

[13:51] For Hegel, this response misses what is most important.
  Para Hegel, esta respuesta omite lo más importante.

[13:54] what is most important.
  lo más importante.

[13:56] The contradiction that emerges from the dialectical moment is not a dead end but a determinate result.
  La contradicción que surge del momento dialéctico no es un callejón sin salida sino un resultado determinado.

[14:03] a determinate result.
  un resultado determinado.

[14:06] It is a specific contentladen outcome that carries the trace of the concepts that produced it.
  Es un resultado específico cargado de contenido que lleva la huella de los conceptos que lo produjeron.

[14:12] that carries the trace of the concepts that produced it.
  que lleva la huella de los conceptos que lo produjeron.

[14:15] The speculative moment grasps this positive content in the collapse.
  El momento especulativo capta este contenido positivo en el colapso.

[14:17] collapse.
  colapso.

[14:17] A concrete scenario makes this
  Un escenario concreto hace que esto

[14:20] A concrete scenario makes this structural point visible.
  Un escenario concreto hace visible este punto estructural.

[14:23] Consider the concept of a limit as it functions in mathematics and in ordinary thought.
  Considere el concepto de límite tal como funciona en las matemáticas y en el pensamiento ordinario.

[14:30] The understanding fixes the concept of a limit as a boundary.
  La comprensión fija el concepto de límite como una frontera.

[14:32] What is inside and what is outside are clearly distinguished.
  Lo que está dentro y lo que está fuera están claramente distinguidos.

[14:37] But when you push the concept of a limit, you find that the limit is defined by what it separates.
  Pero cuando se empuja el concepto de límite, se encuentra que el límite se define por lo que separa.

[14:45] That it both belongs to what is inside and to what is outside.
  Que pertenece tanto a lo que está dentro como a lo que está fuera.

[14:50] And that the attempt to specify it precisely generates an instability in the very boundary you tried to fix.
  Y que el intento de especificarlo con precisión genera una inestabilidad en la propia frontera que intentaste fijar.

[14:58] The concept of a limit passes into the concept of transition.
  El concepto de límite pasa al concepto de transición.

[15:01] And the concept of transition is not simply the negation of limit but a new determination that carries both inside and outside as moments within it.
  Y el concepto de transición no es simplemente la negación del límite, sino una nueva determinación que lleva tanto el interior como el exterior como momentos dentro de él.

[15:14] This is the speculative result, not the rejection of limits, but a richer concept that includes limiting and
  Este es el resultado especulativo, no el rechazo de los límites, sino un concepto más rico que incluye la limitación y

[15:22] concept that includes limiting and transitioning as aspects of a single process.
  concepto que incluye la limitación y la transición como aspectos de un único proceso.

[15:28] The practically important implication is that Hegelian dialectic has no fixed schematic form.
  La implicación prácticamente importante es que la dialéctica hegeliana no tiene una forma esquemática fija.

[15:37] The number of moments in any particular dialectical sequence varies with the subject matter.
  El número de momentos en cualquier secuencia dialéctica particular varía con el tema.

[15:42] Some transitions involve more than three steps, some fewer, and the pattern depends on the internal structure of the concept being examined.
  Algunas transiciones involucran más de tres pasos, algunas menos, y el patrón depende de la estructura interna del concepto que se está examinando.

[15:53] The three moments, understanding, dialectical, speculative, describe aspects of what happens in every dialectical transition, not the number of terms involved in each one.
  Los tres momentos, entendimiento, dialéctico, especulativo, describen aspectos de lo que sucede en cada transición dialéctica, no el número de términos involucrados en cada uno.

[16:05] Anyone who applies the thesis antithesis synthesis grid to Hegel's texts will find it fits some passages tolerably well and many others not at all and will be confused by both.
  Cualquiera que aplique la cuadrícula de tesis, antítesis, síntesis a los textos de Hegel encontrará que se ajusta tolerablemente bien a algunos pasajes y a muchos otros nada en absoluto, y se confundirá por ambos.

[16:23] all and will be confused by both.
  todos y se confundirán con ambos.

[16:26] What remains genuinely difficult even after correcting the formula is Hegel's
  Lo que sigue siendo genuinamente difícil incluso después de corregir la fórmula es la afirmación de Hegel

[16:28] after correcting the formula is Hegel's claim that this self-sublating movement
  después de corregir la fórmula es la afirmación de Hegel de que este movimiento auto-superador

[16:32] claim that this self-sublating movement is necessary rather than contingent.
  afirmación de que este movimiento auto-superador es necesario en lugar de contingente.

[16:35] is necessary rather than contingent.
  es necesario en lugar de contingente.

[16:38] Why should a concept's own determination drive it to pass into its opposite?
  ¿Por qué la propia determinación de un concepto debería impulsarlo a pasar a su opuesto?

[16:42] drive it to pass into its opposite?
  impulsarlo a pasar a su opuesto?

[16:45] This is not obvious, and the answer depends on exactly what work the word
  Esto no es obvio, y la respuesta depende exactamente del trabajo que la palabra

[16:47] depends on exactly what work the word contradiction is doing in Hegel's logic.
  depende exactamente del trabajo que la palabra contradicción está haciendo en la lógica de Hegel.

[16:51] contradiction is doing in Hegel's logic.
  contradicción está haciendo en la lógica de Hegel.

[16:53] That question requires its own full treatment, and it has a live debate in
  Esa pregunta requiere su propio tratamiento completo, y tiene un debate activo en

[16:56] treatment, and it has a live debate in contemporary scholarship that is far
  tratamiento, y tiene un debate activo en la erudición contemporánea que está lejos

[16:58] contemporary scholarship that is far from closed.
  la erudición contemporánea que está lejos de cerrarse.

[17:03] Part three, being nothing becoming.
  Tercera parte, ser nada devenir.

[17:07] Part three, being nothing becoming.
  Tercera parte, ser nada devenir.

[17:10] What the first three pages of the logic are actually doing.
  Lo que las primeras tres páginas de la lógica están haciendo realmente.

[17:14] actually doing.
  haciendo realmente.

[17:16] The science of logic opens with a problem that is not immediately visible as a problem.
  La ciencia de la lógica se abre con un problema que no es inmediatamente visible como un problema.

[17:19] opens with a problem that is not immediately visible as a problem.
  se abre con un problema que no es inmediatamente visible como un problema.

[17:21] If Hegel's logic is to be a science of pure thought, a derivation of the most
  Si la lógica de Hegel ha de ser una ciencia del pensamiento puro, una derivación de lo más

[17:24] thought, a derivation of the most fundamental categories of rational
  pensamiento, una derivación de las categorías más fundamentales del pensamiento racional

[17:26] fundamental categories of rational thought without any presuppositions,
  categorías fundamentales del pensamiento racional sin ninguna presuposición,

[17:29] thought without any presuppositions, it must begin somewhere.
  pensamiento sin ninguna presuposición, debe empezar en algún lugar.

[17:32] it must begin somewhere.
  debe empezar en algún lugar.

[17:34] But every beginning already presupposes something.
  Pero todo comienzo ya presupone algo.

[17:38] A subject matter, a method, a reason for starting here rather than there.
  Un tema, un método, una razón para empezar aquí en lugar de allí.

[17:42] there.
  allí.

[17:44] Any content you bring to the starting point imports assumptions that have not yet been justified.
  Cualquier contenido que traigas al punto de partida importa suposiciones que aún no han sido justificadas.

[17:49] yet been justified.
  aún han sido justificadas.

[17:52] The logic cannot begin with a sophisticated concept like substance, cause or mind because those concepts would need to be derived from something more basic.
  La lógica no puede comenzar con un concepto sofisticado como sustancia, causa o mente porque esos conceptos necesitarían ser derivados de algo más básico.

[17:59] would need to be derived from something more basic.
  necesitarían ser derivados de algo más básico.

[18:03] But it cannot begin with nothing at all because then it has no starting point.
  Pero no puede empezar con nada en absoluto porque entonces no tiene punto de partida.

[18:09] starting point.
  punto de partida.

[18:11] Hegel's solution is to begin with what is left when you subtract every determination from a concept pure being sign with no further qualification.
  La solución de Hegel es empezar con lo que queda cuando se resta toda determinación de un concepto de ser puro sin más cualificación.

[18:18] determination from a concept pure being sign with no further qualification.
  determinación de un concepto de ser puro sin más cualificación.

[18:21] Not the being of this or that thing, not existence in any specific sense, but
  No el ser de esta o aquella cosa, no la existencia en ningún sentido específico, sino

[18:27] existence in any specific sense, but being as such stripped of every particular content.
  existencia en cualquier sentido específico, sino el ser como tal despojado de todo contenido particular.

[18:32] particular content.
  contenido particular.

[18:34] This is the most minimal starting point conceivable, the thought of something in general before anything specific is thought about it.
  Este es el punto de partida más mínimo concebible, el pensamiento de algo en general antes de que se piense algo específico en él.

[18:39] general before anything specific is thought about it.
  general antes de que se piense algo específico en él.

[18:42] Its philosophical advantage is precisely that it imports nothing.
  Su ventaja filosófica es precisamente que no importa nada.

[18:48] nothing.
  nada.

[18:52] Now examine what pure being actually is considered as a concept.
  Ahora examinemos qué es realmente el ser puro considerado como concepto.

[18:55] It has no determination, no specific content, no distinguishing feature.
  No tiene determinación, ni contenido específico, ni rasgo distintivo.

[19:01] distinguishing feature.
  rasgo distintivo.

[19:04] It is pure indeterminacy.
  Es pura indeterminación.

[19:07] But pure indeterminacy is also what we mean by nothing.
  Pero la pura indeterminación es también lo que queremos decir con nada.

[19:13] both concepts when actually thought rather than merely gestured at have the same content complete absence of determination.
  ambos conceptos cuando se piensan realmente en lugar de simplemente aludirse tienen el mismo contenido, ausencia completa de determinación.

[19:20] determination.
  determinación.

[19:23] The difference is only one of intention.
  La diferencia es solo de intención.

[19:26] Being is meant as presence nothing as absence.
  El ser se entiende como presencia, la nada como ausencia.

[19:28] Absence.
  Ausencia.

[19:30] But when the concepts are examined rather than merely pointed at, this difference in intention collapses into the same indeterminate content.
  Pero cuando los conceptos se examinan en lugar de simplemente señalarse, esta diferencia de intención colapsa en el mismo contenido indeterminado.

[19:40] Here is where most introductory treatments stop and declare the result puzzling or mystical.
  Aquí es donde la mayoría de los tratamientos introductorios se detienen y declaran el resultado desconcertante o místico.

[19:48] The actually important move is what Hegel does next.
  El movimiento realmente importante es lo que Hegel hace a continuación.

[19:53] Being and nothing are not identical.
  Ser y nada no son idénticos.

[19:56] Even though they have the same content, they are meant differently, pointed at differently.
  Aunque tienen el mismo contenido, se entienden de manera diferente, se señalan de manera diferente.

[20:04] This means there is a movement, a restless instability between them.
  Esto significa que hay un movimiento, una inestabilidad inquieta entre ellos.

[20:06] Being slides into nothing, nothing into being.
  El ser se desliza hacia la nada, la nada hacia el ser.

[20:14] And this movement back and forth is itself a concept becoming verden.
  Y este movimiento de vaivén es en sí mismo un concepto que se convierte en verden.

[20:22] Becoming is the first concrete concept in the logic.
  El devenir es el primer concepto concreto en la lógica.

[20:25] Unlike being and nothing which have no
  A diferencia del ser y la nada que no tienen ningún

[20:30] Unlike being and nothing which have no internal differentiation and no

[20:32] internal differentiation and no determinate content, becoming is defined

[20:35] determinate content, becoming is defined by the relationship between being and

[20:38] by the relationship between being and nothing.

[20:40] nothing. It is the thought of something going

[20:42] It is the thought of something going from presence to absence or from absence

[20:45] from presence to absence or from absence to presence. Its content is not empty.

[20:49] to presence. Its content is not empty. It is constituted by the tension between

[20:52] It is constituted by the tension between the two earlier concepts.

[20:55] the two earlier concepts. Becoming succeeds in being determinate

[20:58] Becoming succeeds in being determinate because it inherits the determinations

[21:01] because it inherits the determinations such as they are of what came before it.

[21:05] such as they are of what came before it. What makes this philosophically

[21:07] What makes this philosophically significant beyond the logic itself is

[21:10] significant beyond the logic itself is that the opening moves demonstrate

[21:12] that the opening moves demonstrate Hegel's general strategy for

[21:15] Hegel's general strategy for presuppositionless beginning.

[21:17] presuppositionless beginning. The logic does not begin from a neutral

[21:20] The logic does not begin from a neutral vantage point and then add content from

[21:23] vantage point and then add content from outside.

[21:25] outside. It begins with the most minimal possible

[21:28] It begins with the most minimal possible starting point and allows the internal

[21:30] starting point and allows the internal instability of that starting point to

[21:33] instability of that starting point to generate the next concept. The

[21:36] generate the next concept. The progression is driven from within.

[21:39] progression is driven from within. Every later concept in the logic will

[21:42] Every later concept in the logic will have richer content than its

[21:44] have richer content than its predecessors because it will have

[21:46] predecessors because it will have absorbed the contradictions that the

[21:48] absorbed the contradictions that the earlier concepts could not resolve.

[21:53] There is a standard objection from

[21:56] There is a standard objection from Steven Holgate and others in the

[21:58] Steven Holgate and others in the metaphysical reading camp. The opening

[22:01] metaphysical reading camp. The opening of the logic requires that we approach

[22:03] of the logic requires that we approach it having already undergone the

[22:05] it having already undergone the experience the phenomenology of spirit

[22:08] experience the phenomenology of spirit describes, namely the recognition that

[22:11] describes, namely the recognition that all determinate presuppositions have

[22:12] all determinate presuppositions have been set aside. The logic's

[22:14] been set aside. The logic's presuppositionlessness is not absolute.

[22:16] presuppositionlessness is not absolute. It rests on a prior philosophical

[22:18] It rests on a prior philosophical preparation.

[22:20] preparation. Pippen's non-metaphysical reading

[22:22] Pippen's non-metaphysical reading contests this. For Pippen, the logic's

[22:26] contests this. For Pippen, the logic's opening is a response to the canion

[22:28] opening is a response to the canion problem of how conceptual self-nowledge

[22:31] problem of how conceptual self-nowledge is possible, not a derivation of being

[22:34] is possible, not a derivation of being from an emptied standpoint.

[22:37] from an emptied standpoint. These two framings of what the logic is

[22:39] These two framings of what the logic is actually doing remain in live dispute.

[22:43] actually doing remain in live dispute. The dispute is not merely exeetical. It

[22:47] The dispute is not merely exeetical. It changes what the logic is supposed to be

[22:49] changes what the logic is supposed to be proving and what would count as a

[22:51] proving and what would count as a successful objection to it.

[22:56] Part four of the one concept doing all

[23:01] Part four of the one concept doing all the structural work. Every dialectical

[23:04] the structural work. Every dialectical transition in Hegel depends on a single

[23:07] transition in Hegel depends on a single structural operation that German

[23:09] structural operation that German provides with one word and English

[23:11] provides with one word and English cannot. Ofen the verb and alibong the

[23:15] cannot. Ofen the verb and alibong the noun carry three meanings

[23:17] noun carry three meanings simultaneously.

[23:19] simultaneously. to cancel or negate, to preserve or

[23:22] to cancel or negate, to preserve or retain, and to elevate to a higher

[23:25] retain, and to elevate to a higher level.

[23:27] level. Hegel is explicit that he intends all

[23:31] Hegel is explicit that he intends all three. The English word sublation, which

[23:35] three. The English word sublation, which translators use as a technical term for

[23:38] translators use as a technical term for ale, captures none of these meanings on

[23:41] ale, captures none of these meanings on its own. The triple meaning is not a

[23:44] its own. The triple meaning is not a word game. It names the structural fact

[23:48] word game. It names the structural fact that in Hegel's dialectic, what gets

[23:51] that in Hegel's dialectic, what gets negated in a transition is not simply

[23:55] negated in a transition is not simply discarded.

[23:58] discarded. Consider what happens in ordinary

[24:00] Consider what happens in ordinary logical negation.

[24:02] logical negation. If you have the concept of a straight

[24:04] If you have the concept of a straight line and negate it, you get not a

[24:07] line and negate it, you get not a straight line, which could be a curved

[24:10] straight line, which could be a curved line, a broken line, or no line at all.

[24:14] line, a broken line, or no line at all. The negation is abstract. It tells you

[24:18] The negation is abstract. It tells you what the concept is not but nothing

[24:20] what the concept is not but nothing about what replaces it. The original

[24:23] about what replaces it. The original concept does not contribute any specific

[24:26] concept does not contribute any specific content to what comes after it. The

[24:30] content to what comes after it. The replacement could be anything. This is

[24:33] replacement could be anything. This is what Hegel calls abstract negation and

[24:37] what Hegel calls abstract negation and it is logically useless for his

[24:39] it is logically useless for his purposes.

[24:42] purposes. Orbong is structurally different. When a

[24:45] Orbong is structurally different. When a concept is sublated, the higher concept

[24:48] concept is sublated, the higher concept that results retains the earlier concept

[24:51] that results retains the earlier concept as a moment, a non-independent aspect

[24:54] as a moment, a non-independent aspect that continues to do work within the new

[24:57] that continues to do work within the new determination.

[24:59] determination. Consider color as a concept.

[25:03] Consider color as a concept. When you think the concept red, you are

[25:06] When you think the concept red, you are thinking something that gets offen into

[25:09] thinking something that gets offen into the concept color.

[25:11] the concept color. Color does not simply replace or negate

[25:15] Color does not simply replace or negate red. Red continues to operate within

[25:18] red. Red continues to operate within color as one of its determinate

[25:21] color as one of its determinate instances.

[25:23] instances. Color is what it is partly because it is

[25:26] Color is what it is partly because it is the concept under which red, blue,

[25:28] the concept under which red, blue, yellow and so on are gathered. Without

[25:31] yellow and so on are gathered. Without the specificity of the sublated

[25:34] the specificity of the sublated concepts, the higher concept would be

[25:36] concepts, the higher concept would be empty.

[25:39] empty. Now move this from the relatively

[25:41] Now move this from the relatively ordinary case to the harder one. In the

[25:44] ordinary case to the harder one. In the logic's opening, being and nothing are

[25:47] logic's opening, being and nothing are offen in becoming.

[25:51] offen in becoming. Becoming does not simply replace them.

[25:54] Becoming does not simply replace them. Becoming is the movement from being to

[25:57] Becoming is the movement from being to nothing and from nothing to being held

[26:00] nothing and from nothing to being held as a unity.

[26:03] as a unity. Being and nothing continue to operate

[26:06] Being and nothing continue to operate within becoming as the poles of the

[26:08] within becoming as the poles of the movement that constitutes it. Remove

[26:11] movement that constitutes it. Remove them and becoming has no content.

[26:16] them and becoming has no content. The structural consequence is that the

[26:19] The structural consequence is that the logic is cumulative in a specific way.

[26:22] logic is cumulative in a specific way. Each new concept does not replace what

[26:25] Each new concept does not replace what came before it. It contains the earlier

[26:28] came before it. It contains the earlier concepts as sublated moments.

[26:32] concepts as sublated moments. This means the entire logic is present

[26:35] This means the entire logic is present in compressed form in any sufficiently

[26:38] in compressed form in any sufficiently late concept. The concept of the

[26:41] late concept. The concept of the absolute idea at the logic's end

[26:44] absolute idea at the logic's end contains the whole movement of the logic

[26:46] contains the whole movement of the logic within it. This is also why Hegel says

[26:50] within it. This is also why Hegel says the logic is a circle. The ending

[26:53] the logic is a circle. The ending returns to the beginning but with the

[26:55] returns to the beginning but with the beginning now understood as the result

[26:58] beginning now understood as the result of the whole.

[27:01] of the whole. The standard objection to Alfong is that

[27:03] The standard objection to Alfong is that the claim to simultaneously cancel and

[27:06] the claim to simultaneously cancel and preserve is either incoherent or

[27:09] preserve is either incoherent or trivially true. It is incoherent. The

[27:13] trivially true. It is incoherent. The objection runs because cancelling and

[27:15] objection runs because cancelling and preserving are contradictory operations.

[27:18] preserving are contradictory operations. You cannot do both to the same thing in

[27:21] You cannot do both to the same thing in the same respect.

[27:23] the same respect. Or it is trivially true in the sense

[27:26] Or it is trivially true in the sense that every replacement of a concept by a

[27:29] that every replacement of a concept by a new one involves the old concept being

[27:32] new one involves the old concept being preserved in memory which is

[27:34] preserved in memory which is philosophically uninteresting.

[27:37] philosophically uninteresting. Hegel's defenders respond that along is

[27:41] Hegel's defenders respond that along is neither of these.

[27:43] neither of these. The earlier concept is preserved not in

[27:46] The earlier concept is preserved not in memory but as a structurally necessary

[27:49] memory but as a structurally necessary moment in the higher concept's own

[27:51] moment in the higher concept's own definition.

[27:53] definition. The higher concept requires the earlier

[27:56] The higher concept requires the earlier concept to be what it is.

[27:59] concept to be what it is. This is a substantive claim and it can

[28:02] This is a substantive claim and it can be evaluated case by case as the logic

[28:06] be evaluated case by case as the logic proceeds.

[28:07] proceeds. Whether it is sustained throughout the

[28:09] Whether it is sustained throughout the logic's massive scope is one of the most

[28:12] logic's massive scope is one of the most contested questions in the literature.

[28:17] Part five, Vand and Venom. the

[28:21] Part five, Vand and Venom. the distinction that makes dialectic

[28:23] distinction that makes dialectic possible. There is a widespread

[28:26] possible. There is a widespread assumption that the dialectic between

[28:28] assumption that the dialectic between understanding and reason in Hegel is a

[28:31] understanding and reason in Hegel is a soft or rhetorical contrast, something

[28:34] soft or rhetorical contrast, something like the difference between analytical

[28:36] like the difference between analytical precision and synthetic insight.

[28:41] precision and synthetic insight. This underestimates how technically

[28:43] This underestimates how technically loaded both concepts are and how much

[28:46] loaded both concepts are and how much work the distinction does in the system.

[28:50] work the distinction does in the system. Understanding and reason vestand and

[28:52] Understanding and reason vestand and vern are not simply different

[28:55] vern are not simply different intellectual styles. They are different

[28:58] intellectual styles. They are different modes in which thought relates to its

[29:00] modes in which thought relates to its own determinations.

[29:02] own determinations. And the transition between them is what

[29:04] And the transition between them is what dialectical movement is.

[29:08] dialectical movement is. For Kant, understanding is the faculty

[29:11] For Kant, understanding is the faculty of concepts, the cognitive capacity that

[29:14] of concepts, the cognitive capacity that brings the manifold of intuition under

[29:17] brings the manifold of intuition under rules and produces judgments about

[29:20] rules and produces judgments about objects.

[29:21] objects. Reason in K sense is the faculty that

[29:24] Reason in K sense is the faculty that seeks the unconditioned that tries to go

[29:27] seeks the unconditioned that tries to go beyond all the conditioned items of

[29:30] beyond all the conditioned items of possible experience to reach a final

[29:33] possible experience to reach a final unrestricted ground.

[29:36] unrestricted ground. Reason systematizes and extends the work

[29:39] Reason systematizes and extends the work of understanding. But when it tries to

[29:41] of understanding. But when it tries to apply its ideas directly to reality, it

[29:44] apply its ideas directly to reality, it generates the paralogisms, antitoinies

[29:48] generates the paralogisms, antitoinies and ideal of pure reason, illusions that

[29:51] and ideal of pure reason, illusions that look like knowledge but are not. For

[29:54] look like knowledge but are not. For Kant, reasons overreach produces

[29:57] Kant, reasons overreach produces dialectical illusion. And the proper job

[30:00] dialectical illusion. And the proper job of critical philosophy is to expose this

[30:02] of critical philosophy is to expose this and constrain reason within legitimate

[30:05] and constrain reason within legitimate bounds.

[30:08] Hegel takes both concepts and assigns

[30:11] Hegel takes both concepts and assigns them different roles significantly

[30:14] them different roles significantly transforming what each does.

[30:17] transforming what each does. Understanding in Hegel's sense is the

[30:19] Understanding in Hegel's sense is the moment of fixity and determination.

[30:22] moment of fixity and determination. thought grasping a concept with clear

[30:24] thought grasping a concept with clear boundaries, holding it steady, treating

[30:27] boundaries, holding it steady, treating its distinctions as real and its content

[30:30] its distinctions as real and its content as stable.

[30:33] as stable. Understanding is the mode of thought

[30:35] Understanding is the mode of thought operative in mathematics, in natural

[30:38] operative in mathematics, in natural science, in law, and in all practical

[30:41] science, in law, and in all practical reasoning where precision matters. It

[30:44] reasoning where precision matters. It produces knowledge that is determinate

[30:46] produces knowledge that is determinate and reliable within its domain.

[30:50] and reliable within its domain. Hegel does not want to eliminate it. The

[30:53] Hegel does not want to eliminate it. The error of understanding is not that it

[30:55] error of understanding is not that it determines concepts, but that it treats

[30:58] determines concepts, but that it treats its determinations as final, as if the

[31:02] its determinations as final, as if the fixed boundaries were the ultimate truth

[31:04] fixed boundaries were the ultimate truth of the matter.

[31:07] of the matter. Reason in Hegel's sense is the cognitive

[31:10] Reason in Hegel's sense is the cognitive capacity that grasps what understanding

[31:13] capacity that grasps what understanding cannot. The positive content in the

[31:16] cannot. The positive content in the collapse of understanding's own

[31:18] collapse of understanding's own determinations.

[31:20] determinations. The crucial inversion of Kant is here.

[31:25] The crucial inversion of Kant is here. Kant said reason produces contradictions

[31:28] Kant said reason produces contradictions when it overreaches and these

[31:30] when it overreaches and these contradictions prove reason cannot know

[31:32] contradictions prove reason cannot know the unconditioned.

[31:34] the unconditioned. Hegel says reason produces

[31:36] Hegel says reason produces contradictions. Yes, but the

[31:38] contradictions. Yes, but the contradictions are not failures.

[31:42] contradictions are not failures. They are invitations.

[31:44] They are invitations. They are the points at which

[31:46] They are the points at which understanding's rigid boundaries break

[31:48] understanding's rigid boundaries break down under their own internal pressure.

[31:52] down under their own internal pressure. And reason's task is to grasp what is

[31:55] And reason's task is to grasp what is positive in that breakdown.

[31:59] positive in that breakdown. There is a concrete case that shows this

[32:01] There is a concrete case that shows this most clearly. Take the concept of a

[32:05] most clearly. Take the concept of a material thing. Understanding determines

[32:08] material thing. Understanding determines a material thing as something that

[32:11] a material thing as something that occupies space, has determinate

[32:14] occupies space, has determinate properties, and is distinguished from

[32:16] properties, and is distinguished from other things by its specific

[32:18] other things by its specific characteristics.

[32:20] characteristics. This is coherent and useful for physics

[32:23] This is coherent and useful for physics and ordinary experience.

[32:26] and ordinary experience. But when you follow the concept of a

[32:27] But when you follow the concept of a material thing rigorously, you reach an

[32:30] material thing rigorously, you reach an instability.

[32:32] instability. A material thing is supposed to be

[32:34] A material thing is supposed to be self-identical and distinct from other

[32:37] self-identical and distinct from other things. But it can only be what it is

[32:40] things. But it can only be what it is through its relations to other things.

[32:44] through its relations to other things. Its properties are relational. It is

[32:47] Its properties are relational. It is hard and heavy only relative to other

[32:49] hard and heavy only relative to other materials.

[32:51] materials. It is extended only relative to what it

[32:54] It is extended only relative to what it is not.

[32:56] is not. The concept of a discrete

[32:58] The concept of a discrete self-sufficient material thing

[33:00] self-sufficient material thing destabilizes itself when thought through

[33:03] destabilizes itself when thought through completely.

[33:04] completely. Understanding has nothing to do with

[33:06] Understanding has nothing to do with this except to note the tension.

[33:11] this except to note the tension. Reason in Hegel's sense grasps the

[33:14] Reason in Hegel's sense grasps the relational structure that understanding

[33:17] relational structure that understanding tried to exclude.

[33:19] tried to exclude. The thing is not dissolved into its

[33:21] The thing is not dissolved into its relations, but the concept of a discrete

[33:24] relations, but the concept of a discrete self-sufficient thing is replaced by a

[33:26] self-sufficient thing is replaced by a richer concept in which internal

[33:29] richer concept in which internal constitution and external relation are

[33:32] constitution and external relation are moments of a unified determination.

[33:36] moments of a unified determination. This is not mysticism.

[33:38] This is not mysticism. It is the recognition that

[33:40] It is the recognition that understanding's initial clean boundary

[33:43] understanding's initial clean boundary was achieved by suppressing a complexity

[33:46] was achieved by suppressing a complexity that the concept itself contains.

[33:50] The problem that remains unresolved in

[33:53] The problem that remains unresolved in this picture is whether Hegel's vern is

[33:56] this picture is whether Hegel's vern is simply a more sophisticated form of

[33:59] simply a more sophisticated form of understanding or whether it is genuinely

[34:01] understanding or whether it is genuinely different in kind. Pippen argues in his

[34:05] different in kind. Pippen argues in his reconstruction of the logic that Hegel's

[34:08] reconstruction of the logic that Hegel's reason is still thoroughly discursive,

[34:11] reason is still thoroughly discursive, still operating through judgment and

[34:14] still operating through judgment and inference.

[34:16] inference. There is no mystical intuition of

[34:18] There is no mystical intuition of totality, only a more self-aware form of

[34:22] totality, only a more self-aware form of conceptual activity.

[34:24] conceptual activity. Critics like Robert Stern argue that

[34:27] Critics like Robert Stern argue that Pippen's Hegel is too canion, that the

[34:31] Pippen's Hegel is too canion, that the speculative moment of reason in Hegel

[34:33] speculative moment of reason in Hegel requires a stronger claim about thoughts

[34:36] requires a stronger claim about thoughts access to reality than Pippen will

[34:38] access to reality than Pippen will allow.

[34:40] allow. The precise scope of speculative reason,

[34:43] The precise scope of speculative reason, what it can know and how it knows it, is

[34:46] what it can know and how it knows it, is exactly where the most consequential

[34:48] exactly where the most consequential interpretive disagreements in current

[34:50] interpretive disagreements in current Hegel scholarship are located.

[34:55] Part six, the speculative proposition.

[35:00] Part six, the speculative proposition. Why Hegel's sentences are meant to

[35:02] Why Hegel's sentences are meant to function differently.

[35:05] function differently. Open any page of Hegel's mature writing

[35:08] Open any page of Hegel's mature writing and you will encounter sentences that

[35:10] and you will encounter sentences that resist the reading strategy that works

[35:13] resist the reading strategy that works for almost every other philosopher. This

[35:16] for almost every other philosopher. This is not accidental obscurity or poor

[35:18] is not accidental obscurity or poor writing.

[35:20] writing. Hegel argues in the preface to the

[35:22] Hegel argues in the preface to the phenomenology that philosophical content

[35:25] phenomenology that philosophical content requires a form of sentence that

[35:28] requires a form of sentence that ordinary propositional logic cannot

[35:30] ordinary propositional logic cannot accommodate. and he is explicit about

[35:33] accommodate. and he is explicit about why

[35:35] why understanding this is a precondition for

[35:38] understanding this is a precondition for reading Hegel rather than projecting

[35:40] reading Hegel rather than projecting onto him.

[35:43] onto him. The ordinary or representational

[35:46] The ordinary or representational proposition which Hegel calls the sats

[35:49] proposition which Hegel calls the sats has a fixed structure. There is a

[35:52] has a fixed structure. There is a subject term which picks out some entity

[35:55] subject term which picks out some entity or kind and there is a predicate which

[35:59] or kind and there is a predicate which says something about it. The subject is

[36:03] says something about it. The subject is the stable ground. The predicate

[36:05] the stable ground. The predicate qualifies it. The dog is brown leaves

[36:10] qualifies it. The dog is brown leaves the dog standing as a discrete item and

[36:13] the dog standing as a discrete item and adds a property to it.

[36:15] adds a property to it. The subject does not change through the

[36:18] The subject does not change through the predication. It merely acquires an

[36:21] predication. It merely acquires an additional determination.

[36:25] Now consider what happens in a sentence

[36:28] Now consider what happens in a sentence like the actual is the rational.

[36:32] like the actual is the rational. In ordinary propositional logic, this

[36:34] In ordinary propositional logic, this looks like a claim that actuality and

[36:37] looks like a claim that actuality and rationality have the same extension or

[36:40] rationality have the same extension or that everything actual has the property

[36:42] that everything actual has the property of being rational.

[36:44] of being rational. The subject, the actual remains the

[36:47] The subject, the actual remains the fixed reference point and the predicate

[36:49] fixed reference point and the predicate assigns it a property. But this reading

[36:52] assigns it a property. But this reading loses what Hegel is doing. When Hegel

[36:56] loses what Hegel is doing. When Hegel writes the actual is the rational, the

[36:59] writes the actual is the rational, the subject term actual does not remain

[37:02] subject term actual does not remain stable while rational is predicated of

[37:05] stable while rational is predicated of it.

[37:06] it. The thought that the actual eyes the

[37:09] The thought that the actual eyes the rational requires us to understand

[37:12] rational requires us to understand actuality itself through rationality and

[37:15] actuality itself through rationality and rationality through actuality so that

[37:18] rationality through actuality so that neither term remains what it was at the

[37:22] neither term remains what it was at the start of the sentence.

[37:25] start of the sentence. Hegel calls this the speculative

[37:28] Hegel calls this the speculative proposition.

[37:29] proposition. In a speculative proposition, the

[37:31] In a speculative proposition, the predicate does not merely qualify the

[37:33] predicate does not merely qualify the subject but transforms the subject's own

[37:37] subject but transforms the subject's own determination.

[37:39] determination. Thought in reading the sentence is

[37:41] Thought in reading the sentence is pushed back from the predicate into the

[37:43] pushed back from the predicate into the subject and finds the subject altered by

[37:46] subject and finds the subject altered by what was predicated of it. Hegel

[37:50] what was predicated of it. Hegel describes this as a counter thrust in

[37:53] describes this as a counter thrust in which the sentence's movement reflects

[37:55] which the sentence's movement reflects back on itself.

[37:57] back on itself. This is not merely semantic complexity.

[38:00] This is not merely semantic complexity. It is an argument about what kind of

[38:03] It is an argument about what kind of logical form is adequate to speculative

[38:06] logical form is adequate to speculative content.

[38:09] content. The practical consequence for reading

[38:10] The practical consequence for reading Hegel is substantial.

[38:13] Hegel is substantial. When you read spirit is the idea that

[38:16] When you read spirit is the idea that has returned to itself, you cannot pass

[38:19] has returned to itself, you cannot pass this by identifying a subject called

[38:21] this by identifying a subject called spirit and asking what is asserted of it

[38:24] spirit and asking what is asserted of it as an external property.

[38:27] as an external property. The sentence is a node in a network of

[38:30] The sentence is a node in a network of determinations in which every term

[38:33] determinations in which every term modifies every other term. The meaning

[38:37] modifies every other term. The meaning is distributed across the network, not

[38:40] is distributed across the network, not located in the subject term.

[38:43] located in the subject term. Reading Hegel requires following this

[38:46] Reading Hegel requires following this movement rather than extracting discrete

[38:48] movement rather than extracting discrete claims.

[38:50] claims. Resistance to this is not philosophical

[38:53] Resistance to this is not philosophical sophistication. It is the

[38:55] sophistication. It is the understanding's refusal to leave its own

[38:58] understanding's refusal to leave its own mode.

[39:01] mode. The most forceful contemporary challenge

[39:04] The most forceful contemporary challenge to the speculative proposition doctrine

[39:06] to the speculative proposition doctrine comes from those who argue that it

[39:08] comes from those who argue that it simply makes Hegelian sentences

[39:11] simply makes Hegelian sentences unfalsifiable.

[39:13] unfalsifiable. If any apparent contradiction in a

[39:15] If any apparent contradiction in a speculative claim can be resolved by

[39:19] speculative claim can be resolved by saying that the subject was modified by

[39:21] saying that the subject was modified by the predicate in the course of the

[39:23] the predicate in the course of the sentences movement, then no Hegelian

[39:26] sentences movement, then no Hegelian speculative proposition is ever in

[39:29] speculative proposition is ever in danger from a counter example.

[39:32] danger from a counter example. Sebastian Roodel and Michael Wolf have

[39:35] Sebastian Roodel and Michael Wolf have pressed versions of this objection.

[39:38] pressed versions of this objection. Hegel's defenders respond that the

[39:41] Hegel's defenders respond that the speculative proposition does not

[39:43] speculative proposition does not eliminate truth conditions but changes

[39:46] eliminate truth conditions but changes the unit at which truth is assessed from

[39:49] the unit at which truth is assessed from the individual sentence to the whole

[39:51] the individual sentence to the whole articulated network of determinations.

[39:55] articulated network of determinations. Whether this response is satisfactory or

[39:58] Whether this response is satisfactory or is a sophisticated evasion is a genuine

[40:01] is a sophisticated evasion is a genuine open question.

[40:06] Part seven. determinate negation and why

[40:10] Part seven. determinate negation and why abstract negation gets you nothing.

[40:14] abstract negation gets you nothing. The philosophical tradition before Hegel

[40:17] The philosophical tradition before Hegel uses negation to clear the ground. You

[40:20] uses negation to clear the ground. You find a concept that fails some test. You

[40:23] find a concept that fails some test. You reject it and you look for something

[40:25] reject it and you look for something better.

[40:27] better. The rejection might be powered by a

[40:30] The rejection might be powered by a counter example, a contradiction in the

[40:32] counter example, a contradiction in the concept itself, or a rival theory that

[40:35] concept itself, or a rival theory that does the same work more elegantly.

[40:38] does the same work more elegantly. In all these cases, negation removes the

[40:41] In all these cases, negation removes the concept from the field and leaves you

[40:43] concept from the field and leaves you with a blank that must be filled from

[40:46] with a blank that must be filled from outside.

[40:49] This is what Hegel calls abstract

[40:51] This is what Hegel calls abstract negation. and his objection to it is

[40:54] negation. and his objection to it is structural rather than merely aesthetic.

[40:57] structural rather than merely aesthetic. Abstract negation tells you what is not

[41:00] Abstract negation tells you what is not the case, but it cannot tell you what is

[41:03] the case, but it cannot tell you what is the case because the negative result

[41:05] the case because the negative result carries no information about its own

[41:08] carries no information about its own replacement.

[41:10] replacement. Any number of different positions could

[41:12] Any number of different positions could fill the blank left by the rejected

[41:15] fill the blank left by the rejected concept. Philosophical progress driven

[41:18] concept. Philosophical progress driven by abstract negation alone will be

[41:21] by abstract negation alone will be episodic and arbitrary. You stumble upon

[41:24] episodic and arbitrary. You stumble upon the next position not because the

[41:26] the next position not because the rejected one demanded it but because you

[41:30] rejected one demanded it but because you happen to think of it.

[41:33] happen to think of it. Determinate negation

[41:35] Determinate negation negation in German is structurally

[41:38] negation in German is structurally different in a way that makes it the

[41:40] different in a way that makes it the engine of dialectical progress. In

[41:44] engine of dialectical progress. In determinate negation, the specific

[41:46] determinate negation, the specific character of the concept's failure

[41:48] character of the concept's failure generates the specific content of what

[41:51] generates the specific content of what replaces it.

[41:53] replaces it. The negation is not of the concept in

[41:55] The negation is not of the concept in general, but of a specific inadequacy in

[41:58] general, but of a specific inadequacy in the concept, and that inadequacy points

[42:01] the concept, and that inadequacy points to what must be included in any

[42:03] to what must be included in any successor concept. The result is not a

[42:07] successor concept. The result is not a blank, but a new determination with

[42:10] blank, but a new determination with identifiable content.

[42:13] identifiable content. Take the transition in the phenomenology

[42:16] Take the transition in the phenomenology from sense certainty to perception.

[42:20] from sense certainty to perception. Sense certainty is the claim that the

[42:22] Sense certainty is the claim that the most immediate most direct form of

[42:24] most immediate most direct form of knowledge is also the richest. This

[42:27] knowledge is also the richest. This thing here now known without mediation.

[42:32] thing here now known without mediation. When Hegel examines what sense certainty

[42:35] When Hegel examines what sense certainty actually delivers, he finds that this

[42:37] actually delivers, he finds that this here and now are universal terms, not

[42:41] here and now are universal terms, not singular references.

[42:44] singular references. Now applies to every moment. Here

[42:47] Now applies to every moment. Here applies to any location.

[42:50] applies to any location. The supposed singular immediacy turns

[42:53] The supposed singular immediacy turns out to involve universals all the way

[42:56] out to involve universals all the way down. The specific inadequacy of sense

[43:00] down. The specific inadequacy of sense certainty is that it claimed to be

[43:02] certainty is that it claimed to be purely singular and immediate, but

[43:04] purely singular and immediate, but required universality and mediation to

[43:08] required universality and mediation to articulate its very object.

[43:12] articulate its very object. This specific failure determines the

[43:15] This specific failure determines the content of what must come next. The

[43:18] content of what must come next. The successor concept cannot simply ignore

[43:21] successor concept cannot simply ignore universality. It must account for how

[43:24] universality. It must account for how the universal and the particular are

[43:27] the universal and the particular are related in any cognitive grasp of an

[43:30] related in any cognitive grasp of an individual thing.

[43:32] individual thing. This is perception. The concept of an

[43:35] This is perception. The concept of an object as a thing with multiple

[43:37] object as a thing with multiple properties, universal and particular

[43:40] properties, universal and particular aspects held together.

[43:42] aspects held together. Perception is not an arbitrary next

[43:45] Perception is not an arbitrary next stop.

[43:47] stop. It is what sense certainty's specific

[43:50] It is what sense certainty's specific internal failure demands.

[43:52] internal failure demands. The determinate character of the

[43:54] The determinate character of the negation carries the dialectic forward.

[43:59] negation carries the dialectic forward. This is where the notion of determinacy

[44:02] This is where the notion of determinacy meets the most serious technical

[44:04] meets the most serious technical challenge. The claim that each

[44:07] challenge. The claim that each dialectical transition is driven by the

[44:10] dialectical transition is driven by the specific character of the preceding

[44:12] specific character of the preceding concepts failure seems to require that

[44:15] concepts failure seems to require that there is only one possible successor to

[44:18] there is only one possible successor to each concept.

[44:20] each concept. Critics, most sharply Michael Rosen in

[44:23] Critics, most sharply Michael Rosen in his study of Hegel's dialectic from

[44:25] his study of Hegel's dialectic from 1982, argue that Hegel has not shown

[44:29] 1982, argue that Hegel has not shown this uniqueness.

[44:31] this uniqueness. Even if the failure of sense certainty

[44:34] Even if the failure of sense certainty demands a concept that accommodates

[44:36] demands a concept that accommodates universality, there are many different

[44:38] universality, there are many different concepts that do this. And Hegel has not

[44:42] concepts that do this. And Hegel has not demonstrated that perception

[44:44] demonstrated that perception specifically is the uniquely required

[44:46] specifically is the uniquely required next step.

[44:48] next step. The transitions may be motivated but not

[44:52] The transitions may be motivated but not strictly necessary.

[44:54] strictly necessary. Hegel's system is vulnerable here and

[44:56] Hegel's system is vulnerable here and the question of whether determinate

[44:59] the question of whether determinate negation produces genuine necessity or

[45:01] negation produces genuine necessity or only strong motivation is genuinely

[45:04] only strong motivation is genuinely unresolved.

[45:09] Part eight. The phenomenologies method

[45:12] Part eight. The phenomenologies method immainant critique from the inside. The

[45:16] immainant critique from the inside. The phenomenology of spirit is not a history

[45:19] phenomenology of spirit is not a history of philosophy, not a psychological

[45:21] of philosophy, not a psychological account of human development, and not a

[45:24] account of human development, and not a survey of cultural formations. It is a

[45:27] survey of cultural formations. It is a specific methodological project, the

[45:30] specific methodological project, the demonstration that every form of

[45:32] demonstration that every form of consciousness examined according to its

[45:34] consciousness examined according to its own internal standards generates the

[45:36] own internal standards generates the conditions for its own supersession.

[45:40] conditions for its own supersession. The method is imminent critique and what

[45:44] The method is imminent critique and what makes it iminent is exactly what makes

[45:46] makes it iminent is exactly what makes it philosophically distinctive.

[45:49] it philosophically distinctive. Hegel does not evaluate a shape of

[45:51] Hegel does not evaluate a shape of consciousness from an external

[45:53] consciousness from an external standpoint that the consciousness itself

[45:56] standpoint that the consciousness itself has not accepted.

[45:59] has not accepted. Every shape of consciousness that the

[46:02] Every shape of consciousness that the phenomenology examines comes with an

[46:05] phenomenology examines comes with an implicit claim about what counts as

[46:08] implicit claim about what counts as knowledge. what the object of knowledge

[46:10] knowledge. what the object of knowledge is and what the criterion of success is.

[46:14] is and what the criterion of success is. Sense certainty claims that direct

[46:17] Sense certainty claims that direct acquaintance with the particular is the

[46:19] acquaintance with the particular is the model of knowledge. The object is the

[46:23] model of knowledge. The object is the immediate given. The criterion is the

[46:26] immediate given. The criterion is the richness of direct contact.

[46:30] richness of direct contact. Hegel does not reject this by importing

[46:33] Hegel does not reject this by importing a better criterion from outside. He

[46:36] a better criterion from outside. He shows that when sense certainty is

[46:39] shows that when sense certainty is evaluated against its own criterion, it

[46:43] evaluated against its own criterion, it fails.

[46:44] fails. The immediate particular it claims to

[46:47] The immediate particular it claims to know is when actually examined already

[46:50] know is when actually examined already universal and mediated. The failure is

[46:54] universal and mediated. The failure is internal not external.

[46:58] internal not external. The technical structure of emanant

[47:00] The technical structure of emanant critique in the phenomenology involves

[47:02] critique in the phenomenology involves two perspectives that are in play

[47:05] two perspectives that are in play simultaneously.

[47:06] simultaneously. There is the perspective of natural

[47:09] There is the perspective of natural consciousness. The shape of

[47:10] consciousness. The shape of consciousness being examined which takes

[47:13] consciousness being examined which takes its own criterion to be adequate and its

[47:16] its own criterion to be adequate and its object to be what it takes it to be.

[47:20] object to be what it takes it to be. Then there is the perspective of the

[47:22] Then there is the perspective of the philosopher watching natural

[47:24] philosopher watching natural consciousness undergo its experience.

[47:27] consciousness undergo its experience. The philosopher does not intervene. The

[47:30] The philosopher does not intervene. The philosopher observes.

[47:33] philosopher observes. Natural consciousness itself discovers

[47:36] Natural consciousness itself discovers the gap between its criterion and its

[47:39] the gap between its criterion and its actual achievement.

[47:41] actual achievement. When the gap becomes intolerable,

[47:43] When the gap becomes intolerable, natural consciousness revises itself,

[47:46] natural consciousness revises itself, producing a new shape of consciousness.

[47:51] producing a new shape of consciousness. What the philosopher sees that natural

[47:54] What the philosopher sees that natural consciousness does not is that the new

[47:56] consciousness does not is that the new shape of consciousness that emerges from

[47:59] shape of consciousness that emerges from this failure is not accidental. The new

[48:02] this failure is not accidental. The new shape is constituted by precisely the

[48:06] shape is constituted by precisely the content that the previous shape was

[48:08] content that the previous shape was forced to include in order to resolve

[48:11] forced to include in order to resolve its internal tension.

[48:14] its internal tension. Natural consciousness experiences this

[48:16] Natural consciousness experiences this as a new beginning as if it was starting

[48:19] as a new beginning as if it was starting fresh. The philosopher sees it as a

[48:23] fresh. The philosopher sees it as a determinate result.

[48:26] determinate result. A concrete case, the section on force

[48:29] A concrete case, the section on force and the understanding in the

[48:31] and the understanding in the phenomenology.

[48:33] phenomenology. Perception, the shape that replaced

[48:35] Perception, the shape that replaced sense certainty grasped objects as

[48:38] sense certainty grasped objects as things with properties.

[48:40] things with properties. But this raised a new problem. How do

[48:44] But this raised a new problem. How do the multiple properties of a thing

[48:46] the multiple properties of a thing cohhere into a single thing rather than

[48:49] cohhere into a single thing rather than a mere collection?

[48:51] a mere collection? The understanding introduces force as

[48:54] The understanding introduces force as the explanatory concept, the inner

[48:56] the explanatory concept, the inner principle that unifies the thing's

[48:59] principle that unifies the thing's manifestations.

[49:01] manifestations. But force is only ever known through its

[49:04] But force is only ever known through its expressions, its manifestations in

[49:07] expressions, its manifestations in appearance. The inner force behind the

[49:10] appearance. The inner force behind the appearances is never directly

[49:12] appearances is never directly accessible. It is posited as an

[49:15] accessible. It is posited as an explanation but never confirmed

[49:17] explanation but never confirmed independently of what it is supposed to

[49:20] independently of what it is supposed to explain.

[49:22] explain. The understanding finds itself

[49:24] The understanding finds itself postulating an inverted world, a super

[49:27] postulating an inverted world, a super sensible realm of forces that mirrors

[49:29] sensible realm of forces that mirrors appearance without being accessible

[49:32] appearance without being accessible through it. This generates the

[49:35] through it. This generates the instability that drives the

[49:36] instability that drives the phenomenology into self-consciousness.

[49:41] The contemporary dispute about this

[49:43] The contemporary dispute about this method concerns whether iminant critique

[49:46] method concerns whether iminant critique succeeds without a background normative

[49:48] succeeds without a background normative standard. Hegel's claim is that each

[49:51] standard. Hegel's claim is that each shape of consciousness is evaluated

[49:54] shape of consciousness is evaluated purely internally without an external

[49:57] purely internally without an external standard being imported.

[50:00] standard being imported. But critics, including Sally Sedwick and

[50:03] But critics, including Sally Sedwick and some Frankfurt school interpreters,

[50:06] some Frankfurt school interpreters, argue that recognizing a gap between a

[50:08] argue that recognizing a gap between a shape's criterion and its achievement

[50:11] shape's criterion and its achievement already requires a standard of what a

[50:14] already requires a standard of what a gap is, which is not itself immen.

[50:18] gap is, which is not itself immen. If there is a hidden external standard

[50:21] If there is a hidden external standard operating in Hegel's critique, then the

[50:23] operating in Hegel's critique, then the method is not as self-sufficient as it

[50:26] method is not as self-sufficient as it claims and the transitions are less

[50:28] claims and the transitions are less necessary than advertised.

[50:34] Part nine, recognition,

[50:37] Part nine, recognition, self-consciousness, and the dialectic

[50:39] self-consciousness, and the dialectic that has no exit.

[50:42] that has no exit. The phenomenologies movement from

[50:44] The phenomenologies movement from consciousness to self-consciousness is

[50:46] consciousness to self-consciousness is not a psychological transition from

[50:49] not a psychological transition from knowing objects to knowing oneself.

[50:52] knowing objects to knowing oneself. It is driven by a structural argument.

[50:55] It is driven by a structural argument. The concept of the object that

[50:57] The concept of the object that consciousness was tracking in the

[50:59] consciousness was tracking in the understanding section turned out to have

[51:02] understanding section turned out to have the same structure as consciousness

[51:04] the same structure as consciousness itself.

[51:06] itself. The object was constituted by relations

[51:08] The object was constituted by relations of negation and identity that mirror the

[51:12] of negation and identity that mirror the structure of self-referring thought.

[51:15] structure of self-referring thought. Consciousness in coming to understand

[51:18] Consciousness in coming to understand its object fully was actually tracking

[51:20] its object fully was actually tracking itself without knowing it.

[51:24] itself without knowing it. Self-consciousness once it arrives faces

[51:28] Self-consciousness once it arrives faces its own structural problem immediately.

[51:32] its own structural problem immediately. Self-consciousness is consciousness that

[51:34] Self-consciousness is consciousness that takes itself as its object.

[51:38] takes itself as its object. But a self that simply contemplates

[51:40] But a self that simply contemplates itself that has no other reference is

[51:43] itself that has no other reference is empty. Self-consciousness requires

[51:47] empty. Self-consciousness requires something other than itself to be

[51:49] something other than itself to be self-conscious of something that is its

[51:52] self-conscious of something that is its own otherness.

[51:55] own otherness. Desire is the first form this takes.

[51:58] Desire is the first form this takes. Self-consciousness asserts itself by

[52:01] Self-consciousness asserts itself by negating and consuming what is other to

[52:03] negating and consuming what is other to it as in hunger satisfied by eating. But

[52:08] it as in hunger satisfied by eating. But satisfied desire does not produce

[52:10] satisfied desire does not produce durable self-consciousness.

[52:12] durable self-consciousness. The object is consumed. The desire

[52:15] The object is consumed. The desire returns and nothing permanent is

[52:18] returns and nothing permanent is established.

[52:21] established. For genuine self-consciousness, the

[52:23] For genuine self-consciousness, the other that self-consciousness relates to

[52:26] other that self-consciousness relates to must be able to recognize it as a

[52:28] must be able to recognize it as a self-consciousness.

[52:30] self-consciousness. A rock, an animal, a consumed object

[52:34] A rock, an animal, a consumed object cannot confer recognition.

[52:37] cannot confer recognition. Only another self-consciousness can do

[52:40] Only another self-consciousness can do this because only another

[52:42] this because only another self-consciousness has the conceptual

[52:44] self-consciousness has the conceptual structure to recognize a self as a self.

[52:49] structure to recognize a self as a self. Self-consciousness therefore essentially

[52:51] Self-consciousness therefore essentially requires another self-consciousness to

[52:54] requires another self-consciousness to encounter it, struggle with it, and

[52:56] encounter it, struggle with it, and recognize it.

[52:59] recognize it. The encounter between two

[53:01] The encounter between two self-consciousnesses produces the famous

[53:04] self-consciousnesses produces the famous dialectic of lordship and bondage, which

[53:07] dialectic of lordship and bondage, which is what Hegel actually calls it, not

[53:09] is what Hegel actually calls it, not master and slave, though the latter has

[53:12] master and slave, though the latter has become standard in translation.

[53:15] become standard in translation. Both self-consciousnesses initially try

[53:18] Both self-consciousnesses initially try to assert themselves by negating the

[53:20] to assert themselves by negating the other, treating the other as a mere

[53:23] other, treating the other as a mere thing.

[53:25] thing. The dialectic moves through a life and

[53:28] The dialectic moves through a life and death struggle. But death is

[53:30] death struggle. But death is dialectically useless. A dead other

[53:33] dialectically useless. A dead other cannot recognize you.

[53:36] cannot recognize you. The struggle stops when one of the two,

[53:39] The struggle stops when one of the two, rather than face death, submits and

[53:41] rather than face death, submits and acknowledges the other's primacy. The

[53:44] acknowledges the other's primacy. The one who submitted becomes the bondsman,

[53:48] one who submitted becomes the bondsman, the worker. The one acknowledged becomes

[53:51] the worker. The one acknowledged becomes the lord.

[53:54] the lord. The reversal is the philosophically

[53:57] The reversal is the philosophically crucial moment. The lord having the

[54:00] crucial moment. The lord having the recognition it sought receives

[54:02] recognition it sought receives recognition from something it has

[54:04] recognition from something it has already degraded to the status of a

[54:07] already degraded to the status of a non-free non-independent consciousness.

[54:11] non-free non-independent consciousness. But recognition from a degraded

[54:13] But recognition from a degraded consciousness is not the genuine

[54:15] consciousness is not the genuine recognition that self-consciousness

[54:17] recognition that self-consciousness requires. It is an empty acknowledgement

[54:21] requires. It is an empty acknowledgement from a non-equal and the Lord's

[54:23] from a non-equal and the Lord's self-consciousness remains unfulfilled

[54:26] self-consciousness remains unfulfilled because what recognized it was not

[54:28] because what recognized it was not itself recognizing freely.

[54:31] itself recognizing freely. The Lord's position is dialectically

[54:34] The Lord's position is dialectically unstable from the start.

[54:38] unstable from the start. The bondsman meanwhile encounters the

[54:40] The bondsman meanwhile encounters the world through labor. Through work the

[54:43] world through labor. Through work the bondsman externalizes its inner

[54:45] bondsman externalizes its inner projects, shapes the world according to

[54:48] projects, shapes the world according to its own conception and then sees itself

[54:52] its own conception and then sees itself in the worked world as in a mirror.

[54:55] in the worked world as in a mirror. The bondsman's consciousness constrained

[54:57] The bondsman's consciousness constrained by service develops a form of

[55:00] by service develops a form of self-recognition through the

[55:02] self-recognition through the transformation of the objective world

[55:04] transformation of the objective world that the Lord who only consumes what the

[55:07] that the Lord who only consumes what the bondsman produces cannot achieve. The

[55:10] bondsman produces cannot achieve. The dialectic reverses. The apparent

[55:13] dialectic reverses. The apparent inferior becomes the locust of genuine

[55:17] inferior becomes the locust of genuine self-development.

[55:20] The structural argument here is not

[55:23] The structural argument here is not primarily about historical slavery or

[55:25] primarily about historical slavery or labor relations, though it has obvious

[55:28] labor relations, though it has obvious implications for both. It is an argument

[55:32] implications for both. It is an argument about what self-consciousness

[55:34] about what self-consciousness structurally requires, another that is

[55:37] structurally requires, another that is genuinely other, genuinely free, and

[55:40] genuinely other, genuinely free, and genuinely capable of recognition, so

[55:43] genuinely capable of recognition, so that the recognition it confers is worth

[55:45] that the recognition it confers is worth having.

[55:47] having. No finite arrangement of two

[55:49] No finite arrangement of two self-consciousnesses satisfies this

[55:52] self-consciousnesses satisfies this requirement completely. Every

[55:54] requirement completely. Every arrangement either degrades the other to

[55:57] arrangement either degrades the other to a non-equal, making its recognition

[55:59] a non-equal, making its recognition worthless, or makes the other unequal,

[56:02] worthless, or makes the other unequal, but then faces the problem that

[56:04] but then faces the problem that recognition from an equal still depends

[56:07] recognition from an equal still depends on a fragile symmetry that either party

[56:10] on a fragile symmetry that either party can disrupt.

[56:14] can disrupt. The recognition regress here is not

[56:16] The recognition regress here is not resolved within the lordship and bondage

[56:18] resolved within the lordship and bondage section. The phenomenologies movement

[56:21] section. The phenomenologies movement through stoicism, skepticism and the

[56:24] through stoicism, skepticism and the unhappy consciousness is the story of

[56:27] unhappy consciousness is the story of self-consciousness trying to achieve

[56:29] self-consciousness trying to achieve stable self-reulation without an

[56:31] stable self-reulation without an adequate other.

[56:34] adequate other. Each shape fails for structural reasons

[56:36] Each shape fails for structural reasons traceable to the original problem. A

[56:40] traceable to the original problem. A finite self-consciousness cannot achieve

[56:42] finite self-consciousness cannot achieve fully adequate recognition from another

[56:45] fully adequate recognition from another finite self-consciousness.

[56:48] finite self-consciousness. Whether the eventual resolution in gist,

[56:51] Whether the eventual resolution in gist, the social and historical whole in which

[56:54] the social and historical whole in which individual self-consciousnesses

[56:56] individual self-consciousnesses participate, genuinely solves this

[56:58] participate, genuinely solves this structural problem or simply defers it

[57:01] structural problem or simply defers it to a higher level is one of the most

[57:03] to a higher level is one of the most contested questions in contemporary

[57:05] contested questions in contemporary Hegel scholarship.

[57:10] Part 10. The doctrine of essence,

[57:14] Part 10. The doctrine of essence, reflection, appearance, and the logic's

[57:17] reflection, appearance, and the logic's hardest moves. The science of logic has

[57:21] hardest moves. The science of logic has three main divisions. The doctrine of

[57:24] three main divisions. The doctrine of being, the doctrine of essence, and the

[57:26] being, the doctrine of essence, and the doctrine of the concept. Of the three,

[57:29] doctrine of the concept. Of the three, the doctrine of essence, which occupies

[57:31] the doctrine of essence, which occupies the middle position, is the most

[57:33] the middle position, is the most technically demanding and the most

[57:35] technically demanding and the most frequently skipped by readers who want

[57:38] frequently skipped by readers who want Hegel's conclusions without the

[57:40] Hegel's conclusions without the machinery that produces them.

[57:43] machinery that produces them. Skipping it is a mistake. The logic's

[57:47] Skipping it is a mistake. The logic's hardest structural claims, including the

[57:49] hardest structural claims, including the claim that contradiction is the ground

[57:52] claim that contradiction is the ground of all movement in reality, are made and

[57:55] of all movement in reality, are made and defended here, not in the more discussed

[57:59] defended here, not in the more discussed doctrine of being.

[58:02] doctrine of being. Being logic, the first book, dealt with

[58:05] Being logic, the first book, dealt with immediate determinations,

[58:07] immediate determinations, concepts taken in their directness

[58:09] concepts taken in their directness before their mediated character was

[58:11] before their mediated character was acknowledged.

[58:13] acknowledged. Quality, quantity, and measure are

[58:15] Quality, quantity, and measure are categories of being logic. They describe

[58:18] categories of being logic. They describe how something simply is presented

[58:21] how something simply is presented without reference to a ground behind the

[58:24] without reference to a ground behind the presentation.

[58:26] presentation. Essence logic begins from the

[58:29] Essence logic begins from the recognition that the apparent immediacy

[58:31] recognition that the apparent immediacy of being was a one-sided abstraction.

[58:36] of being was a one-sided abstraction. Behind appearance, there is an essence.

[58:39] Behind appearance, there is an essence. The immediate is not simply what it

[58:41] The immediate is not simply what it immediately appears to be.

[58:45] immediately appears to be. The very distinction between essence and

[58:47] The very distinction between essence and appearance, however, generates its own

[58:50] appearance, however, generates its own structural problem immediately.

[58:53] structural problem immediately. If essence is what something really is

[58:56] If essence is what something really is behind its appearances, and if

[58:58] behind its appearances, and if appearance is the surface that masks

[59:00] appearance is the surface that masks essence, then we have a split between a

[59:03] essence, then we have a split between a real interior and a deceptive exterior.

[59:07] real interior and a deceptive exterior. This is the framework of many

[59:09] This is the framework of many metaphysical and epistemological

[59:11] metaphysical and epistemological positions. Plato's forms behind the

[59:14] positions. Plato's forms behind the sensible world things in

[59:17] sensible world things in themselves behind phenomena. Scientific

[59:20] themselves behind phenomena. Scientific realism's underlying micro structure

[59:22] realism's underlying micro structure behind observable properties. Hegel's

[59:26] behind observable properties. Hegel's move in the doctrine of essence is to

[59:28] move in the doctrine of essence is to show that this framework is internally

[59:30] show that this framework is internally unstable.

[59:33] The key concept in the opening of

[59:36] The key concept in the opening of essence logic is shine. Shine in German.

[59:40] essence logic is shine. Shine in German. Hegel distinguishes shine from

[59:42] Hegel distinguishes shine from appearance shinong which introduces a

[59:46] appearance shinong which introduces a specific technical requirement.

[59:49] specific technical requirement. Shine is the residual appearance left

[59:52] Shine is the residual appearance left over when you have subtracted the

[59:54] over when you have subtracted the apparent from a thing to get at its

[59:56] apparent from a thing to get at its essence. The shine is what the thing is

[01:00:00] essence. The shine is what the thing is not. But the shine is there and it is

[01:00:03] not. But the shine is there and it is the shine that makes the essence appear.

[01:00:07] the shine that makes the essence appear. Here is the instability.

[01:00:10] Here is the instability. If essence is supposed to be what

[01:00:12] If essence is supposed to be what remains after you strip away the

[01:00:15] remains after you strip away the inessential show, the shine, then the

[01:00:18] inessential show, the shine, then the essence requires the shine in order to

[01:00:21] essence requires the shine in order to be recognized as essence.

[01:00:24] be recognized as essence. The essence that was supposed to be

[01:00:26] The essence that was supposed to be independent of appearance turns out to

[01:00:29] independent of appearance turns out to need appearance in order to manifest

[01:00:31] need appearance in order to manifest itself as essence.

[01:00:35] itself as essence. The doctrine of essence works through

[01:00:37] The doctrine of essence works through this instability systematically

[01:00:40] this instability systematically developing categories of reflection

[01:00:42] developing categories of reflection including identity, difference,

[01:00:44] including identity, difference, contradiction, and ground.

[01:00:47] contradiction, and ground. The contradiction chapter is where Hegel

[01:00:49] The contradiction chapter is where Hegel makes his strongest claim. Contradiction

[01:00:52] makes his strongest claim. Contradiction is not a defect in thought, but the

[01:00:55] is not a defect in thought, but the innermost principle of all movement and

[01:00:58] innermost principle of all movement and vitality.

[01:01:00] vitality. A thing that did not contain

[01:01:02] A thing that did not contain contradiction within itself would be

[01:01:05] contradiction within itself would be inert, static, and without internal

[01:01:08] inert, static, and without internal dynamism.

[01:01:10] dynamism. Contradiction is what drives things to

[01:01:13] Contradiction is what drives things to develop, change, and resolve themselves

[01:01:16] develop, change, and resolve themselves into higher forms.

[01:01:20] into higher forms. Steven Holgates's careful reading of the

[01:01:23] Steven Holgates's careful reading of the doctrine of essence in his 2006 book,

[01:01:26] doctrine of essence in his 2006 book, The Opening of Hegel's Logic tracks

[01:01:28] The Opening of Hegel's Logic tracks these moves as constituting a genuine

[01:01:31] these moves as constituting a genuine argument, not a rhetorical device.

[01:01:35] argument, not a rhetorical device. The category of ground grund that

[01:01:38] The category of ground grund that emerges from the contradiction chapter

[01:01:40] emerges from the contradiction chapter is particularly important. The ground is

[01:01:44] is particularly important. The ground is what a thing is in virtue of having its

[01:01:46] what a thing is in virtue of having its essence become essential, having its

[01:01:49] essence become essential, having its inner determinations generate rather

[01:01:52] inner determinations generate rather than merely hide its appearances.

[01:01:55] than merely hide its appearances. Holgate argues that Hegel's

[01:01:57] Holgate argues that Hegel's contradiction in essence logic is

[01:02:00] contradiction in essence logic is ontological, not merely epistemic. It is

[01:02:03] ontological, not merely epistemic. It is a feature of things, not just of our

[01:02:06] a feature of things, not just of our concepts of them. This is one of the

[01:02:09] concepts of them. This is one of the points at which the non-metaphysical

[01:02:12] points at which the non-metaphysical reading of Pippen and the traditional

[01:02:14] reading of Pippen and the traditional metaphysical reading diverge most

[01:02:17] metaphysical reading diverge most sharply.

[01:02:20] sharply. The objection that most defenders of

[01:02:22] The objection that most defenders of essence logic find hardest to answer

[01:02:25] essence logic find hardest to answer comes from the theory of reflection

[01:02:27] comes from the theory of reflection itself.

[01:02:29] itself. Hegel's account of reflection, the

[01:02:31] Hegel's account of reflection, the movement of thought that posits its own

[01:02:34] movement of thought that posits its own ground and then recognizes that the

[01:02:37] ground and then recognizes that the ground was posited by the very movement

[01:02:39] ground was posited by the very movement that it was supposed to ground involves

[01:02:42] that it was supposed to ground involves a circularity.

[01:02:44] a circularity. Dieter Henrik in work beginning in the

[01:02:48] Dieter Henrik in work beginning in the 1960s argued that Hegel's solution to

[01:02:51] 1960s argued that Hegel's solution to the problem of self- grounding cognition

[01:02:54] the problem of self- grounding cognition in the doctrine of essence inherits a

[01:02:57] in the doctrine of essence inherits a structural problem from FA's attempt to

[01:03:00] structural problem from FA's attempt to ground the eye on itself.

[01:03:03] ground the eye on itself. The first act of positing cannot itself

[01:03:06] The first act of positing cannot itself be accounted for within the system of

[01:03:08] be accounted for within the system of reflection.

[01:03:10] reflection. Henrik's critique developed further in

[01:03:13] Henrik's critique developed further in his 1982 essay collection Selst for

[01:03:16] his 1982 essay collection Selst for Helnisser is that Hegel's reflective

[01:03:18] Helnisser is that Hegel's reflective structure requires a prior moment of

[01:03:21] structure requires a prior moment of spontaneous self-reulation that the

[01:03:23] spontaneous self-reulation that the logic treats as given rather than

[01:03:26] logic treats as given rather than derived.

[01:03:28] derived. Whether Hegel has a satisfactory

[01:03:30] Whether Hegel has a satisfactory response to this is still disputed in

[01:03:33] response to this is still disputed in the literature, and it is precisely the

[01:03:36] the literature, and it is precisely the kind of objection that defenders of

[01:03:38] kind of objection that defenders of Hegel find hardest to dismiss because it

[01:03:41] Hegel find hardest to dismiss because it accepts Hegel's own framework to

[01:03:43] accepts Hegel's own framework to generate the problem.

[01:03:48] Part 11, the doctrine of the concept,

[01:03:52] Part 11, the doctrine of the concept, subjectivity, objectivity, and the idea.

[01:03:56] subjectivity, objectivity, and the idea. When Hegel calls the third division of

[01:03:59] When Hegel calls the third division of the logic the subjective logic, the

[01:04:02] the logic the subjective logic, the contrast with the objective logic of

[01:04:04] contrast with the objective logic of being and essence requires careful

[01:04:06] being and essence requires careful handling. Subjective does not mean

[01:04:09] handling. Subjective does not mean private, psychological or confined to

[01:04:13] private, psychological or confined to individual minds.

[01:04:15] individual minds. It means the domain in which the

[01:04:17] It means the domain in which the structure of conceptuality itself

[01:04:20] structure of conceptuality itself becomes the explicit subject matter in

[01:04:22] becomes the explicit subject matter in which thought examines its own structure

[01:04:25] which thought examines its own structure as thought rather than tracking

[01:04:27] as thought rather than tracking categories that present themselves as

[01:04:29] categories that present themselves as features of an external world.

[01:04:33] features of an external world. The doctrine of the concept is where

[01:04:35] The doctrine of the concept is where being and essence reconceive themselves

[01:04:38] being and essence reconceive themselves as and turn out to have always been

[01:04:41] as and turn out to have always been forms of the concept.

[01:04:45] forms of the concept. The concept big riff with a capital B in

[01:04:48] The concept big riff with a capital B in Hegel's usage is not a concept in the

[01:04:51] Hegel's usage is not a concept in the ordinary sense of a mental

[01:04:52] ordinary sense of a mental representation or a linguistic meaning.

[01:04:56] representation or a linguistic meaning. It is the structure of conceptuality as

[01:04:59] It is the structure of conceptuality as such. The activity of self-ifferiating

[01:05:02] such. The activity of self-ifferiating universality.

[01:05:04] universality. The concept is universal in that it

[01:05:07] The concept is universal in that it encompasses particulars under it.

[01:05:10] encompasses particulars under it. particular in that it specifies and

[01:05:12] particular in that it specifies and differentiates itself into determinate

[01:05:15] differentiates itself into determinate cases and individual or singular in that

[01:05:18] cases and individual or singular in that it exists only in concrete self-unified

[01:05:21] it exists only in concrete self-unified instances.

[01:05:23] instances. These three aspects universality,

[01:05:27] These three aspects universality, particularity and individuality are not

[01:05:30] particularity and individuality are not three parts of the concept but three

[01:05:33] three parts of the concept but three moments of its selfarticulation.

[01:05:39] What makes this structurally important

[01:05:41] What makes this structurally important is Hegel's claim that the concept is not

[01:05:44] is Hegel's claim that the concept is not merely the form through which we grasp

[01:05:46] merely the form through which we grasp things but the form through which things

[01:05:49] things but the form through which things are what they are. The intelligibility

[01:05:52] are what they are. The intelligibility of a thing what it is to be that thing

[01:05:56] of a thing what it is to be that thing is not a feature added to the thing by a

[01:05:58] is not a feature added to the thing by a knowing subject but is internal to the

[01:06:01] knowing subject but is internal to the thing's own constitution.

[01:06:04] thing's own constitution. A living organism is what it is by

[01:06:06] A living organism is what it is by virtue of the concept organism. Meaning

[01:06:09] virtue of the concept organism. Meaning by virtue of the organizational

[01:06:11] by virtue of the organizational structure that makes it a unity of parts

[01:06:14] structure that makes it a unity of parts directed towards self-maintenance.

[01:06:18] directed towards self-maintenance. The concept is not projected onto the

[01:06:20] The concept is not projected onto the organism from outside. It is what the

[01:06:23] organism from outside. It is what the organism is.

[01:06:26] organism is. Judgment and syllogism in the doctrine

[01:06:29] Judgment and syllogism in the doctrine of the concept are not merely formal

[01:06:31] of the concept are not merely formal logical structures but ontological

[01:06:34] logical structures but ontological categories. The judgment the rose is red

[01:06:38] categories. The judgment the rose is red is for Hegel a claim about the structure

[01:06:42] is for Hegel a claim about the structure of the rose's being not merely about how

[01:06:45] of the rose's being not merely about how we classify it.

[01:06:47] we classify it. Hegel traces the development of judgment

[01:06:50] Hegel traces the development of judgment forms from the most abstract immediate

[01:06:53] forms from the most abstract immediate judgment. The rose is read through

[01:06:56] judgment. The rose is read through increasingly complex forms. The judgment

[01:06:59] increasingly complex forms. The judgment of reflection, the judgment of

[01:07:01] of reflection, the judgment of necessity, and the judgment of the

[01:07:03] necessity, and the judgment of the concept. Each more complex judgment form

[01:07:07] concept. Each more complex judgment form captures more of the genuine structure

[01:07:09] captures more of the genuine structure of a thing's constitution.

[01:07:13] The doctrine of the concept then moves

[01:07:15] The doctrine of the concept then moves from subjectivity through objectivity to

[01:07:18] from subjectivity through objectivity to the idea.

[01:07:20] the idea. Mechanism, chemism and teology are

[01:07:23] Mechanism, chemism and teology are presented as categories of objectivity,

[01:07:26] presented as categories of objectivity, ways in which objects are structured.

[01:07:30] ways in which objects are structured. Mechanism is the domain of external

[01:07:33] Mechanism is the domain of external relations where things influence each

[01:07:35] relations where things influence each other through impact and without any

[01:07:38] other through impact and without any inner principle of unity.

[01:07:41] inner principle of unity. Chemism introduces differentiation

[01:07:43] Chemism introduces differentiation through inner affinity where things are

[01:07:46] through inner affinity where things are constituted by their tendency to unite

[01:07:49] constituted by their tendency to unite with complimentary others.

[01:07:51] with complimentary others. Teology is the category under which

[01:07:54] Teology is the category under which objects are organized around an inner

[01:07:57] objects are organized around an inner end where the whole determines the

[01:08:00] end where the whole determines the character of the parts. Hegel argues

[01:08:03] character of the parts. Hegel argues that mechanism and chemism cannot fully

[01:08:06] that mechanism and chemism cannot fully account for themselves and that teology

[01:08:09] account for themselves and that teology is a more adequate category for

[01:08:11] is a more adequate category for understanding organized structures.

[01:08:15] understanding organized structures. The idea ID is the unity of the concept

[01:08:19] The idea ID is the unity of the concept and objectivity. The situation in which

[01:08:23] and objectivity. The situation in which the conceptual structure of a thing and

[01:08:25] the conceptual structure of a thing and the thing's actual organization

[01:08:27] the thing's actual organization coincide.

[01:08:29] coincide. The idea is not an additional

[01:08:31] The idea is not an additional metaphysical entity. It is the condition

[01:08:34] metaphysical entity. It is the condition in which a thing's inner concept is

[01:08:37] in which a thing's inner concept is fully realized in its actual existence.

[01:08:41] fully realized in its actual existence. The highest form of the idea in the

[01:08:44] The highest form of the idea in the logic is the absolute idea where

[01:08:47] logic is the absolute idea where conceptual thought grasps its own

[01:08:50] conceptual thought grasps its own structure as the structure of being

[01:08:52] structure as the structure of being itself.

[01:08:54] itself. The absolute idea is not a thing. It is

[01:08:58] The absolute idea is not a thing. It is the logical structure of rational

[01:09:00] the logical structure of rational self-comprehension.

[01:09:03] The hardest question the doctrine of the

[01:09:05] The hardest question the doctrine of the concept raises and the one that the

[01:09:08] concept raises and the one that the Pippen versus traditional metaphysics

[01:09:10] Pippen versus traditional metaphysics dispute turns on most directly is

[01:09:13] dispute turns on most directly is whether the claim that the concept is

[01:09:15] whether the claim that the concept is the structure of things is a claim about

[01:09:18] the structure of things is a claim about reality or about the conditions of our

[01:09:21] reality or about the conditions of our ability to talk about reality.

[01:09:25] ability to talk about reality. Pippen's position is that the logic is a

[01:09:28] Pippen's position is that the logic is a science of the conditions of rational

[01:09:30] science of the conditions of rational discourse, not a derivation of the

[01:09:32] discourse, not a derivation of the structure of mind independent being.

[01:09:36] structure of mind independent being. The traditional reading represented by

[01:09:39] The traditional reading represented by Michael Inwood, Charles Taylor, and in

[01:09:41] Michael Inwood, Charles Taylor, and in different ways by James Kryers holds

[01:09:44] different ways by James Kryers holds that the logic's claims are genuinely

[01:09:47] that the logic's claims are genuinely about what there is, not merely about

[01:09:49] about what there is, not merely about the structure of our commitments. The

[01:09:52] the structure of our commitments. The difference is significant because on

[01:09:54] difference is significant because on Pippen's reading the doctrine of the

[01:09:57] Pippen's reading the doctrine of the concept makes no stronger claim than a

[01:10:00] concept makes no stronger claim than a sophisticated cantian would make while

[01:10:02] sophisticated cantian would make while on the traditional reading it makes a

[01:10:05] on the traditional reading it makes a very strong claim that Kant would regard

[01:10:08] very strong claim that Kant would regard as dogmatic metaphysics.

[01:10:13] Part 12 contradiction in the logic. what

[01:10:17] Part 12 contradiction in the logic. what Hegel means and why formal logicians are

[01:10:21] Hegel means and why formal logicians are not simply right. Hegel writes in the

[01:10:24] not simply right. Hegel writes in the doctrine of essence that contradiction

[01:10:26] doctrine of essence that contradiction is the root of all movement and life and

[01:10:29] is the root of all movement and life and that it is only in so far as something

[01:10:32] that it is only in so far as something contains a contradiction within itself

[01:10:34] contains a contradiction within itself that it moves has an urge and is active.

[01:10:39] that it moves has an urge and is active. Formal logicians read this and diagnose

[01:10:42] Formal logicians read this and diagnose a violation of the law of

[01:10:44] a violation of the law of non-contradiction.

[01:10:46] non-contradiction. the logical principle that no

[01:10:48] the logical principle that no proposition can be both true and false

[01:10:51] proposition can be both true and false at the same time in the same respect.

[01:10:55] at the same time in the same respect. The diagnosis is that Hegel is either

[01:10:58] The diagnosis is that Hegel is either confused or using contradiction in a

[01:11:01] confused or using contradiction in a loose non-logical sense that does not

[01:11:04] loose non-logical sense that does not actually challenge formal logic. Neither

[01:11:07] actually challenge formal logic. Neither dismissal is satisfactory. And the

[01:11:10] dismissal is satisfactory. And the question of what Hegel means by

[01:11:12] question of what Hegel means by contradiction is one of the most

[01:11:14] contradiction is one of the most technically active in current

[01:11:16] technically active in current scholarship.

[01:11:18] scholarship. There are three interpretive positions

[01:11:21] There are three interpretive positions that need to be distinguished precisely.

[01:11:24] that need to be distinguished precisely. The first is the paraphrase reading

[01:11:26] The first is the paraphrase reading Hegel uses contradiction loosely to mean

[01:11:30] Hegel uses contradiction loosely to mean tension, opposition or dynamic

[01:11:33] tension, opposition or dynamic instability. and his claims do not

[01:11:36] instability. and his claims do not challenge the law of non-contradiction

[01:11:38] challenge the law of non-contradiction at all because he is not asserting that

[01:11:41] at all because he is not asserting that any proposition is both true and false.

[01:11:46] any proposition is both true and false. On this reading, Hegel's logic is

[01:11:48] On this reading, Hegel's logic is perfectly compatible with classical

[01:11:51] perfectly compatible with classical formal logic. It just operates at a

[01:11:54] formal logic. It just operates at a different level, examining the self-

[01:11:56] different level, examining the self- differentiating structure of concepts

[01:11:59] differentiating structure of concepts rather than truthf functional relations

[01:12:01] rather than truthf functional relations between propositions.

[01:12:04] between propositions. This reading was popular among

[01:12:06] This reading was popular among neocantian

[01:12:07] neocantian and early analytic commentators.

[01:12:13] The second position is the dialtheist

[01:12:15] The second position is the dialtheist reading developed most rigorously by

[01:12:18] reading developed most rigorously by Graeme Priest beginning in the late

[01:12:20] Graeme Priest beginning in the late 1980s.

[01:12:22] 1980s. Priest argues that Hegel genuinely

[01:12:25] Priest argues that Hegel genuinely affirms true contradictions,

[01:12:28] affirms true contradictions, propositions that are both true and

[01:12:30] propositions that are both true and false simultaneously, and that Hegel

[01:12:33] false simultaneously, and that Hegel should be read as an ancestor of

[01:12:35] should be read as an ancestor of dialtheism.

[01:12:37] dialtheism. The logical view that some

[01:12:39] The logical view that some contradictions are true and that

[01:12:41] contradictions are true and that inference should be conducted with a

[01:12:43] inference should be conducted with a paracconsistent logic that does not

[01:12:45] paracconsistent logic that does not allow any contradiction to entail

[01:12:48] allow any contradiction to entail everything.

[01:12:51] everything. Paracconsistency to define it precisely

[01:12:54] Paracconsistency to define it precisely is the property of a logical system in

[01:12:56] is the property of a logical system in which a contradiction does not entail

[01:12:59] which a contradiction does not entail every proposition in which from P and

[01:13:02] every proposition in which from P and not P you cannot derive any arbitrary Q.

[01:13:06] not P you cannot derive any arbitrary Q. Priest has argued that Hegel's

[01:13:08] Priest has argued that Hegel's contradiction claims are genuine logical

[01:13:11] contradiction claims are genuine logical ones and that Hegel's logic should be

[01:13:13] ones and that Hegel's logic should be formalized using paracconsistent tools.

[01:13:18] formalized using paracconsistent tools. The third position developed by Mikuela

[01:13:21] The third position developed by Mikuela Bordinho in a 2019 paper and in

[01:13:24] Bordinho in a 2019 paper and in subsequent work tries to distinguish

[01:13:27] subsequent work tries to distinguish Hegel's position from priest's

[01:13:29] Hegel's position from priest's dialtheism without retreating to the

[01:13:31] dialtheism without retreating to the paraphrase reading. Bordin argues that

[01:13:35] paraphrase reading. Bordin argues that Hegel affirms logical contradictions,

[01:13:38] Hegel affirms logical contradictions, contradictions in the full logical

[01:13:40] contradictions in the full logical sense, but that his notion of truth is

[01:13:42] sense, but that his notion of truth is developmental rather than static.

[01:13:46] developmental rather than static. A contradiction is true in Hegel's

[01:13:48] A contradiction is true in Hegel's logic, not in the sense that a

[01:13:50] logic, not in the sense that a proposition and its negation are both

[01:13:53] proposition and its negation are both simultaneously true at a fixed instant,

[01:13:56] simultaneously true at a fixed instant, but in the sense that the contradiction

[01:13:58] but in the sense that the contradiction is the driving moment of a process whose

[01:14:01] is the driving moment of a process whose truth is the process as a whole. The

[01:14:05] truth is the process as a whole. The truth of the contradiction is the

[01:14:07] truth of the contradiction is the alheong that results from it, not the

[01:14:10] alheong that results from it, not the bare co-presence of affirmation and

[01:14:13] bare co-presence of affirmation and negation.

[01:14:15] negation. This is a substantive distinction and it

[01:14:19] This is a substantive distinction and it has real consequences.

[01:14:21] has real consequences. Priest dialtheism is static in the sense

[01:14:25] Priest dialtheism is static in the sense that the diala the true contradiction is

[01:14:29] that the diala the true contradiction is a fixed feature of the logical

[01:14:31] a fixed feature of the logical situation.

[01:14:33] situation. Hegel's contradictions are dynamic. They

[01:14:36] Hegel's contradictions are dynamic. They are moments in a process that resolves

[01:14:39] are moments in a process that resolves them into higher determinations.

[01:14:42] them into higher determinations. The contradiction is true as the engine

[01:14:44] The contradiction is true as the engine of the dialectical movement, not as a

[01:14:47] of the dialectical movement, not as a logical truth that simply stands

[01:14:49] logical truth that simply stands alongside its negation.

[01:14:52] alongside its negation. On this reading, Hegel is committed

[01:14:55] On this reading, Hegel is committed neither to classical logic nor to simple

[01:14:57] neither to classical logic nor to simple dialtheism, but to something that

[01:15:00] dialtheism, but to something that requires a logic of process, in which

[01:15:03] requires a logic of process, in which truth is not a static predicate of

[01:15:05] truth is not a static predicate of propositions, but a feature of unfolding

[01:15:09] propositions, but a feature of unfolding determinations.

[01:15:12] What formal logicians are right about is

[01:15:15] What formal logicians are right about is this. If Hegel's contradiction claims

[01:15:18] this. If Hegel's contradiction claims are interpreted as asserting static

[01:15:20] are interpreted as asserting static co-presence of P and not P, then the law

[01:15:24] co-presence of P and not P, then the law of non-contradiction is violated and the

[01:15:27] of non-contradiction is violated and the entire system trivializes

[01:15:29] entire system trivializes because from any contradiction you can

[01:15:32] because from any contradiction you can derive anything. This consequence would

[01:15:35] derive anything. This consequence would make the logic worthless as a

[01:15:37] make the logic worthless as a discriminating account of rational

[01:15:39] discriminating account of rational categories.

[01:15:41] categories. What formal logicians are wrong about is

[01:15:44] What formal logicians are wrong about is assuming that their own static

[01:15:46] assuming that their own static conception of contradiction is the only

[01:15:48] conception of contradiction is the only coherent one.

[01:15:50] coherent one. The question of whether a logic of

[01:15:52] The question of whether a logic of process in which contradictions are true

[01:15:55] process in which contradictions are true as moments of determinate developmental

[01:15:57] as moments of determinate developmental structures rather than as static

[01:15:59] structures rather than as static co-presences

[01:16:01] co-presences is a coherent formal framework is

[01:16:04] is a coherent formal framework is genuinely open in contemporary

[01:16:06] genuinely open in contemporary philosophy of logic.

[01:16:09] philosophy of logic. Elena Ficara's recent work developing

[01:16:12] Elena Ficara's recent work developing Hegelian logic using the resources of

[01:16:14] Hegelian logic using the resources of non-class logic represents the most

[01:16:17] non-class logic represents the most technically rigorous attempt to work

[01:16:20] technically rigorous attempt to work this out. It remains unresolved and its

[01:16:24] this out. It remains unresolved and its resolution matters for whether Hegel's

[01:16:26] resolution matters for whether Hegel's logic is defensible at all, not just as

[01:16:30] logic is defensible at all, not just as a historical position, but as a live

[01:16:33] a historical position, but as a live philosophical proposal.

[01:16:37] Part 13. Teology without a teologist.

[01:16:43] Part 13. Teology without a teologist. The hardest structural claim in Hegel.

[01:16:46] The hardest structural claim in Hegel. Teology as a concept in the history of

[01:16:48] Teology as a concept in the history of philosophy comes in two varieties and

[01:16:52] philosophy comes in two varieties and conflating them produces almost every

[01:16:54] conflating them produces almost every serious misreading of Hegel on this

[01:16:57] serious misreading of Hegel on this topic. The first variety is external

[01:17:00] topic. The first variety is external teology.

[01:17:02] teology. A designer or intelligent agent who

[01:17:05] A designer or intelligent agent who exists independently of the system

[01:17:07] exists independently of the system imposes a purpose on it from outside.

[01:17:11] imposes a purpose on it from outside. A watchmaker designs a watch for the

[01:17:14] A watchmaker designs a watch for the purpose of telling time. The watch's

[01:17:17] purpose of telling time. The watch's functional organization is explained by

[01:17:19] functional organization is explained by the watchmaker's prior intention.

[01:17:22] the watchmaker's prior intention. The second variety is imanent teology. A

[01:17:27] The second variety is imanent teology. A system is organized around an end that

[01:17:30] system is organized around an end that is intrinsic to the system itself, not

[01:17:32] is intrinsic to the system itself, not imposed from outside by any external

[01:17:36] imposed from outside by any external agent.

[01:17:38] agent. Kant analyzed iminant teology carefully

[01:17:41] Kant analyzed iminant teology carefully in the critique of judgment using the

[01:17:43] in the critique of judgment using the living organism as the paradigm case. An

[01:17:47] living organism as the paradigm case. An organism's parts are organized not by an

[01:17:50] organism's parts are organized not by an external designer but by the living

[01:17:53] external designer but by the living whole where the whole determines what

[01:17:55] whole where the whole determines what the parts must be and how they must

[01:17:58] the parts must be and how they must function in in order for the organism to

[01:18:00] function in in order for the organism to sustain itself.

[01:18:03] sustain itself. Kant's position on imanent teiology was

[01:18:06] Kant's position on imanent teiology was rigorously restricted. He argued that we

[01:18:09] rigorously restricted. He argued that we need the concept of inner purposiveness

[01:18:11] need the concept of inner purposiveness to understand living things. But we are

[01:18:14] to understand living things. But we are not entitled to treat this concept as

[01:18:17] not entitled to treat this concept as describing how organisms actually are in

[01:18:20] describing how organisms actually are in themselves as opposed to how we must

[01:18:23] themselves as opposed to how we must think about them given the limits of

[01:18:25] think about them given the limits of mechanical explanation.

[01:18:27] mechanical explanation. Inner purposiveness is a regulative

[01:18:30] Inner purposiveness is a regulative concept, a useful heruristic for

[01:18:32] concept, a useful heruristic for biology, not a constitutive claim about

[01:18:36] biology, not a constitutive claim about the real structure of organisms.

[01:18:39] the real structure of organisms. Hegel's move against Kant on this point

[01:18:41] Hegel's move against Kant on this point is precise and consequential.

[01:18:45] is precise and consequential. Kant's restriction fails on its own

[01:18:48] Kant's restriction fails on its own terms because Kant cannot explain why

[01:18:51] terms because Kant cannot explain why mechanical explanation is insufficient

[01:18:54] mechanical explanation is insufficient for biology without committing to the

[01:18:56] for biology without committing to the claim that organisms genuinely have a

[01:18:59] claim that organisms genuinely have a structure that mechanism cannot capture.

[01:19:02] structure that mechanism cannot capture. The admission that we must use

[01:19:04] The admission that we must use teological concepts is an implicit

[01:19:07] teological concepts is an implicit admission that something about organisms

[01:19:10] admission that something about organisms requires them.

[01:19:13] requires them. Hegel draws a further consequence from

[01:19:16] Hegel draws a further consequence from James Kryin's careful reconstruction.

[01:19:19] James Kryin's careful reconstruction. The concept of an organism requires that

[01:19:22] The concept of an organism requires that a general kind, a species concept, be

[01:19:25] a general kind, a species concept, be the substance or nature of an individual

[01:19:28] the substance or nature of an individual organism.

[01:19:30] organism. What it is to be a tiger is determined

[01:19:32] What it is to be a tiger is determined by the concept tiger, by the kind, not

[01:19:36] by the concept tiger, by the kind, not by the mechanical processes that happen

[01:19:38] by the mechanical processes that happen to produce a tiger-shaped body.

[01:19:42] to produce a tiger-shaped body. The concept is the inner principle of

[01:19:44] The concept is the inner principle of the organism's organization, the

[01:19:47] the organism's organization, the standard against which the organism's

[01:19:49] standard against which the organism's actual state is measured.

[01:19:51] actual state is measured. A disease tiger is a tiger that fails to

[01:19:55] A disease tiger is a tiger that fails to instantiate the concept tiger fully.

[01:19:59] instantiate the concept tiger fully. This failure makes sense only if the

[01:20:02] This failure makes sense only if the concept is immanent in the organism, not

[01:20:05] concept is immanent in the organism, not merely a label applied by an external

[01:20:08] merely a label applied by an external classifier.

[01:20:11] The structural hardness of this claim

[01:20:13] The structural hardness of this claim becomes visible when you ask what drives

[01:20:16] becomes visible when you ask what drives the dialectical progression in Hegel's

[01:20:18] the dialectical progression in Hegel's logic through mechanism, chemism, and

[01:20:21] logic through mechanism, chemism, and teiology.

[01:20:23] teiology. Mechanism as already discussed is the

[01:20:26] Mechanism as already discussed is the category of purely external relations

[01:20:28] category of purely external relations where things influence each other

[01:20:30] where things influence each other without any inner principle of

[01:20:32] without any inner principle of self-organization.

[01:20:35] When mechanism is pushed to its limits,

[01:20:38] When mechanism is pushed to its limits, it reveals an instability.

[01:20:40] it reveals an instability. You cannot individuate mechanical

[01:20:42] You cannot individuate mechanical objects at all without presupposing some

[01:20:45] objects at all without presupposing some principle that makes each thing a

[01:20:47] principle that makes each thing a unified thing rather than an arbitrary

[01:20:50] unified thing rather than an arbitrary region of matter.

[01:20:52] region of matter. The very concept of a distinct object

[01:20:55] The very concept of a distinct object requires something more than external

[01:20:58] requires something more than external relations.

[01:21:01] relations. This opens into chemism where things are

[01:21:05] This opens into chemism where things are constituted by their affinities, their

[01:21:07] constituted by their affinities, their tendencies to combine with and separate

[01:21:10] tendencies to combine with and separate from complimentary others. But chemism

[01:21:13] from complimentary others. But chemism still treats the drive toward

[01:21:15] still treats the drive toward combination as an external goal. The

[01:21:19] combination as an external goal. The acid seeks the base, but there is no

[01:21:22] acid seeks the base, but there is no inner principle that constitutes the

[01:21:24] inner principle that constitutes the acid as the kind of thing that seeks

[01:21:26] acid as the kind of thing that seeks bases.

[01:21:29] bases. Imminent teology, the concept of an

[01:21:32] Imminent teology, the concept of an organized whole whose parts are

[01:21:34] organized whole whose parts are constituted by their function within the

[01:21:36] constituted by their function within the whole is what mechanism and chemism

[01:21:39] whole is what mechanism and chemism cannot account for on their own.

[01:21:42] cannot account for on their own. Kevin Thompson and others in a 20 or 23

[01:21:46] Kevin Thompson and others in a 20 or 23 cluster of papers in Hegel bulletin have

[01:21:49] cluster of papers in Hegel bulletin have argued that Hegel's teology chapter in

[01:21:52] argued that Hegel's teology chapter in the logic is not primarily about

[01:21:54] the logic is not primarily about organisms at all but about the abstract

[01:21:57] organisms at all but about the abstract logical structure of purposive activity

[01:22:00] logical structure of purposive activity as such including human action and

[01:22:03] as such including human action and technical production.

[01:22:06] technical production. On this reading, the deeper argument is

[01:22:08] On this reading, the deeper argument is that any account of what it means to do

[01:22:10] that any account of what it means to do something, to act toward an end requires

[01:22:13] something, to act toward an end requires the concept of iminant purposiveness.

[01:22:18] the concept of iminant purposiveness. External teology always presupposes

[01:22:20] External teology always presupposes imanent teology at a deeper level

[01:22:24] imanent teology at a deeper level because even an external designer's act

[01:22:26] because even an external designer's act of designing requires a prior iman

[01:22:29] of designing requires a prior iman self-organizing structure in the

[01:22:32] self-organizing structure in the designer.

[01:22:35] designer. The objection that most troubles

[01:22:37] The objection that most troubles defenders of Hegelian teology is not

[01:22:40] defenders of Hegelian teology is not Kunt's restriction, but what we might

[01:22:42] Kunt's restriction, but what we might call the naturalization problem.

[01:22:45] call the naturalization problem. Contemporary natural science has

[01:22:47] Contemporary natural science has achieved explanatory frameworks for

[01:22:49] achieved explanatory frameworks for living systems, including evolutionary

[01:22:52] living systems, including evolutionary biology, that do not obviously require

[01:22:55] biology, that do not obviously require imminent teological categories in

[01:22:58] imminent teological categories in Hegel's strong sense.

[01:23:00] Hegel's strong sense. selection pressures and historical

[01:23:02] selection pressures and historical accident rather than iminent conceptual

[01:23:05] accident rather than iminent conceptual structures account for biological

[01:23:08] structures account for biological organization.

[01:23:10] organization. Kryness's response is that Hegel's claim

[01:23:13] Kryness's response is that Hegel's claim is not about which causal mechanisms

[01:23:16] is not about which causal mechanisms produce organisms but about which

[01:23:19] produce organisms but about which explanatory framework captures what it

[01:23:22] explanatory framework captures what it is to be an organism which is a

[01:23:25] is to be an organism which is a different question.

[01:23:28] different question. Whether that distinction is ultimately

[01:23:30] Whether that distinction is ultimately sustainable or whether it retreats to a

[01:23:33] sustainable or whether it retreats to a merely epistemic claim about explanation

[01:23:36] merely epistemic claim about explanation that Hegel would himself reject remains

[01:23:39] that Hegel would himself reject remains genuinely open.

[01:23:44] Part 14. Gist. The onlogical commitment

[01:23:48] Part 14. Gist. The onlogical commitment you cannot deflate away. Gist translated

[01:23:52] you cannot deflate away. Gist translated as spirit or mind is the concept that

[01:23:55] as spirit or mind is the concept that most sharply divides readers of Hegel

[01:23:57] most sharply divides readers of Hegel along interpretive lines. On the

[01:24:00] along interpretive lines. On the deflationary reading associated with

[01:24:02] deflationary reading associated with Pippen and Pinker, Gist is not an entity

[01:24:06] Pippen and Pinker, Gist is not an entity at all, not a cosmic consciousness, not

[01:24:09] at all, not a cosmic consciousness, not a world mind that thinks through human

[01:24:11] a world mind that thinks through human beings.

[01:24:13] beings. It is a name for the structure of

[01:24:15] It is a name for the structure of self-conscious normgoed rational

[01:24:18] self-conscious normgoed rational activity as it unfolds historically in

[01:24:21] activity as it unfolds historically in and through communities of agents.

[01:24:24] and through communities of agents. On this reading saying Gist develops

[01:24:28] On this reading saying Gist develops means that the social norms, practices

[01:24:31] means that the social norms, practices and standards through which rational

[01:24:33] and standards through which rational self understanding is enacted change,

[01:24:36] self understanding is enacted change, develop and become more adequate over

[01:24:39] develop and become more adequate over time.

[01:24:41] time. There is no spooky metaphysics here,

[01:24:44] There is no spooky metaphysics here, only social ontology and the history of

[01:24:47] only social ontology and the history of reason, self-clarification.

[01:24:51] on the traditional metaphysical reading

[01:24:54] on the traditional metaphysical reading associated with Charles Taylor, the

[01:24:56] associated with Charles Taylor, the early Michael Inwood and more recently

[01:24:58] early Michael Inwood and more recently James Kines and Robert Stern. Gist

[01:25:02] James Kines and Robert Stern. Gist involves genuine onlogical commitments

[01:25:05] involves genuine onlogical commitments that cannot be deflated into social

[01:25:07] that cannot be deflated into social normative terms without serious

[01:25:10] normative terms without serious distortion.

[01:25:12] distortion. The logic's claim that the concept is

[01:25:14] The logic's claim that the concept is the inner nature of things, not merely

[01:25:17] the inner nature of things, not merely our way of categorizing them, requires

[01:25:20] our way of categorizing them, requires that conceptual structures be

[01:25:22] that conceptual structures be constitutive features of reality, not

[01:25:24] constitutive features of reality, not just of our representations of it.

[01:25:29] just of our representations of it. Gist's development is not just the

[01:25:31] Gist's development is not just the historical development of human norms,

[01:25:34] historical development of human norms, but the movement of the conceptual

[01:25:36] but the movement of the conceptual structure of reality itself toward

[01:25:39] structure of reality itself toward greater self-transparency.

[01:25:41] greater self-transparency. The universe in some non-trivially

[01:25:44] The universe in some non-trivially idealist sense is organized by the same

[01:25:47] idealist sense is organized by the same rational structures that govern thought.

[01:25:51] rational structures that govern thought. Pippen's 2019 study of the science of

[01:25:55] Pippen's 2019 study of the science of logic tried to close the gap between

[01:25:57] logic tried to close the gap between these positions.

[01:25:59] these positions. Pippen now acknowledges that the logic

[01:26:02] Pippen now acknowledges that the logic makes claims about the structure of

[01:26:04] makes claims about the structure of being, not merely about the conditions

[01:26:07] being, not merely about the conditions of our discourse about being.

[01:26:10] of our discourse about being. But he maintains that being so

[01:26:13] But he maintains that being so understood is not independent of

[01:26:16] understood is not independent of conceptual articulation in any precant

[01:26:19] conceptual articulation in any precant sense. There is a speculative identity

[01:26:22] sense. There is a speculative identity between the categories of thought and

[01:26:25] between the categories of thought and the categories of being. But this

[01:26:27] the categories of being. But this identity is not the relation between a

[01:26:29] identity is not the relation between a mind and a mind independent world.

[01:26:33] mind and a mind independent world. It is the identity of thought structure

[01:26:36] It is the identity of thought structure with the structure of intelligibility as

[01:26:38] with the structure of intelligibility as such where what it is to be something is

[01:26:41] such where what it is to be something is to be intelligible in a specific way.

[01:26:44] to be intelligible in a specific way. Whether this is a genuine onlogical

[01:26:47] Whether this is a genuine onlogical position or a sophisticated

[01:26:49] position or a sophisticated redescription of transcendental

[01:26:52] redescription of transcendental conditions is what the debate turns on.

[01:26:57] conditions is what the debate turns on. The practical stake of this debate is

[01:27:00] The practical stake of this debate is high. If Gist is merely social

[01:27:03] high. If Gist is merely social normative, then the philosophy of rights

[01:27:06] normative, then the philosophy of rights claims about the rationality of modern

[01:27:08] claims about the rationality of modern institutions and the lectures on the

[01:27:11] institutions and the lectures on the philosophy of history's claims about the

[01:27:13] philosophy of history's claims about the rational necessity of historical

[01:27:15] rational necessity of historical development are claims about the

[01:27:18] development are claims about the internal logic of human practices, not

[01:27:22] internal logic of human practices, not about the structure of reality.

[01:27:25] about the structure of reality. This makes them revisable, subject to

[01:27:28] This makes them revisable, subject to critique and reconstruction, tools for

[01:27:31] critique and reconstruction, tools for social analysis rather than metaphysical

[01:27:34] social analysis rather than metaphysical claims about how things must be. If Gist

[01:27:38] claims about how things must be. If Gist is onlogically robust in the traditional

[01:27:40] is onlogically robust in the traditional sense, then these claims are claims

[01:27:43] sense, then these claims are claims about what reason demands at the level

[01:27:45] about what reason demands at the level of reality and their normative force

[01:27:48] of reality and their normative force comes from a source that transcends the

[01:27:50] comes from a source that transcends the contingency of any particular social

[01:27:53] contingency of any particular social arrangement.

[01:27:55] arrangement. Honith's recognition theory, Pippen's

[01:27:58] Honith's recognition theory, Pippen's social theory of agency, and Pinkard's

[01:28:01] social theory of agency, and Pinkard's account of shapes of spirit take the

[01:28:04] account of shapes of spirit take the first path.

[01:28:06] first path. All three leave open the question of

[01:28:08] All three leave open the question of whether their reconstructions capture

[01:28:11] whether their reconstructions capture what Hegel was actually doing or replace

[01:28:14] what Hegel was actually doing or replace him with something more defensible but

[01:28:17] him with something more defensible but different.

[01:28:20] Part 15. Sitkite and the social

[01:28:24] Part 15. Sitkite and the social ontology. Why individual spirit is not

[01:28:28] ontology. Why individual spirit is not the unit of analysis. The movement in

[01:28:31] the unit of analysis. The movement in the philosophy of right from abstract

[01:28:33] the philosophy of right from abstract right through morality to ethical life

[01:28:36] right through morality to ethical life sitkite is not simply an ordering of

[01:28:39] sitkite is not simply an ordering of topics. It is a dialectical argument

[01:28:42] topics. It is a dialectical argument that each prior conception of practical

[01:28:44] that each prior conception of practical freedom fails because it abstracts from

[01:28:48] freedom fails because it abstracts from the social conditions that make it

[01:28:49] the social conditions that make it possible and that the failure produces

[01:28:52] possible and that the failure produces the next more adequate conception.

[01:28:55] the next more adequate conception. Abstract

[01:28:57] Abstract right is freedom conceived as the sphere

[01:29:01] right is freedom conceived as the sphere of external negative liberty. The

[01:29:04] of external negative liberty. The individual's right to own property, make

[01:29:06] individual's right to own property, make contracts, and not be interfered with by

[01:29:09] contracts, and not be interfered with by others.

[01:29:11] others. This is Isaiah Berlin's negative

[01:29:13] This is Isaiah Berlin's negative freedom, the freedom of classical

[01:29:16] freedom, the freedom of classical liberalism.

[01:29:17] liberalism. Hegel does not dismiss it, but he argues

[01:29:21] Hegel does not dismiss it, but he argues that it is unstable on its own terms.

[01:29:25] that it is unstable on its own terms. A right without enforcement is no right

[01:29:27] A right without enforcement is no right at all. And enforcement requires a

[01:29:30] at all. And enforcement requires a social and legal framework that abstract

[01:29:33] social and legal framework that abstract right itself cannot generate or justify.

[01:29:37] right itself cannot generate or justify. The concept of punishment, for instance,

[01:29:40] The concept of punishment, for instance, cannot be derived from abstract right

[01:29:42] cannot be derived from abstract right alone. It requires a conception of wrong

[01:29:46] alone. It requires a conception of wrong that already presupposes an ethical

[01:29:49] that already presupposes an ethical community.

[01:29:52] community. Morality is freedom conceived as the

[01:29:55] Morality is freedom conceived as the sphere of the autonomous moral subject

[01:29:58] sphere of the autonomous moral subject who legislates for herself through

[01:30:00] who legislates for herself through reason.

[01:30:02] reason. This is Kant's moral philosophy. The

[01:30:05] This is Kant's moral philosophy. The individual will is the source of moral

[01:30:07] individual will is the source of moral law. Duty is internal and the standard

[01:30:11] law. Duty is internal and the standard of right action is universalizability.

[01:30:16] of right action is universalizability. Hegel's critique here is not that moral

[01:30:19] Hegel's critique here is not that moral autonomy is unimportant, but that it

[01:30:21] autonomy is unimportant, but that it cannot sustain itself in abstraction

[01:30:24] cannot sustain itself in abstraction from concrete social content. The

[01:30:27] from concrete social content. The Kantian moral subject, stripped of all

[01:30:29] Kantian moral subject, stripped of all particular social roles and commitments,

[01:30:32] particular social roles and commitments, has no determinate content to

[01:30:34] has no determinate content to universalize.

[01:30:36] universalize. The categorical imperative requires

[01:30:39] The categorical imperative requires actual particular maxims to test and

[01:30:41] actual particular maxims to test and those maxims come from somewhere from

[01:30:44] those maxims come from somewhere from social practices, cultural norms,

[01:30:46] social practices, cultural norms, concrete roles and relationships.

[01:30:49] concrete roles and relationships. Morality without sitkite is an empty

[01:30:52] Morality without sitkite is an empty formalism that can sanction

[01:30:54] formalism that can sanction contradictory maxims as Hegel argues in

[01:30:58] contradictory maxims as Hegel argues in his famous critique of Kant.

[01:31:03] his famous critique of Kant. Zitlikite is the sphere in which freedom

[01:31:05] Zitlikite is the sphere in which freedom is actualized in concrete institutional

[01:31:09] is actualized in concrete institutional form. The family, civil society, and the

[01:31:13] form. The family, civil society, and the state. What makes Zitlikite

[01:31:16] state. What makes Zitlikite philosophically distinctive is Hegel's

[01:31:18] philosophically distinctive is Hegel's claim that individuals achieve genuine

[01:31:21] claim that individuals achieve genuine freedom not in spite of their social

[01:31:23] freedom not in spite of their social roles and institutional memberships, but

[01:31:26] roles and institutional memberships, but through them.

[01:31:28] through them. A person who is a parent, a

[01:31:31] A person who is a parent, a professional, a citizen inhabiting

[01:31:33] professional, a citizen inhabiting determinate social roles is not less

[01:31:36] determinate social roles is not less free than a canian abstract subject. She

[01:31:39] free than a canian abstract subject. She is more free because she has a concrete

[01:31:42] is more free because she has a concrete shape to her freedom rather than an

[01:31:44] shape to her freedom rather than an abstract potential.

[01:31:46] abstract potential. The institutions of Zitlikite are not

[01:31:49] The institutions of Zitlikite are not external constraints on a pre-social

[01:31:52] external constraints on a pre-social freedom. They are the medium through

[01:31:56] freedom. They are the medium through which freedom becomes actual.

[01:32:00] which freedom becomes actual. Frederick Neuhauser's 2000

[01:32:02] Frederick Neuhauser's 2000 reconstruction identified three distinct

[01:32:06] reconstruction identified three distinct conceptions of freedom operating in

[01:32:08] conceptions of freedom operating in Hegel's social theory. Personal freedom,

[01:32:12] Hegel's social theory. Personal freedom, moral freedom, and what Newhauser calls

[01:32:15] moral freedom, and what Newhauser calls social freedom. the mode of freedom

[01:32:18] social freedom. the mode of freedom constituted by individuals participation

[01:32:21] constituted by individuals participation in rational social institutions where

[01:32:23] in rational social institutions where their ends are also the community's

[01:32:26] their ends are also the community's ends.

[01:32:28] ends. Social freedom is Hegel's most

[01:32:30] Social freedom is Hegel's most distinctive contribution and the one

[01:32:32] distinctive contribution and the one that has no clear precedent in Kant or

[01:32:35] that has no clear precedent in Kant or in liberal political philosophy.

[01:32:39] in liberal political philosophy. An individual participates in social

[01:32:41] An individual participates in social freedom when her own projects are

[01:32:43] freedom when her own projects are simultaneously contributions to a shared

[01:32:46] simultaneously contributions to a shared form of life, when she is at home in the

[01:32:49] form of life, when she is at home in the institutions she inhabits rather than

[01:32:52] institutions she inhabits rather than constrained by them. This requires that

[01:32:56] constrained by them. This requires that the institutions themselves have a

[01:32:58] the institutions themselves have a structure that accommodates individual

[01:33:00] structure that accommodates individual self-realization

[01:33:02] self-realization rather than suppressing it.

[01:33:06] The hardest objection to sitkite is not

[01:33:10] The hardest objection to sitkite is not Carl Pauper's fasile accusation of

[01:33:13] Carl Pauper's fasile accusation of prototalitarianism

[01:33:15] prototalitarianism which confuses the claim that

[01:33:17] which confuses the claim that institutions are constitutive of freedom

[01:33:20] institutions are constitutive of freedom with the claim that any existing

[01:33:22] with the claim that any existing institution must be rationally endorsed.

[01:33:26] institution must be rationally endorsed. The harder objection is that Hegel's

[01:33:29] The harder objection is that Hegel's identification of rational freedom with

[01:33:31] identification of rational freedom with the modern state at a specific

[01:33:33] the modern state at a specific historical moment late 18th century

[01:33:36] historical moment late 18th century Europe is an illegitimate closure of the

[01:33:39] Europe is an illegitimate closure of the dialectic.

[01:33:41] dialectic. If sitkite's rationality is historically

[01:33:44] If sitkite's rationality is historically indexed, then any claim that a

[01:33:47] indexed, then any claim that a particular set of institutions is the

[01:33:50] particular set of institutions is the actualization of freedom is a political

[01:33:52] actualization of freedom is a political claim with a philosophical gloss rather

[01:33:56] claim with a philosophical gloss rather than a philosophical claim with

[01:33:58] than a philosophical claim with determinate content. Axel Honith's

[01:34:01] determinate content. Axel Honith's freedoms right from 2011 attempted to

[01:34:04] freedoms right from 2011 attempted to reconstruct sitkite on purely imanent

[01:34:08] reconstruct sitkite on purely imanent critical grounds evaluating contemporary

[01:34:11] critical grounds evaluating contemporary institutions against the freedom claims

[01:34:14] institutions against the freedom claims they themselves make without Hegel's

[01:34:17] they themselves make without Hegel's metaphysical backstory.

[01:34:20] metaphysical backstory. Whether this reconstruction is still

[01:34:23] Whether this reconstruction is still recognizably Hegelian or whether it

[01:34:25] recognizably Hegelian or whether it borrows only the dialectical style while

[01:34:28] borrows only the dialectical style while abandoning the engine that drives it is

[01:34:30] abandoning the engine that drives it is contested in current social philosophy.

[01:34:37] Part 16.

[01:34:39] Part 16. History and the cunning of reason. The

[01:34:42] History and the cunning of reason. The argument and its wreckage.

[01:34:45] argument and its wreckage. Hegel's philosophy of history makes a

[01:34:48] Hegel's philosophy of history makes a claim that even his sympathizers find

[01:34:50] claim that even his sympathizers find difficult to defend without

[01:34:52] difficult to defend without embarrassment and a claim that his

[01:34:54] embarrassment and a claim that his critics find so easy to lampoon that

[01:34:57] critics find so easy to lampoon that they often stop there. Missing what is

[01:35:00] they often stop there. Missing what is philosophically serious about the

[01:35:02] philosophically serious about the surrounding framework.

[01:35:04] surrounding framework. The claim is this. World history taken

[01:35:08] The claim is this. World history taken as a whole is the realization of

[01:35:10] as a whole is the realization of freedom. And the apparently senseless

[01:35:12] freedom. And the apparently senseless violence, exploitation, and suffering

[01:35:14] violence, exploitation, and suffering that constitute most of recorded history

[01:35:17] that constitute most of recorded history serve as necessary instruments for this

[01:35:19] serve as necessary instruments for this realization used by reason without the

[01:35:22] realization used by reason without the knowledge of the individuals who

[01:35:24] knowledge of the individuals who perpetrate them.

[01:35:26] perpetrate them. Hegel calls this the cunning of reason.

[01:35:30] Hegel calls this the cunning of reason. The universal uses particular passions

[01:35:32] The universal uses particular passions and interests as its means without

[01:35:35] and interests as its means without consulting them and without their

[01:35:37] consulting them and without their understanding what they are doing.

[01:35:41] understanding what they are doing. The argument preceding this claim is

[01:35:44] The argument preceding this claim is more careful than the claim itself.

[01:35:47] more careful than the claim itself. Hegel's starting point in the lectures

[01:35:50] Hegel's starting point in the lectures on the philosophy of history is the

[01:35:52] on the philosophy of history is the observation that historical agents act

[01:35:54] observation that historical agents act from particular passions and interests

[01:35:57] from particular passions and interests not from universal rational purposes.

[01:36:01] not from universal rational purposes. Napoleon did not conquer Europe because

[01:36:03] Napoleon did not conquer Europe because he was working out the logic of freedom

[01:36:05] he was working out the logic of freedom consciousness. He had personal

[01:36:08] consciousness. He had personal ambitions, strategic interests, and an

[01:36:11] ambitions, strategic interests, and an extraordinary military mind. Yet the

[01:36:14] extraordinary military mind. Yet the historical consequence of Napoleon's

[01:36:16] historical consequence of Napoleon's campaigns, including the codification of

[01:36:19] campaigns, including the codification of law, the abolition of feudal structures

[01:36:22] law, the abolition of feudal structures across Europe, and the dissemination of

[01:36:25] across Europe, and the dissemination of revolutionary principles, was the

[01:36:27] revolutionary principles, was the advancement of rational freedom in

[01:36:30] advancement of rational freedom in institutions, whatever Napoleon

[01:36:32] institutions, whatever Napoleon intended.

[01:36:35] intended. The cunning of reason is Hegel's attempt

[01:36:38] The cunning of reason is Hegel's attempt to explain how history can have rational

[01:36:41] to explain how history can have rational progressive structure without any of its

[01:36:43] progressive structure without any of its individual actors consciously tracking

[01:36:45] individual actors consciously tracking that structure. The universal end is

[01:36:49] that structure. The universal end is realized through particular passions

[01:36:52] realized through particular passions precisely because particular passions

[01:36:54] precisely because particular passions are powerful enough to move people to

[01:36:56] are powerful enough to move people to actions that have largecale structural

[01:36:59] actions that have largecale structural consequences.

[01:37:01] consequences. World historical individuals as Hegel

[01:37:04] World historical individuals as Hegel calls them are people whose particular

[01:37:06] calls them are people whose particular ambitions happen to align with the next

[01:37:09] ambitions happen to align with the next required step in the development of

[01:37:11] required step in the development of freedom consciousness in institutions.

[01:37:15] freedom consciousness in institutions. They do not know this. They are not

[01:37:17] They do not know this. They are not working for it consciously and they

[01:37:19] working for it consciously and they typically gain nothing from it

[01:37:21] typically gain nothing from it personally.

[01:37:24] personally. Three separate objections carry genuine

[01:37:27] Three separate objections carry genuine philosophical force. The first is

[01:37:30] philosophical force. The first is Poppers, though not quite in his version

[01:37:33] Poppers, though not quite in his version of it. The claim that history has a

[01:37:36] of it. The claim that history has a rational direction cannot be falsified

[01:37:39] rational direction cannot be falsified because any apparently irrational

[01:37:41] because any apparently irrational episode can always be reinterpreted as a

[01:37:45] episode can always be reinterpreted as a necessary moment in the rational

[01:37:47] necessary moment in the rational progression.

[01:37:49] progression. The philosophical cost is that the claim

[01:37:51] The philosophical cost is that the claim has no determinate content. It says

[01:37:54] has no determinate content. It says history is rational but cannot say in

[01:37:57] history is rational but cannot say in advance what rationality requires in any

[01:38:00] advance what rationality requires in any specific case. Hegel explicitly

[01:38:04] specific case. Hegel explicitly acknowledges that the philosophical

[01:38:06] acknowledges that the philosophical account of history is retrospective

[01:38:08] account of history is retrospective which means it cannot serve as a guide

[01:38:11] which means it cannot serve as a guide to action.

[01:38:14] to action. The second objection is ethical. The

[01:38:17] The second objection is ethical. The cunning of reason treats the suffering

[01:38:19] cunning of reason treats the suffering of actual persons as instruments for a

[01:38:22] of actual persons as instruments for a purpose they did not consent to and did

[01:38:24] purpose they did not consent to and did not share. Hegel is candid about this in

[01:38:28] not share. Hegel is candid about this in the lectures acknowledging that

[01:38:30] the lectures acknowledging that history's progress is built on the

[01:38:32] history's progress is built on the wreckage of individual happiness and

[01:38:36] wreckage of individual happiness and that this is simply how things are at

[01:38:39] that this is simply how things are at the level of world history.

[01:38:42] the level of world history. The ethical perspective which demands

[01:38:45] The ethical perspective which demands that individuals not be treated merely

[01:38:47] that individuals not be treated merely as means belongs to a lower level of

[01:38:50] as means belongs to a lower level of spirit than world history. Hegel says

[01:38:54] spirit than world history. Hegel says this is perhaps the most uncomfortable

[01:38:57] this is perhaps the most uncomfortable passage in all of Hegel's published

[01:38:59] passage in all of Hegel's published writing.

[01:39:02] writing. The third objection is the most

[01:39:04] The third objection is the most structurally damaging.

[01:39:06] structurally damaging. Hegel's argument requires that the

[01:39:09] Hegel's argument requires that the development of freedom consciousness in

[01:39:11] development of freedom consciousness in institutions constitutes genuine

[01:39:14] institutions constitutes genuine progress. That the modern European state

[01:39:17] progress. That the modern European state and its rational institutions represent

[01:39:19] and its rational institutions represent a more adequate actualization of freedom

[01:39:22] a more adequate actualization of freedom than ancient Greek or Eastern forms.

[01:39:26] than ancient Greek or Eastern forms. The criteria for what counts as progress

[01:39:29] The criteria for what counts as progress are drawn from Hegel's own philosophical

[01:39:32] are drawn from Hegel's own philosophical system. This means the argument is

[01:39:35] system. This means the argument is circular.

[01:39:36] circular. The system provides the standard by

[01:39:39] The system provides the standard by which history is judged to be rational

[01:39:41] which history is judged to be rational and history is used to confirm the

[01:39:44] and history is used to confirm the system.

[01:39:45] system. The circularity may be unavoidable given

[01:39:48] The circularity may be unavoidable given Hegel's own account of how philosophy

[01:39:51] Hegel's own account of how philosophy relates to history, but it makes the

[01:39:53] relates to history, but it makes the claim to derive historical necessity

[01:39:56] claim to derive historical necessity from imminent critique rather than from

[01:39:59] from imminent critique rather than from dogmatic presupposition very difficult

[01:40:02] dogmatic presupposition very difficult to sustain.

[01:40:06] Part 17, art, religion, philosophy,

[01:40:10] Part 17, art, religion, philosophy, absolute spirit, and why the ordering is

[01:40:14] absolute spirit, and why the ordering is not arbitrary. The final section of the

[01:40:17] not arbitrary. The final section of the encyclopedia's philosophy of spirit,

[01:40:20] encyclopedia's philosophy of spirit, covering art, religion, and philosophy

[01:40:22] covering art, religion, and philosophy as forms of absolute spirit, is treated

[01:40:24] as forms of absolute spirit, is treated in most introductory treatments as a

[01:40:27] in most introductory treatments as a tidy completion of the system.

[01:40:30] tidy completion of the system. Thought finally knows itself as the

[01:40:33] Thought finally knows itself as the structure of everything.

[01:40:35] structure of everything. This misses what is philosophically

[01:40:37] This misses what is philosophically substantive about the ordering and why

[01:40:40] substantive about the ordering and why it is not arbitrary.

[01:40:42] it is not arbitrary. Art, religion, and philosophy do not

[01:40:45] Art, religion, and philosophy do not differ merely in their subject matter.

[01:40:48] differ merely in their subject matter. They differ in the form in which they

[01:40:50] They differ in the form in which they present the same content. the structure

[01:40:53] present the same content. the structure of spirit self-recognition in its other

[01:40:59] of spirit self-recognition in its other art presents this content in sensuous

[01:41:02] art presents this content in sensuous particular form. A Greek statue of

[01:41:05] particular form. A Greek statue of Apollo presents the identity of human

[01:41:07] Apollo presents the identity of human and divine not as a proposition or a

[01:41:10] and divine not as a proposition or a doctrine but as a visible specific

[01:41:13] doctrine but as a visible specific presence that strikes the viewer

[01:41:15] presence that strikes the viewer directly.

[01:41:17] directly. The Pathonon freeze presents civic and

[01:41:20] The Pathonon freeze presents civic and religious identity as organized stone

[01:41:23] religious identity as organized stone that you can see, touch, and walk

[01:41:25] that you can see, touch, and walk through. Art's mode of presentation is

[01:41:29] through. Art's mode of presentation is sensuous intuition. The absolute content

[01:41:32] sensuous intuition. The absolute content is given an outer perceptible shape.

[01:41:36] is given an outer perceptible shape. Art is limited precisely because it is

[01:41:40] Art is limited precisely because it is adequate only to contents whose

[01:41:42] adequate only to contents whose spiritual depth can be rendered sensuous

[01:41:45] spiritual depth can be rendered sensuous without distortion.

[01:41:47] without distortion. Classical Greek sculpture achieves this

[01:41:49] Classical Greek sculpture achieves this adequacy. The content, a vision of human

[01:41:53] adequacy. The content, a vision of human divine unity in a particular human form

[01:41:56] divine unity in a particular human form fits the medium.

[01:41:59] fits the medium. Religion presents the same content. The

[01:42:02] Religion presents the same content. The structure of spirit self-recognition in

[01:42:05] structure of spirit self-recognition in the form of vorelong representation or

[01:42:09] the form of vorelong representation or pictorial thought. Vorstellong is a

[01:42:12] pictorial thought. Vorstellong is a specifically Hegelian technical term. It

[01:42:16] specifically Hegelian technical term. It names the cognitive mode of thought that

[01:42:19] names the cognitive mode of thought that grasps conceptual content through

[01:42:21] grasps conceptual content through images, narratives, and personifications

[01:42:24] images, narratives, and personifications rather than through pure concepts.

[01:42:28] rather than through pure concepts. The Christian doctrines of the

[01:42:29] The Christian doctrines of the incarnation and trinity are for Hegel

[01:42:32] incarnation and trinity are for Hegel for Stellongan of the same content that

[01:42:35] for Stellongan of the same content that the logic expresses through the

[01:42:37] the logic expresses through the categories of being, essence, and

[01:42:40] categories of being, essence, and concept.

[01:42:41] concept. The trinity in its religious form

[01:42:43] The trinity in its religious form presents the structure of universality,

[01:42:46] presents the structure of universality, particularity and individuality as three

[01:42:50] particularity and individuality as three persons and their relations.

[01:42:54] persons and their relations. The logic presents the same structure

[01:42:56] The logic presents the same structure through pure conceptual determination.

[01:43:00] through pure conceptual determination. Religion is more adequate than art

[01:43:03] Religion is more adequate than art because it grasps that the content is

[01:43:05] because it grasps that the content is spiritual rather than sensuous, but less

[01:43:08] spiritual rather than sensuous, but less adequate than philosophy because it

[01:43:10] adequate than philosophy because it grasps the content through images and

[01:43:13] grasps the content through images and narratives that remain external to the

[01:43:16] narratives that remain external to the concept.

[01:43:18] concept. Philosophy presents this content in the

[01:43:21] Philosophy presents this content in the form of the pure concept beg without

[01:43:25] form of the pure concept beg without sensuous or pictorial supplement.

[01:43:28] sensuous or pictorial supplement. Philosophy's superiority over art and

[01:43:30] Philosophy's superiority over art and religion is not a superiority of content

[01:43:33] religion is not a superiority of content but a superiority of the form in which

[01:43:36] but a superiority of the form in which content is held.

[01:43:39] content is held. The concept grasps what art and religion

[01:43:42] The concept grasps what art and religion picture and it does so in the mode of

[01:43:44] picture and it does so in the mode of thought that is adequate to thought's

[01:43:47] thought that is adequate to thought's own self-determination.

[01:43:49] own self-determination. Hegel is explicit that art and religion

[01:43:52] Hegel is explicit that art and religion are not abolished by philosophy. They

[01:43:56] are not abolished by philosophy. They remain as forms of spirits

[01:43:58] remain as forms of spirits self-presentation.

[01:44:00] self-presentation. Art does not become obsolete when

[01:44:02] Art does not become obsolete when philosophy grasps its content

[01:44:05] philosophy grasps its content conceptually any more than friendship

[01:44:07] conceptually any more than friendship becomes obsolete when psychology

[01:44:10] becomes obsolete when psychology explains attachment.

[01:44:14] The live debate about this triad

[01:44:16] The live debate about this triad concerns Hegel's claim that art has

[01:44:19] concerns Hegel's claim that art has passed its highest vocation in the

[01:44:21] passed its highest vocation in the modern age. the famous end of art

[01:44:24] modern age. the famous end of art thesis.

[01:44:26] thesis. Hegel does not say that art ceases to

[01:44:29] Hegel does not say that art ceases to exist in modernity or that no great art

[01:44:32] exist in modernity or that no great art will be made.

[01:44:34] will be made. He says that art can no longer function

[01:44:37] He says that art can no longer function as the primary vehicle through which a

[01:44:39] as the primary vehicle through which a culture's deepest self-standing is

[01:44:42] culture's deepest self-standing is formed and transmitted because in

[01:44:44] formed and transmitted because in modernity the form of reflective

[01:44:47] modernity the form of reflective self-consciousness has become paramount

[01:44:50] self-consciousness has become paramount and arts sensuous immediacy cannot

[01:44:52] and arts sensuous immediacy cannot satisfy the need for explicit conceptual

[01:44:56] satisfy the need for explicit conceptual self-comprehension.

[01:44:58] self-comprehension. Steven Holgate and William Desmond have

[01:45:02] Steven Holgate and William Desmond have argued that this claim is more

[01:45:04] argued that this claim is more restricted than it appears and that

[01:45:06] restricted than it appears and that Hegel's own aesthetics contains

[01:45:08] Hegel's own aesthetics contains resources for acknowledging art's

[01:45:10] resources for acknowledging art's continued capacity for absolute

[01:45:12] continued capacity for absolute expression.

[01:45:14] expression. Whether the end of art claim is a

[01:45:16] Whether the end of art claim is a substantive argument tied to Hegel's

[01:45:19] substantive argument tied to Hegel's theory of modernity or a historically

[01:45:21] theory of modernity or a historically parochial observation dressed in

[01:45:24] parochial observation dressed in systematic language is a debate that the

[01:45:27] systematic language is a debate that the discovery in 2022 of previously unknown

[01:45:30] discovery in 2022 of previously unknown transcripts of Hegel's H Highleberg

[01:45:32] transcripts of Hegel's H Highleberg aesthetics lectures containing

[01:45:34] aesthetics lectures containing significantly different formulations has

[01:45:37] significantly different formulations has reopened

[01:45:41] in part 18. What absolute knowing is not

[01:45:45] in part 18. What absolute knowing is not and the deflationary reading.

[01:45:48] and the deflationary reading. The phenomenology of spirit ends with a

[01:45:51] The phenomenology of spirit ends with a chapter called absolute knowing and

[01:45:54] chapter called absolute knowing and every reader who arrives there faces the

[01:45:57] every reader who arrives there faces the same question. Has this earned its

[01:46:00] same question. Has this earned its conclusion or has it simply announced

[01:46:02] conclusion or has it simply announced it? The chapter is startlingly brief

[01:46:06] it? The chapter is startlingly brief given the enormous journey that precedes

[01:46:08] given the enormous journey that precedes it, and most of what it says concerns

[01:46:11] it, and most of what it says concerns the relationship between the

[01:46:13] the relationship between the phenomenology and the logic, not a new

[01:46:17] phenomenology and the logic, not a new philosophical content.

[01:46:20] philosophical content. The most common misreading takes

[01:46:23] The most common misreading takes absolute knowing to be a cognitive state

[01:46:26] absolute knowing to be a cognitive state in which a subject has finally succeeded

[01:46:29] in which a subject has finally succeeded in knowing reality as it is in itself,

[01:46:32] in knowing reality as it is in itself, eliminating all the distortions of

[01:46:35] eliminating all the distortions of finite partial perspectives.

[01:46:38] finite partial perspectives. On this reading, the phenomenology

[01:46:41] On this reading, the phenomenology arrives at a god's eye view, a complete

[01:46:44] arrives at a god's eye view, a complete and unobstructed knowledge of the whole.

[01:46:47] and unobstructed knowledge of the whole. This is not what Hegel means and the

[01:46:50] This is not what Hegel means and the textual evidence against it is decisive.

[01:46:54] textual evidence against it is decisive. Absolute knowing is described as the

[01:46:56] Absolute knowing is described as the shape of consciousness in which the

[01:46:58] shape of consciousness in which the opposition between consciousness and its

[01:47:01] opposition between consciousness and its object has been overcome. Not in the

[01:47:04] object has been overcome. Not in the sense that the object has been fully

[01:47:06] sense that the object has been fully inspected, but in the sense that

[01:47:08] inspected, but in the sense that consciousness has recognized that the

[01:47:11] consciousness has recognized that the object was never truly separate from the

[01:47:13] object was never truly separate from the categories through which it was known.

[01:47:18] categories through which it was known. Brandham's reconstruction of absolute

[01:47:20] Brandham's reconstruction of absolute knowing in a spirit of trust published

[01:47:23] knowing in a spirit of trust published in 2019 offers the most technically

[01:47:27] in 2019 offers the most technically detailed recent account. For Brandom,

[01:47:30] detailed recent account. For Brandom, absolute knowing is the recognitional

[01:47:33] absolute knowing is the recognitional achievement in which a community of

[01:47:35] achievement in which a community of rational agents has learned to treat its

[01:47:38] rational agents has learned to treat its own practices of attributing and

[01:47:40] own practices of attributing and acknowledging commitments as themselves

[01:47:43] acknowledging commitments as themselves the subject matter of philosophical

[01:47:45] the subject matter of philosophical inquiry.

[01:47:47] inquiry. The phenomenology is a retrospective

[01:47:50] The phenomenology is a retrospective rational reconstruction of how the

[01:47:52] rational reconstruction of how the current normative framework, the

[01:47:54] current normative framework, the framework within which we now operate,

[01:47:57] framework within which we now operate, came to be by showing how its

[01:47:59] came to be by showing how its predecessors failed and what they

[01:48:01] predecessors failed and what they contributed.

[01:48:03] contributed. Absolute knowing is not a view from

[01:48:05] Absolute knowing is not a view from nowhere, but a reflective self

[01:48:08] nowhere, but a reflective self understanding of the tradition that is

[01:48:11] understanding of the tradition that is one's own, achieved through the full

[01:48:14] one's own, achieved through the full recollection of that tradition's

[01:48:16] recollection of that tradition's development.

[01:48:18] development. The deflationary reading at its

[01:48:20] The deflationary reading at its strongest says something like this.

[01:48:23] strongest says something like this. Absolute knowing is the recognition that

[01:48:26] Absolute knowing is the recognition that there is no foundation outside of the

[01:48:29] there is no foundation outside of the practices of rational inquiry that could

[01:48:31] practices of rational inquiry that could justify those practices. Combined with

[01:48:34] justify those practices. Combined with the recognition that this absence of

[01:48:37] the recognition that this absence of external foundation is not a deficiency

[01:48:40] external foundation is not a deficiency but a mark of the maturity of rational

[01:48:42] but a mark of the maturity of rational self-leation.

[01:48:45] self-leation. Thought has no ground beneath it. Its

[01:48:48] Thought has no ground beneath it. Its ground is itself.

[01:48:50] ground is itself. This is not a regress but a circle. And

[01:48:54] This is not a regress but a circle. And Hegel argues that recognizing the circle

[01:48:56] Hegel argues that recognizing the circle as a circle is the philosophical

[01:48:59] as a circle is the philosophical achievement of absolute knowing.

[01:49:03] achievement of absolute knowing. The objection that even sympathetic

[01:49:05] The objection that even sympathetic readers find hard to dismiss is this. If

[01:49:09] readers find hard to dismiss is this. If absolute knowing is purely

[01:49:11] absolute knowing is purely retrospective, a recollective

[01:49:13] retrospective, a recollective rationalization of past failures that

[01:49:16] rationalization of past failures that does not claim any predictive or

[01:49:18] does not claim any predictive or prescriptive force, then it arrives too

[01:49:21] prescriptive force, then it arrives too late and does too little.

[01:49:24] late and does too little. Hegel himself says in a famous passage

[01:49:27] Hegel himself says in a famous passage that the owl of Manurva spreads its

[01:49:30] that the owl of Manurva spreads its wings only at dusk, that philosophy can

[01:49:33] wings only at dusk, that philosophy can only comprehend its world when that

[01:49:35] only comprehend its world when that world is already complete.

[01:49:38] world is already complete. This is an admission that philosophy

[01:49:41] This is an admission that philosophy offers understanding, not guidance.

[01:49:45] offers understanding, not guidance. If absolute knowing merely recounts what

[01:49:47] If absolute knowing merely recounts what has already happened without being able

[01:49:50] has already happened without being able to prescribe what should happen next,

[01:49:52] to prescribe what should happen next, then Hegel's system is a monument to the

[01:49:55] then Hegel's system is a monument to the past, architecturally impressive, but

[01:49:58] past, architecturally impressive, but not action-guiding.

[01:50:00] not action-guiding. K and Ruda's 2018 book, The Dash, argues

[01:50:05] K and Ruda's 2018 book, The Dash, argues that this retrospective character is not

[01:50:07] that this retrospective character is not a limitation, but a structural feature

[01:50:10] a limitation, but a structural feature of speculative thought, and that the

[01:50:13] of speculative thought, and that the punctuation Hegel uses between the

[01:50:15] punctuation Hegel uses between the phenomenologies last word and the

[01:50:18] phenomenologies last word and the logic's first word encodes precisely

[01:50:21] logic's first word encodes precisely this open, non-terminating character of

[01:50:24] this open, non-terminating character of absolute knowing.

[01:50:26] absolute knowing. Whether this rehabilitates or merely

[01:50:29] Whether this rehabilitates or merely aestheticizes the limitation is a

[01:50:32] aestheticizes the limitation is a question the book raises without

[01:50:33] question the book raises without resolving.

[01:50:37] Part 19. The circularity problem

[01:50:41] Part 19. The circularity problem vicious, virtuous or unavoidable.

[01:50:45] vicious, virtuous or unavoidable. The circularity problem in Hegel's

[01:50:47] The circularity problem in Hegel's system is not a single problem but a

[01:50:50] system is not a single problem but a family of related structural concerns

[01:50:53] family of related structural concerns and they need to be kept distinct

[01:50:55] and they need to be kept distinct because they have different weights.

[01:50:58] because they have different weights. Treating them as one inflates a genuine

[01:51:01] Treating them as one inflates a genuine challenge into an apparently fatal

[01:51:04] challenge into an apparently fatal objection.

[01:51:05] objection. Treating them as nothing deflates a real

[01:51:08] Treating them as nothing deflates a real limitation into a literary device.

[01:51:14] limitation into a literary device. The first circularity is methodological.

[01:51:18] The first circularity is methodological. The phenomenology of spirit is supposed

[01:51:20] The phenomenology of spirit is supposed to clear the ground for the logic by

[01:51:23] to clear the ground for the logic by demonstrating that all presuppositions

[01:51:25] demonstrating that all presuppositions have been examined and that pure

[01:51:27] have been examined and that pure thinking without presuppositions is now

[01:51:31] thinking without presuppositions is now possible.

[01:51:33] possible. But the phenomenology itself employs

[01:51:36] But the phenomenology itself employs philosophical categories, including

[01:51:38] philosophical categories, including those of consciousness, object,

[01:51:40] those of consciousness, object, negation, and experience that have not

[01:51:43] negation, and experience that have not yet been derived.

[01:51:45] yet been derived. The starting point of the

[01:51:47] The starting point of the presuppositionless inquiry already

[01:51:49] presuppositionless inquiry already presupposes the categories it is

[01:51:52] presupposes the categories it is supposed to derive.

[01:51:54] supposed to derive. This is Henrik's version of the problem,

[01:51:57] This is Henrik's version of the problem, and it has not been definitively

[01:51:59] and it has not been definitively answered. Holgate's response is that the

[01:52:03] answered. Holgate's response is that the presuppositions operative in the

[01:52:05] presuppositions operative in the phenomenology are derived and vindicated

[01:52:08] phenomenology are derived and vindicated by the logic that follows it and that

[01:52:10] by the logic that follows it and that the relationship is therefore circular

[01:52:13] the relationship is therefore circular in a virtuous rather than a vicious

[01:52:16] in a virtuous rather than a vicious sense.

[01:52:19] sense. The second circularity concerns the

[01:52:21] The second circularity concerns the logic itself. Hegel says at the end of

[01:52:24] logic itself. Hegel says at the end of the science of logic that the absolute

[01:52:27] the science of logic that the absolute idea, the final result of the logic

[01:52:30] idea, the final result of the logic returns to its beginning to pure being.

[01:52:34] returns to its beginning to pure being. The logic is literally circular. Its

[01:52:36] The logic is literally circular. Its ending is its beginning made

[01:52:39] ending is its beginning made comprehensible by the whole. On

[01:52:42] comprehensible by the whole. On Holgate's reading, this circularity is

[01:52:45] Holgate's reading, this circularity is virtuous because it means that the logic

[01:52:47] virtuous because it means that the logic has justified its own starting point

[01:52:50] has justified its own starting point retrospectively.

[01:52:52] retrospectively. You needed to go through the hole to see

[01:52:55] You needed to go through the hole to see why being mere being was the only

[01:52:58] why being mere being was the only possible beginning.

[01:53:00] possible beginning. Critics including Michael Rosen argue

[01:53:03] Critics including Michael Rosen argue that this retroactive self-justification

[01:53:06] that this retroactive self-justification is the kind of philosophical self-

[01:53:09] is the kind of philosophical self- congratulation that looks rigorous but

[01:53:12] congratulation that looks rigorous but guarantees nothing.

[01:53:15] guarantees nothing. The third circularity is the most

[01:53:17] The third circularity is the most damaging and the least discussed in

[01:53:20] damaging and the least discussed in introductory treatments.

[01:53:22] introductory treatments. Hegel's system is supposed to proceed

[01:53:25] Hegel's system is supposed to proceed from iminant critique, examining each

[01:53:28] from iminant critique, examining each position against its own standards

[01:53:30] position against its own standards rather than importing external criteria.

[01:53:34] rather than importing external criteria. But the determination of what counts as

[01:53:37] But the determination of what counts as a position's own standard and what

[01:53:39] a position's own standard and what constitutes a failure against that

[01:53:42] constitutes a failure against that standard requires a philosophical

[01:53:44] standard requires a philosophical framework that is already operative in

[01:53:47] framework that is already operative in the examination.

[01:53:49] the examination. The examiner is never outside the

[01:53:52] The examiner is never outside the examined.

[01:53:54] examined. This is not a defect unique to Hegel.

[01:53:58] This is not a defect unique to Hegel. Every philosophical system faces some

[01:54:01] Every philosophical system faces some version of this problem. But it is a

[01:54:04] version of this problem. But it is a defect that Hegel's system is

[01:54:06] defect that Hegel's system is particularly exposed to because his

[01:54:09] particularly exposed to because his method makes the strongest possible

[01:54:11] method makes the strongest possible claim to self- grounding imminence.

[01:54:16] claim to self- grounding imminence. The recent Hegel literature has largely

[01:54:18] The recent Hegel literature has largely shifted from treating circularity as a

[01:54:21] shifted from treating circularity as a reputation to treating it as a

[01:54:23] reputation to treating it as a structural feature to be understood and

[01:54:26] structural feature to be understood and evaluated.

[01:54:28] evaluated. Brandom's claim in a spirit of trust

[01:54:31] Brandom's claim in a spirit of trust that the phenomenology exemplifies the

[01:54:34] that the phenomenology exemplifies the very kind of recollective rationality it

[01:54:36] very kind of recollective rationality it describes is a frank embrace of

[01:54:39] describes is a frank embrace of self-referential circularity.

[01:54:42] self-referential circularity. The book's reconstruction is itself an

[01:54:45] The book's reconstruction is itself an instance of the rational recollection it

[01:54:48] instance of the rational recollection it analyzes.

[01:54:49] analyzes. Whether this is self- grounding in the

[01:54:51] Whether this is self- grounding in the virtuous sense or simply

[01:54:53] virtuous sense or simply self-reinforcing in a way that excludes

[01:54:56] self-reinforcing in a way that excludes critical purchase from outside the

[01:54:58] critical purchase from outside the system is a question that the most

[01:55:00] system is a question that the most recent critics including Shaun Kelly and

[01:55:04] recent critics including Shaun Kelly and James Crane is in a 2020 symposium in

[01:55:07] James Crane is in a 2020 symposium in the Australasian philosophical review

[01:55:10] the Australasian philosophical review have targeted precisely

[01:55:15] part 20 diet Henrik and the reflection

[01:55:19] part 20 diet Henrik and the reflection theoretic critique.

[01:55:22] theoretic critique. Dieter Henrik's contribution to Hegel

[01:55:24] Dieter Henrik's contribution to Hegel scholarship is unusual in that it is

[01:55:27] scholarship is unusual in that it is primarily a diagnosis of a structural

[01:55:29] primarily a diagnosis of a structural problem rather than a defense of a

[01:55:32] problem rather than a defense of a position, and it has proven more durable

[01:55:35] position, and it has proven more durable than most positive readings because it

[01:55:37] than most positive readings because it forces defenders to address a

[01:55:39] forces defenders to address a specifically located difficulty rather

[01:55:42] specifically located difficulty rather than a vague concern about obscurity.

[01:55:46] than a vague concern about obscurity. The problem Henrik identifies is the

[01:55:49] The problem Henrik identifies is the structure of self-consciousness as Hegel

[01:55:52] structure of self-consciousness as Hegel inherits and attempts to solve it.

[01:55:56] inherits and attempts to solve it. The problem begins in Fika.

[01:56:00] The problem begins in Fika. Fika needed to ground the system of

[01:56:02] Fika needed to ground the system of knowledge in the self's immediate

[01:56:04] knowledge in the self's immediate self-nowledge. The eyes relation to

[01:56:07] self-nowledge. The eyes relation to itself as the absolute first principle.

[01:56:11] itself as the absolute first principle. The self must know itself if knowledge

[01:56:14] The self must know itself if knowledge is to have an unconditioned starting

[01:56:16] is to have an unconditioned starting point. But how can the self know itself?

[01:56:21] point. But how can the self know itself? If the self knows itself by an act of

[01:56:24] If the self knows itself by an act of reflection, then self-nowledge is

[01:56:27] reflection, then self-nowledge is mediated produced by an act of

[01:56:29] mediated produced by an act of reflection that is distinct from the

[01:56:32] reflection that is distinct from the self being reflected.

[01:56:34] self being reflected. The self that reflects is not the same

[01:56:37] The self that reflects is not the same as the self being reflected on. Which

[01:56:39] as the self being reflected on. Which means the self-coincidence

[01:56:42] means the self-coincidence that was supposed to be immediate and

[01:56:43] that was supposed to be immediate and absolute is in fact mediated and not

[01:56:47] absolute is in fact mediated and not absolute.

[01:56:50] Henrik showed in a series of essays

[01:56:53] Henrik showed in a series of essays beginning with his 1966 paper on

[01:56:56] beginning with his 1966 paper on Fisher's original insight that any

[01:56:59] Fisher's original insight that any attempt to ground self-consciousness in

[01:57:02] attempt to ground self-consciousness in an act of self-reflection faces this

[01:57:04] an act of self-reflection faces this problem.

[01:57:06] problem. Reflection produces the appearance of

[01:57:08] Reflection produces the appearance of self-coincidence but actually produces a

[01:57:11] self-coincidence but actually produces a duality. The reflecting eye and the

[01:57:15] duality. The reflecting eye and the reflected upon eye.

[01:57:18] reflected upon eye. You need a prior non-reflective

[01:57:20] You need a prior non-reflective self-acquaintance to close the gap. But

[01:57:22] self-acquaintance to close the gap. But this prior self-acquaintance is

[01:57:25] this prior self-acquaintance is precisely what the theory was supposed

[01:57:27] precisely what the theory was supposed to explain.

[01:57:28] to explain. Fisher's various attempts to solve this

[01:57:31] Fisher's various attempts to solve this problem all either reintroduce the

[01:57:33] problem all either reintroduce the duality at a higher level or posit a

[01:57:36] duality at a higher level or posit a primitive nonreflective

[01:57:38] primitive nonreflective self-acquaintance that is left

[01:57:40] self-acquaintance that is left unexplained.

[01:57:44] Hegel's response worked out in the

[01:57:46] Hegel's response worked out in the phenomenology and the doctrine of

[01:57:48] phenomenology and the doctrine of essence is to abandon the model of a

[01:57:51] essence is to abandon the model of a pre-social pre-linguistic immediate

[01:57:54] pre-social pre-linguistic immediate self-coincidence and locate

[01:57:56] self-coincidence and locate self-consciousness in the structure of

[01:57:58] self-consciousness in the structure of recognition.

[01:58:00] recognition. Self-consciousness is not something a

[01:58:03] Self-consciousness is not something a subject achieves by reflecting on itself

[01:58:06] subject achieves by reflecting on itself in isolation.

[01:58:08] in isolation. It is constituted through the encounter

[01:58:11] It is constituted through the encounter with another self-consciousness that

[01:58:13] with another self-consciousness that recognizes it.

[01:58:15] recognizes it. This move to interubjectivity

[01:58:18] This move to interubjectivity is Hegel's most celebrated response to

[01:58:21] is Hegel's most celebrated response to the fistian problem. Henrik argues,

[01:58:24] the fistian problem. Henrik argues, however, that the recognition structure

[01:58:27] however, that the recognition structure does not fully escape the difficulty.

[01:58:31] does not fully escape the difficulty. For recognition to constitute

[01:58:34] For recognition to constitute self-consciousness rather than merely

[01:58:36] self-consciousness rather than merely mediate it, the two self-consciousnesses

[01:58:39] mediate it, the two self-consciousnesses that enter the encounter must already be

[01:58:42] that enter the encounter must already be able to take a position with respect to

[01:58:44] able to take a position with respect to each other, which requires that they

[01:58:47] each other, which requires that they already have a form of self- relation

[01:58:49] already have a form of self- relation prior to the recognition encounter.

[01:58:53] prior to the recognition encounter. If they do not, there is nothing there

[01:58:55] If they do not, there is nothing there to be recognized.

[01:58:58] to be recognized. If they do, then the recognition

[01:59:00] If they do, then the recognition structure did not originate

[01:59:02] structure did not originate self-consciousness, but only shaped it.

[01:59:05] self-consciousness, but only shaped it. The prior moment of non-reflective

[01:59:07] The prior moment of non-reflective self-acquaintance, which Fisher needed,

[01:59:10] self-acquaintance, which Fisher needed, seems to be presupposed by Hegel's

[01:59:13] seems to be presupposed by Hegel's recognition story as well, merely

[01:59:16] recognition story as well, merely displaced earlier.

[01:59:20] displaced earlier. Henrik's later work, especially between

[01:59:22] Henrik's later work, especially between Kant and Hegel, does not conclude that

[01:59:25] Kant and Hegel, does not conclude that Hegel fails entirely, but that Hegel's

[01:59:28] Hegel fails entirely, but that Hegel's theory of gist as the social medium of

[01:59:31] theory of gist as the social medium of self-consciousness presupposes a model

[01:59:34] self-consciousness presupposes a model of individual selfhood that it cannot

[01:59:36] of individual selfhood that it cannot fully derive from its own resources.

[01:59:40] fully derive from its own resources. The precise form of individual

[01:59:42] The precise form of individual self-acquaintance that makes

[01:59:43] self-acquaintance that makes participation in social practices of

[01:59:46] participation in social practices of recognition possible is a structure that

[01:59:49] recognition possible is a structure that Hegel's system treats as given rather

[01:59:52] Hegel's system treats as given rather than derived.

[01:59:54] than derived. whether a fully reconstructed Hegelian

[01:59:57] whether a fully reconstructed Hegelian account can respond to this by showing

[01:59:59] account can respond to this by showing that individual self-acquaintance is

[02:00:02] that individual self-acquaintance is itself always already socially

[02:00:04] itself always already socially constituted is the question that

[02:00:06] constituted is the question that connects Henrik's critique to the Pippen

[02:00:09] connects Henrik's critique to the Pippen Pinkard normative reading and to

[02:00:12] Pinkard normative reading and to Brandham's inferentialist account.

[02:00:15] Brandham's inferentialist account. The connection is not coincidental.

[02:00:18] The connection is not coincidental. Henrik's problem is exactly what the

[02:00:20] Henrik's problem is exactly what the normative reading must solve if it is to

[02:00:22] normative reading must solve if it is to be adequate to the full reach of Hegel's

[02:00:25] be adequate to the full reach of Hegel's claims.

[02:00:29] Part 21. Pippen and Brandom's Hegel, the

[02:00:33] Part 21. Pippen and Brandom's Hegel, the normative turn and what it saves.

[02:00:36] normative turn and what it saves. The normative turn in Hegel scholarship

[02:00:39] The normative turn in Hegel scholarship inaugurated by Pippen in 1989 and

[02:00:42] inaugurated by Pippen in 1989 and extended by Brandom in 2019 is the most

[02:00:45] extended by Brandom in 2019 is the most influential development in the field in

[02:00:48] influential development in the field in the past four decades. It is also

[02:00:50] the past four decades. It is also contested in ways that go beyond

[02:00:53] contested in ways that go beyond academic preference because what is at

[02:00:55] academic preference because what is at stake is not just which reading of Hegel

[02:00:58] stake is not just which reading of Hegel is correct, but whether Hegel's most

[02:01:00] is correct, but whether Hegel's most ambitious claims can survive being

[02:01:03] ambitious claims can survive being rescued from their metaphysical shell.

[02:01:08] rescued from their metaphysical shell. Pippin's central move in Hegel's

[02:01:10] Pippin's central move in Hegel's idealism was to show that Hegel's

[02:01:13] idealism was to show that Hegel's project is best understood as a

[02:01:15] project is best understood as a radicalization of Kant's transcendental

[02:01:18] radicalization of Kant's transcendental inquiry into the conditions of the

[02:01:21] inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of self-conscious

[02:01:23] possibility of self-conscious experience.

[02:01:24] experience. For Kant, the categories of the

[02:01:26] For Kant, the categories of the understanding are the conditions under

[02:01:28] understanding are the conditions under which a subject can have experience at

[02:01:31] which a subject can have experience at all.

[02:01:32] all. For Hegel, Pippin argues, "The

[02:01:35] For Hegel, Pippin argues, "The conditions of self-conscious rational

[02:01:37] conditions of self-conscious rational agency are not fixed in a static table

[02:01:40] agency are not fixed in a static table of categories, but are historically and

[02:01:43] of categories, but are historically and socially constituted.

[02:01:46] socially constituted. They are the norms and practices through

[02:01:48] They are the norms and practices through which a community of rational agents

[02:01:50] which a community of rational agents holds itself accountable and revises its

[02:01:54] holds itself accountable and revises its standards over time.

[02:01:56] standards over time. Gist is the ongoing historical process

[02:01:59] Gist is the ongoing historical process of this normative self-constitution

[02:02:02] of this normative self-constitution and revision.

[02:02:05] and revision. Brandom's contribution in a spirit of

[02:02:08] Brandom's contribution in a spirit of trust, which took over 20 years to

[02:02:10] trust, which took over 20 years to complete and runs to over 800 pages,

[02:02:13] complete and runs to over 800 pages, extends the normative reading into a

[02:02:16] extends the normative reading into a comprehensive account of the

[02:02:18] comprehensive account of the phenomenology as a theory of rational

[02:02:20] phenomenology as a theory of rational agency as inferential practice. For

[02:02:24] agency as inferential practice. For Brandham, the key concept is not

[02:02:26] Brandham, the key concept is not recognition in the political sense, but

[02:02:29] recognition in the political sense, but the deontic social practice of

[02:02:31] the deontic social practice of attributing and acknowledging

[02:02:33] attributing and acknowledging inferential commitments, of holding one

[02:02:36] inferential commitments, of holding one another responsible for the logical

[02:02:38] another responsible for the logical consequences of what one asserts.

[02:02:42] consequences of what one asserts. The phenomenology traces the development

[02:02:44] The phenomenology traces the development of increasingly adequate conceptions of

[02:02:47] of increasingly adequate conceptions of what it means for a community of

[02:02:49] what it means for a community of rational agents to hold each other to

[02:02:52] rational agents to hold each other to norms of this kind.

[02:02:55] norms of this kind. Absolute knowing is the achievement of a

[02:02:58] Absolute knowing is the achievement of a community that grasps the historical

[02:03:01] community that grasps the historical conditions of its own normative

[02:03:03] conditions of its own normative practices and can take responsibility

[02:03:05] practices and can take responsibility for them.

[02:03:08] for them. What this reading saves is enormous. It

[02:03:11] What this reading saves is enormous. It allows Hegel to be taken seriously as a

[02:03:14] allows Hegel to be taken seriously as a systematic philosopher without requiring

[02:03:17] systematic philosopher without requiring commitment to a world mind, a cosmic

[02:03:20] commitment to a world mind, a cosmic teology or a theory that the categories

[02:03:23] teology or a theory that the categories of logic are the furniture of the

[02:03:25] of logic are the furniture of the universe in any robust preconcient

[02:03:28] universe in any robust preconcient sense.

[02:03:29] sense. The result is a Hegel who is directly

[02:03:32] The result is a Hegel who is directly relevant to debates in action theory,

[02:03:35] relevant to debates in action theory, philosophy of language, metaeththics,

[02:03:37] philosophy of language, metaeththics, and the social sciences without

[02:03:39] and the social sciences without requiring any prior metaphysical

[02:03:42] requiring any prior metaphysical loyalty.

[02:03:44] loyalty. The connection to Wilfried Cellar's

[02:03:45] The connection to Wilfried Cellar's critique of the myth of the given, which

[02:03:48] critique of the myth of the given, which Pippen made central, has been

[02:03:50] Pippen made central, has been particularly productive. It allows a

[02:03:54] particularly productive. It allows a direct line from Hegel to John McDow's

[02:03:56] direct line from Hegel to John McDow's account of experience as permeated by

[02:04:00] account of experience as permeated by conceptual norms.

[02:04:03] conceptual norms. What the reading costs is also

[02:04:06] What the reading costs is also substantial.

[02:04:07] substantial. The most persistent objection is that

[02:04:10] The most persistent objection is that the normative reading simply cannot

[02:04:12] the normative reading simply cannot account for large portions of Hegel's

[02:04:14] account for large portions of Hegel's text, above all the science of logic,

[02:04:17] text, above all the science of logic, without distortion or evasion.

[02:04:21] without distortion or evasion. Kleiners has pressed this objection

[02:04:23] Kleiners has pressed this objection across multiple publications. Hegel's

[02:04:26] across multiple publications. Hegel's logic is not a theory of the conditions

[02:04:29] logic is not a theory of the conditions of rational discourse, but a metaphysics

[02:04:32] of rational discourse, but a metaphysics of the actual structure of reality and

[02:04:34] of the actual structure of reality and the normative readings. Hegel has

[02:04:37] the normative readings. Hegel has evacuated this commitment.

[02:04:39] evacuated this commitment. Pippen's 2019 book is his most sustained

[02:04:42] Pippen's 2019 book is his most sustained response, conceding significantly more

[02:04:45] response, conceding significantly more metaphysical content than his 1989

[02:04:48] metaphysical content than his 1989 position, but still interpreting it

[02:04:50] position, but still interpreting it through the lens of discursive

[02:04:52] through the lens of discursive self-articulation.

[02:04:55] self-articulation. The debate has become increasingly

[02:04:57] The debate has become increasingly precise. The question is no longer

[02:05:00] precise. The question is no longer whether Hegel has a metaphysics, but

[02:05:02] whether Hegel has a metaphysics, but what kind, how thick its commitments

[02:05:05] what kind, how thick its commitments are, and whether the forms of pure

[02:05:08] are, and whether the forms of pure thinking and the forms of being are

[02:05:11] thinking and the forms of being are identical in a way that makes them

[02:05:13] identical in a way that makes them genuinely mind independent or only

[02:05:16] genuinely mind independent or only systematically correlated with the

[02:05:18] systematically correlated with the structure of rational

[02:05:19] structure of rational self-understanding.

[02:05:21] self-understanding. This question does not yet have a

[02:05:24] This question does not yet have a consensus answer.

[02:05:29] Part 22.

[02:05:31] Part 22. The Marx problem. What survives when you

[02:05:34] The Marx problem. What survives when you invert the dialectic?

[02:05:37] invert the dialectic? Marx's famous statement that he found

[02:05:40] Marx's famous statement that he found the dialectic in Hegel standing on its

[02:05:42] the dialectic in Hegel standing on its head and set it right side up is among

[02:05:45] head and set it right side up is among the most quoted and least examined

[02:05:47] the most quoted and least examined sentences in the history of philosophy.

[02:05:50] sentences in the history of philosophy. The metaphor of inversion in German

[02:05:55] The metaphor of inversion in German turning inside out is not the same as

[02:05:58] turning inside out is not the same as reversal or negation. And the precise

[02:06:01] reversal or negation. And the precise meaning of what Marx takes from Hegel

[02:06:03] meaning of what Marx takes from Hegel and what he claims to have transformed

[02:06:06] and what he claims to have transformed is considerably more complex than either

[02:06:09] is considerably more complex than either the standard Marxist or the standard

[02:06:12] the standard Marxist or the standard anti-haggelian accounts allow.

[02:06:16] anti-haggelian accounts allow. The standard reading goes like this.

[02:06:19] The standard reading goes like this. Hegel made thought the idea primary and

[02:06:24] Hegel made thought the idea primary and treated material reality as the

[02:06:26] treated material reality as the externalization of thought. Markx

[02:06:29] externalization of thought. Markx reversed this making material productive

[02:06:32] reversed this making material productive activity primary and treating thought,

[02:06:34] activity primary and treating thought, consciousness and ideology as

[02:06:37] consciousness and ideology as epiphenomena of material conditions.

[02:06:40] epiphenomena of material conditions. This is the base superstructure model.

[02:06:44] This is the base superstructure model. The economic base determines the

[02:06:46] The economic base determines the ideological superstructure including

[02:06:49] ideological superstructure including religion, philosophy, art and law. On

[02:06:53] religion, philosophy, art and law. On this reading, Markx simply took the

[02:06:55] this reading, Markx simply took the Hegelian dialectic's logical structure

[02:06:58] Hegelian dialectic's logical structure including contradiction, negation, and

[02:07:01] including contradiction, negation, and resolution, and applied it to the

[02:07:03] resolution, and applied it to the history of class struggle and modes of

[02:07:05] history of class struggle and modes of production rather than to the

[02:07:07] production rather than to the self-movement of the idea.

[02:07:11] self-movement of the idea. This reading is inadequate to the actual

[02:07:14] This reading is inadequate to the actual relationship between Hegel's and Marxist

[02:07:17] relationship between Hegel's and Marxist dialectics. And several specific points

[02:07:19] dialectics. And several specific points show why.

[02:07:21] show why. First, the young Marx's 1844 manuscripts

[02:07:25] First, the young Marx's 1844 manuscripts do not simply invert Hegel, but engage

[02:07:28] do not simply invert Hegel, but engage with him at the level of the theory of

[02:07:30] with him at the level of the theory of alienation, arguing that Hegel correctly

[02:07:33] alienation, arguing that Hegel correctly identified alienation as the fundamental

[02:07:36] identified alienation as the fundamental structure of modern life, but located it

[02:07:39] structure of modern life, but located it in thought rather than in material

[02:07:41] in thought rather than in material labor.

[02:07:43] labor. For Marx, alienated labor, the condition

[02:07:47] For Marx, alienated labor, the condition in which the worker produces objects

[02:07:49] in which the worker produces objects that stand against her as alien powers,

[02:07:52] that stand against her as alien powers, is the concrete reality of which Hegel's

[02:07:55] is the concrete reality of which Hegel's alienated consciousness is the abstract

[02:07:58] alienated consciousness is the abstract philosophical reflection.

[02:08:00] philosophical reflection. The inversion is not from thought to

[02:08:02] The inversion is not from thought to matter, but from the philosophical form

[02:08:05] matter, but from the philosophical form to the practical content it expresses.

[02:08:10] Second, Marx's capital uses the category

[02:08:13] Second, Marx's capital uses the category of the commodity form in a way that is

[02:08:16] of the commodity form in a way that is deeply indebted to Hegel's doctrine of

[02:08:19] deeply indebted to Hegel's doctrine of essence. The commodity form of wealth,

[02:08:22] essence. The commodity form of wealth, Markx argues in the first chapter of

[02:08:25] Markx argues in the first chapter of capital involves a specific inversion in

[02:08:28] capital involves a specific inversion in which social relations between people

[02:08:31] which social relations between people appear as relations between things.

[02:08:34] appear as relations between things. Wages, prices, and profits appear as

[02:08:37] Wages, prices, and profits appear as natural properties of objects. rather

[02:08:39] natural properties of objects. rather than as historically specific social

[02:08:42] than as historically specific social relations.

[02:08:45] relations. This is commodity fetishism and it is a

[02:08:48] This is commodity fetishism and it is a Hegelian argument through and through.

[02:08:51] Hegelian argument through and through. Appearance conceals essence. The

[02:08:54] Appearance conceals essence. The immediate form of the commodity conceals

[02:08:56] immediate form of the commodity conceals the social relation of labor

[02:08:58] the social relation of labor exploitation that constitutes its value.

[02:09:02] exploitation that constitutes its value. Frederick Jameson and others in the

[02:09:04] Frederick Jameson and others in the tradition of what he calls the new

[02:09:06] tradition of what he calls the new dialectics have argued that Hegel's

[02:09:09] dialectics have argued that Hegel's logic read through Markx is revealed as

[02:09:12] logic read through Markx is revealed as the anticipatory form of the logic of

[02:09:15] the anticipatory form of the logic of capital itself. So that the idealist

[02:09:18] capital itself. So that the idealist appearance of the logic was always

[02:09:20] appearance of the logic was always already a reflection of the capitalist

[02:09:23] already a reflection of the capitalist social form that produced it.

[02:09:27] social form that produced it. What survives the inversion on the

[02:09:29] What survives the inversion on the strongest reading is the dialectical

[02:09:32] strongest reading is the dialectical method's core claim that appearances are

[02:09:35] method's core claim that appearances are generated by and conceal underlying

[02:09:38] generated by and conceal underlying structural contradictions. That those

[02:09:41] structural contradictions. That those contradictions drive development and

[02:09:43] contradictions drive development and that critique must proceed from within

[02:09:46] that critique must proceed from within the iman logic of the structure being

[02:09:49] the iman logic of the structure being examined rather than from external moral

[02:09:52] examined rather than from external moral standards.

[02:09:54] standards. What gets lost or needs to be replaced

[02:09:57] What gets lost or needs to be replaced is Hegel's confidence that the

[02:09:59] is Hegel's confidence that the contradictions resolve themselves into

[02:10:01] contradictions resolve themselves into an increasingly rational actualization

[02:10:04] an increasingly rational actualization of freedom.

[02:10:06] of freedom. For Markx, the contradictions of capital

[02:10:09] For Markx, the contradictions of capital do not resolve themselves. They require

[02:10:12] do not resolve themselves. They require political intervention, the organized

[02:10:15] political intervention, the organized action of the class whose labor produces

[02:10:17] action of the class whose labor produces the structure that exploits it. the

[02:10:20] the structure that exploits it. the dialectic becomes critical and practical

[02:10:23] dialectic becomes critical and practical rather than speculative and

[02:10:25] rather than speculative and contemplative.

[02:10:27] contemplative. Whether this transformation is genuinely

[02:10:30] Whether this transformation is genuinely internal to the Hegelian dialectic, a

[02:10:33] internal to the Hegelian dialectic, a radicalization of its imminent critical

[02:10:35] radicalization of its imminent critical logic, or an abandonment of dialectic's

[02:10:38] logic, or an abandonment of dialectic's core claim that thought can comprehend

[02:10:41] core claim that thought can comprehend its own movement without external

[02:10:43] its own movement without external intervention remains a disputed question

[02:10:46] intervention remains a disputed question at the intersection of Hegel scholarship

[02:10:49] at the intersection of Hegel scholarship and Marxist theory.

[02:10:53] Part 23. Adorno's Negative Dialectics.

[02:10:58] Part 23. Adorno's Negative Dialectics. The most serious internal challenge.

[02:11:01] The most serious internal challenge. Adorno's Negative Dialectics published

[02:11:04] Adorno's Negative Dialectics published in 1966 is the most sustained and

[02:11:07] in 1966 is the most sustained and philosophically rigorous critique of

[02:11:09] philosophically rigorous critique of Hegel's dialectic to come from within

[02:11:11] Hegel's dialectic to come from within the tradition that Hegel himself

[02:11:14] the tradition that Hegel himself generated. It is not a reputation from

[02:11:17] generated. It is not a reputation from outside. It is not an application of

[02:11:20] outside. It is not an application of analytic techniques to expose confusion

[02:11:23] analytic techniques to expose confusion and it is not a sociological debunking.

[02:11:27] and it is not a sociological debunking. It is an immen critique using Hegel's

[02:11:30] It is an immen critique using Hegel's own tools against Hegel's conclusions

[02:11:34] own tools against Hegel's conclusions and it is constructed with sufficient

[02:11:36] and it is constructed with sufficient philosophical precision that its

[02:11:38] philosophical precision that its challenge cannot be dismissed by

[02:11:40] challenge cannot be dismissed by defenders of the tradition.

[02:11:44] defenders of the tradition. Adorno's starting point is the concept

[02:11:47] Adorno's starting point is the concept of identity thinking identitates Denan.

[02:11:52] of identity thinking identitates Denan. Every concept Adorno argues is a tool of

[02:11:56] Every concept Adorno argues is a tool of identity. It subsumes particulars under

[02:12:00] identity. It subsumes particulars under a universal declaring them to be

[02:12:02] a universal declaring them to be instances of a type and suppressing

[02:12:05] instances of a type and suppressing whatever about them does not fit the

[02:12:07] whatever about them does not fit the type.

[02:12:08] type. The concept table identifies a

[02:12:11] The concept table identifies a particular wooden object with every

[02:12:13] particular wooden object with every other table, treating their differences

[02:12:16] other table, treating their differences as accidental to their essential

[02:12:19] as accidental to their essential sameness.

[02:12:20] sameness. This is not merely a feature of ordinary

[02:12:23] This is not merely a feature of ordinary practical thought. It structures

[02:12:25] practical thought. It structures science, law, and philosophy.

[02:12:28] science, law, and philosophy. The force of identity thinking is not

[02:12:31] The force of identity thinking is not neutral. It serves the social function

[02:12:34] neutral. It serves the social function of exchange where things must be made

[02:12:37] of exchange where things must be made equivalent in value in order to

[02:12:39] equivalent in value in order to circulate as commodities.

[02:12:42] circulate as commodities. Identity thinking in philosophy and

[02:12:44] Identity thinking in philosophy and exchange value in economics are for

[02:12:47] exchange value in economics are for Adorno expressions of the same social

[02:12:50] Adorno expressions of the same social logic.

[02:12:52] logic. Hegel Adorno argues recognized the

[02:12:56] Hegel Adorno argues recognized the problem of identity thinking and tried

[02:12:58] problem of identity thinking and tried to overcome it through the dialectic.

[02:13:02] to overcome it through the dialectic. The dialectic keeps concepts in motion,

[02:13:05] The dialectic keeps concepts in motion, shows how they pass into their

[02:13:07] shows how they pass into their opposites, and claims to produce a

[02:13:09] opposites, and claims to produce a higher unity that preserves difference

[02:13:12] higher unity that preserves difference rather than suppressing it.

[02:13:15] rather than suppressing it. But for Adorno, Hegel's dialectic is

[02:13:18] But for Adorno, Hegel's dialectic is itself the highest form of identity

[02:13:20] itself the highest form of identity thinking rather than its overcoming.

[02:13:24] thinking rather than its overcoming. The negation of a concept in the

[02:13:26] The negation of a concept in the dialectic produces a new concept that

[02:13:29] dialectic produces a new concept that subsumes both predecessor concepts under

[02:13:32] subsumes both predecessor concepts under a higher identity.

[02:13:35] a higher identity. The particular the singular object or

[02:13:37] The particular the singular object or moment that resists conceptual

[02:13:39] moment that resists conceptual subsumption is not honored in its

[02:13:42] subsumption is not honored in its singularity. It is used as the fuel for

[02:13:45] singularity. It is used as the fuel for the production of more comprehensive

[02:13:47] the production of more comprehensive universals

[02:13:49] universals or whatever it preserves preserves it as

[02:13:53] or whatever it preserves preserves it as a moment in a unity that transcends it,

[02:13:56] a moment in a unity that transcends it, not as a resistance to unity that

[02:13:59] not as a resistance to unity that persists.

[02:14:02] persists. Adorno's alternative is what he calls

[02:14:05] Adorno's alternative is what he calls the consistent consciousness of

[02:14:07] the consistent consciousness of nonidentity,

[02:14:09] nonidentity, the philosophical practice of attending

[02:14:11] the philosophical practice of attending to what in an object exceeds the concept

[02:14:14] to what in an object exceeds the concept under which it falls, of using the

[02:14:17] under which it falls, of using the inadequacy of concepts as a means of

[02:14:20] inadequacy of concepts as a means of approach rather than a defect to be

[02:14:23] approach rather than a defect to be overcome.

[02:14:24] overcome. As Lambert Zuedart has formulated it,

[02:14:28] As Lambert Zuedart has formulated it, the goal of thought is to honor objects

[02:14:31] the goal of thought is to honor objects in their nonidentity,

[02:14:33] in their nonidentity, in their difference from what a

[02:14:35] in their difference from what a restricted rationality declares them to

[02:14:37] restricted rationality declares them to be.

[02:14:39] be. This practice has no positive result in

[02:14:42] This practice has no positive result in the Hegelian sense. It does not produce

[02:14:45] the Hegelian sense. It does not produce a new, more adequate concept that

[02:14:47] a new, more adequate concept that resolves the tension.

[02:14:50] resolves the tension. The tension is maintained.

[02:14:54] The most penetrating question Adorno's

[02:14:57] The most penetrating question Adorno's negative dialectics must answer is the

[02:15:00] negative dialectics must answer is the self-referential one. By what standard

[02:15:03] self-referential one. By what standard does negative dialectics criticize

[02:15:06] does negative dialectics criticize identity thinking? If negative

[02:15:08] identity thinking? If negative dialectics uses concepts which it must

[02:15:12] dialectics uses concepts which it must and if concepts always involve identity

[02:15:14] and if concepts always involve identity thinking then negative dialectics is

[02:15:17] thinking then negative dialectics is implicated in what it criticizes.

[02:15:21] implicated in what it criticizes. Adorno is aware of this and does not

[02:15:23] Adorno is aware of this and does not claim that negative dialectics escapes

[02:15:26] claim that negative dialectics escapes the condition it critiques.

[02:15:29] the condition it critiques. He calls his procedure an attempt to use

[02:15:32] He calls his procedure an attempt to use the strength of the subject to break

[02:15:34] the strength of the subject to break through the deception of constitutive

[02:15:37] through the deception of constitutive subjectivity which is a deliberately

[02:15:40] subjectivity which is a deliberately paradoxical formulation.

[02:15:43] paradoxical formulation. Philosophy must use its tools critically

[02:15:46] Philosophy must use its tools critically against itself.

[02:15:48] against itself. Brian O'Connor and JM Bernstein have

[02:15:51] Brian O'Connor and JM Bernstein have argued that this paradox is not a

[02:15:53] argued that this paradox is not a contradiction but a recognition that

[02:15:56] contradiction but a recognition that critical practice must work from within

[02:15:59] critical practice must work from within its own constraints which is itself a

[02:16:02] its own constraints which is itself a Hegelian insight turned against Hegel.

[02:16:07] Hegelian insight turned against Hegel. Whether Adorno's negative dialectics is

[02:16:11] Whether Adorno's negative dialectics is genuinely dialectical in any rigorous

[02:16:14] genuinely dialectical in any rigorous sense or whether it is a style of

[02:16:16] sense or whether it is a style of philosophical writing that mimics the

[02:16:18] philosophical writing that mimics the form of dialectical argument without its

[02:16:21] form of dialectical argument without its determinate content is the deepest

[02:16:24] determinate content is the deepest objection to the project. Habamus

[02:16:27] objection to the project. Habamus pressed this objection famously, arguing

[02:16:30] pressed this objection famously, arguing that Adorno's critique of reason is

[02:16:32] that Adorno's critique of reason is self- undermining because it cannot

[02:16:34] self- undermining because it cannot articulate the normative standard from

[02:16:37] articulate the normative standard from which it criticizes without relying on a

[02:16:40] which it criticizes without relying on a form of rationality it has put in

[02:16:42] form of rationality it has put in question.

[02:16:44] question. Adorno's defenders including Sailor

[02:16:46] Adorno's defenders including Sailor Benabib and Axel Honith in different

[02:16:49] Benabib and Axel Honith in different ways have argued that negative

[02:16:51] ways have argued that negative dialectics is best understood not as a

[02:16:54] dialectics is best understood not as a theory but as a practice and that

[02:16:57] theory but as a practice and that demanding a positive standard from a

[02:17:00] demanding a positive standard from a practice of resistance to

[02:17:02] practice of resistance to systematization is precisely the demand

[02:17:05] systematization is precisely the demand that negative dialectics is designed to

[02:17:08] that negative dialectics is designed to refuse.

[02:17:10] refuse. This response is either a genuine

[02:17:12] This response is either a genuine philosophical position or a strategic

[02:17:15] philosophical position or a strategic evasion depending on how seriously you

[02:17:18] evasion depending on how seriously you take the self-reference problem and the

[02:17:21] take the self-reference problem and the debate has not been resolved.

[02:17:27] Part 24. The live objections

[02:17:31] Part 24. The live objections where the debate actually stands.

[02:17:35] where the debate actually stands. The current state of Hegel scholarship

[02:17:37] The current state of Hegel scholarship is not one of convergence toward

[02:17:39] is not one of convergence toward consensus.

[02:17:40] consensus. The major interpretive divisions have

[02:17:43] The major interpretive divisions have deepened rather than resolved and new

[02:17:45] deepened rather than resolved and new objections have emerged that cut across

[02:17:48] objections have emerged that cut across the existing fault lines.

[02:17:50] the existing fault lines. What follows is a map of the genuinely

[02:17:53] What follows is a map of the genuinely unsettled terrain with the objections

[02:17:56] unsettled terrain with the objections that even defenders of Hegel find

[02:17:58] that even defenders of Hegel find hardest to answer identified precisely.

[02:18:03] hardest to answer identified precisely. The metaphysical versus normative

[02:18:05] The metaphysical versus normative dispute is the central ongoing debate

[02:18:08] dispute is the central ongoing debate and its terms have evolved

[02:18:10] and its terms have evolved significantly.

[02:18:12] significantly. The crude form of the dispute whether

[02:18:15] The crude form of the dispute whether Hegel is a precantion dogmatic

[02:18:17] Hegel is a precantion dogmatic metaphysician or a sophisticated

[02:18:20] metaphysician or a sophisticated postcant anti-taphysician

[02:18:22] postcant anti-taphysician has been superseded.

[02:18:25] has been superseded. Both Pippen and Holgate now acknowledge

[02:18:28] Both Pippen and Holgate now acknowledge that Hegel has a metaphysics. The

[02:18:31] that Hegel has a metaphysics. The question is what kind? Pippen in 2119

[02:18:35] question is what kind? Pippen in 2119 characterizes it as metaphysics in a new

[02:18:38] characterizes it as metaphysics in a new sense where logic and ontology are

[02:18:41] sense where logic and ontology are identical not in the sense that thought

[02:18:43] identical not in the sense that thought creates being but in the sense that

[02:18:46] creates being but in the sense that intelligibility and being are

[02:18:48] intelligibility and being are inseparable.

[02:18:50] inseparable. Hallgate argues that this still

[02:18:53] Hallgate argues that this still underpays Hegel's commitment to a logic

[02:18:56] underpays Hegel's commitment to a logic that is ontology directly, not merely a

[02:18:59] that is ontology directly, not merely a theory of the conditions of

[02:19:00] theory of the conditions of intelligibility.

[02:19:02] intelligibility. The precise specification of how the

[02:19:05] The precise specification of how the categories of pure thought can be

[02:19:07] categories of pure thought can be simultaneously the structure of being

[02:19:10] simultaneously the structure of being without collapsing into pre-Cantian

[02:19:12] without collapsing into pre-Cantian dogmatism or deflating into canian

[02:19:14] dogmatism or deflating into canian epistemology remains the hardest

[02:19:17] epistemology remains the hardest technical question in current Hegel

[02:19:19] technical question in current Hegel studies.

[02:19:22] studies. The problem of transition necessity is

[02:19:25] The problem of transition necessity is the second major live objection.

[02:19:28] the second major live objection. Even readers sympathetic to the overall

[02:19:31] Even readers sympathetic to the overall system have not been satisfied by the

[02:19:34] system have not been satisfied by the demonstration that each dialectical

[02:19:36] demonstration that each dialectical transition is strictly necessary rather

[02:19:39] transition is strictly necessary rather than merely motivated or plausible.

[02:19:43] than merely motivated or plausible. Rosen's 1982 critique that determinate

[02:19:47] Rosen's 1982 critique that determinate negation does not generate a unique

[02:19:49] negation does not generate a unique successor has never been fully answered.

[02:19:53] successor has never been fully answered. The transitions in the logic, the

[02:19:55] The transitions in the logic, the phenomenology and the philosophy of

[02:19:57] phenomenology and the philosophy of right are widely acknowledged to be

[02:19:59] right are widely acknowledged to be uneven. Some are compelling, some seem

[02:20:03] uneven. Some are compelling, some seem to require supplementary premises that

[02:20:05] to require supplementary premises that are not drawn from the iminent logic of

[02:20:08] are not drawn from the iminent logic of the preceding concept.

[02:20:11] the preceding concept. Paul Reading's work and Graham Priest's

[02:20:14] Paul Reading's work and Graham Priest's logical formalization projects have both

[02:20:17] logical formalization projects have both tried to tighten the account of

[02:20:19] tried to tighten the account of transitions with limited success.

[02:20:22] transitions with limited success. The problem of transition necessity may

[02:20:25] The problem of transition necessity may be the most practically significant

[02:20:27] be the most practically significant objection for anyone who wants to use

[02:20:30] objection for anyone who wants to use the dialectic as a method outside of

[02:20:33] the dialectic as a method outside of Hegel's own texts.

[02:20:36] Hegel's own texts. The euroentrism and racism of Hegel's

[02:20:40] The euroentrism and racism of Hegel's philosophy of history constitute a third

[02:20:43] philosophy of history constitute a third objection that is neither purely

[02:20:45] objection that is neither purely political nor irrelevant to the

[02:20:47] political nor irrelevant to the philosophical core. Hegel's account of

[02:20:51] philosophical core. Hegel's account of which peoples and cultures have

[02:20:53] which peoples and cultures have contributed to the development of

[02:20:55] contributed to the development of freedom consciousness in history

[02:20:57] freedom consciousness in history systematically excludes Africa and

[02:20:59] systematically excludes Africa and pre-Colombian America from world history

[02:21:02] pre-Colombian America from world history on grounds that are not merely ignorant

[02:21:05] on grounds that are not merely ignorant but structurally motivated by the

[02:21:07] but structurally motivated by the progressive teology of the system.

[02:21:11] progressive teology of the system. The teological framework requires stages

[02:21:15] The teological framework requires stages and the stages are populated with actual

[02:21:18] and the stages are populated with actual historical cultures assigned ranks by a

[02:21:21] historical cultures assigned ranks by a philosopher who knew remarkably little

[02:21:24] philosopher who knew remarkably little about most of them.

[02:21:26] about most of them. Recent scholarship by Tesla Tibbeu,

[02:21:29] Recent scholarship by Tesla Tibbeu, Peter Park, and in a different register,

[02:21:32] Peter Park, and in a different register, Robert Bernosone has argued that this is

[02:21:34] Robert Bernosone has argued that this is not an accidental bias that can be

[02:21:37] not an accidental bias that can be removed by updating the historical

[02:21:39] removed by updating the historical information, but a structural

[02:21:41] information, but a structural consequence of the teological framework

[02:21:44] consequence of the teological framework itself.

[02:21:46] itself. If the framework requires that

[02:21:47] If the framework requires that historical cultures be assigned places

[02:21:50] historical cultures be assigned places on a developmental hierarchy, then any

[02:21:53] on a developmental hierarchy, then any philosopher who uses it will produce a

[02:21:55] philosopher who uses it will produce a hierarchy that reflects the prejudices

[02:21:58] hierarchy that reflects the prejudices of her historical location.

[02:22:01] of her historical location. Whether a reconstructed Hegelian

[02:22:03] Whether a reconstructed Hegelian philosophy of history can abandon the

[02:22:05] philosophy of history can abandon the developmental hierarchy while retaining

[02:22:08] developmental hierarchy while retaining the imanent critical method is one of

[02:22:10] the imanent critical method is one of the most contested questions in

[02:22:12] the most contested questions in contemporary Hegel scholarship.

[02:22:17] The question of whether Hegel's system

[02:22:19] The question of whether Hegel's system is genuinely open or covertly closed is

[02:22:23] is genuinely open or covertly closed is the fourth live debate. Hegel insists

[02:22:27] the fourth live debate. Hegel insists that philosophy comprehends its own

[02:22:29] that philosophy comprehends its own historical moment rather than projecting

[02:22:32] historical moment rather than projecting beyond it that the owl of Manurva cannot

[02:22:35] beyond it that the owl of Manurva cannot prescribe the future.

[02:22:38] prescribe the future. But the systems claim to

[02:22:40] But the systems claim to comprehensiveness to being the circle of

[02:22:43] comprehensiveness to being the circle of circles that contains all the

[02:22:45] circles that contains all the fundamental categories of rational

[02:22:47] fundamental categories of rational thought implies that future developments

[02:22:50] thought implies that future developments can only be applications or elaborations

[02:22:53] can only be applications or elaborations of structures already derived. This is

[02:22:56] of structures already derived. This is the open closure problem that several

[02:22:58] the open closure problem that several recent commentators including the 2014

[02:23:02] recent commentators including the 2014 paper by Kirsty Gizdal have pursued.

[02:23:06] paper by Kirsty Gizdal have pursued. If the logic's categories are derived

[02:23:09] If the logic's categories are derived necessarily and exhaustively, then no

[02:23:12] necessarily and exhaustively, then no genuinely new logical category is

[02:23:15] genuinely new logical category is possible, which means history can bring

[02:23:18] possible, which means history can bring new content but not new rational

[02:23:20] new content but not new rational structure. But if new rational structure

[02:23:24] structure. But if new rational structure is possible, then the logic's claim to

[02:23:27] is possible, then the logic's claim to exhaustive derivation is false.

[02:23:30] exhaustive derivation is false. The tension between systematicity and

[02:23:34] The tension between systematicity and genuine historical openness has not been

[02:23:36] genuine historical openness has not been resolved in the literature and the

[02:23:39] resolved in the literature and the recent engagement between Hegel

[02:23:41] recent engagement between Hegel scholarship and philosophy of science

[02:23:44] scholarship and philosophy of science particularly around whether Hegel's

[02:23:46] particularly around whether Hegel's logical categories can accommodate the

[02:23:49] logical categories can accommodate the formal structures of contemporary

[02:23:50] formal structures of contemporary mathematical physics has made the

[02:23:53] mathematical physics has made the problem more acute rather than less.

[02:23:58] problem more acute rather than less. The ultimate question that runs beneath

[02:24:00] The ultimate question that runs beneath all of these disputes is whether Hegel's

[02:24:03] all of these disputes is whether Hegel's project of philosophy as the system of

[02:24:05] project of philosophy as the system of all rational categories comprehending

[02:24:08] all rational categories comprehending its own historical location and the

[02:24:11] its own historical location and the structure of its own method is a

[02:24:13] structure of its own method is a coherent aspiration or a self-defeating

[02:24:16] coherent aspiration or a self-defeating one. Kant drew limits on what reason can

[02:24:21] one. Kant drew limits on what reason can know.

[02:24:23] know. Hegel argued that drawing limits is

[02:24:26] Hegel argued that drawing limits is itself a rational act that exceeds the

[02:24:29] itself a rational act that exceeds the limits. The question is whether that

[02:24:32] limits. The question is whether that argument succeeds or whether it is as

[02:24:35] argument succeeds or whether it is as some critics have maintained since

[02:24:37] some critics have maintained since Schopenhau simply the refusal to

[02:24:40] Schopenhau simply the refusal to acknowledge that limits exist combined

[02:24:42] acknowledge that limits exist combined with the production of enormously

[02:24:44] with the production of enormously elaborate pros that simulates the

[02:24:47] elaborate pros that simulates the transcendence of limits without

[02:24:48] transcendence of limits without achieving it.

[02:24:51] achieving it. That question is not yet settled, and

[02:24:54] That question is not yet settled, and the rigor and seriousness with which it

[02:24:56] the rigor and seriousness with which it continues to be pursued in current

[02:24:58] continues to be pursued in current journals and monographs is the best

[02:25:01] journals and monographs is the best evidence that Hegel remains a living

[02:25:04] evidence that Hegel remains a living problem rather than a solved one.