Eritrea–United States relations| Red sea politics | Ethiopia--Eritrea tension | Pretoria Agreement

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHRc8EtM2H0

[00:00] Thank you for being with us, Chettil.
[00:03] Thank you for being with us, Chettil.
[00:03] My pleasure, Telay, as always.
[00:05] It's my pleasure too.
[00:08] And um today I thought we would talk about um the Horn of African politics and um namely um recent developments between Ethiopia and um Eratria.
[00:13] I think it was the Wall Street Journal that reported that there are attempts at rushmore between the two countries.
[00:26] And I invited you on to help us understand and make sense of what that means.
[00:32] Um, so how did you what did you make of that of that of that news?
[00:34] Well, you you said between Ethiopia and Eratria, but you mean between the US and Eratria, obviously.
[00:40] Yeah.
[00:45] Um, I think um that information that piece of information disclosed by Wall Street Journal um 10 days back or so uh is interesting.
[00:53] Uh although not too surprising.
[00:57] Um they just mentioned that u
[01:01] just mentioned that u representatives from Aratria meaning the representatives from Aratria meaning the foreign minister Osman has met with uh foreign minister Osman has met with uh the US administration special advisor or the US administration special advisor or special envoy on Africa Masad Buloo um special envoy on Africa Masad Buloo um first in New York on the margin of the general assembly I believe in September last year and later on in Cairo.
[01:26] last year and later on in Cairo.
[01:29] in December uh in order to try to reach some kind of repro some kind of understand common understanding uh on um their bilateral relations.
[01:40] relations.
[01:43] What is at stake here obviously is that US has imposed unilateral sanctions on Aritraa both individuals and entities uh which were instrumental in the genocidal war on Tigra for instance but also because of their draconical human rights abuses domestically in Eritraa.
[02:03] abuses domestically in Eritraa.
[02:07] So um I think you know there are different approaches to try to unwrap that um repro mount if it is a rapro mount because it is it hasn't been concluded yet and uh I'll come back to that.
[02:21] I think it is as I commented on Twitter that it was more or less a non-starter to begin with.
[02:26] um to view it from the US perspective alone.
[02:34] I think it it it is uh it makes sense in the new geopolitical order uh and certainly after the the battle of the Iran war that uh the interest to keep the Red Sea bassin um secure and and open for business so to say particularly um the Babel Mad
[03:04] to say particularly um the Babel Mad Strait.
[03:05] Strait.
[03:05] open is is of US interest as it is of European interest as it is of China's interest.
[03:13] all are kind of depending on that shipping line is secure and safe and the hoot is in Yemen is a threat to the to the straight so to say.
[03:27] andrea's coastline is um instrumental or can be instrumental to be used as um the port then of Assab and Masava to monitor the Red Sea and and the straight to secure safe passage of commercial vessels through the straight.
[03:47] So I think that um that's obviously the the one of the key reasons for us to engage with Aritria.
[03:54] But keep in mind this initiative started before the Iran war.
[04:00] So it is a longer perspective on it than only being but being enhanced or accentuated by the
[04:05] being enhanced or accentuated by the Iran war possibly.
[04:08] Iran war possibly.
[04:11] It is also the element of the competition of the Red Sea bassin itself.
[04:14] the element of the competition of the Red Sea bassin itself.
[04:18] Um the Russians are there having tried to establish a naval base uh in Port Sudan uh for instance it's on and off uh I think it is on now in in that in that sense um
[04:24] naval base uh in Port Sudan uh for instance it's on and off uh I think it
[04:27] instance it's on and off uh I think it is on now in in that in that sense um
[04:29] is on now in in that in that sense um
[04:34] and also other geopolitical competitors um positioning themselves there it can be viewed in the perspective that um
[04:39] um positioning themselves there it can
[04:42] be viewed in the perspective that um US is also trying to secure possibly um what is called um non-Arab monopoly control of the Red Sea.
[04:47] US is also trying to secure possibly
[04:51] um what is called um non-Arab monopoly
[04:55] control of the Red Sea.
[04:58] We know that Israel is certainly concerned about that.
[05:00] Uh hence also Israel's recognition
[05:03] that. Uh hence also Israel's recognition of Somali land um in order to safeguard
[05:08] of Somali land um in order to safeguard Israel's interest on the other end of Israel's interest on the other end of the Red Sea.
[05:13] Um but I think but I think I think we should also take note of in I think we should also take note of in order in trying to interpret what is order in trying to interpret what is going on going on is that who were the facilitator of the is that who were the facilitator of the last crucial meeting between US administration and the trian administration and the trian representatives.
[05:32] Yes, it was Egypt and Egypt has its own stake in the its own skin in the game so to say on on this issue.
[05:46] Uh certainly with what is u with with with what has been brewing for a long time the conflict between Aratria and Ethiopia where Egypt is certainly siding with Eritrea in the runup to that potential conflict and Egypt's interest um kind of openly articulated but
[06:10] um kind of openly articulated but certainly also in more confidential
[06:13] certainly also in more confidential rooms to
[06:15] rooms to uh pressure Ethiopia, to um destabilize
[06:19] uh pressure Ethiopia, to um destabilize Ethiopia, as many argues in order for
[06:22] Ethiopia, as many argues in order for Ethiopia not to
[06:25] Ethiopia not to not to um harness the full potential of
[06:28] not to um harness the full potential of the Gird Dam on the Blue Nile, but
[06:31] the Gird Dam on the Blue Nile, but certainly also the fear of Egypt that
[06:34] certainly also the fear of Egypt that Ethiopia is also going to have a control
[06:37] Ethiopia is also going to have a control indirectly or directly of uh the Red Sea
[06:42] indirectly or directly of uh the Red Sea through the Bob El Manded straight.
[06:45] That through the Bob El Manded straight.
[06:49] That is the scenario Egypt is fearing the most.
[06:52] Possibly if Ethiopia manage to
[06:55] through negotiations or other means get access to ASAP, Ethiopia will control
[06:58] access to ASAP, Ethiopia will control the inlet outlet of the Red Sea and they
[07:01] the inlet outlet of the Red Sea and they will control uh the source of the Nile
[07:04] will control uh the source of the Nile so to say.
[07:07] the two bodies of water Egypt is 100% depending upon financially,
[07:11] is 100% depending upon financially, agriculture wise, resource-wise, exist existentially.
[07:15] So I think um Egypt certainly has an interest to sway us over fully to their side in this geopolitical competition where you see um various states aligning with either Arutria or Ethiopia in that schism we see on the Africa's on the horn of Africa when it comes to geopolitical competition.
[07:46] So it is a mixed bag of interest as seen from US and then Egypt is playing into this um to um to um strengthen their claim so to say in in in this debacle.
[08:03] H so a lot of countries and a lot of interestes and maybe we'll come back to some of the countries and what their um interests are in the in the Red Sea. But
[08:12] interests are in the in the Red Sea.
[08:15] But if you could um focus on Eratria and the US for for now.
[08:18] your reaction to that news was to say and you repeated it now to say that it's it's a nobrainer.
[08:25] You don't think there is high chance that the Raproma could succeed.
[08:27] Why?
[08:31] Well,
[08:33] I believe that so many states and entities have tried for and everyone has failed more or less in its attempt to sway Isayas to their side or in their attempt to convince Isayas to liberalize and to open up at a trans society.
[09:09] Um the attempt so far has mainly been you know from EU or European states Norway
[09:16] know from EU or European states Norway for instance uh in order to try to liberalize Aditria that has that have all attempts failed.
[09:21] More recently we see the EU engagement towards Aritria over the last few months have increased radically.
[09:28] Sweden spearheading a new initiative uh departing from their earlier kind of thinking on Aritria.
[09:37] I'm referring then to the David Issach case of the Swedish Aritrian journalist who are who who is the longest imprisoned journalist in the world.
[09:47] Um they are also trying to um engage with Aritria trying to have dialogue with Aritria trying to have an understanding of Isayas movement.
[09:59] I'm certain that that will fail.
[10:00] It will not produce anything because it has been tried over and over and over again u by by others.
[10:06] Um it might be that the US coming to this um coming to the Rapro with a different interest obviously they're not that the
[10:18] interest obviously they're not that the US administration today are not that interested to liberalize Aratria.
[10:22] uh interested to liberalize Aratria.
[10:25] uh they have their own um interest in the Raph, the geopolitical security interest and safeguarding uh safe passage through the Red Sea.
[10:35] That might play in US favor that you know that is something which is might listen to differently but there are a lot of butts in that um uh both in terms of domestic policies in Aritria but also certainly relating to its southern neighbor Ethiopia.
[10:52] First of all, if there will be a reproach mount between Aratria and US is of will be forced to reconceptualize fully his over 25 years presentation of US as the Satan as the main enemy of Aritria.
[11:14] The US have been consistently presented by Isai of as the main enemy undermining
[11:23] by Isai of as the main enemy undermining sovereignity, independence, development, sovereignity, independence, development, you name it.
[11:27] you name it. US and Ethiopia has been put in cohort
[11:32] US and Ethiopia has been put in cohort to
[11:34] to be presented to thean people as the explanation for all their sufferings and
[11:38] be presented to thean people as the explanation for all their sufferings and all the wars they have fought since
[11:42] explanation for all their sufferings and all the wars they have fought since issas have been in power.
[11:44] all the wars they have fought since issas have been in power.
[11:47] issas have been in power. So if Eratria and US is really reaching a repro mount well is have some serious
[11:51] So if Eratria and US is really reaching a repro mount well is have some serious explanations to provide to thean people.
[11:55] a repro mount well is have some serious explanations to provide to thean people.
[12:00] explanations to provide to thean people. How come this enemy this enduring enemy of the state suddenly is an ally of Isis
[12:03] How come this enemy this enduring enemy of the state suddenly is an ally of Isis
[12:07] of the state suddenly is an ally of Isis of
[12:09] of Has he kept then theran people in the
[12:12] Has he kept then theran people in the dark for 25 years? Has he fooled the editan people of what they have said?
[12:14] dark for 25 years? Has he fooled the editan people of what they have said?
[12:17] editan people of what they have said? Has it been a lie? All his excuses and explanations for the endless military
[12:20] Has it been a lie? All his excuses and explanations for the endless military service, for the endless wars, for the
[12:22] explanations for the endless military service, for the endless wars, for the
[12:26] service, for the endless wars, for the whata calls the strategic depopulation.
[12:30] whata calls the strategic depopulation of Aritraa, the refugees.
[12:33] of Aritraa, the refugees.
[12:35] This is serious issues. Then is need to explain or to provide some other explanations why Aritraa is facing all the challenges they are facing if US is not the big enemy any longer.
[12:48] I think that will be a bit too much to bite off for isas to be frank.
[12:54] The second thing is obviously the relations to Ethiopia.
[12:56] I think US and certainly Pentagon and um intelligence services of US administration are very keen to keep Ethiopia as a partner in the Horn of Africa.
[13:14] Ethiopia is the most the biggest military actor in the region.
[13:17] It is the kind of most strategically positioned versus both the Somalia alab es
[13:27] versus both the Somalia alab es challenges but also versus Sudan Sudan challenges but also versus Sudan Sudan and Arutria for that matter.
[13:37] and Arutria for that matter.
[13:41] Um and if the approach mount with Arutria and US is going to be fulfilled.
[13:46] fulfilled.
[13:49] I'm pretty sure or at least I hope there are sensible minds in Pentagon and in CIA who would then put a condition on that mant that the relations with Ethiopia should be improved so to say that um Aritria needs to allow for or negotiate um for instance the use of Assab in order to um to um ease the pressure in order to deescalate the very very high tensions between the two countries and that will also be a challenge for Isayas if that is put part of that condition for a
[14:29] is put part of that condition for a raprom.
[14:32] raprom.
[14:36] So I really don't think this is um going to be fulfilled.
[14:38] I called it a non-starter.
[14:39] non-starter.
[14:44] And uh I heard um some information saying telling me some rather well positioned sources saying me that Isaas has already spoiled it by putting too high demands on the US contact so to say.
[14:52] that uh it is beneath Isayas stature to speak to for instance Masad Buloon directly as um as a little guy.
[15:03] He is wants to relate to the two top guys be that either President Trump or the foreign the minister of state Ruby Marco.
[15:16] So I think is has already shown his um colors to us once again and has spoiled it and we have to keep in mind also going a bit back not that long time
[15:29] also going a bit back not that long time ago.
[15:31] I think it was two years ago when the former US ambassador to Adutraa stepped down after being there for 3 four years.
[15:39] He wrote a very interesting piece in um I don't remember now was it the Atlantic or the New Yorker I don't remember on his um endeavors in Aritria as an ambassador and uh admitting that he came in with flying colors and saying that you know I will solve the trian issue.
[16:00] I will try to I will I will manage to sway Isayas to talk to us to be friendly to liberalize and all that and after 3 four years he he left us ma deflated and admitting that you know it was a failure everything we did was a failure and that has more or less been the experience of all ambassadors to Aditria for the last 25 years I don't understand why they don't learn from each other that they still have this inflated egos that they think they will manage to talk to this guy and manage to
[16:31] manage to talk to this guy and manage to sway him, manage to liberalize him,
[16:32] sway him, manage to liberalize him, manage to having as a trusted partner.
[16:35] manage to having as a trusted partner.
[16:37] Is it one thing we have learned for the last 30 years is that no one can trust Isaru.
[16:39] Not the Saudis, not the US, not China, not Russia, no one, and not least the people.
[16:46] the people.
[16:49] H what you have perfectly laid out the difficulties and pitfalls that that that um lie in in in that attempt to to reconcile or create some sort of reproach more but from Eroska's point of view or from Isayas's point of view you say that it would be difficult to sell that to the people couldn't he simply say um things have changed um and and just to give two examples number There is a new threat now from Ethiopia.
[16:51] difficulties and pitfalls that that that um lie in in in that attempt to to reconcile or create some sort of reproach more but from Eroska's point of view or from Isayas's point of view you say that it would be difficult to sell that to the people couldn't he simply say um things have changed um and and just to give two examples number There is a new threat now from Ethiopia.
[16:54] um lie in in in that attempt to to reconcile or create some sort of reproach more but from Eroska's point of view or from Isayas's point of view you say that it would be difficult to sell that to the people couldn't he simply say um things have changed um and and just to give two examples number There is a new threat now from Ethiopia.
[16:58] reconcile or create some sort of reproach more but from Eroska's point of view or from Isayas's point of view you say that it would be difficult to sell that to the people couldn't he simply say um things have changed um and and just to give two examples number There is a new threat now from Ethiopia.
[17:01] reproach more but from Eroska's point of view or from Isayas's point of view you say that it would be difficult to sell that to the people couldn't he simply say um things have changed um and and just to give two examples number There is a new threat now from Ethiopia.
[17:03] view or from Isayas's point of view you say that it would be difficult to sell that to the people couldn't he simply say um things have changed um and and just to give two examples number There is a new threat now from Ethiopia.
[17:06] say that it would be difficult to sell that to the people couldn't he simply say um things have changed um and and just to give two examples number There is a new threat now from Ethiopia.
[17:08] that to the people couldn't he simply say um things have changed um and and just to give two examples number There is a new threat now from Ethiopia.
[17:11] say um things have changed um and and just to give two examples number There is a new threat now from Ethiopia.
[17:12] um things have changed um and and just to give two examples number There is a new threat now from Ethiopia.
[17:17] to give two examples number There is a new threat now from Ethiopia.
[17:19] new threat now from Ethiopia.
[17:20] Ethiopia is threatening to to invade us and therefore we need the support of the of the US despite our grievances, despite our objections and disagreements with the US.
[17:23] therefore we need the support of the of the US despite our grievances, despite our objections and disagreements with the US.
[17:25] the US despite our grievances, despite our objections and disagreements with the US.
[17:27] our objections and disagreements with the US.
[17:29] We have a bigger enemy in
[17:31] the US.
[17:33] We have a bigger enemy in Ethiopia and therefore that is why we Ethiopia and therefore that is why we should we should reconcile with the US.
[17:36] should we should reconcile with the US and that the US is now.
[17:39] and that the US is now the US government is a new.
[17:41] the US government is a new administration under Trump that it is.
[17:43] administration under Trump that it is not putting the same demand that.
[17:45] not putting the same demand that previous administrations were putting.
[17:47] previous administrations were putting on.
[17:49] on. If you read statements issued by Eratria, they always say that one of.
[17:51] Eratria, they always say that one of their problems with the US is that the.
[17:53] their problems with the US is that the US acts as a as an imperial power with.
[17:57] US acts as a as an imperial power with with demands, but that the Trump.
[17:59] with demands, but that the Trump administration is not doing that and for.
[18:01] administration is not doing that and for those reasons um this is a new era.
[18:05] those reasons um this is a new era.
[18:08] Couldn't Itas um say that to the people? >> I think so. Yes, he can say that. And he.
[18:11] he also kind of showed that um by heart.
[18:17] so to say by sending personal notes to.
[18:21] President Trump when he was elected the first time and when he was reelected.
[18:23] first time and when he was reelected uh showing an interest so to say from.
[18:25] uh showing an interest so to say from the perspective but I don't think.
[18:34] the perspective but I don't think you know Ethiopia has been a constant.
[18:36] you know Ethiopia has been a constant here during the last 30 years too.
[18:39] here during the last 30 years too versusa.
[18:41] versusa And I don't think that um.
[18:45] And I don't think that um President Trump coming to power changing that constant.
[18:47] President Trump coming to power changing that constant.
[18:50] Ethiopia has always been perceived as a possible threat by work to sovereignity and territorial.
[18:54] perceived as a possible threat by work to sovereignity and territorial integrity.
[18:56] integrity. Um and u although I think uh the US administration certainly has less.
[19:03] the US administration certainly has less um strings attached if I can use that term to their bilateral relation these days than earlier uh in terms of upholding certain standards of human rights and democracy uh with their partner countries.
[19:07] um strings attached if I can use that term to their bilateral relation these days than earlier uh in terms of upholding certain standards of human.
[19:11] strings attached if I can use that term to their bilateral relation these days than earlier uh in terms of upholding certain standards of human rights and democracy uh with their.
[19:13] term to their bilateral relation these days than earlier uh in terms of upholding certain standards of human rights and democracy uh with their partner countries.
[19:15] days than earlier uh in terms of upholding certain standards of human rights and democracy uh with their partner countries.
[19:18] upholding certain standards of human rights and democracy uh with their partner countries.
[19:20] rights and democracy uh with their partner countries. Um there is um still the element of um from the US perspective if they do have certain a certain level of institutional memory.
[19:24] partner countries. Um there is um still the element of um from the US perspective if they do have certain a certain level of institutional memory.
[19:28] the element of um from the US perspective if they do have certain a certain level of institutional memory.
[19:32] perspective if they do have certain a certain level of institutional memory.
[19:35] a certain level of institutional memory in state department, white house,
[19:36] in state department, white house, Pentagon they know they cannot put too
[19:40] Pentagon they know they cannot put too much confidence and trust into any kind
[19:43] much confidence and trust into any kind of talks or negotiations or
[19:47] of talks or negotiations or repro with iski.
[19:50] repro with iski.
[19:53] So they will be hesitant on that ground.
[19:53] But from the editus viewpoint, from his
[19:56] size of work viewpoint, yes, he can, you
[19:59] know,
[20:01] he can try to sell whatever he wants to
[20:03] the people because they don't have a
[20:05] voice in the governance anyway and and
[20:07] he will get away with it. But I think
[20:09] this will might stick uh a bit to um too
[20:14] difficult to his former you know decades
[20:18] of policies blaming us for everything
[20:22] bad happening to Aratria. It's it's you
[20:26] know we're talking about a a master
[20:28] narrative of of Aritrian nationalism and
[20:31] itran statethood so to say and uh to to
[20:38] itran statethood so to say and uh to to uh pull the carpet underneath that
[20:40] uh pull the carpet underneath that master narrative you really have to
[20:44] master narrative you really have to um come up with something then which are
[20:48] um come up with something then which are acceptable as an excuse as an
[20:50] acceptable as an excuse as an explanation as an understanding to why
[20:52] explanation as an understanding to why it has been like this for 25 30 years
[20:57] it has been like this for 25 30 years I I don't say it is impossible for isas
[21:00] I I don't say it is impossible for isas but I think it will be a huge challenge
[21:02] but I think it will be a huge challenge but again you know who cares because the
[21:06] but again you know who cares because the people doesn't have a voice anyway in
[21:08] people doesn't have a voice anyway in the governance so yes is going to do
[21:11] the governance so yes is going to do this on a whim
[21:13] this on a whim but by doing so he might also then
[21:20] I don't know not challenge necessarily
[21:23] I don't know not challenge necessarily but um at least this provoke certain
[21:26] but um at least this provoke certain other actors he's also flirting with be
[21:28] other actors he's also flirting with be that Russia or or or others in the
[21:32] that Russia or or or others in the region.
[21:34] region. >> Um and you said that also it's reported
[21:37] >> Um and you said that also it's reported in the news that the talks between
[21:39] in the news that the talks between Eritria and um the US were were held in
[21:43] Eritria and um the US were were held in in Cairo um and that that gives the idea
[21:47] in Cairo um and that that gives the idea that Egypt is central player here. So if
[21:51] that Egypt is central player here. So if the US is relying on Egypt and on
[21:54] the US is relying on Egypt and on Aratria,
[21:56] Aratria, um why does it has to why does it have
[21:59] um why does it has to why does it have to put a lot of emphasis on Ethiopia?
[22:00] to put a lot of emphasis on Ethiopia? Why does it matter? Because it's it's
[22:02] Why does it matter? Because it's it's relying on forces that are hostile to
[22:05] relying on forces that are hostile to Ethiopia generally speaking.
[22:09] Ethiopia generally speaking. >> Yeah. And I think um you know Egypt is
[22:11] >> Yeah. And I think um you know Egypt is certainly a very close ally of us
[22:14] certainly a very close ally of us militarily security-wise in the region
[22:16] militarily security-wise in the region is the second biggest ally after the
[22:19] is the second biggest ally after the biggest one Israel.
[22:21] biggest one Israel. And you know for us it is important to
[22:25] And you know for us it is important to balance these two biggest allies they do
[22:29] balance these two biggest allies they do have in the region and their competitive
[22:34] have in the region and their competitive alliances.
[22:35] alliances. Israel, Somaliand,
[22:38] Israel, Somaliand, Ethiopia, UAE
[22:40] Ethiopia, UAE is emerging as one of the
[22:45] is emerging as one of the prominent two blocks in the in the in
[22:48] prominent two blocks in the in the in that region spanning the Red Sea and you
[22:50] that region spanning the Red Sea and you have Egypt, Arutria
[22:54] have Egypt, Arutria uh balancing on the other side with
[22:56] uh balancing on the other side with their supporters be that Saudi and
[22:58] their supporters be that Saudi and others. So I think viewed from
[23:01] others. So I think viewed from Washington
[23:03] Washington it is it might be too challenging to
[23:07] it is it might be too challenging to come down firmly on Egypt Aratria's side
[23:11] come down firmly on Egypt Aratria's side because that will again not look too
[23:14] because that will again not look too good in Jerusalem as the key other
[23:17] good in Jerusalem as the key other partner here and I believe possibly that
[23:21] partner here and I believe possibly that um Israel has a stronger voice
[23:25] um Israel has a stronger voice internally in the US administration than
[23:27] internally in the US administration than Egypt has And uh we see Israel is
[23:30] Egypt has And uh we see Israel is increasing its prominence in the region
[23:33] increasing its prominence in the region and its influence in the region. Um and
[23:36] and its influence in the region. Um and that will also come into play when it
[23:38] that will also come into play when it comes to Arutria's
[23:41] comes to Arutria's repromant with with us.
[23:45] repromant with with us. >> But more generally um shuttle to just
[23:48] >> But more generally um shuttle to just give an idea to viewers when Eratrian
[23:52] give an idea to viewers when Eratrian and American officials meet what are the
[23:55] and American officials meet what are the stick what are the difficult pointers in
[23:57] stick what are the difficult pointers in between them? what what are the the
[23:58] between them? what what are the the things that they couldn't agree on? You
[24:01] things that they couldn't agree on? You you mentioned for in fact that the US um
[24:06] you mentioned for in fact that the US um has um imposed sanction on Eratria
[24:08] has um imposed sanction on Eratria because of what um some Eratrian
[24:10] because of what um some Eratrian officials have done in Tigra in relation
[24:12] officials have done in Tigra in relation to the genocide and also in rel in
[24:15] to the genocide and also in rel in relation to freedom of expression in
[24:17] relation to freedom of expression in Eratria and all that. But we know that
[24:19] Eratria and all that. But we know that the Trump administration doesn't care
[24:21] the Trump administration doesn't care about freedom of expression now. Um and
[24:25] about freedom of expression now. Um and really we know that they don't really
[24:27] really we know that they don't really care about what um happened in in
[24:29] care about what um happened in in integrate deep down I I think it's at
[24:31] integrate deep down I I think it's at the end of the day it's about interests.
[24:34] the end of the day it's about interests. So when they talk, what are the issues
[24:36] So when they talk, what are the issues that they couldn't find middle ground
[24:39] that they couldn't find middle ground on?
[24:41] on? >> You know, I I don't have privy to to th
[24:44] >> You know, I I don't have privy to to th those discussions. I I wish I I could
[24:46] those discussions. I I wish I I could and I don't think the talks came, you
[24:49] and I don't think the talks came, you know, didn't necessarily go into
[24:52] know, didn't necessarily go into details, agenda items on the level you
[24:55] details, agenda items on the level you are asking. Uh I'm I'm not sure of that.
[24:57] are asking. Uh I'm I'm not sure of that. Um but we can speculate obviously. Um I
[25:02] Um but we can speculate obviously. Um I I I agree with you that the US
[25:04] I I agree with you that the US administration would not necessarily put
[25:07] administration would not necessarily put as a priority talking point the the
[25:11] as a priority talking point the the human rights situation in Aditria. Uh
[25:14] human rights situation in Aditria. Uh although issues of religious freedom for
[25:17] although issues of religious freedom for instance, issues where you have a number
[25:20] instance, issues where you have a number of Christian churches being banned in
[25:23] of Christian churches being banned in Aditria, a number of Christian religious
[25:26] Aditria, a number of Christian religious leaders being incarcerated in Aditria.
[25:29] leaders being incarcerated in Aditria. That is a challenge for us to accept
[25:32] That is a challenge for us to accept considering the basis of uh the Trump
[25:36] considering the basis of uh the Trump administration support in that segment
[25:39] administration support in that segment of population in the US that if they are
[25:42] of population in the US that if they are getting too close to um government
[25:46] getting too close to um government which are imprisoning their religious
[25:49] which are imprisoning their religious brethren that might question the basis
[25:53] brethren that might question the basis uh of that policy back in back in US. So
[25:56] uh of that policy back in back in US. So I think that is that might be one of the
[25:58] I think that is that might be one of the sticky points actually how how Aritria
[26:02] sticky points actually how how Aritria then will approach and solve that that
[26:07] then will approach and solve that that issue if they want if they are serious
[26:09] issue if they want if they are serious with the repromant with with us or that
[26:12] with the repromant with with us or that initiative.
[26:13] initiative. I think uh again uh that the US would
[26:17] I think uh again uh that the US would put pressure on Aratria to
[26:21] put pressure on Aratria to um
[26:22] um stabilize uh their relations with
[26:26] stabilize uh their relations with Ethiopia um which um would favor both
[26:30] Ethiopia um which um would favor both countries obviously Adatria and
[26:32] countries obviously Adatria and Ethiopia. It is a win-win situation, an
[26:35] Ethiopia. It is a win-win situation, an obvious win-win situation for the
[26:37] obvious win-win situation for the Ethiopia to be in a friendly
[26:38] Ethiopia to be in a friendly relationship, a cooperative relationship
[26:42] relationship, a cooperative relationship uh where trade uh uh is a is an open uh
[26:47] uh where trade uh uh is a is an open uh two-way street so to say between the two
[26:50] two-way street so to say between the two countries and the use of ports for
[26:52] countries and the use of ports for Ethiopia's benefit. Um so but
[26:58] Ethiopia's benefit. Um so but that that uh is still a more a lofty
[27:02] that that uh is still a more a lofty dream scenario considering the events on
[27:06] dream scenario considering the events on the ground in Aratria in Tigra elsewhere
[27:09] the ground in Aratria in Tigra elsewhere in Ethiopia and the region. So that's
[27:12] in Ethiopia and the region. So that's why I'm
[27:14] why I'm rather pessimistic that this reproach
[27:16] rather pessimistic that this reproach mount will be fulfilled so to say with
[27:18] mount will be fulfilled so to say with some kind of joint agreement between
[27:21] some kind of joint agreement between Asara and and Washington DC. Mhm. Well,
[27:25] Asara and and Washington DC. Mhm. Well, I think your um pessimism is well placed
[27:28] I think your um pessimism is well placed and and understandable, but um seeing
[27:31] and and understandable, but um seeing things from from Ethiopia, as you know,
[27:33] things from from Ethiopia, as you know, one of the things that Ethiopian
[27:34] one of the things that Ethiopian officials have been saying lately um on
[27:37] officials have been saying lately um on a daily basis, you could say that um
[27:41] a daily basis, you could say that um Ethiopia at a matter of urgency needs
[27:44] Ethiopia at a matter of urgency needs the the port of asset and whether that
[27:47] the the port of asset and whether that is through negotiation or by force um
[27:50] is through negotiation or by force um something has to give. That's what they
[27:52] something has to give. That's what they say. So how can this whole um
[27:56] say. So how can this whole um port issue be incorporated into the
[28:01] port issue be incorporated into the Eatrium US Raproimo issue? Is that is
[28:03] Eatrium US Raproimo issue? Is that is there a way that the whole Ethiopian
[28:06] there a way that the whole Ethiopian thing could be incorporated into that?
[28:09] thing could be incorporated into that? Well, that might be one of the key
[28:11] Well, that might be one of the key issues then uh raised by the US
[28:14] issues then uh raised by the US administration if they will continue uh
[28:17] administration if they will continue uh discussing a possible repromant
[28:20] discussing a possible repromant framework that uh Ethiopia would um
[28:25] framework that uh Ethiopia would um uh have the opportunity
[28:28] uh have the opportunity in parallel to negotiate the use of
[28:30] in parallel to negotiate the use of Assad for instance uh for their uh as a
[28:33] Assad for instance uh for their uh as a as a trading port not as a military port
[28:36] as a trading port not as a military port which Ethiopia also has an interest in
[28:38] which Ethiopia also has an interest in but at least as a trading port. Um but
[28:43] but at least as a trading port. Um but again we are not privy to what they have
[28:46] again we are not privy to what they have been discussing and we are we don't even
[28:48] been discussing and we are we don't even know if the contact between DC and Asara
[28:53] know if the contact between DC and Asara is still on track on this issue. uh as
[28:57] is still on track on this issue. uh as far as I heard more recently is that um
[29:01] far as I heard more recently is that um it was kind of closed by size of work's
[29:04] it was kind of closed by size of work's arrogant attitude versus the US uh
[29:08] arrogant attitude versus the US uh Africa envoy.
[29:12] >> So what can you expand on that? What
[29:15] >> So what can you expand on that? What happened there?
[29:20] It's it's uh not officially confirmed
[29:23] It's it's uh not officially confirmed but uh the US envoy Masad Baloo was um
[29:28] but uh the US envoy Masad Baloo was um asking to um meet with Isa Nasara but
[29:33] asking to um meet with Isa Nasara but was rejected
[29:35] was rejected on the basis that uh President Isaas
[29:39] on the basis that uh President Isaas doesn't speak to little envoys he speaks
[29:42] doesn't speak to little envoys he speaks to presidents and foreign ministers
[29:44] to presidents and foreign ministers only.
[29:45] only. H but is isn't it strange that from
[29:48] H but is isn't it strange that from Isaya's point of view because on the one
[29:50] Isaya's point of view because on the one hand there the real threat of Ethiopia
[29:54] hand there the real threat of Ethiopia if if we took Ethiopian seriously what
[29:56] if if we took Ethiopian seriously what what they say in terms of the port
[29:59] what they say in terms of the port access and here is the US extending an
[30:02] access and here is the US extending an olive branch you could you could you
[30:04] olive branch you could you could you could say right that we could find a
[30:06] could say right that we could find a solution to to the whole thing now for
[30:08] solution to to the whole thing now for Isayas to to be nitpicking by saying I
[30:12] Isayas to to be nitpicking by saying I can't meet with this official I can only
[30:15] can't meet with this official I can only those officials. It it sounds a bit
[30:18] those officials. It it sounds a bit luxury if he's in in a desperate
[30:20] luxury if he's in in a desperate situation as we are constantly told. So
[30:24] situation as we are constantly told. So what's happening there?
[30:25] what's happening there? >> Is he in a desperate situation? Who's
[30:28] >> Is he in a desperate situation? Who's telling you this?
[30:30] telling you this? >> I see I see is have been repositioned as
[30:33] >> I see I see is have been repositioned as a relevant actor over the last couple of
[30:35] a relevant actor over the last couple of three years as a geopolitical relevant
[30:37] three years as a geopolitical relevant actor. He's possibly stronger now than
[30:40] actor. He's possibly stronger now than he has been for quite a long time in
[30:42] he has been for quite a long time in terms of his regional position and the
[30:45] terms of his regional position and the way he is u playing the international
[30:48] way he is u playing the international community. I don't see him as desperate
[30:51] community. I don't see him as desperate as such. EU has changed his policy
[30:54] as such. EU has changed his policy versus Aritraa. uh a lot of uh
[30:57] versus Aritraa. uh a lot of uh geopolitical actors and international
[31:00] geopolitical actors and international medium powers and also superpowers are
[31:02] medium powers and also superpowers are quoting Arutria for um port access or
[31:08] quoting Arutria for um port access or naval bases or
[31:10] naval bases or other kind of alliances.
[31:13] other kind of alliances. So u the only threat to Isaiah's
[31:17] So u the only threat to Isaiah's power is potentially Ethiopia and
[31:19] power is potentially Ethiopia and Ethiopia's possibly or potentially
[31:22] Ethiopia's possibly or potentially military intervention if it comes to
[31:24] military intervention if it comes to that. Other than that is establishing
[31:27] that. Other than that is establishing regional alliances. He's establishing
[31:29] regional alliances. He's establishing alliances with Ethiopian
[31:32] alliances with Ethiopian military political actors to destabilize
[31:34] military political actors to destabilize further Ethiopia. Um, and I believe he
[31:37] further Ethiopia. Um, and I believe he thinks he might be in a stronger
[31:42] thinks he might be in a stronger position than he was just a few months
[31:44] position than he was just a few months or a couple of years ago. H is there is
[31:48] or a couple of years ago. H is there is there any maybe it's is slightly off
[31:50] there any maybe it's is slightly off topic the this one but is there any
[31:52] topic the this one but is there any credence to the to the rumor let's let
[31:56] credence to the to the rumor let's let me put it that way that there is an
[31:58] me put it that way that there is an alliance being created by Isayas and the
[32:01] alliance being created by Isayas and the TPLF and the rebel groups in Amhara and
[32:06] TPLF and the rebel groups in Amhara and possibly Egypt as well. And the reason
[32:09] possibly Egypt as well. And the reason why Isaas is not really interested in
[32:11] why Isaas is not really interested in this talk of Rushma with the US and
[32:13] this talk of Rushma with the US and Ethiopia is because he he feels
[32:15] Ethiopia is because he he feels confident because he had these forces
[32:18] confident because he had these forces behind him.
[32:20] behind him. There's some some element of truth to
[32:22] There's some some element of truth to that.
[32:24] that. I'm sure you know more about Simo than I
[32:26] I'm sure you know more about Simo than I do but uh I think uh well we do have the
[32:31] do but uh I think uh well we do have the recent um
[32:33] recent um diaspora interview done by Adis Alam in
[32:36] diaspora interview done by Adis Alam in TPLF
[32:38] TPLF uh confirming
[32:41] uh confirming from an official source now that it is
[32:43] from an official source now that it is more a strategic military alliance
[32:46] more a strategic military alliance between Aritria and TPLF not only
[32:48] between Aritria and TPLF not only people-to-people reconciliation we know
[32:51] people-to-people reconciliation we know that there our editorian operatives,
[32:54] that there our editorian operatives, troops,
[32:56] troops, agents, call them whatever you want in
[32:57] agents, call them whatever you want in Tigra
[32:59] Tigra that has been reported for quite some
[33:01] that has been reported for quite some few months now. Uh and that uh there is
[33:05] few months now. Uh and that uh there is a dialogue or contact communication,
[33:08] a dialogue or contact communication, call it whatever you want, between the
[33:09] call it whatever you want, between the TPLF leadership and the leadership in
[33:11] TPLF leadership and the leadership in Asara.
[33:13] Asara. TPLF
[33:14] TPLF has come out with several statements uh
[33:17] has come out with several statements uh most recently from the central committee
[33:19] most recently from the central committee meeting saying that they want friendly
[33:21] meeting saying that they want friendly relations with all their neighboring
[33:23] relations with all their neighboring states and also the peoples of Ethiopia.
[33:26] states and also the peoples of Ethiopia. That's a fair point. Definitely Tigra
[33:28] That's a fair point. Definitely Tigra needs peaceful relations with all
[33:30] needs peaceful relations with all relevant actors in the region be that
[33:32] relevant actors in the region be that Aritraa, Sudan, Amhara but not least
[33:36] Aritraa, Sudan, Amhara but not least Ababa.
[33:37] Ababa. uh and uh there might not be a
[33:40] uh and uh there might not be a possibility to have peaceful relations
[33:42] possibility to have peaceful relations with all of them at the same time
[33:43] with all of them at the same time together because the main discords are
[33:47] together because the main discords are between Adis and Asara you can say or
[33:50] between Adis and Asara you can say or uh also the Sudan uh confrontations are
[33:54] uh also the Sudan uh confrontations are impacting the the domestic alliances in
[33:57] impacting the the domestic alliances in Ethiopia. So
[34:00] Ethiopia. So I think the further the situation
[34:02] I think the further the situation evolves along the path along the
[34:04] evolves along the path along the trajectories we see now where exactly
[34:07] trajectories we see now where exactly you do have a retria
[34:11] you do have a retria uh tigra faro potentially
[34:16] uh tigra faro potentially uh being established increasingly as um
[34:22] uh being established increasingly as um tactical alliance not strategic but it's
[34:24] tactical alliance not strategic but it's a tactical alliance um that is a
[34:26] a tactical alliance um that is a formidable threat to Ali Ababa obviously
[34:29] formidable threat to Ali Ababa obviously if that is cementing as a not only a
[34:34] if that is cementing as a not only a more politically lofty
[34:37] more politically lofty uh alliance but a strategical military
[34:40] uh alliance but a strategical military alliance too.
[34:43] alliance too. >> And of course behind them is Egypt and
[34:46] >> And of course behind them is Egypt and and also SAF for that matter in Sudan.
[34:51] and also SAF for that matter in Sudan. Part of the reason I I ask you that is
[34:53] Part of the reason I I ask you that is mett because ifas is not showing any
[34:58] mett because ifas is not showing any sort of enthusiasm for the talk of
[35:01] sort of enthusiasm for the talk of reproachment with the US because he
[35:03] reproachment with the US because he believes he has partners in Tigra and
[35:05] believes he has partners in Tigra and other places. The reason to the extent
[35:08] other places. The reason to the extent that that is true the reason he will
[35:10] that that is true the reason he will have partners in is because uh the prer
[35:13] have partners in is because uh the prer agreement has completely been abandoned.
[35:16] agreement has completely been abandoned. Um if if a proary agreement has been
[35:18] Um if if a proary agreement has been implemented, if the gr has been
[35:20] implemented, if the gr has been incorporated into the federal structure
[35:23] incorporated into the federal structure in Ethiopia, then the the status quo
[35:29] in Ethiopia, then the the status quo wouldn't wouldn't exist. It would
[35:30] wouldn't wouldn't exist. It would change, right? And it would be in the US
[35:33] change, right? And it would be in the US interest then to push for the
[35:34] interest then to push for the implementation of the preter agreement
[35:37] implementation of the preter agreement um so that itas could have the incentive
[35:39] um so that itas could have the incentive to want to reconcile with the US. But
[35:42] to want to reconcile with the US. But that that is not happening because as
[35:44] that that is not happening because as you say um the occupation of western
[35:47] you say um the occupation of western remains there. There is no political um
[35:50] remains there. There is no political um negotiation between the TPLF and the
[35:52] negotiation between the TPLF and the federal government. And for all intents
[35:54] federal government. And for all intents and purposes you could say that there is
[35:56] and purposes you could say that there is no there is no real attempt at
[35:58] no there is no real attempt at implementing the preter agreement.
[36:00] implementing the preter agreement. >> So what I mean what do we make of that
[36:04] >> So what I mean what do we make of that of that um
[36:06] of that um um set of affairs then?
[36:10] um set of affairs then? Yeah, certainly the the failure of
[36:13] Yeah, certainly the the failure of implementing the Ptoria agreement lurks
[36:15] implementing the Ptoria agreement lurks behind what we see today in terms of new
[36:18] behind what we see today in terms of new alliances in terms of new strategies
[36:20] alliances in terms of new strategies particularly as viewed from Tigra. I've
[36:22] particularly as viewed from Tigra. I've been speaking on this many times earlier
[36:24] been speaking on this many times earlier that from the perspective of TPLF, not
[36:27] that from the perspective of TPLF, not speaking from the perspective of the Gan
[36:29] speaking from the perspective of the Gan people as such, but at least the TPLF
[36:31] people as such, but at least the TPLF leadership, um they have interpreted
[36:36] leadership, um they have interpreted the the impediment to fully implement uh
[36:40] the the impediment to fully implement uh the Ptori agreement as an incentive to
[36:45] the Ptori agreement as an incentive to look for other options, to use that
[36:48] look for other options, to use that term. And we know the humanitarian
[36:50] term. And we know the humanitarian situation in Tigra is dire. We know the
[36:53] situation in Tigra is dire. We know the lack of u funding for u administrative
[36:57] lack of u funding for u administrative health, schooling, social issues is is
[37:01] health, schooling, social issues is is uh really impacting uh the tigan people
[37:05] uh really impacting uh the tigan people at large. The IDPs are in a very severe
[37:09] at large. The IDPs are in a very severe dire situation and so on and so forth.
[37:12] dire situation and so on and so forth. It is natural for political leaders to
[37:14] It is natural for political leaders to look for alternatives if um if the main
[37:18] look for alternatives if um if the main um route through the ptoria agreement
[37:21] um route through the ptoria agreement doesn't fulfill um the needs of the
[37:25] doesn't fulfill um the needs of the people as they are interpreting it. Uh I
[37:28] people as they are interpreting it. Uh I I I clearly see that and uh I think my
[37:32] I I clearly see that and uh I think my my criticism of Ptoria agreement as
[37:36] my criticism of Ptoria agreement as stated 3 hours after the Ptoria
[37:39] stated 3 hours after the Ptoria agreement was made public um still
[37:42] agreement was made public um still stands that the lack of um
[37:47] stands that the lack of um uh robust uh implementing regime
[37:51] uh robust uh implementing regime uh wasn't there and certainly also that
[37:55] uh wasn't there and certainly also that this is a secession of hostilities.
[37:57] this is a secession of hostilities. disagreement and it's not the peace
[37:58] disagreement and it's not the peace agreement as such that the deeper root
[38:01] agreement as such that the deeper root causes to the conflict to the tensions
[38:04] causes to the conflict to the tensions between Tigra and the federal
[38:05] between Tigra and the federal authorities and not only Tigra but also
[38:08] authorities and not only Tigra but also Amhara and Orumu and other people's
[38:12] Amhara and Orumu and other people's tensions and grievances versus the
[38:14] tensions and grievances versus the federal government has not been
[38:16] federal government has not been addressed. So um that the Ptori
[38:20] addressed. So um that the Ptori agreement should immediately be followed
[38:21] agreement should immediately be followed up by a comprehensive peace process. um
[38:26] up by a comprehensive peace process. um uh that didn't happen and as I see now
[38:30] uh that didn't happen and as I see now when over the last year or so when we
[38:33] when over the last year or so when we absolutely for certainity could say that
[38:36] absolutely for certainity could say that Ptoria will die rather soon then at
[38:40] Ptoria will die rather soon then at least we should start or the actors the
[38:43] least we should start or the actors the partners the international observers to
[38:45] partners the international observers to PTO agreement should push for a renewed
[38:48] PTO agreement should push for a renewed effort not only to uphold the elements
[38:52] effort not only to uphold the elements in the PUR agreement but to expand it to
[38:54] in the PUR agreement but to expand it to say that you Let's come together to
[38:56] say that you Let's come together to draft a new peace agreement, a
[38:59] draft a new peace agreement, a comprehensive domestic peace agreement
[39:00] comprehensive domestic peace agreement in Ethiopia with the various politically
[39:04] in Ethiopia with the various politically armed actors confronting or challenging
[39:07] armed actors confronting or challenging federal authority. Um that hasn't
[39:11] federal authority. Um that hasn't happened. There have been some
[39:12] happened. There have been some individual initiatives versus the OA in
[39:14] individual initiatives versus the OA in particular which have failed uh but not
[39:17] particular which have failed uh but not a more comprehensive understanding on
[39:20] a more comprehensive understanding on what's going on inside Ethiopia on its
[39:23] what's going on inside Ethiopia on its own terms.
[39:24] own terms. uh taking the cue from the failure of
[39:27] uh taking the cue from the failure of Pritoria but also certainly looking at
[39:30] Pritoria but also certainly looking at what's happening with the faro rebellion
[39:32] what's happening with the faro rebellion in in Amhara and Ole in Normia. Um
[39:38] in in Amhara and Ole in Normia. Um I might be pessimistic when I say that
[39:42] I might be pessimistic when I say that will probably not
[39:44] will probably not we will not manage to to salvage the
[39:47] we will not manage to to salvage the Pura agreement. I think well from the
[39:50] Pura agreement. I think well from the from the TPLF central committee decision
[39:53] from the TPLF central committee decision and which are being implemented more or
[39:55] and which are being implemented more or less as we speak possibly that um it is
[39:58] less as we speak possibly that um it is formally abrogated and the TPLF will
[40:01] formally abrogated and the TPLF will restore the pre2020
[40:05] restore the pre2020 um regional assembly and then appoint an
[40:08] um regional assembly and then appoint an executive body based on that um de facto
[40:13] executive body based on that um de facto and ejecting the trade
[40:17] and ejecting the trade seed.
[40:18] seed. That is the final nail in the coffin of
[40:21] That is the final nail in the coffin of the Ptoria agreement. So then what comes
[40:24] the Ptoria agreement. So then what comes next? What are the initiatives now of of
[40:29] next? What are the initiatives now of of new talks between Mecca and others in in
[40:34] new talks between Mecca and others in in order to avoid um a fall back to war? Um
[40:38] order to avoid um a fall back to war? Um that is the that is the real question
[40:40] that is the that is the real question here and um I I have seen uh statements
[40:45] here and um I I have seen uh statements of concern from EU from AU and from
[40:48] of concern from EU from AU and from other partners but no real commitment to
[40:53] other partners but no real commitment to push the actors to the negotiation table
[40:56] push the actors to the negotiation table again. Um and again the commitment
[41:01] again. Um and again the commitment a peace process doesn't uh is not
[41:04] a peace process doesn't uh is not sustainable based on external pressure.
[41:06] sustainable based on external pressure. a peace process need to be based on
[41:08] a peace process need to be based on internal interests between the
[41:10] internal interests between the contending partners and it doesn't seem
[41:13] contending partners and it doesn't seem to be
[41:15] to be um the genuine willingness to compromise
[41:19] um the genuine willingness to compromise on key issues either from others or from
[41:22] on key issues either from others or from Mecca because you need compromises and
[41:26] Mecca because you need compromises and um you need compromises on territories
[41:28] um you need compromises on territories for instance or on on other issues which
[41:30] for instance or on on other issues which are not um
[41:35] which apparent currently is not um an
[41:37] which apparent currently is not um an interest for either side to to accept.
[41:41] interest for either side to to accept. >> Well, I I think you raised a number of
[41:43] >> Well, I I think you raised a number of interesting points in relation to the
[41:45] interesting points in relation to the PRT agreement, Michelle. And um um you
[41:48] PRT agreement, Michelle. And um um you you say that the TPLF, as far as the
[41:50] you say that the TPLF, as far as the TPLF is concerned, the the PRT agreement
[41:52] TPLF is concerned, the the PRT agreement is dead. And indeed, that's what they
[41:54] is dead. And indeed, that's what they have been saying. they have been making
[41:56] have been saying. they have been making a series of decisions and there is a lot
[41:59] a series of decisions and there is a lot of talk and discussion in in in in
[42:01] of talk and discussion in in in in Tigray circles criticisms and sometimes
[42:05] Tigray circles criticisms and sometimes support and but one thing that that is
[42:08] support and but one thing that that is um um undeniable is the reason that the
[42:11] um um undeniable is the reason that the TPLF gave uh for their decision. they
[42:14] TPLF gave uh for their decision. they have been they they said that they had
[42:16] have been they they said that they had pleaded with all um actors the Europeans
[42:20] pleaded with all um actors the Europeans and the Americans and that they they got
[42:23] and the Americans and that they they got um cold shoulder treatment essentially
[42:25] um cold shoulder treatment essentially nothing and it's only now after the TPLF
[42:28] nothing and it's only now after the TPLF had made their move that the the
[42:31] had made their move that the the Americans and the Europeans are giving
[42:33] Americans and the Europeans are giving statements of concern which are which
[42:35] statements of concern which are which are nothing. So it remains a mystery to
[42:38] are nothing. So it remains a mystery to me shhatil that the Americans and the
[42:40] me shhatil that the Americans and the Europeans invested a lot of energy and
[42:42] Europeans invested a lot of energy and time into making Ethiopia and Tigra um
[42:46] time into making Ethiopia and Tigra um sign an agreement but after that they
[42:49] sign an agreement but after that they completely left the scene and I don't
[42:52] completely left the scene and I don't understand why why was all the
[42:53] understand why why was all the investment then if you don't care about
[42:55] investment then if you don't care about the implementation of the um agreement.
[42:59] the implementation of the um agreement. So maybe that's um another time shut but
[43:01] So maybe that's um another time shut but just a one final point because I we
[43:04] just a one final point because I we digressed a little bit from the Red Sea
[43:07] digressed a little bit from the Red Sea politics. You mentioned other countries
[43:09] politics. You mentioned other countries in in in in addition to Eratria and the
[43:12] in in in in addition to Eratria and the US. Um who are the other countries who
[43:14] US. Um who are the other countries who are following this with with interest um
[43:18] are following this with with interest um in relation to
[43:20] in relation to the raproma between um
[43:24] the raproma between um and US and we will end with that. Oh, I
[43:28] and US and we will end with that. Oh, I I think the whole red sea bassin is
[43:29] I think the whole red sea bassin is following it with keen interest
[43:31] following it with keen interest certainly because if if US
[43:35] certainly because if if US if you will have the scenario where you
[43:39] if you will have the scenario where you America and
[43:41] America and come together in an alliance
[43:44] come together in an alliance politically, strategically, militarily
[43:47] politically, strategically, militarily that will um impact
[43:51] that will um impact the
[43:54] role and perception of the whole Red Sea
[43:56] role and perception of the whole Red Sea basin.
[43:58] basin. um and which might be supported by some
[44:01] um and which might be supported by some of the local middle powers but certainly
[44:04] of the local middle powers but certainly also be looked upon as provocative by
[44:06] also be looked upon as provocative by others. Um it is not necessarily that
[44:09] others. Um it is not necessarily that that will stabilize anything as such. Um
[44:13] that will stabilize anything as such. Um and again there is no war preventing the
[44:18] and again there is no war preventing the security of the shipping lanes through
[44:22] security of the shipping lanes through the Red Sea as of today. But it's the
[44:25] the Red Sea as of today. But it's the potential of that we are talking about.
[44:28] potential of that we are talking about. And um
[44:31] And um the Houthis are the most direct threat
[44:34] the Houthis are the most direct threat to that um the the security and safety
[44:37] to that um the the security and safety of the of the merchant shipping lanes
[44:40] of the of the merchant shipping lanes through the Red Sea. Um that the Houthis
[44:43] through the Red Sea. Um that the Houthis can be tackled
[44:46] can be tackled by other means than reprom
[44:49] by other means than reprom and and US. So it goes beyond that. It
[44:52] and and US. So it goes beyond that. It is it is some it is a new element if
[44:55] is it is some it is a new element if Aritria
[44:56] Aritria um
[44:58] um goes to that side so to say. Aritraa has
[45:02] goes to that side so to say. Aritraa has so far during its independence from 1991
[45:05] so far during its independence from 1991 and 1993 been fiercely non-aligned so to
[45:09] and 1993 been fiercely non-aligned so to say
[45:10] say but more over the years much closer to
[45:14] but more over the years much closer to Russia and the east side than the west
[45:16] Russia and the east side than the west side. Uh keep in mind that Aritria was
[45:19] side. Uh keep in mind that Aritria was the first country to accept uh Russian
[45:22] the first country to accept uh Russian sovereignity over Crimea and also to
[45:26] sovereignity over Crimea and also to accept Russian sovereignity over over
[45:30] accept Russian sovereignity over over eastern Ukraine, the contested
[45:32] eastern Ukraine, the contested territories there or the invaded
[45:35] territories there or the invaded territories there. So is very strongly
[45:39] territories there. So is very strongly backing Russia on the global
[45:42] backing Russia on the global arena so to say.
[45:45] arena so to say. Uh so it will be a shift if US comes in.
[45:49] Uh so it will be a shift if US comes in. Now you can say that US has a rather
[45:53] Now you can say that US has a rather pecular position on the Ukraine war in
[45:56] pecular position on the Ukraine war in itself. So that might not be too
[45:58] itself. So that might not be too difficult to handle for the Trump
[46:00] difficult to handle for the Trump administration that is also recognizing
[46:03] administration that is also recognizing Russia's uh territorial claims over
[46:07] Russia's uh territorial claims over Ukraine. But but there are other stakes
[46:09] Ukraine. But but there are other stakes involved which might tilt the table so
[46:12] involved which might tilt the table so to say. But I think the Saudis will be
[46:15] to say. But I think the Saudis will be certainly very keen to follow the
[46:17] certainly very keen to follow the Israelis um and so on. And in one way,
[46:22] Israelis um and so on. And in one way, yes, it might because US is
[46:27] yes, it might because US is is an ally with both Egypt, Israel and
[46:30] is an ally with both Egypt, Israel and Saudi.
[46:32] Saudi. Uh and as such then
[46:36] Uh and as such then can potentially
[46:38] can potentially stabilize the Red Sea if they bring
[46:43] stabilize the Red Sea if they bring Isayas on board to a more um to a more
[46:47] Isayas on board to a more um to a more conform or more um predictable regional
[46:51] conform or more um predictable regional policy. But um is it one thing we know
[46:55] policy. But um is it one thing we know that the Horn of Africa never uh uh
[46:59] that the Horn of Africa never uh uh provide any predictability so to say? it
[47:02] provide any predictability so to say? it is always changing alliances and
[47:04] is always changing alliances and allegiances we have seen uh for decades
[47:07] allegiances we have seen uh for decades or desend or centuries for that matter.
[47:10] or desend or centuries for that matter. So I just see it as one
[47:13] So I just see it as one more turn in the wheel of uh of that
[47:17] more turn in the wheel of uh of that play and um uh but again you know to end
[47:21] play and um uh but again you know to end with I I don't think it will happen. I I
[47:24] with I I don't think it will happen. I I realistically I don't think it will be
[47:26] realistically I don't think it will be fulfilled at the level where we um um
[47:31] fulfilled at the level where we um um which the Wall Street Journal exposed so
[47:34] which the Wall Street Journal exposed so to say. I I I think it will end with it
[47:38] to say. I I I think it will end with it will fizzle out and um and um we have to
[47:42] will fizzle out and um and um we have to see then atraa again in the perspective
[47:45] see then atraa again in the perspective they are playing now w versus Ethiopia
[47:48] they are playing now w versus Ethiopia and uh and what they're doing in Sudan
[47:52] and uh and what they're doing in Sudan uh and in alliance with Egypt as the
[47:55] uh and in alliance with Egypt as the main axis here.
[47:57] main axis here. M well um we will leave it at that um
[48:00] M well um we will leave it at that um shut because you have to leave but um
[48:03] shut because you have to leave but um the issue of the um horn of Africa will
[48:05] the issue of the um horn of Africa will always remain interesting so we will try
[48:06] always remain interesting so we will try to have you on soon but also because you
[48:09] to have you on soon but also because you have um I think you have um interesting
[48:11] have um I think you have um interesting and um useful things to say about the
[48:14] and um useful things to say about the protori agreement. So if it's not
[48:16] protori agreement. So if it's not completely dead maybe it's something
[48:17] completely dead maybe it's something that we should talk about as well
[48:18] that we should talk about as well another time. Um but um for today
[48:25] Talk for
[48:27] Talk for head up.

Eritrea–United States relations| Red sea politics | Ethiopia--Eritrea tension | Pretoria Agreement

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHRc8EtM2H0

Summary

TL;DR — Reports suggest the US is seeking to improve relations with Eritrea, a move influenced by geopolitical interests in the Red Sea and competition with other global powers. However, significant obstacles exist, including Eritrea's long-standing adversarial stance towards the US and complex regional dynamics involving Ethiopia and Egypt.

Key points

• The US is reportedly engaging with Eritrea to foster better bilateral relations, with meetings held between officials from both countries.

• A primary driver for US interest is securing the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, crucial for global trade and security, with Eritrea's ports potentially playing a key role.

• Geopolitical competition, including Russia's presence in the region and China's interests, also motivates US engagement to maintain influence.

• Egypt is a key facilitator in these discussions, with its own strategic interests in regional stability and influencing Ethiopia's actions regarding the Nile River and Red Sea access.

• Significant challenges to rapprochement include Eritrea's historical narrative portraying the US as an enemy and Ethiopia's strategic importance to the US, complicating any potential shift in alliances.

• The failure to implement the Pretoria Agreement between Ethiopia and the TPLF is seen as a major factor contributing to current regional instability and new alliances.

Takeaway — While the US seeks to improve ties with Eritrea for strategic Red Sea interests, deep-seated historical animosities, complex regional rivalries, and the unresolved Ethiopian conflict present formidable barriers to any substantial rapprochement.